Middle East oil pumping stations and military air bases

Tiyas Air Base, also known as T-4, located east of Hims, Syria© Google Earth

Over the last year, there have been a series of confrontations between the Israelis on one side, and the Iranians and their Syrian allies on the other, at an airbase in western Syria. The air base is located between the Syrian cities of Hims (Homs) and Tadmur (Palmyra). The base has been identified as both Tiyas, and as T-4, depending on the media outlet doing the reporting.

In the above image, the Arabic descriptions give both names. Which is correct? Actually, both are.

The name Tiyas comes from the name of the closest village. It is customary in the Syrian Air Force to name bases and installations for the nearest city, town, or village. However, the base is not just close to the village of Tiyas, it is also close to the location of an oil pumping station in Tiyas designated as T-4. The T-4 designator goes back to the early days of oil exploration and transport in Iraq as far back as the 1930s.

This map shows the oil pipelines used to move oil from the Kirkuk oilfields in Iraq to Mediterranean ports - Haifa, (now in Israel but then in British-mandated Palestine) and Tarablus al-Sham (Tripoli, in French-mandated Lebanon).

The K-prefix indicates pumping stations on the Kirkuk pipeline, which transported the oil from Kirkuk to a station near the city of al-Hadithah. At Hadithah, the oil was routed into the Tripoli triple pipeline or the Haifa double pipeline. Pumping stations on the Tripoli pipeline are designated with a T prefix, while the Haifa pipeline stations are designated with an H prefix.

Not only were the pipelines accessible by the series of roads paralleling the lines, the Iraq Petroleum Company constructed private airstrips to move men, supplies, parts, etc. between stations and facilities. Many of the airstrips still exist in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan. Many of them were converted into civil airports, some into military air bases, and some into shared civil/military facilities. K-1, K-3, T-3, T-4, H-2, H-3, H-5 all were/are major air bases. The current T-4 air base is about four miles west of the original Iraq Petroleum Company airstrip.

Tiyas was the location of the fourth pumping station on the al-Hadithah-Tripoli pipeline. There are three such stations in Syria, all in use today. T-2 is located just inside the Syrian border near the city of Albu Kamal, the site of a large Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) base populated by both IRGC personnel as well as Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi'a militia groups.

The station at T-3 is now the shared military air base and civilian airport in the city of Tadmur (also known as Palmyra, site of ancient Aramean, Arabic, and Roman ruins).

The air base at T-4 is used by not only the Syrian Air Force, but by Russian forces in Syria, and elements of the IRGC. Having been there a few times, I can vouch for the description as being "in the middle of nowhere."

Note: Given the political situation following the 1948 creation of Israel, and later political turmoil in both Syria and Lebanon, the Iraqis constructed an alternate pipeline from al-Hadithah to Faysh Khabur on the Turkish border, then west to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. It is still in use today.




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A ceasefire in southwest Syria - genesis of a Trump Administration policy on Syria?

Southwest Syria

The United States and Russia have agreed to a ceasefire in southwest Syria which will take effect at noon on July 9. Jordan and Israel are also parties to the agreement. No additional details were released.

Any ceasefire in Syria is welcome, even a limited one such as this. Southwest Syria has been the scene of ongoing three-way fighting for months. The combatants are the Syrian Army supported by Iranian and Hizballah forces, an Islamist group who has declared itself part of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and opposition elements of the Free Syrian Army (FSA).

On several occasions, artillery shells fired from Syria have struck Israeli positions in the occupied Golan Heights. The Israelis have responded with artillery fire and air strikes against Syrian military and/or ISIS positions in retaliation.

Israel is concerned with the deployment of Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) forces and Hizballah fighters opposite the Golan Heights. News reports have shown Iranian and Hizballah flags visible from the Israeli side of the United Nations zone that separates the Israeli-occupied Golan from Syria. Iranian officials have claimed this IRGC deployment will be a permanent garrison opposite Israeli positions.

Syrian Air Force fighter-bombers have attacked FSA targets across the border in Jordan, although the Syrians claim the attack was the result of pilot error. Both Israel and Jordan are concerned about being drawn further into the six-year old Syrian civil war.

Ceasefires in Syria do not have a history of success, and I doubt this one will be an different. ISIS is not a party to this agreement and could be the spoiler. It may hold in the city of Dara' where the combatants are the regime and the FSA.

That said, the important point is that the United States and Russia are talking to each other directly about potential solutions in Syria.

The willingness of the United States to engage with the Russians over Syria may indicate the genesis of a long-awaited Trump Administration policy on Syria.

Despite all of the political posturing by other regional powers - Turkey, Iran, Iraq and even the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Asad - the main interlocutors for a solution to the civil war in Syria will be the United States and the Russian Federation.

It is high time that these two major powers came to terms with the fact that any solution in Syria is going to require American and Russian cooperation and leadership. Perhaps this is the start of that effort.

One can hope.

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The UAE Air Force returns to the skies over Syria

UAE Air Force F-16 Desert Falcons

One of the key Arab allies in the U.S.-led coalition formed to fight the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is the United Arab Emirates (UAE). UAE Air Force (UAEAF) F-16 "Desert Falcons" were among the first aircraft involved in the coalition airstrikes on Syria beginning in September 2014. The UAEAF flies one of the later versions of the venerable fourth-generation Lockheed Martin (originally General Dynamics) F-16.

On December 24, a Royal Jordanian Air Force (RJAF) F-16 crashed during an airstrike on a target in al-Raqqah, Syria, the self-proclaimed capital of ISIS's "Islamic State." The pilot was captured almost immediately, and was later brutally murdered. (See Downing of a Jordanian fighter aircraft and ISIS capture of the pilot, and The death of Lieutenant Mu'az al-Kasasbah - some thoughts.)

After the loss of the aircraft and the capture of the pilot, the Arab members of the coalition, including the UAE, ceased flight operations over Syria, leaving only the United States to conduct airstrikes in the country. UAE military officials complained that U.S. Air Force combat search and rescue (CSAR) forces were based in Kuwait, too far from the potential shootdown areas to be of use.

After the murder of the Jordanian pilot, Lieutenant Mu'az al-Kasasbah, the Jordanians reversed their moratorium on participation in coalition airstrikes and resumed operations against ISIS at an increased level. The U.S. Air Force repositioned its CSAR assets to a base in northern Iraq, and the UAE announced the deployment of a squadron of F-16 fighters to a Jordanian air base and the resumption of airstrikes in Syria. It was a welcome decision - both the RJAF and UAEAF are professional organizations.

Some background on the UAEAF.

I served as the acting Defense Attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi, UAE in the early 1990s - a short detour on my way to my real position as the Air Attaché at the American Embassy in Damascus, Syria. While in Abu Dhabi, I had several meetings with the UAE Minister of Defense, Shaykh Muhammad bin Rashid Al Maktum ("call me Shaykh Mo"). He is now the Vice President and Prime Minister of the UAE, the constitutional monarch of Dubai, and still the Minister of Defense.

At the time when I was meeting with "Shaykh Mo," many defense contractors from a variety of nations - particularly the United States, United Kingdom and France - were trying to sell weapons to the Emirates. The weapons ran the gamut from fighter aircraft, main battle tanks, surface to air missiles, frigates, coastal defense systems, reconnaissance platforms - you name it, there was someone there trying to sell it to the Emirates armed forces. The recent successes of many of the systems in Operation Desert Storm was a key selling point.

