Movie Review: Damascus Cover (Vertical Entertainment - 2017)

 

Damascus Cover is a 2017 espionage film, based on the 1977 Howard Kaplan novel of the same name. The book is the first of four in Kaplan’s The Jerusalem Spy Series. I have not read the book. There are a few confusing scenes, but it can be difficult to boil 321 pages into a 90-minute screenplay.

Mossad officer Ari Ben-Sion, working undercover as German businessman Hans Hoffmann in Berlin in 1989, is recalled and ordered to Damascus to help a Jewish family flee the country. This turns out not to be his actual mission, which is revealed to him only once he is on the ground in Syria. I am not sure why he was not just briefed with the real mission so he could properly prepare and train.

There is, of course, the required romantic entanglement – this with an American photojournalist.

There is also the required double-crossing and changes of allegiance as the story unfolds. Hoffman/Ben-Sion adjusts his operation to exfiltrate a Syrian scientist and quickly finds himself in way over his head with lessening chances of success.

I will not describe what happen so as not to spoil it for any of you who wish to see it. You will have to watch it to the very end – I was surprised.

The movie stars Jonathan Rhys Meyers, Olivia Thirlby, Jürgen Prochnow, Igal Naor, Navid Negahban and John Hurt (in his final role).

I must compliment the producers for the excellent attention to detail when it comes to replicating the country of Syria and the city of Damascus in the Moroccan countryside and city of Casablanca, even down to the accurate Damascus street signs, including shari’ madhat basha (A Street Called Straight) and the Hamidiyah suq.

The movie received mixed reviews. I enjoyed it, not only because it took me back to my posting at the US Embassy in Damascus, but because it was a good story not requiring too much suspension of disbelief (except maybe at the very end).

Watch it on Amazon Prime.

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Israeli Airstrike on Iranian Consulate in Damascus Kills Senior Iranian IRGC Leader

Iranian Consulate - Damascus, Syria

An Israeli airstrike in the early evening hours of April 1 on the Iranian consulate in Damascus, Syria, killed the apparent target of the operation, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi.

According to Iranian television, Zahedi was the commander of Qods Force units in Syria and Lebanon. The Qods Force is a capable special operations organization charged with much of Iranian activities in the region and around the world. A previous commander of the Qods Force, Qassem Soleimani, was killed in an American airstrike in Baghdad in January 2020.

According to the semi-official IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency, five other IRGC commanders and two advisers were killed in the consulate along with Zahedi. They include Zahedi's deputy and chief or staff. The Islamic Republic News Agency reported that the consulate building was completely destroyed. Syrian television added that everyone in the building was killed.

Mohammad Reza Zahedi

Zahedi is one the IRGC's top commanders with a wealth of operational and command experience. A combat veteran of the Irani-Iraq War, he previously served as the commander of the IRGC Air Force, then commander of the IRGC Ground Force, before taking command of all Qods Forces deployed to Lebanon and Syria - one of the key commands in the IRGC. 

The loss of Zahedi and virtually his entire senior staff is a severe blow to Iranian foreign policy in the region - this was a bad day for the Iranians.

I am impressed with the execution of the Israeli operation. 

I lived in Damascus not far from these Iranian diplomatic facilities - embassy, consulate, and ambassador's residence. These are located in crowded areas with civilian residential compounds and buildings. The Iranian diplomatic staff in Damascus reported that neither the ambassador nor any other personnel were injured in the attack - this shows the accuracy of the Israeli strike.

It also highlights the ability of the Israeli intelligence services to determine that at least eight IRGC commanders and advisers would be in the consulate building at the same time, and determine it in time to take action to eliminate the targets.

Impressive.

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Interesting Syrian Air Force Flight Activity

Syrian Air Force IL-76 YK-ATA

The Syrian Air Force (SYAF), officially the Syrian Arab Air Force, operates three Ilyushin IL-76T (NATO: Candid) heavy lift transport aircraft: YK-ATA, YK-ATB, and YK-ATD (shown top to bottom). A fourth aircraft (YK-ATC) has not been operational for almost 30 years.

These are older photos – all three aircraft are in need of depot-level maintenance, upgrade, and overhaul. This is done at at the Ilyushin facility in Ramenskoye, Russia. Based on publicly available flight tracking information, YK-ATD was overhauled in 2016, YK-ATB in 2018, and YK-ATA in 2019. 

I suspect that YK-ATD is in dire need of major maintenance - it has not flown since November 24, 2022, and then only for a short domestic flight. It appears to have become what we in the U.S. Air Force refer to as a “hangar queen.”

Do not let the colorful livery of SYRIANAIR (Syrian Airlines) fool you – I have flown on both SYRIANAIR and with the SYAF - they’re different. One is a second-tier Middle East airline with great passenger service, and the other is a third-rate air force transport operation that worried me. I have flown on SYAF Antonov AN-24 (NATO: Coke), Tupolev TU-134 (NATO: Crusty), and Yakovlev YAK-40 (NATO: Codling) aircraft – the condition of the YAK-40 and AN-24 was far below U.S. Air Force standards.

The three IL-76 aircraft are actually assigned to the 585th Transport Squadron of the Syrian Air Force 29th Air Transport Brigade, based at Damascus International Airport. 

The military ramp at the airport is southwest of the civilian terminal. I have been on the 29th Brigade ramp a few times to catch attaché flights on the extremely rare occasions when the Syrians included American officers in official attaché trips.

These transports were built in 1980 (YK-ATA and YK-ATB) and 1981 (YK-ATD) – I remember them in the original IL-76MD (military) configuration, complete with tail guns. In the early 2000s, all were converted to their current IL-76T configuration.

Over the past few years, the Syrian IL-76’s made almost daily resupply flights to the regime-controlled enclave of al-Qamishly in northeast Syria, and almost daily flights to Mehrabad airport in Tehran, Iran. Once in a while, one of the aircraft would fly to/from Moscow. 

That pattern has changed a bit.

I have noticed a massive increase of SYAF IL-76 flights between Damascus International Airport (read that as 29th Air Brigade) and Benghazi/Beninah International Airport (coincidentally also an air base at which SYAF fighter pilots were assigned to support Mu’amar al-Qadhafi in the 1970s). It is in the area of Libya controlled by Field Marshal Khalifah Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA). 

Syrian media reported that Haftar’s armed forces have airlifted relief supplies to victims of the February 6 earthquakes that have devastated part of northern Syria. Some of that aid was delivered by LNA aircraft to the Russian-leased Humaymim air base south of Latakia.

Looking over publicly available flight records for the past three months, an interesting international flight pattern emerges. 

YK-ATA has flown 13 round-trip flights between Damascus, Syria and Benghazi, Libya, which seems to be its primary route. It did fly to Moscow three times, Beirut once, and once to, for whatever reason, Oral in northwestern Kazakhstan.

YK-ATB flew seven round-trip flights between Damascus, Syria and Benghazi, Libya. It also flew to Tehran/Mehrabad airport, using a ramp dedicated solely to the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard (IRGC), four times. Additionally, it was used at least six times for the routine domestic flight from Damascus to al-Qamishly.

In the last 90 days for the Syrian Air Force, there have been at least:

• 20 round trip flights to Benghazi, Libya (most before the earthquake)

• 4 round trip flights to Tehran/Mehrabad, Iran

• 3 round trip flights to Moscow/Vnukovo, Russia

• 1 round trip flight to Beirut, Lebanon

• 1 round trip flight to Oral, Kazakhstan

I am puzzled by the number of flights to Libya, specifically to the area controlled by Khalifah Haftar. If anyone has any insight into the relationship between Syrian President Bashar al-Asad and Khalifah Haftar, please inform me.

I will note that after the earthquakes that created catastrophic damage in northern Syria, all return flights from Benghazi to Syria stopped first in Latakia, and in at least one case in Aleppo, both areas that have suffered catastrophic earthquake damage. I have to assume that these aircraft were transporting relief supplies from Benghazi.

My question: What were the Syrian IL-76 aircraft moving between Damascus and Benghazi before the earthquake?

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Movie Review: The Swimmers (Netflix - 2022)

 

Sometimes you need a story that reminds you of the power and resilience of the human spirit. This movie does that in spades.

By August of 2015, the civil war in Syria had been going on for over four years. Having lived in Syria and covering much of the civil was as a military analyst for CNN, this was of great interest.

The violence was non-stop; irreplaceable antiquities were destroyed as multiple factions began killing each other; a flood of refugees* created a humanitarian disaster and forever changed the character of numerous European cities; our nominal Turkish NATO allies strained the unity of the alliance with senseless interventions focused not on the new threat from the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), but on a generated/perceived threat from the Kurds in northern Syria while turning a blind eye to their almost open borders allowing jihadi terrorists from the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe to join ISIS in Syria; and American air support of the only group – Kurds – willing to take on ISIS.

The situation was so chaotic that a month later, the Russians deployed troops to bolster – and save – the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad, their puppet in Damascus. The Russian intervention was not driven by love for Bashar al-Asad, but to guarantee continued access to a naval base on the Syrian Mediterranean coast at Tartus, and an air base just south of the port city of Latakia.

It was against this backdrop that two teenage sisters, Yusra and Sarah Mardini, decided that the violence in their Damascus suburb of Darayya had gotten so bad that they would try to leave Syria and seek refuge in Europe.

I am very familiar with the Darayya area. When I was posted as the air attaché at the American embassy in Damascus, I lived a mere half of a mile from the area. It is located on the edge of a Syrian air force base which was often the venue of sensitive activities. I took note – the role of an attaché is to observe and report.

Darayya saw massive destruction as the city was initially controlled by opposition groups. Given the sensitive location near the al-Mazzah air base, the regime decided to commit whatever force was necessary to bring it back under control. There was substantial damage to the city, and there were numerous civilian casualties in what became known as the “Darayya massacre.”

These two sisters are not just any teenagers. Both of the girls, especially the younger Yusra, were world class competitive swimmers, and had competed internationally.  Yusra’s goal was to swim in the Olympics. Training at that level during the ongoing civil was impossible, despite being trained by their father, a champion swimmer himself.

I did note that there is almost no mention of the Bashar al-Asad regime in the movie. I am not surprised - the family appears to be proud Syrians, and, the key here, Christian. During the civil war, most Christians sided with the government, fearing the backlash if a more Islamist regime replaced the secular Ba'ath party regime.

I do not want to spoil the flow of the movie. It is an incredible story of the Mardini sisters who finally realized their dreams. I am sure some of it is dramatized, but considering what these girls went through, I can live with it.

Yusra has become a United Nations goodwill ambassador, and Sarah became a volunteer assisting refugees in 2016 on the Greek island of Lesbos, where they arrived in Europe in 2015. Although she was arrested for her activities, she was allowed to post bond and leave Greece. Note to Sarah: Don’t go back.

Sarah and Yusra Mardini

When the movie was released at the Toronto Film Festival, the audience gave a four-minute standing ovation for the two sisters and the two Lebanese actresses (Manal and Nathalie Issa). Well deserved, in my opinion.

It’s a good movie and a great story - watch it on Netflix.

_________

* I think the correct term is refugee. These people are not going back to Syria. Why would they?

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Syrian "Voice of the Capital" reporting on recent Israeli strikes

(Note: This is my translation of an article from Syrian "Voice of the Capital")

Israeli air raids destroy early warning and air defense systems in the environs of Damascus

17 September 2022

Military sources close to the Syrian government discovered damage to radar and air defense systems as the result of the latest Israeli raids in the environs of Damascus.