In one of our meetings, the shaykh/minister mentioned that he was besieged with sales representatives and security assistance officers (that is military-speak for an officer who is theoretically advising on security needs, but is in reality an arms salesman for his country's defense contractors). I suggested he determine potential threats to the Emirates, formulate a defense strategy, then buy the weapons and systems that supported that strategy. At the time, he had hired a consultant to help him develop that strategy - I told him he didn't need a consultant.

The shaykh was intrigued by what I thought was a pretty simple analysis. He asked if I could come back and discuss this further - of course, I agreed. We met over dinner and began a rather informal assessment of the country's needs. I pointed at the map on the wall in his official dining room at the Ministry of Defense and asked who he needed to defend the UAE against. Of course, the obvious and really only threat was, and remains, Iran.

While the UAE may have minor issues with its Arab neighbors - Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Oman - the chances of actually going to war were pretty slim. However, there were major issues with the non-Arab Iranians across the Gulf - including sovereignty claims over a series of islands in the oil-rich areas of the southern Gulf.

I pointed out that given the geography of the UAE and the relations with its Arab neighbors, a ground war was unlikely or impractical. If there was to be a conflict with Iran, it would likely be an air and naval engagement. My recommendation was that the shaykh pursue the creation of a world-class air force and a credible navy, with less emphasis on his land forces.

When the contractors hawking tanks and armored personnel carriers heard of my advice, complaints were lodged with the ambassador and the Army colonel who headed the U.S. Security Assistance Office. The fact that I was right was of no consequence. It was "suggested" that I cease my security assistance advice to the shaykh and stick to being the Defense Attaché. I thought I was, but it seems I was interfering in potential multi-billion dollar contracts.

In any case, the shaykh either took my advice or figured it out for himself and embarked on the creation of one of the best air forces in the Arab world. The backbone of the service are 79 F-16E/F Block 60 fighters (three squadrons) with an additional 25 on order. The pilots are well-trained and routinely exercise with their American counterparts in both the United States and the UAE.

The UAEAF is a potent military force capable of delivering a wide range of precision-guided munitions in virtually all conditions, day or night. It is good to see them back in the skies of Syria taking the fight to ISIS.

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The death of Lieutenant Mu'az al-Kasasbah - some thoughts

By now, virtually everyone with even a passing interest in the Middle East has at least heard of the brutal immolation of Royal Jordanian Air Force (RJAF) pilot 1st Lieutenant Mu'az al-Kasasbah at the hands of the self-described Islamic State (more commonly called the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, or ISIS). Al-Kasasbah's F-16 fighter jet crashed in Syria on December 24, 2014 - there are indications that he was murdered as early as January 3 of this year.

News commentators, political pundits and military analysts (including me) have offered our thoughts on the murder - why did they do it, what did it accomplish, was it a smart propaganda tool for ISIS, will it increase ISIS recruitment, did it violate the tenets of Islam, etc.

Here are a few initial thoughts and conclusions.

Let's address the gruesome murder of Lt al-Kasasbah. I watched the video (I believe it is part of my professional obligation) and cannot remember feeling this much revulsion at the death of another human, a fellow airman and officer - and I survived an improvised explosive device (IED) attack which resulted in a scene of sickening carnage.

By way of disclosure, I served as an adviser to the Jordan Armed Forces - my colleagues included several RJAF officers - I feel a sense of kinship with my Jordanian brothers in arms. I make a living analyzing events and either writing about them or talking about them on the air, but it is hard to find the words to describe the feelings this video generated.

The video - obviously almost professionally produced - placed Lt al-Kasasbah in scenes designed to replicate areas subjected to coalition airstrikes. In fact, the man who lit the accelerant which ignited the fire that killed the pilot was identified in the Arabic caption of the video as the leader of a unit who had been bombed by coalition aircraft.

The fact that ISIS chose to make this point is telling. There are many analysts in the media, academia and what I will call "militaria" (we retired officers who analyze wars and combat operations) have been critical of the U.S.-led air operation against ISIS which began in August 2014. Granted, it is hard to accurately assess the effects of the air campaign against ISIS, but overall the evaluation has not been favorable.

Based on U.S. Air Force standards, the campaign is, to be kind, anemic - the sortie counts are mere fractions of the amount we analysts believe is required to deal a decisive blow to ISIS. Although in Iraq the airstrikes may have blunted ISIS's momentum as it advanced down the Tigris River valley towards Baghdad and stopped the group's moves towards the Kurdish area, the terrorist organization still manages to hold territory and launch new attacks - the oil-rich city of Kirkuk is now in their sights.

That said, American and allied fighter and bomber aircraft have dealt a blow to ISIS. I would be remiss if I did not distinguish between coalition air operations over Iraq and those over Syria. While there are many nations who have committed aircraft to military operations over Iraq, very few have agreed to allow their pilots to operate over Syria.

Only the United States and a handful of Arab countries - Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar - agreed to attack targets in Syria. This arrangement may stem from the Iraqi government's unwillingness to have aircraft of countries who are supporting the removal of the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Asad, a government supported by the Shi'a-dominated government of Iraqi Prime Minister Haydar al-'Abadi, operate in its skies. When it comes to the United States, the Iraqis have no choice - they need American airpower.

After the capture of Lt al-Kasasbah, the Arab countries suspended operations, leaving only the United States to conduct airstrikes in Syria, including a large number of sorties aimed at stopping ISIS from overrunning the Syrian-Kurdish town of Kobani on the Turkish border. At least that part of the operation has met with some success - ISIS has been forced to withdraw after suffering heavy losses to American airpower.

One of the objections voiced by the Arab members of the coalition, particularly the United Arab Emirates (UAE), was the long distance of combat search and rescue (CSAR) forces from the target areas. Some analysts believe that had there been CSAR assets staged closer to Syria, there may have been a chance to rescue Lt al-Kasasbah. In reaction to this criticism, the U.S. has moved its CSAR forces into northern Iraq. At the same time, the UAE has deployed an F-16 squadron to a Jordanian air base to cut the flight time to targets in Syria from hours to minutes.

When I think about the brutal method used to murder Lt al-Kasasbah, I believe that ISIS is being battered by the coalition air campaign and is frustrated because there is very little they can do about it. Although it is hard to gauge the effectiveness of the air campaign, it seems to be hurting them.

Another factor of frustration is ISIS's realization too late - almost certainly after they killed the pilot in early January - that they missed an opportunity of having an extremely valuable hostage in their custody. They grossly underestimated the power and influence of the al-Kasasbah family and tribe in Jordan, and the lengths to which the Jordanian monarchy was prepared to go to secure his release.

While I do not think ISIS cared in the least about convicted suicide bomber Sijadah al-Rishawi or al-Qa'idah in Iraq member Ziyad Karbuli, it clearly missed an opportunity to extract concessions from the Jordanian government, publicly embarrass King 'Abdullah and drive a wedge between those in Jordan who did not believe ISIS posed a threat to the kingdom and those who supported the king's affiliation with the coalition.

ISIS miscalculated the regional and international response to the brutal murder of Lt Mu'az al-Kasasbah. It appears that all ISIS has done is galvanized the Jordanian people to support their king in his stepped up participation in airstrikes against ISIS in Syria and brought at least one of the other Arab allies, the UAE, back into the fray.

ISIS has responded by burning alive at least three Iraqis in the western Iraqi governorate of al-Anbar. I think they may have miscalculated again. People who were undecided on how to deal with these brutal psychopaths are beginning to realize that there is only one way to deal with them - hunt them down and kill them.