Voice of the Capital sources said the surface-to-surface missiles fired from the Golan Heights struck a Buk-M air defense system and an early warning radar located on one of the hills around the town of al-Sabinah south of Damascus.

The source added that the Israeli missiles also hit an air defense system belonging to the 75th Brigade on a mountain in the village of Marnah in the al-Kiswah district - the 75th Brigade belongs to the 1st Division of the [Syrian] Army.

The sources also confirmed that 15 were killed or wounded during the direct targeting of the radar and air defense bases south of the city of Damascus.

The area also saw heavy movement of ambulances after the bombing to transport the dead and wounded to nearby hospitals.

Voice of the Capital correspondents observed intense military movement by the Syrian army and Iranian militias during the bombing.

Israeli aircraft launched air raids targeting several points in the environs of Damascus with various munitions.

The Syrian government, via its military media, acknowledged the killing of five air defense troops, while saying that the air defenses engaged most of the Israeli missiles which targeted the environs of al-Kiswah and Damascus International Airport.

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What does withdrawal of US troops from Iraq mean? - American military expert explains

US Central Command Gen. Frank McKenzie paid an official visit to Baghdad for meeting with Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi on Tuesday. In the meeting, Gen. McKenzie announced a possible reduction of US troops in Iraq. Apart from this US withdrawal of Germany was announced previous months this year. Withdrawal or shifting military troops caused a great interest among experts and media. 

In order to find the answers about the US moves, Eurasia Diary took the opinions of military expert Rick Francona.

Rick Francona is an author, commentator and media military analyst. He is a retired United States Air Force intelligence officer with experience in the Middle East, including tours of duty with the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency. 

Q. Why does the US withdraw troops from Iraq and Germany? Does it mean Iran and Russia are not threats to the US like they were before? 

A. Let me address Germany—and Europe—first. The press release from the Department of Defense said the removal of troops from Germany will “enhance Russian deterrence, strengthen NATO, reassure Allies, improve strategic U.S. flexibility....” 

 The repositioning—not necessarily withdrawal—of American forces is long overdue. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, there has been no real need to maintain that much force presence in Germany. However, I am not advocating we return them to the United States. With the growing threat from Russia and the expansion of NATO to the east, I would hope that the United States is going to move the forces forward to either Poland or Romania or both. 

 Move the troops closer to where they will be needed, send a message to the Russians that we’re there to support/strengthen NATO while bringing the families and the accompanying unnecessary support infrastructure home. If we are going to have forces deployed opposite the Russians, keep them lean and mean—more tooth, less tail. 

As for Iraq, American troops returned to Iraq for one reason, to assist the Iraqis in their fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Remember, after what I believe was the premature withdrawal of US forces from Iraq by President Obama in 2011, the Iraqi Army was basically hollowed out by corruption, mismanagement, and a lack of leadership epitomized by the disastrous government of Nuri al-Maliki. That army collapsed as ISIS took the city of Mosul in 2014.

As ISIS continued to move south towards Baghdad and expand its territorial holdings in the country, it was clear that Iraqi security forces were incapable of stopping the group without external assistance. That assistance came in the form of a small US ground presence supported by massive amounts of coalition airpower. 

Unfortunately, al-Maliki also requested, and received, support from Iran, in the form of a series of Public Mobilization Units (hashed)—Iraqi Shi’a militias trained and armed (and I maintain, led) by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The hand of IRGC-Qods Force commander Qassem Solimani was readily apparent. 

With the increase in the capabilities of the US-revitalized Iraqi security forces (police, counterterrorism units, and military), a continued presence of American forces in the presence of an Iranian-dominated Iraqi government, has become no longer viable. Most Arab Iraqis don’t want a continued US presence, and there is little stomach in the United States for keeping troops there. Yes, Iran remains a regional threat to American interests in the region, but it will have to be addressed in other ways. The US does not need forces in Iraq to maintain freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf. 

Q. We observe that the Middle East has become a Russian-Turkish battlefield. Does the US think it is better to withdraw and let two powers weaken each other? 

A. We now have Russia and Turkey involved in two proxy wars in the region: Syria and Libya. While we have serious issues with Turkish “adventurism” on the part of President Erdoğan in both theaters, the bottom line remains: Russia presents a threat to the United States across a variety of fronts; Turkey is a key NATO ally. 

That said, Turkey has been singularly unhelpful in the US-led coalition fight against ISIS since the beginning of the effort in 2014. Erdoğan’s efforts were more focused on anti-Kurdish operations in Syria than on defeating ISIS – it was as if that the Turkish leader was supporting ISIS at the expense of the Kurds. Virtually all of Turkey’s incursions into north and northwest Syria did nothing to promote the defeat of ISIS, only to create what appears to be a semi-permanent Turkish and Turkish-backed Islamist presence in the country. 

Are we looking at the reintroduction of the Ottomans? Hardly, just a quagmire/standoff between Erdoğan and Putin, at the expense of the Syrian population caught in the crossfire. 

Libya is no better. While Turkish intervention has turned the tide of the fighting in favor of the GNA over the LNA, nothing seems to have been resolved. You have the Turkish-supported GNA on one side against the Russian-backed, Haftar-led LNA, which is now also supported by US allies Egypt and the UAE. Add what now appears to be Syrian government support to the LNA, while Turkey deploys Syrian mercenaries to fight for the GNA. 

This is a recipe for escalation. Elsewhere in the region, Erdoğan has acquired a military base in Qatar. This is more unnecessary and unhelpful Ottoman adventurism from “Sultan Recep.” He should focus on cleaning up his current debacles before creating a third. 

Q. The FBI director says China is a threat to US security. Can we expect the US will shift troops from these areas to Asia-Pacific? 