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Jordan to exchange suicide bomber for its pilot - professional opinion and personal comment

Sajidah al-Rishawi and 1st Lt Mu'az al-Kasasbah

Jordan has agreed to release a convicted suicide bomber to the group calling itself the Islamic State or Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in exchange for the release of a Royal Jordanian Air Force (RJAF) pilot who was captured by ISIS in Syria after his jet went down during a bombing mission near the self-proclaimed ISIS capital of al-Raqqah. That exchange was supposed to take place on the Turkish-Syrian border before sunset on January 29.

That deadline passed as the Jordanians asked for proof that 1st Lt Mu'az al-Kasasbah is still alive. See my earlier article on the December 24, 2014 on the downing of the Jordanian F-16, Downing of a Jordanian fighter aircraft and ISIS capture of the pilot.

Jordan's agreement is a stark reversal of Jordan’s normally hardline refusal to negotiate with terrorists, and could set a precedent for future concessions to terrorist organizations. I understand the position of Jordanian King 'Abdullah II - the Kasabah family is large and influential in the kingdom. The Kasasbahs have been long-time supporters of the Hashemite dynasty that has ruled the country since its founding in the aftermath of World War One.

Before we cast stones at Jordan's seeming acquiescence to ISIS, we should remember that just last year, the United States made a deal with the Taliban in which it released five senior Taliban officials from the detention center in Guantanamo in exchange for U.S. Army Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl, who many believe deserted his post in Afghanistan. See my article on this from June, The Bowe Bergdahl exchange - a mixed blessing.

As I said, I understand King 'Abdullah's position - I can only imagine the pressure he is under from not only the Kasasbah family, but from popular demonstrations in the kingdom against Jordanian involvement in the U.S.-led coalition against ISIS.

While many in the kingdom - those demonstrating for sure - believe that this is not Jordan's fight, most rational thinkers understand that Jordan is probably next on the agenda for ISIS. ISIS fighters have already skirmished with Jordanian army units on the border with Iraq.

A major question is what will Jordan's role be in the coalition after this issue is resolved, one way or the other? If Jordan withdraws from active participation in the coalition - its stance since the loss of the F-16 and capture of Lt. al-Kasasbah - will they still allow coalition access to Jordanian air bases, a key to effective air operations against ISIS in Syria?

In my professional opinion, Jordan is making a mistake in changing its position in dealing with ISIS. That said, I understand why they are willing to do so, although they may regret it later. I was also against the U.S. (read President Obama) decision to release five senior Taliban leaders in exchange for a likely deserter.

Now to my personal comments. I realize that I am supposed to be a Middle East analyst, and a military analyst - I am paid for my professional opinions. However, I am going to diverge here for a few minutes and talk about my personal opinion - please bear with me.

In the mid-1990s, I was an adviser to the Jordan Armed Forces. While many of the details of that assignment remain classified, suffice it to say that I gained a healthy respect for my colleagues in the storied "Arab Legion" (the Jordanian Army) and the RJAF. They are professionals with whom I am proud to have served.

The suicide bomber the Jordanians have agreed to release is Sajidah al-Rishawi. She is originally an Iraqi and was recruited to become a suicide bomber by a Jordanian national who was the head of al-Qa'idah in Iraq (AQI), Abu Musa'ib al-Zarqawi. As we all know, AQI is the forerunner of ISIS. The couple was assigned to detonate explosive vests at the Raddison Hotel in Amman, Jordan. While attempting to do just that on November 9, 2005, her vest failed. Her accomplice/husband pushed her aside and detonated his vest - Sajidah survived.

The attack on the Radisson - where I have spent many nights - was part of a coordinated attack on three Amman hotels frequented by foreigners and wealthy Jordanians. The other attacks took place at the Grand Hyatt and the Days Inn.

It is the attack at the Grand Hyatt - where I have also stayed - that is germane. A suicide bomber named Rawad Jasim Muhammad 'Abid, operating in collaboration with Sajidah al-Rishawi and her husband, detonated his explosive vest, killed seven hotel employees and Syrian-American movie producer Moustapha Akkad (Mustafa al-'Aqad), along with his 34 year-old daughter, Rima.

Moustapha Akkad was born in Aleppo, Syria and emigrated to the United States with his family. He ended up as a Hollywood filmmaker, producing "The Message" and "Lion of the Desert," both starring Anthony Quinn and Irene Pappas. His younger brother Usamah - known to those of us who know him as Sam - ended up as an instructor of the Arabic language at the Defense Language Institute (DLI), located at the Presidio of Monterey, California. I was among Sam's many Arabic language students there and later got to know Sam much better when I served on the faculty of the Arabic department at DLI in the late 1970s.

In 2005, I called Sam and offered my condolences, but what really can you say? We have had numerous conversations since then on the current state of affairs in the region. Until today Sajidah al-Rishawi, one member of the conspiracy that ended with Sam's brother's death, was in custody and sentenced by a Jordanian military court to death by hanging and remained on death row.

I get the Jordanian government's decision to exchange her for their pilot. I almost understand (but still disagree with) the Obama Administration's agreement to release five senior Taliban officials for a likely deserter.

I get it, but I don't like it - it's personal.

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Downing of a Jordanian fighter aircraft and ISIS capture of the pilot

Caption: Urgent / Jordanian 1st lieutenant pilot Ma'az after
his aircraft was downed by an infrared [guided] missile

The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) claims to have downed a Royal Jordanian Air Force F-16 with an infrared guided missile (sarukh harari) today. The aircraft was conducting airstrikes on targets 11 kilometers east of the self-proclaimed ISIS capital city of al-Raqqah. ISIS has published photographs of the pilot being taken into custody - one is shown above. Arabic language media has identified the pilot as 27-year old 1st Lieutenant Ma'az Safi Yusif al-Kasasbah.

The RJAF has acknowledged the loss of the aircraft and the capture of the pilot, and is holding ISIS responsible for the safety of the pilot. The family of the flier has also confirmed that the pictures posted by ISIS on social media indeed show Ma'az al-Kasasbah, and that he is a pilot in the Jordanian air force. It is not clear if the aircraft was shot down or was lost due to a problem with the aircraft.

ISIS is in possession of hundreds of Russian-made and Chinese-made shoulder-fired infrared-guided missiles that the Islamist group has seized from both Syrian and Iraqi army units, as well as the Free Syrian Army. The missiles are capable of downing low-flying aircraft, including fighter aircraft. The Syrian air force has lost numerous helicopters and fixed wing aircraft to such missiles. The F-16 - which is flown by several countries who are members of the coalition, including the U.S. Air Force - is equipped with heat flares to defeat these systems, but they are not foolproof.

Today's loss of an aircraft - whether a shootdown or not - highlights the danger coalition pilots face every day, especially over Syria and near the ISIS stronghold of al-Raqqah. This danger is complicated by the fact that the Syrian Air Force is also conducting airstrikes in and around al-Raqqah. ISIS has concentrated much of its air defense weaponry near al-Raqqah. The risk of such events cannot be ignored.

ISIS now has a trophy - a coalition pilot, in this case an Arab and a Muslim. This creates a serious situation for the coalition, especially the Jordanians. The question is whether ISIS will use the pilot for potential leverage against the Hashemite Kingdom, or murder him in a grisly manner and publish the event on social media. ISIS has beheaded at least three Americans and several other nationalities in the recent past. An indication of how he might be treated is the description in Arabic, al-tiyar al-urduni al-murtad - "the apostate Jordanian pilot." Under Islamic law, apostasy is punishable by death.

Captured Arab military personnel - both Syrian and Iraqi - have been summarily murdered, often beheaded and the videos of the murders posted online. Given the location of the pilot's capture - deep in the heart of ISIS's territory, the chances of a successful rescue are extremely small. The next move is up to ISIS.

The Jordanians are a small country and will rally around their pilot and his family. In that vein, there have been at least seven Arabic-language Facebook community pages set up in solidarity with the captured pilot with more than 25,000 followers.

(Personal note: In the 1980's, I served as an adviser to the Jordanian Armed Forces. Some of the officers I worked with were RJAF pilots - fine officers. I have always felt a kinship with the Jordanian military and remain in touch with several of them. I am joining the "We are all Ma'az al-Kasasbah" community page.)

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ISIS map indicates intentions in the Levant

This is a map ostensibly published by the Islamic State in Iraq and [Greater] Syria (ISIS) - it is chilling.

Here is the legend:

- The black flags and grey/black circles indicate areas ISIS claims to have under its control
- The red circles indicate areas where fighting is going on
- The black rings on the borders are border crossings under their control
- The capital of the new Islamic State is indicated as Baghdad
- The lines of march in grey to the south indicate planned advances into Jordan and Saudi Arabia, which has been renamed "Land of the Two Holy Places" - once you remove the ruling family, the House of Sa'ud, it is no longer "Sa'udi" Arabia

Several cities in Syria that have come under ISIS control have been renamed as well. For example, Dayr al-Zawr, a city in the oil producing region on the Euphrates River is know called al-Khayr.

It would appear that ISIS wants to control the entire Levant....

Read this in conjunction with my earlier article: URGENT - ISIS seizes almost all Iraq-Syrian-Jordanian border crossings.

URGENT - ISIS seizes almost all Iraq-Syrian-Jordanian border crossings

In just the last few days, fighters of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have seized a series of Iraqi cities from Mosul in the north to cities as close as 35 miles from Baghdad. They have also consolidated their gains by taking a series of towns in al-Anbar province - most of these are in the Euphrates Valley.

They have also moved in the opposite direction, to the southwest, taking the city of al-Rutbah (A on the map), which sits at the junction of the main highways from Baghdad to Damascus, Syria and Amman, Jordan. Immediately afterwards, they moved to the borders and seized the border posts. This positions ISIS to basically cut off Iraq from both Syria and Jordan.

Let's take a look at what this means from a military standpoint.

The first border crossing (#1) near Jabal Juraybah was key to the ISIS advance on Mosul. Soon after that, ISIS forces seized the border crossing at Albu Kamal/al-Qa'im (#2), the main route into al-Anbar province. In just the past few days, they have moved from the junction at al-Rutbah to the border crossing on the Syrian border at al-Walid (#3) and the border crossing on the Jordanian border at al-Turaybil (#4).

Controlling these border crossings is a smart move on the part of ISIS. Someone in that organization has attended war college - I suspect this expertise is coming from former senior Iraqi army officers who have joined the ISIS cause.

As a result, ISIS can now:

- prevent overland support from the government of Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to his embattled ally in Damascus, Syrian President Bashar al-Asad.
- position forces for a possible attack into Syria that expands ISIS's presence from the north to areas east of Damascus.
- stopped overland traffic - both commercial and a possible evacuation route for foreigners in Iraq - between Iraq and Jordan.
- position forces to mount an incursion into Jordan. ISIS has threatened to move into Jordan and "slaughter" the Hashemite royal family.

There have been reports, seemingly corroborated by American defense officials, that Syrian fighter aircraft have struck targets inside Iraq near these border posts in an attempt to prevent these border crossings from coming under ISIS control. The Syrian military public affairs office acknowledged the reports of the air strikes, indicating the location of the alleged targets, but refused to confirm or deny the veracity of the reports.

ISIS has pretty much a free hand in western Iraq - it appears that the Iraqi military has ceded control of the area to ISIS and is planning on defending Baghdad. What we do not want is the acceptance/acquiescence by the Iraqi government of the presence of ISIS on their soil. The status quo is unacceptable.

A new landscape in the Middle East

Egyptians demanding the removal of Husni Mubarak

It is a troubling time for America's allies and friends in the Middle East. It had an unlikely start in Tunisia, normally not considered a hotbed of instability, with what journalists have titled "the Jasmine Revolution" in which President Zayn al-'Abidayn bin 'Ali was forced from office. Bin 'Ali had served for over 20 years and if not a staunch ally of the United States, certainly was not anti-American.

Relations between Tunisia and the United States were warm. Tunisian officers routinely attended American military training schools, and Tunis is home to the U.S. State Department's Arabic language field school. Many of my fellow military Arabists attended school there. Although there were indications of a growing Islamist movement based on high unemployment among the nation's large youth population, no one expected the intensity of the protests that brought down the bin 'Ali government. When a new president is elected, it is likely that relations with the United States will be correct, but not improved. Like in many instances, the United States is viewed as allowing autocratic rulers to remain in power as long as they resist a move toward radical Islamic governments.

At the same time as Tunisians were taking to the streets, a crisis erupted in another of America's allies in the Middle East, this time in Lebanon. The government of Rifaq al-Hariri was brought down by the resignation of 11 Hizballah and Hizballah-allied cabinet ministers.

On January 24, the alliance that brought down the government of now former Prime Minister Sa'ad al-Hariri nominated Najib Miqati as prime minister. The nomination was confirmed by the Parliament, and Lebanese President Mishal Sulayman had no choice but to ask Hizballah-backed Miqati to form a new government. As that process develops, you can be sure that the Iranian and Syrian influenced government that emerges will have a much different outlook on relations with the United States.

Egypt, of course, with the largest population of the Arab world and arguably its cultural center, is of major concern to the United States for a host of reasons. The 32-year old peace treaty between Egypt and Israel (also known as the Camp David Accords of 1978) has been one of the cornerstones of American foreign policy in the region. The Egyptian government of Husni Mubarak has become a staunch ally of the United States, growing even closer to Washington than the government of Mubarak's assassinated predecessor Anwar al-Sadat.

The relationship between Egypt and the United States is close and complex. The American Embassy in Cairo is one of the largest in the world with well over 1000 employees assigned. The 13-story building is easily seen from almost anywhere in Cairo, including the pyramids on the Giza plateau. It is a symbol of the importance of Egypt to our policy in the region, and to Egypt's importance in the Arab world in general.

Egyptian officers attend numerous military training course in the United States, and American officers routinely attend Egyptian staff colleges. Egypt receives more foreign aid than any other country except Israel, totalling up to $50 billion since 1978. Last year alone Egypt received around $1.3 billion in military aid plus $250 million in civilian assistance. The primary fighter aircraft of the Egyptian air force are 220 F-16 Fighting Falcons, and the primary main battle tank of the Egyptian army is the American-designed M1 Abrams built under license in Egypt. Should there ever be another war inthe Middle East, Egypt may well be the deciding factor. The adage among Middle East specialists has always been, "No war without Egypt, no peace without Syria."

American and Egyptian armed forces have conducted large-scale exercises for decades. These exercises paved the way for Egypt to send a 35,000 man force to fight alongside American troops in the Gulf War in 1990-91, making its contribution the third largest of all countries. Ten Egyptian soldiers died in combat in Kuwait.

The U.S.-Egyptian relationship is critical to our policy in the region. It ranks up there with our relationships with Israel and Saudi Arabia. A serious disruption in that relationship, for example should an Islamist government emerge in Cairo, would be a serious setback. The peace process as we know it would end. The concern over the relationship is also being felt in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.