A. China is emerging as the key long-term future threat to US security, likely to surpass the Russians in the not-too-distant future. Although President Trump has slowed down the Obama “pivot to Asia,” the United States will eventually have to increase either its own force structure in the region, or alternately enter into a broad multinational alliance with countries like Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam, even India, and Australia to confront growing Chinese power and its seemingly willingness to use it. 

Chinese handling of the coronavirus has cost them some goodwill. The US and its allies should capitalize on Chinese malign behavior directed at the rest of the world and attempt to isolate Beijing to make them pay a price for unleashing—wittingly or unwittingly (although many believe it was the former)—the virus on the rest of the world. 

Interviewer: Ulvi Ahmedli

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Syria resumes sanctioned flights from Iran that US says are carrying weapons

Note: I provided much of the information in this article by journalist Albin Szakola for The National, a leading English-language news service based in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.

Syria resumes sanctioned flights from Iran that US says are carrying weapons

- Damascus-owned cargo jet fleet paused operations because of Covid-19

Albin Szakola - April 21, 2020

A Syrian-government operated cargo jet fleet that the United States says is carrying weapons from Iran has resumed deliveries after a pause caused by the outbreak of Covid-19.

On Monday afternoon Ilyushin IL-76 jet, registered as YK-ATA, flew to Latakia from Tehran Mehrabad International Airport, which is used by Iran's air force, aviation data portal FlightRadar24 said.

The flight was the first in more than a month from Iran by a fleet of cargo jets ostensibly operated by Syria Airlines, the country's civilian flag carrier, the website said.

On March 12, another Ilyushin IL-76 jet, registered as YK-ATB, flew from Tehran to Damascus, the day after YK-ATA flew the same route. Damascus International Airport announced it was not accepting international commercial traffic 10 days later.

Hours after YK-ATA touched down in Latakia, Syria's Transport Ministry said Syrian Airlines was resuming international cargo flights into and out of the country. The U.S. sanctioned Syrian Airlines and its fleet of cargo planes in 2013 for allegedly ferrying cargo on behalf of the Iran's elite Qods Force, the foreign operations arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Hizballah helped to organize the flights, which were taking mortars, small arms, rockets and light anti-aircraft guns to Syria at the time, the U.S. Department of Treasury said.

Lieutenant Colonel Rick Francona, a retired U.S. Air Force intelligence officer (and former air attache at the American Embassy in Damascus) who closely follows Iranian flights to Syria, said the jets "belong to the Syrian Air Force 585th Transport Squadron of the 29th Air Brigade."

"The Syrians try to maintain the fiction that all of the 29th Brigade's aircraft are civilian airliners," Colonel Francona said.

The jets are mainly used in an air bridge to al-Qamishly, where the Syrian government has an enclave in the largely Kurdish controlled north-east of the country, he said. They also take military equipment into Syria to support IRGC operations, Colonel Francona said.

He believed the YK-ATA flight on Monday "was a resumption of the past IRGC resupply flights."

Unlike Monday's flight to Latakia International Airport, which shares its facilities with Russia's Humaymim military airbase, past flights by Syria's cargo fleet have normally landed in Damascus.

"It will be interesting to see if Latakia/Humaymim becomes the newest stopover point for the flights," Colonel Francona said.

He said the base was safe from Israeli air strikes.

Israel has carried out strikes on Syrian airports, including Damascus International Airport, in recent years.

State media reported that Syrian air defenses intercepted an Israeli attack near the eastern Homs province city of Palmyra on Monday evening and shot down "hostile targets."

On March 31, Syria said it had intercepted an Israeli strike in the country's central Homs province, state news agency Sana reported.

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights in Britain said Israel attacked Al Sha'yrat airbase after a cargo plane flew out.

Monday's flight from Iran comes soon after a similar flight by an Iranian cargo plane. An Ilyushin IL-76 Pouya Air jet flew into Latakia on Saturday afternoon, FlightRadar24 data showed. The US sanctioned Pouya Air in 2014 for working on behalf of the Qods Force to take illicit cargo, including weapons, to Syria.

Iranian Foreign minister Javad Zarif this week visited Damascus to meet Syrian President Bashar Al Assad.

(Updated: April 22, 2020 2:02am)

Read the original article on The National website.

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Miniseries Review: "Caliphate" (Netflix - 2020)

The Netflix series Caliphate is centered around an operation by the Swedish Security Service (Säkerhetspolisen, SÄPO) to uncover and hopefully disrupt a coordinated terrorist attack being planned by members of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The targets are in Sweden; the planning is being done mostly in al-Raqqah, Syria.

Obviously set in either 2016 or 2017 before the anti-ISIS coalition assault on ISIS's self-proclaimed capital, the story tends to validate U.S. and most coalition partner fears that attacks against the West were actively being planned in al-Raqqah. It was this assessment that drove the timeline for the coalition's decision to use the Syrian Democratic Forces to lead the assault on al-Raqqah over strident (not to mention unhelpful, unnecessary, and counterproductive) Turkish objections over using the SDF to liberate al-Raqqah.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan objected to the mere existence of the SDF because its key component was the Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units, known more commonly by the initials YPG. The Turks regard the YPG as nothing more than an extension of the Turkish Kurdish separatist group People's Workers' Party, or PKK.

The United States and some of its allies have designated the PKK as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), mostly as a courtesy to a fellow, albeit nominal, NATO ally. I have been vocal in my criticism of Turkey and Erdoğan and their disastrous policies in Syria and half-hearted fight against ISIS. See my latest on this subject, Syria and Turkey - the NATO realities.

In the series, the two lead characters are a SÄPO case officer (they use the term handler) named Fatima Zukić in Stockholm and a Turkish-Swede ISIS bride named Pervin trapped in al-Raqqah. Fatima is herself a Bosnian-born Muslim, although that facet of her character is only marginally explored.

The story is about the attack plot and Fatima's handling of Pervin, but it also touches on the tension between Sweden's ethnic Scandinavians and the Muslims who have resettled there from Iraq, Syria, Bosnia, etc. There is also a sizable Kurdish population in the country - all this thanks to Sweden's policy of allowing large numbers of refugees into the country.