There have also been demonstrations in Jordan and Yemen, both American allies. The relationship with Jordan is also long and deep, with extensive intelligence and military cooperation. King 'Abdullah appears to still have the support of the population, but there is a desire for more input into the political process, especially among younger Jordanians. The king fired the prime minister and appointed a replacement. The replacement was soundly rejected by many of those demanding change. The king will likely make accommodations, after all, that is how Jordan's ruling family has survived.

Yemen, what I call a "nominal" American ally, faces a bigger challenge. Yemen has a violent history and tradition; guns are often the means of conflict resolution. Yemen's importance has grown in recent years as the southern Arabian peninsula has become a battleground for Islamic fundamentalists, specifically al-Qa'idah in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

Yemeni President 'Ali 'Abdullah Salih has already committed to not seek re-election in 2013, but this may not be enough for those calling for political reform. Yemen is home to American-born cleric Anwar al-'Awlaqi, who is complicit in the Fort Hood shootings, the attempted bombing of a Detroit-bound airliner and attempted sabotage of aircraft with bombs secreted in printer cartridges. Removal of a friendly government in Yemen will not bode well for the war on terror.

I will forgo comment on Syria, since there is no way to construe it as either an American ally or even friendly to the United States. Given Syria's track record on handling internal protest and dissent, I am doubtful that there will be meaningful demonstration-driven change in the country.

While change in Syria might actually be a good thing for American foreign policy, the other potential changes are not. Loss of Egypt as an ally could be catastrophic for our efforts in the Middle East. The loss of Tunisia, possibly Algeria, Lebanon (which I believe is already gone), Jordan and Yemen would be of great concern.

It is impossible to predict with any certainly the outcome of the current unrest in the Middle East. Anyone who attempts predictions is merely speculating. That said, the landscape when the dust finally settles will be markedly different than it was just a month ago at the end of 2010. It may not be to our liking, and we shoud be prepared for that eventuality.

Rocket hits Jordan - whodunit?

Earlier today, a Katyusha rocket landed in the duty-free commercial zone of the port city of al-'Aqabah, Jordan. A second rocket landed in the Gulf of 'Aqabah near the Israel border town of Eilat. The obvious question is, who did it?

It might be easier to start with who didn't do it. The Jordanians claim that the rocket was not launched from Jordanian territory. If it had been, of course, there are Palestinian groups that operate in Jordan and could have fired the rocket. Given the inherent inaccuracy of the Grad/Katyusha rocket, it is conceivable that a rocket fired by a Palestinian group at Israel could have landed in al-'Aqabah, but the Jordanians are pretty reliable. If they say the rocket was not fired from their territory, it is most likely true. In the past, they have been forthcoming about attacks against Israel emanating from inside the small kingdom, including a 2005 rocket attack similar to this incident.

Looking around the area at other groups that use these type of rockets: Hizballah is in southern Lebanon, too far away. Hamas and most of Islamic Jihad is in the Gaza Strip, also too far to the north. I seriously doubt that any of the Fatah-related groups in the West Bank would be able to get far enough south from the West Bank into Israel proper to fire a rocket that landed in al-'Aqabah.

Let's look at where the rocket must have been launched from to impact in the northern part of the Jordanian port. Given the relatively short ranges of the Grad/Katyusha family of rockets (10 miles to 25 miles for the newest variants), if the rocket was not fired from Israel or Jordan, it had to come from either Saudi Arabia or Egypt - both are close enough. The Saudi border is less than ten miles from al-'Aqabah, but I have been to this area of Saudi Arabia. The chance of someone armed with a Katyusha getting that close to the Jordanian border seems remote to me.

That leaves Egypt, which I suspect is the actual launch location of the rockets. The east coast of the Sinai peninsula - part of Egypt - is on the Gulf of 'Aqabah, and that area has been the venue of attacks launched at Israel before. Yes, Israel - I seriously doubt that the Jordanian side of the border was the intended target.

The rockets, easily launched with as little as a makeshift stand and a car battery, missed their target and impacted across the border in al-Aqabah. The two port cities are side by side, separated only by a line on a map.

As to who actually did it, we may never know. If I had to make a judgment based on the scant information available, I would say that some group with enmity towards Israel - as we all know, there are a host of them - launched two rockets at Eilat, Israel. They missed and hit al-'Aqabah Jordan.

Did the President really say Al-Qa'idah is "hunkered down?"

In his address to the nation today, President Obama attempted to explain his intelligence and security agencies' compound failures surrounding the Christmas Day failed attack on an airliner flying to the United States.

For the most part, the rhetoric was about what you would expect - order a review, hold people accountable, buck stops here, things will change - the usual words.

What struck me was his description of al-Qa'idah as being "hunkered down" because of his policies. How can he possibly use those words to describe the organization that on December 30 mounted one of the most lethal attacks in on his intelligence service in recent memory?

From "hiding in caves" along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, al-Qa'idah was able to penetrate a covert CIA operation and kill seven of its officers, as well as kill a Jordanian intelligence officer working with the agency. It was a successful operation, one that should indicate that al-Qa'idah is still a capable enemy not to be discounted.

The story of the operation in Afghanistan has been covered fairly well in the media. The Jordanian intelligence services, close partners with their counterpart American services, are extremely professional organizations. The Jordanian effort to penetrate al-Qa'idah was laudable, but flawed. In my past dealings with the Jordanian services, my one (and only) complaint is their use of coercion to effect the recruitment of an asset.

That tactic appears to have happened here as well. According to the family of the Jordanian militant who was "turned" or "doubled" to work against al-Qa'idah was forced by Jordanian intelligence into that decision. At some point in the operation, the asset reverted to his fundamentalist roots and agreed to mount an operation against the Jordanian intelligence officer, and at the same time kill as many CIA officers as possible.

The media has highlighted the fact that the asset passed through security checkpoints and was able to get close to a host of CIA officers during the fatal meeting. It was described as a breach of security. In the CIA officers' defense, this is generally how these things happen. You try to bring a trusted asset into a safe area as quickly and quietly as possible to debrief him for intelligence, task the asset for further collection, and genrally manage the operation. I am a bit surprised at the number of officers present for the meeting. Most of the time, you would expose the asset to the minimum number of officers absolutely necessary for operational security reasons.

The operation against the CIA base in Khost demonstrates real operational skills. It was likely mounted in retaliation for the Obama Administration's escalated unmanned aerial vehicle attacks on targets in Pakistan. Al-Qa'idah was able to identify a target, recruit an asset that had access to that target, and then execute a lethal operation that killed eight of the enemy's key intelligence officers.

All that while "hunkered down?" That characterization is an insult to the memories of our fallen and the fallen officer of a close ally. Do not underestimate this enemy.

Jordan loses a soldier in Afghanistan

The Jordanian government surprisingly acknowledged today that a Jordanian military officer had been killed in Afghanistan. This is the first official confirmation that Jordan has sent members of its armed forces to Afghanistan. The soldier, Captain 'Ali bin Zayd, was killed on Wednesday. There were no other details of what the captain was doing in the country, nor of the circumstances of his death other than the official announcement that he died "as a martyr while performing the sacred duty of the Jordanian forces in Afghanistan."

Given the timing of the death - the same day that seven CIA officers were killed in an attack on the Agency base in Khowst province - it is very likely that the captain was participating in a CIA operation.

This would not be uncommon. The United States intelligence community has had long and strong ties connections with the Jordanian intelligence services, both military and civilian. The Jordanians bring to the table skills that are in short supply in our intelligence agencies - local language skills, area knowledge, ability to operate undetected in Middle East populations, etc. I have often worked with both the Jordan's Directorate of Military Intelligence and the General Intelligence Directorate. Their officers are skilled professionals and I would work them again with no hesitation whatsoever.