Once getting her hands on a contraband cell phone in al-Raqqah, Pervin contacts a former teacher in Stockholm. The teacher contacts Fatima, hoping that the Swedish service can assist the trapped wife and her daughter return to Sweden. Once Fatima and Pervin are in contact, Pervin provides information that her husband's ISIS cell is actively planning a spectacular attack in Sweden. Of course, that sets in motion an intelligence-driven counter-terrorism operation to uncover and stop the attack.

As a case officer, I was intrigued at the thought of running an intelligence operation by phone. Running an asset requires trust and the ability to assess and vet the subject - both are difficult over a phone. Pervin was basically the electronic equivalent of a "walk in," someone who volunteers to become an asset, usually in return for something.

In this case, Pervin wanted to get herself and her daughter out of Syria and back to Sweden. My case officer mind immediately thought - she may be making this up (it's called "fabrication" in the vernacular) to get what she wants. I felt vindicated when Fatima's supervisor said the exact same thing. Walk ins can be the real thing, but mostly they are not.

In covering Pervin's story of coming from Sweden to Syria so her husband could join the fight as a member of ISIS, the series uncovers the deceit, radicalization, and treachery involved in the recruiting of not only fighters for ISIS, but also young women to become ISIS brides.

We do observe the movement of a group of young women to Syria via the Turkish city of Gaziantep. I've driven almost the entire Syrian-Turkish border (on both sides). It's about a seven-hour drive from Ankara to Gaziantep, which is a fairly nice city - good food, great sights. From Gaziantep, the major hub for moving ISIS fighters and brides into Syria, there are a few ways to go, depending on who controls what parts of northern Syria. I'd probably go further east, then two hours south to the border, then another five hours to al-Raqqah.

It is an arduous trip. As I said, I've been on both sides of that border. I would not attempt to cross it going either direction unless I had "hired a guide." It's heavily guarded, fortified, and in places, mined. I still believe that there was some collusion between ISIS (and other Islamist groups in Syria) and the Turkish government to let the crossings happen, if not actually facilitating them - that is just my opinion.

Without spoiling the story, there were some facets that strained the necessary "suspension of disbelief" required in most fictional accounts. In some places, there is too much coincidence, and of course, since it's fiction, everything falls nicely into place. In the real world of intelligence, it usually doesn't work that way. There is a lot more guesswork and estimation - we like to call it "analysis."

There was one phrase that sticks with me. One of the ISIS recruiters described al-Raqqah to potential recruits as "a magical place." I've been to al-Raqqah - it was okay before the war, right on the Euphrates River, but I have never heard it described as magical. Imagine it under ISIS rule.

Watch it, enjoy it. It is well written and well produced. With only a few minor glitches in the Arabic translations, it's solid entertainment.

There is to be a Season 2, to be released in early 2021. You can watch Season 1 here.

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Russian airstrike on Turkish troops in Syria - predictable and avoidable. Now what?

Turkish military convoy in northwestern Syria

An airstrike by Russian Air Force fighter-bombers on a Turkish supply convoy in Syria's Idlib governorate on February 27 resulted in the deaths of 33 Turkish troops, and the wounding of at least 30 others. This represents a major escalation in the confrontation between Russian forces supporting Syrian troops attempting to re-establish Syrian government control over the area held by primarily Islamist opposition forces - those forces are backed by Turkey. In recent weeks, Turkish support has escalated from logistics and supplies to air, artillery, and special operations forces support.

I will leave the blow-by-blow coverage of the actual operation to the media. Suffice it to say, the Russian Air Force has determined that it will no longer tolerate Turkish or Turkish-backed opposition groups firing man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) at their aircraft operating in support of Syrian troops. There has been a marked increase in the use of these systems, forcing Russian pilots to alter their tactics, to include the use of flares and other countermeasures, and flying at higher altitudes.

Although there have been tensions between the Russians and Turks in the past in northwestern Syria, including the shootdown of a Russian SU-24 fighter-bomber in November 2015, and smaller exchanges of artillery fire between Syrian and proxy forces and the Turks and Turkish-backed forces in the past, this airstrike is a major escalation of tensions that have been brewing for years.

The obvious questions - why are the Turks and Russians in Syria?

The short answers: the Russians have been in Syria since September 2015 when it became obvious to Moscow that the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Asad was incapable of surviving the threats posed by either the forces of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or the various opposition groups, including al-Qa'idah affiliated or other Islamist groups supported by the government of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Were the Russians "true believers" in the Ba'ath Party ideology of the Syrian regime? No - the Russians were there for much more pragmatic reasons. Russian President Vladimir Putin has decided to reassert Russian influence in the Middle East, influence that had been lacking since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The obvious choice of venue was Syria - the country was wracked by civil war, and in need of help beyond that offered by the bevy of Iranian-supported militias from Lebanon, Iraq, and even Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The prize for the Russians? Re-entry to the Mediterranean in the form of access to Syrain military facilities - Humaymim (often incorrectly rendered as Khmeimim) air base on the northwest coast near the port city of Latakia, and the former Soviet naval facility at the port of Tartus. Putin was able to secure renewable 49-year leases on both facilities, creating a permanent Russian presence in the eastern Mediterranean.

The Russians claim they deployed military forces to Syria to combat ISIS, but their actions showed they they were there for one reason - the survival of the al-Asad regime. The vast majority of the airstrikes and operations were focused on opposition forces, not ISIS.

The Russian vision of a permanent presence in the eastern Mediterranean depends on a government in Syria that the Russians can influence, if not outright control. Watching how Putin treats al-Asad in both Syria and Russia lend me to believe it is the latter, not the former. When the civil war eventually ends, the key power broker in Syria will be the Russians and Vladimir Putin.

Why are the Turks in Syria? That is a really good question, for which there are plenty of answers, just not good ones.

The Turks became nominal members of the US-led coalition formed to defeat ISIS, but were never really committed to the fight. It took years before Erdoğan allowed the coalition to fully use the Incirlik air base just north of Syria to conduct offensive operations against ISIS. It was not until ISIS launched lethal attacks inside Turkey that the Turks relented.

Two curious things here - it was always suspected that the Turks were supporters of many of the Islamist groups that were part of the anti-al-Asad alliance under the banner of the Free Syrian Army. That support at times probably included ISIS. Of course, the primary route for the thousands of Middle Eastern and European jihadis that came to Syria to fight for ISIS came via Turkey. I have spent a lot of time on both sides of the Syrian-Turkish border - I would never attempt to cross the mined, fenced, and heavily-guarded frontier without the acquiescence or support of Turkish officials.

Turkey's role in the coalition continued to be obstructionist and unhelpful. As the US-led coalition armed and trained the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to be the "boots on the ground" to fight ISIS, the Turks vehemently objected to the presence of the Kurdish fighters known as the YPG, believing them to be nothing more than an extension of the Turkish PKK separatist group, a designated terrorist group. As the coalition began the fight against ISIS, the Turks often obstructed SDF movements, even to the point of armed confrontation. Despite this, the SDF was successful, pushing ISIS back to its self-proclaimed capital of al-Raqqah.

As part of Turkey's "contribution" to the anti-ISIS effort, it invaded northern Syria in two operations and two locations. Operation Euphrates Shield moved into the are northeast of Aleppo, mostly in support of the Islamist and opposition elements which had relocated there following successful Syrian (albeit Russian and Iranian backed) military operations as the Syrians began to retake those areas that had previously fallen to the opposition.

Operation Olive Branch moved against Kurdish elements in the 'Afrin area of northwest Syria. As in Euphrates Shield, much of the fighting was done by Turkish proxy forces.

At this point, Erdoğan demanded that the coalition allow Turkish troops to liberate al-Raqqah. This was a ridiculous demand - Turkish troops were over 100 miles from al-Raqqah. To liberate al-Raqqah would have required the Turks to traverse SDF-controlled territory, something the Kurds in the coalition found unacceptable, given Turkey's recent obstruction of the fight against ISIS.

After the successful SDF liberation of al-Raqqah and the almost complete expulsion of ISIS fighters from Syria, Erdoğan then demanded that the coalition agree to a "security zone" almost 20 miles deep all along the Syrian border with Turkey. To the Turks, security zone is a euphemism for a Kurdish-free zone. Inexplicably, the United States went along with Erdoğan's petulance and basically created a small security zone in previously Arab areas along the border.

As the Syrian government continued to recover more of its territory, opposition elements were removed to opposition-controlled areas, culminating in the creation of a large enclave of the remaining Islamist and opposition groups in Idlib governorate, setting up the final battle between these elements and the Syrian regime.

Fearing that his allies were about to be soundly defeated, Erdoğan moved Turkish troops into Idlib, ostensibly to provide safe areas to prevent civilian casualties. In my opinion, Turkey's commitment to prevent civilian casualties in Idlib was about as sincere as Russian efforts to combat ISIS.

Although there was a face-saving agreement - the Astana agreement - between the Turks and the Russians to legitimize the presence of Turkish "observation posts" in Idlib, this was merely setting up the inevitable clash between the the foreign powers.

The battle of Idlib is in full swing. Backed by overwhelming Russian airpower, the Syrians are steadily progressing against the Turkish-backed militias. The Turks have responded by providing weapons and fire support to the Islamist and opposition groups, striking not only Iranian-backed militias, but Syrian regime forces as well. Of course, as is the nature of combat, the fighting has spilled over, directly involving the Turks and Russians.

Now we have the Russians and Turks engaging each other. Despite the claims by the Russians that since the Turks have provided armored vehicles and other weapons to the opposition, it is impossible for them to distinguish between the Turkish-supported groups and the Turks themselves. I don't get the impressions the Russians really care.

Now we come to nascent East-West crisis brewing in northern Syria.

Now that Erdoğan's Ottoman revanchism has backed Turkey into a corner in which it is suffering serious casualties - which will not play well at home - the Turkish leader wants to play the NATO card. He wants to rely on the alliance he has basically turned his back on over the last year to bail him out.

Ironically, his first request was to the United States to deploy Patriot air defense systems to Turkey to defend his forces and facilities from potential Russian or Syrian attacks. This is the same system he refused to buy in favor of the Russian S-400. This move resulted in the United States removing Turkey from the F-35 fifth generation stealth fighter program. It appeared that Turkey was drifting more towards the Russians to replace aging Turkish military equipment.

The NATO charter has two articles that might apply here - Article 4 and Article 5. Article 4 can be invoked by any member state "whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened." This has happened numerous times in the past, including several requests from Turkey. It does not trigger a NATO military response.

Article 5 is the key to the alliance. The key passage: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all...." What has happened does not meet the threshold of Article 5 - the Russians or Syrians would have to launch an attack on Turkish territory. The Russians are well aware of the NATO charter and Article 5 - they have lived with it for decades. Conversely, if the Turks launch attacks on Russian forces in Syria from Turkish soil, will this trigger a Russian response against targets in Turkey?

This is where Erdoğan's adventurism, always dangerous and unnecessary, risks expanding the crisis in Syria into an East-West confrontation neither side wants or needs.

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Middle East oil pumping stations and military air bases

Tiyas Air Base, also known as T-4, located east of Hims, Syria© Google Earth

Over the last year, there have been a series of confrontations between the Israelis on one side, and the Iranians and their Syrian allies on the other, at an airbase in western Syria. The air base is located between the Syrian cities of Hims (Homs) and Tadmur (Palmyra). The base has been identified as both Tiyas, and as T-4, depending on the media outlet doing the reporting.