The cooperation of the Jordanians - and this would have to have been approved by King 'Abdullah II himself - is a testament to the unheralded alliance between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the United States. With the notable, but not overly surprising, support of Iraq by King Husayn following Saddam's invasion of Kuwait, the relationship between the two countries has been close for at least three decades. Assisting the Americans in Afghanistan is a continuation of the that relationship - and a welcome one.

Jordan's assistance has usually been kept very quiet, especially in Jordan. King 'Abdullah II walks a fine line in the region. There is a large population of Palestinians, many of whom are, or are the children of, refugees from the wars with Israel since Israel became a state in 1948. There has been a steady growth in Islamic fundamentalism in the kingdom as well. If a poll was taken in Jordan about the relationship between the kingdom and the United States, I suspect that the numbers in support would be low, however, among the military and professional ranks, support would be higher.

The Jordanians have supported us, often at the expense of their relationships with other countries in the region, especially among their Arab brothers. In this case, one of their officers gave his life in a fight that many might consider not his own. We should give a nod of gratitude to our allies in the Hashemite Kingdom.

Pakistan singled out for special treatment?

This article appeared on MSNBC.com

Pakistan singled out for special treatment?
Francona: The U.S. fails to demand the same reforms in other countries

COMMENTARY
By Lt. Col. Rick Francona
Military analyst
MSNBC


In the aftermath of President Pervez Musharraf’s suspension of Pakistan’s constitution, there have been calls for re-evaluation of the relationship between Washington and Islamabad. There have also been threats that the United States might suspend aid to the Pakistani military, most of it intended to assist in their fight against terrorism, specifically al-Qaida and the Taliban. That assistance is estimated to be about $140 million dollars per month.

One of the basic tenets of many American administrations, including that of George Bush, is to support democratic reform around the world. In recent months, the administration has pressured Musharraf to make changes it believes are retarding progress to democracy: step down as army chief, enter a power-sharing arrangement with former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and hold free elections.

That appeared to be on track until the recent spate of violence in the country, causing Musharraf to suspend the constitution. After the announcement of the state of emergency on Nov. 3, there have been repeated demands made of Musharraf to reconsider his actions and not delay the elections scheduled for January. The situation in the nuclear-armed country has prompted visits from concerned senior U.S. officials, including Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte.

I find it interesting that the United States has singled out Pakistan to be denounced for its slow progress towards democracy, while all but ignoring the abysmal human rights records of its other allies — kingdoms and theocracies that make no pretense of being representative governments. Is there a double standard for different allies?

Several states in the region come to mind: the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Emirate of Qatar, the State of Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. These countries are long-time allies of the United Sates, yet not one is a representative democracy. Granted, some have low level elections for positions like municipal offices, but in none of these countries does the population have real input to national level decisionmaking and there is no true electorate.

All of the countries above provide some sort of support to the U.S. military, such as basing rights, overflight permission, use of logistics facilities, pre-positioning of military equipment, etc. They all enjoy another important distinction: they are customers of large American defense contractors. These countries buy large quantities of expensive military hardware and are not recipients of American aid because they don’t need it.

Let’s take another example, a country more analogous to Pakistan. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is an American ally. It has been a strong ally in the Middle East for years with the notable exception of Jordan’s support of Saddam Hussein following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Jordan is not a wealthy country and cannot afford to buy American military equipment on its own. Over the years the kingdom has received billions of dollars of American economic and military assistance in return for desert training opportunities and intelligence sharing.

Despite some moves toward a more representative assembly, Jordan is not a democracy and the ultimate authority remains the king. Yet I don’t recall the United States dispatching John Negroponte to Jordan to push for free elections and democratic reforms. I have not seen any past or current American administration apply real pressure on any of our Gulf Arab allies to hold elections and step down as monarchs.

Why not? Could it be that these autocratic regimes are spending huge amounts of money on expensive American weapons? Maybe, but what about Jordan? Jordan, like Pakistan, receives American aid. Pakistan must become a democracy, but Jordan does not?

Bottom line: If you are an autocratic state spending huge amounts of money on American weapons and allowing U.S. forces to use your territory, you get a pass. If you are Pakistan, receiving billions in American assistance, you need to be moving toward democracy unless you fall into some undefined category like Jordan.

Why don’t we treat Pakistan like Jordan? This sounds like a double standard to me.

© 2007 MSNBC Interactive

Quoted about al-Qa'idah

NBC Investigative Producer Bob Windrem has written an excellent article, What's next for refocused al-Qaida 3.0?. It's a well-researched piece, as usual for Bob, and is a good read - not because he quotes me, but because he looks at all sides of the issue.

Recommended reading!

Do the Shi'a Iraqis want a civil war?

This is a follow-on to my earlier article, "Another step toward civil war in Iraq?

It almost seems to me that the Iraqi Shi'a want a civil war.

On May 10, a majority of members of the Iraqi parliament signed on to draft legislation that calls for a timetable for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the country. The legislation was crafted by members of the Sadrist bloc, the group loyal to rabid anti-American cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. This comes just a few days after Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi threatened to pull his Sunni Arab bloc out of the Iraq coalition government if changes are not made to the Iraqi constitution.

This legislation is just a draft, but the fact that 144 of 275 members (mostly Shi'a) agreed to debate the issue indicates that they believe they can secure the country on their own. What it really says is they think that once the Americans are gone, they can exercise their majority to create whatever laws they wish, or more specifically not pass laws sharing oil revenues with the entire population. This is exactly what the vice president fears - that the Shi'a will create an autonomous region similar to what the Kurds have done in the north, and attempt to reserve control of the oil revenues to that autonomous zone. Since the Sunnis live in areas where there is little if any oil, they stand to lose not only politically, but economically as well.

In the absence of American troops to stop them, the Shi'a-dominated government can unleash the Shi'a-dominated army and security forces to crush Sunni resistance with little regard for human rights. Al-Sadr's jaysh al-mahdi (Mahdi Army) will be able to resume its "death squad" tactics against the Sunnis who dare to remain in Baghdad.

The two threats - withdrawal of the Sunni bloc from the government and the Shi'a legislation calling for a withdrawal of American troops - are a recipe for all-out civil war between the Arab Iraqis, Sunni versus Shi'a. Not only will the Kurds watch and wait from the relative safety of their autonomous region, they will consolidate their hold on Kirkuk, a contested oil-rich city home to Kurds, Turkomans and Sunni Arabs.

Should this degenerate into an all-out civil war, the Sunni Arabs will unite against the Shi'a - they will have no choice if they wish to survive. If they do survive, however, that alliance will be short-lived - it is not a monolithic group. There are the foreigners (mostly in the al-Qa'idah in Iraq group, the Iraqi Wahhabis, Iraqi jihadists, the secular Ba'this, and the tribes. At some point that alliance will fracture. We are seeing some of that now with the Anbar Salvation Front going after the foreign elements in the insurgency.

What about the regional players - Iran, Syria, Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, etc.?

If the Sunnis are about to be defeated, that may force the Saudis, Jordanians, Egyptians and maybe even the Turks to intervene on behalf of their Sunni brethren. The Syrians won't intervene to support the Sunnis. The al-Asad regime in Damascus is not Sunni (although many do not consider al-Asad's 'Alawi sect to be true Shi'a either), however the main reason they will not help the Sunnis is their alliance with Iran. The Syrians have been close allies of Iran since 1980, and supported Iran in the eight-year Iran-Iraq war. The two countries have a defense pact which was renewed in 2006.

A civil war in Iraq will likely drag in the regional players and may lead to the breakup of the country. There may be no way to avoid it. Think Yugoslavia.

"Iraq for Land" - This might work, except...

An edited version of this article appeared on the MSNBC Hardball Hardblogger.

As the United States attempts to create the conditions that will allow it to withdraw its forces from Iraq, Iraq's Arab neighbors are worried about what happens when - and how - American forces depart. With Iranian influence and power on the rise and an escalating civil war in Iraq, the Arab countries are understandably concerned.

Those concerns are particularly acute in Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. With the exception of Bahrain, all of these countries have a Sunni majority. They are rightfully concerned with the future of an Iraq ruled by a Shi'a-dominated government with close ties to the Shi'a regime in Tehran. In an effort to ensure that the post-American period in Iraq is not chaotic and detrimental to their own internal stability, several of the Arab governments have committed to help stabilize the situation in Iraq. In return they expect the United States to restart peace talks between Israel on one side and Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinians on the other. This plan is expected to be presented to Secretary of State Rice during meeting with her counterparts this week while she is traveling in the region.

The inclusion of Lebanon in this proposal is a red herring. According to the United Nations, Israel has completely withdrawn from Lebanon as far back as 2000. According to Lebanon and Syria, however, Israel still occupies a piece of land (the Shaba' Farms) it claims to be part of Syria, but that Lebanon and Syria say is part of Lebanon. This fiction is the fig leaf that allows Hizballah to maintain its militia in Lebanon, counter to UN Security Council Resolutions 425 (of 1978) and 1559 (of 2004), which called for the disbanding of militias and the withdrawal of foreign forces. (See my earlier, The Shaba' Farms - Hizballah's Fig Leaf.)

The concerned Arab countries have labeled their proposal "Iraq for Land." The United States has hoped for some time that the "moderate" Arab states (primarily Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia) would use their influence among Iraq's Sunnis to lessen the violence and convince them to participate in the unity government. That influence, in conjunction with increased American special operations in the volatile Al-Anbar governorate, is expected to have an impact in defeating the Sunni insurgency and on Al-Qa'idah in Iraq's capabilities. If Syria wants to be a part of this, it will have to close down its porous border and stop its tacit support for insurgent operations in western Iraq once and for all.

In return for their assistance, representatives from these Arab countries expect the United States to broker a restart to the Middle East Peace Process, ultimately leading to an agreement in which the Israelis withdraw from all Arab lands seized in 1967. This means the Golan Heights and Shaba' Farms (Syria), and the Gaza Strip and West Bank (Palestinians). Of course, withdrawal from the Palestinian areas also means the establishment of the Palestinian state. According the King 'Abdullah II of Jordan, the Arab states will recognize Israel as a condition of the withdrawal, based on the "Arab Peace Initiative" put forth in 2002.

There is no question that resolution of the Israel-Palestinian issue is required for stability in the region. The Iraq Study Group included this in their recommendations, British Prime Minister Tony Blair has said it, Egyptian President Husni Mubarak has said it, even Syrian President Bashar Al-Asad has said as much.

This might work, except...

There are some major stumbling blocks that always get in the way of these comprehensive proposals. Let's take a look, by issue:

Lebanon: The Shaba' Farms issue is fiction perpetuated by Syria and Hizballah, and at times by the Fu'ad Sinyurah government in Lebanon. The real player here is Syria. Neither Lebanon nor Hizballah has control over their own destinies - final approval for any moves will be granted in Damascus and Tehran.

Syria: Syria wants the return of the Golan Heights. Israel has been reluctant to return what has been for decades considered militarily strategic territory for Israel's security. However, with advances in weapons technology, the Heights have lost their "high ground" importance. Syria does not need the Golan to rain missiles into Israel - they can do that from north of Damascus. Israel does want to retain its intelligence collection sites on the high ground. These sites produce information the Israelis consider critical to monitor and assess Syrian military movements and capabilities. The area is also important to Israel for economic reasons - control of important water resources - the headwaters of the Jordan River.

For the return of any part of the Golan, Israel will demand that Iran and Syria cease their support (especially weapons supplies via Damascus International Airport) for Hizballah, and likely ask for some international guarantees or confidence-building measures. Additionally, Israel has extended civil administration over the Golan and made a huge investment in the infrastructure of the area, so relinquishing it to Syria will require some legal adjustments and compensation to Israeli citizens who would be displaced.

On the Syrian side, there has been disagreement on what actually constitutes the 1967 border, depending on which day in June of that year is used to determine the borders. It is not a simple process - it determines whether or not Syria has access to Lake Tiberias.

Palestine: The ultimate issue, of course, is the future of Jerusalem. Israel cannot legally, and will not politically, withdraw to the 1967 borders and turn the area over to the Palestinians. No matter how close negotiations have come in the past to a resolution of the Palestinian problem, there has never been a solution for Jerusalem acceptable to both sides. The closest resolution was a proposal to address all other issues and leave Jerusalem as "an issue to be resolved in the future."

A major problem in dealing with Palestinian issues is that there is no one group that speaks for all the Palestinians. The Palestinian Authority is split into factions and there is almost a civil war developing between the Fatah faction led by President Mahmud 'Abbas and the Hamas faction led by Prime Minister Isma'il Haniyah. Haniyah has stated as recently as December that Hamas will not recognize Israel. It is difficult to imagine fruitful negotiations if one side refuses to recognize the other.

That said, overall, the "Land for Iraq" proposal deserves serious consideration. The Arabs are not asking for a settlement to the issues in return for their assistance with the situation in Iraq - they are asking that the talks be restarted. While this is certainly possible for the Syria/Lebanon track, progress on the Palestinian track will be difficult to achieve, but worth a try.

Hamas Operation in Jordan - Why?

Almost a week ago, Jordanian internal security forces arrested several Hamas militants in northern Jordan - most likely in Irbid, a common venue for Palestinian activity and home to a large number of Palestinian refugees. The Hamas group had weapons that included British-Swedish anti-tank weapons. The Jordanians claim the weapons were to be used against Jordanian targets.

I think everyone knows that Iran routinely supplies money, weapons and training (the three things required to maintain an insurgency) to Hizballah, as well as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, but not too many realize that Hamas has been on the recipient list for Iranian largesse since at least 1992. The funding is estimated to be as much as $30 million per year. Despite the fact that the PIJ and Hamas are Sunni fundamentalist groups, the Iranian Shi'a leaders' hatred of Israel transcends any reluctance to support the Palestinian Sunni groups.

Although one route to get the weapons from the delivery point at Damascus International Airport to the Hamas and PIJ is via smugglers' trails through Jordan, the question we should be asking is why Hamas would be planning operations in Jordan. They would be foolish to take on the very capable Jordanian security services. If you believe the Jordanians, and they have an effective intelligence service against the Palestinian target, you have to look north to Syria. Syria? Why would Bashar Al-Asad be stirring up trouble to the south? He has enough to keep himself busy with the United Nations investigation into Syrian complicity in the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Al-Hariri.

If you look at Syria's borders, you have Turkey to the north, Iraq to the east, Lebanon to the west, Israel to the southwest, and Jordan to the south. Of all of these, Jordan is the one that is relatively calm - why stir up trouble there?

As for Hamas, aren't they a bit busy now trying to convince the world they can run the Palestinian Authority, convincing people to give them money rather than starting trouble in Jordan? Or is this just a Hamas money-making effort on behalf of sponsors in Syria and/or Iran?