In the above image, the Arabic descriptions give both names. Which is correct? Actually, both are.

The name Tiyas comes from the name of the closest village. It is customary in the Syrian Air Force to name bases and installations for the nearest city, town, or village. However, the base is not just close to the village of Tiyas, it is also close to the location of an oil pumping station in Tiyas designated as T-4. The T-4 designator goes back to the early days of oil exploration and transport in Iraq as far back as the 1930s.

This map shows the oil pipelines used to move oil from the Kirkuk oilfields in Iraq to Mediterranean ports - Haifa, (now in Israel but then in British-mandated Palestine) and Tarablus al-Sham (Tripoli, in French-mandated Lebanon).

The K-prefix indicates pumping stations on the Kirkuk pipeline, which transported the oil from Kirkuk to a station near the city of al-Hadithah. At Hadithah, the oil was routed into the Tripoli triple pipeline or the Haifa double pipeline. Pumping stations on the Tripoli pipeline are designated with a T prefix, while the Haifa pipeline stations are designated with an H prefix.

Not only were the pipelines accessible by the series of roads paralleling the lines, the Iraq Petroleum Company constructed private airstrips to move men, supplies, parts, etc. between stations and facilities. Many of the airstrips still exist in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan. Many of them were converted into civil airports, some into military air bases, and some into shared civil/military facilities. K-1, K-3, T-3, T-4, H-2, H-3, H-5 all were/are major air bases. The current T-4 air base is about four miles west of the original Iraq Petroleum Company airstrip.

Tiyas was the location of the fourth pumping station on the al-Hadithah-Tripoli pipeline. There are three such stations in Syria, all in use today. T-2 is located just inside the Syrian border near the city of Albu Kamal, the site of a large Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) base populated by both IRGC personnel as well as Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi'a militia groups.

The station at T-3 is now the shared military air base and civilian airport in the city of Tadmur (also known as Palmyra, site of ancient Aramean, Arabic, and Roman ruins).

The air base at T-4 is used by not only the Syrian Air Force, but by Russian forces in Syria, and elements of the IRGC. Having been there a few times, I can vouch for the description as being "in the middle of nowhere."

Note: Given the political situation following the 1948 creation of Israel, and later political turmoil in both Syria and Lebanon, the Iraqis constructed an alternate pipeline from al-Hadithah to Faysh Khabur on the Turkish border, then west to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. It is still in use today.




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QUOTED: After the killing of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi - what are the repercussions for ISIS?

The late Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi

I was quoted in the London-based Arabic-language online newspaper Sharq Wa Gharb (East and West) on the death of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

The article, "After the killing of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi - what are the repercussions for ISIS?" (in Arabic) can be accessed here.

Translation:

Retired US Air Force Intelligence officer Rick Francona says it is important for the United States to carry out these types of operations against terrorist leaders.

Francona, a former officer with the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency, added that it sends a message that “we will devote time and resources to locate them, and we will take the risk to either bring them to justice, or in this case, bring justice to them.”

He points out, however, that this is not the end of ISIS. Since the loss of the territorial caliphate, ISIS has reverted to a more of a insurgent organization. They are on the ascent in many areas, especially in Iraq.

Francona says there will be an heir to succeed al-Baghdadi, and the organization will continue, stressing that US efforts against it will continue as well.

For the purists, here is the original Arabic:

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Syria and Turkey - the NATO realities

Turkish troops in northern Syria - unnecessary and  unhelpful

The situation in northern Syria is in complete disarray, and changing by the hour. If you could take a snapshot of what is going on, it would have all the makings of confusing international geopolitical suspense movie.

Just a few days ago, the United States and its in-name-only NATO ally Turkey had arrived at an uneasy status quo in which military forces of the two countries were conducting combined patrols along the Syrian-Turkish border. The patrols were in essence a confidence-building measure by which the U.S.-allied, trained, and equipped Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) attempted to convince the Turks that they were not a terrorist organization, and that they posed no territorial (or other) threat to Turkey. The Turks were gathering intelligence on the best attack axes.

The SDF is composed of mostly Syrian Kurds from the militia known as the People's Protection Unit - known more commonly by the Kurdish initials YPG - along with some Arab, Assyrian/Syriac, Armenian, and other militias. Turkish press accounts aside, these fighters were the key ground combat unit that removed the scourge of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) from its territorial holdings in the country.

Why was this a problem? We have a U.S.-led coalition conducting an effective air campaign in support of an indigenous - Syrians all - on the ground. The SDF did the bulk of the fighting against ISIS, at the cost of over 10,000 killed in the fighting. This combination of forces required the presence of less that 1,000 American troops on the ground in Syria.

This was an effective use of American air power and special operations forces to leverage local militias - this is right out of the textbook taught at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg.

The problem, as far as the Turks are concerned, was the training and equipping of the SDF, or more specifically the YPG, by the United States and its allies - including key NATO allies the United Kingdom and France. Turkey believes that the SDF is an illegitimate organization.

To the Turks, the YPG is nothing more than extension of the Turkish Kurd separatist party known as the Kurdish Workers' Party, or by the Kurdish initials PKK. The PKK has been designated as a terrorist group by Turkey, the United States, European Union (EU), and Japan. The United States and the EU may have made the designation as a favor to their NATO ally.

As the U.S.-led coalition and the SDF successfully pushed ISIS out of city after city, the Turks were sidelined. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan insisted that the liberation of ISIS's capital city of al-Raqqah had to be done by Turkish troops. The only problem was that the YPG was not about to let the anti-Kurd Turks access to their areas of northern Syria. When Turkish troops pushed into northern Syria near the city of Manbij, the Kurds fought them to a standstill - they were stuck in place over 100 miles from al-Raqqah.