It doesn't make sense to me.

Iran - Israel's Air Strike Options

(I have updated this article - please see Iran - Israel's Air Strike Options Update

=======================================
(This article appeared on MSNBC's HARDBALL Hardblogger)

Let's assume that Iran has exhausted the world’s patience over its “peaceful nuclear energy” research program - a program most analysts believe is a cover for a nuclear weapons program. Israel has indicated in clear terms that it will not permit Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. What are Israel's options to derail the program?

Most analysts agree that Israel does not have the capability to strike all of the sites associated with the program - estimates range between 12 and more than 20 locations. With limited power projection capabilities, Israeli intelligence analysts will determine the critical portions of the program - the key elements that if destroyed will slow down the effort. In 1981, the Israeli air force successfully crippled the Iraqi nuclear program with a daring daylight air raid on the key element of that program – the French-built Osirak reactor at At-Tuwaythah, just south of Baghdad. The single most critical element In the Iranian program is thought to be the centrifuge facility at Natanz (also known as the Esfahan enrichment facility).

Natanz, Iran
(Click on image for larger view)

The Natanz facility is a challenging target. The heart of the facility is the centrifuge area, located in an underground, hardened structure. The Iranians are fully aware of Israeli capabilities and no doubt have studied what the Israelis did to the Iraqi program a quarter century ago. They are also aware of the demonstrated capability of the American-made precision-guided penetrating munitions ("bunker busters") in the Israeli inventory. The Iranian program has been dispersed all over the country; the facilities have been built with American and Israeli capabilities in mind and are protected by modern Russian air defense systems.

Aside from the difficult nature of the target itself is its geographic location in relation to Israel. The straight-line distance between Israel and Natanz is almost 1000 miles. (At-Tuwaythah was only 600 miles). Since the countries do not share a common border, Israeli aircraft or missiles must fly through foreign - and hostile - airspace to get to the target.

The least risky method of striking Natanz is with Israel's medium range ballistic missiles, the Jericho II or III. Details on the exact capabilities of these systems are unknown, but it is believed that the Israeli missiles can reach Natanz. However, to travel that far, the missiles will have a limited warhead weight, probably less than 1000 pounds. It is doubtful that these warheads will be able to penetrate far enough underground to achieve the desired level of destruction. That points to an attack by the Israeli air force's American-made fighter-bomber aircraft as the most likely option. The Israelis have 25 F-15I Ra'am (Thunder) and about 30 F-16I Sufa (Storm) jets.

Israeli Air Force F-15I

How will the aircraft fly from their bases in Israel to a target located 200 miles inside Iran? There are two realistic ways to get there – either through Saudi Arabia or Iraq, possibly even using Jordanian airspace as well. Either route is a one-way trip of about 1200 miles. Even though Turkey and Israel have had a defense agreement since 1996, using Turkish airspace is not likely politically and would require the attacking aircraft to fly over 1000 miles inside Iranian airspace. It is also doubtful that the Israelis would jeopardize operational security by consulting with the Turks.

Possible Flight Routes

The Saudi Arabia option (red). The strike aircraft depart southern Israel, enter Saudi airspace from the Gulf of ‘Aqabah or Jordan, fly 800 miles of Saudi airspace to the Persian Gulf and then 300 miles into Iran. Although the Israelis traversed Saudi airspace when they attacked the Iraqi facility in 1981, Saudi Arabia and Jordan have since significantly upgraded their air defense capabilities and share information with each other.

Since the Israeli air force does not operate stealth aircraft, there is a reasonable expectation that at some point the aircraft will be detected over Saudi Arabia, either by ground based radar or the AWACS airborne radar platforms. Whether Saudi defenses could - or would - be able to stop the Israelis is uncertain. Perhaps the Saudis would turn a blind eye and claim ignorance - after all, a nuclear-armed Iran is a potential threat to the Kingdom as well.

The Iraq option (blue). The strike aircraft depart southern Israel, cross 300 to 400 miles of Saudi airspace or a combination of Jordanian and Saudi airspace, and enter Iraqi airspace as soon as possible, continue across 500 miles of Iraq to the Persian Gulf and then on to the target. Entering Iran from Iraqi airspace would create too much of political firestorm. As it is, the use of Iraqi airspace will require the cooperation of the United States. Although Iraq is a sovereign nation, its skies are controlled by the American military. That said, allowing Israeli aircraft to ingress from Iraq is likely out of the question.

Either of these options carries the risk that once the actual attack on the facility is made, the viability of the return route is in jeopardy – all forces in the area will be on alert. The planners may opt to go to the target one way and back home via another.

The limiting factor in Israeli planning is the great distance to the target. Can Israel’s fighter-bombers conduct this mission without refueling? Combat radius - the distance an aircraft can fly and return without refueling - is difficult to calculate, and depends on weapons payload, external fuel tanks, mission profile, etc. It is even more difficult when dealing with Israeli aircraft because they will not release performance data on their assets.

The best "guestimate" of the combat radius of the F-15I and F-16I, outfitted with conformal fuel tanks, two external wing tanks and a decent weapons load, is almost 1000 miles. Either of the two possible flight routes above is about 200 miles further than that. To make up for the shortfall, the aircraft could be fitted with an additional external fuel tank, but this will require a reduction in the weapons load. Given the accuracy of the weapons in the Israeli inventory, that might not be problematic. However, if the aircraft are detected and intercepted, the pilots will have to jettison the tanks in order to engage their attackers. Dropping the tanks will prevent the aircraft from reaching their target.

Air refueling. This raises the question of air refueling? This is a limitation for the Israelis. While Israel has a large air force, its focus has been on the Arab countries that surround it. In recent years, it has sought the capability to project power against a target over 1000 miles away. To do this, Israel has acquired five B707 tanker aircraft. However, the tankers would have to refuel the fighters in hostile airspace. The B707 is a large unarmed aircraft and would be very vulnerable to air defenses.

Israeli Air Force B707 and F-15I fighter-bombers

Looking at the two scenarios, air refueling over Saudi Arabia (red route) would be very risky. It would have to be done at low altitude to evade detection and will probably be at night. Using Iraqi airspace (blue route) will be somewhat less difficult as altitude will not be an issue.

Of course, the tankers would have to get to Iraqi airspace and back. The use of Turkish airspace for the tanker aircraft to enter Iraq is probably not an option for the same reasons that it is not an option for the fighters – political sensitivities on the part of the Turks and operational security considerations on the part of the Israelis. Another possibility is American cooperation – allow the Israelis to stage their tankers from an American air base in Iraq. These tankers could fly to Iraq though international airspace around the Arabian Peninsula and over the Persian Gulf. It would be too far for them to return to Israel without landing to refuel, otherwise the Israelis could refuel the fighters over the Gulf.

American participation? There are other possibilities, from allowing Israeli fighters to land and refuel at U.S.-controlled bases in Iraq, to having U.S. Air Force tankers refuel the Israeli aircraft over Iraq. A diplomatic nightmare, maybe, but certainly a military possibility.

U.S. Air Force KC-135 refuels an Israeli Air Force F-16I

Theoretically, the Israelis could do this, but at great risk of failure. If they decide to attack Natanz, they will have to inflict sufficient damage the first time - they probably will not be able to mount follow-on strikes at other facilities.

When all the analyses are done, there is only one military capable of the sustained widespread air operations required to eliminate Iran's nuclear weapons research program - the United States. Again, a diplomatic nightmare, but certainly a military possibility.

(Thanks to Colonel Rick Pyatt, USAF-Ret for his assistance on this article.)