The SDF was ready to make the assault on al-Raqqah, a city that was crying out for relief from ISIS atrocities. It would have taken the Turks months to get there, having had to fight their way through the U.S.-allied SDF/YPG.

I remember saying at the time that the Turks were going to be a problem after ISIS was defeated. For the Turks, it was not, and is not, about ISIS. It's about the Kurds, specifically the Kurds in neighboring Syria. What better time that during a civil war in Syria to mount a cross border operation and destroy what is perceived to be a threat?

True to form, as soon as the ISIS threat abated, the Turks renewed their threats of a military incursion to "clear the area of terrorists." It was only a matter of time. The presence of a handful of American special operations forces on the border was not going to stop them.

Map and annotations: IHS Markit and the New York Times

President Trump, to my chagrin, was not forceful enough to convince Erdoğan that this was unnecessary and unhelpful, especially since ISIS remained a threat in parts of Syria and Iraq. For some time, Erdoğan had been moving Turkey more toward being an Islamic state rather than the secular republic envisioned and established decades earlier by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Atatürk would hardly recognize what Erdoğan has wrought.

I am not sure if it was by accident, or if someone in the Erdoğan government (I would call it an Islamist regime, but they are technically still a NATO ally) actually understands the reality of NATO politics. Would the United States side with the SDF/YPG against a NATO ally? We all know the answer to that - it's a resounding no.

While we believe we have an obligation to protect the YPG - protect them not only from Turkish troops, but against the marauding, undisciplined, bloodthirsty former al-Qaidah and Free Syrian Army (FSA) rebels now used as proxies by Ankara.

The NATO alliance is almost sacrosanct among the members. Sacrosanct, it appears, except to its sole majority Muslim and Asian member. Turkey may think it's a European country, but it would be the only one that thinks that, given Erdoğan's AKP party moves toward Islamism.

Why is Turkey so important to the United States that it balks at defending the Kurds? A look at the map of the region should be enough.

Turkey is not only the bridge between Asia/East and Europe/West, it also sits astride the Bosporus and Dardanelles, the two narrow waterways that control access between the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea. In practical terms, it is the only sea route from the Russia Navy's ice-free port at Sebastopol (in what many call "occupied Crimea") and the best route to the Russian-leased Syrian port of Tartus.

Unhindered access to the Turkish straits and a route to Tartus (the red line on the map) is strategically and tactically important to Russia. So, Russian intervention in Crimea and Syria within just a few years of each other - coincidence?

So, now the unintended consequences of Turkey's ill-advised incursion into Syria will visit us.

As mentioned, the lead elements of the Turkish assault into northern Syria - after the air and artillery strikes - were not even minimally-disciplined Turkish troops, but former al-Qa'idah, FSA, and other Islamists. These undisciplined thugs ran amok, executing any Kurdish officials they encountered, ransacked homes, and caused unnecessary civilian casualties.

Faced with no U.S.-led coalition support, the SDF, or probably more correctly, the YPG made a deal with Syrian President Bashar al-Asad, yes, the same Bashar al-Asad who on several occasions had ordered the use of chemical weapons on Syrian citizens.

The Kurds, still Syrians, were now faced with a Turkish onslaught with no hope of support from the U.S.-led coalition with whom they had battled ISIS. They requested the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) move forward to fight the Turkish incursion.

What choice did they have? For Kurds in Syria, in Iraq, in Turkey, in Iran - as they say, there are no friends but the mountains. They believed, probably correctly, that they were now on their own.

So now we have the Syrian army entering the fight on the side of, and at the request of, the SDF. What we may see are the national forces of two countries - Turkey and Syria - fighting each other, escalating the fighting from an army on one side and militias on the other, to a battle between two states.

Unfortunately, the way this has unfolded with Turkish President Erdoğan's unnecessary and unhelpful actions against the U.S.-allied SDF, many observers are now siding with the murderous Syrian regime against a NATO ally.

Some history for those who "have not read history and are doomed to repeat it."

- Our involvement with the Kurds in Iraq in 1975 at the behest of the Shah of Iran was about Iran, not them.
- Our involvement with the mujahidin in the 1980s in Afghanistan was about the Soviet Union, not them.
- Our involvement with the Iraqis in 1988 was about Iran, not them.

And as realpolitik goes, our involvement with the SDF/YPG was about ISIS, not them.

Bottom line, whether we like it or not, our relationship with the Kurds was a tactical alliance to defeat ISIS. The NATO/U.S. alliance with Turkey is a strategic alliance about the Russians.

Despite American issues with Turkey's acquisition of the S-400 air defense system from Russia, Ankara's removal from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, its support of Islamist movements, and Erdoğan unwise incursion into Syria, the strategic NATO relationship supercedes any tactical relationship with the YPG.

Vice President Mike Pence and Secretary of Defense Mark Esper have been dispatched to Turkey to discuss the situation. This is an easy one. President Erdoğan, adhere to an immediate ceasefire, let's start a dialogue, and the sanctions on Turkey's economy will continue until that happens.

Yes, Turkey is a strategic partner which NATO needs, but we need to extract a price for this ill-advised course of action. Erdoğan, not our friend, needs to recognize he isn't the new Sultan.

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Trump, Turkey, and the Kurds - a study in perfidy

The long-threatened Turkish invasion of northern Syria has finally begun. I am in total disagreement with the decision of President Donald Trump to basically give Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan a green light to mount an attack on what have become some of America's best allies in the region - the Syrian Kurds.

I spent a fair amount of time working with the Iraqi Kurds in the mid-1990s. Even then, the perceived betrayal of the Kurds in 1975 as part of the fallout of the Shah’s signing of the Treaty of Algiers was still a sore point with the Kurds. It appears that we are repeating the same treatment with the Syrian Kurds, this time at the behest of the Turks.

For some time now, probably since the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), I have not regarded Turkey as an ally. While they are part of NATO, it seems to me they are not really our allies. Ignore the platitudes and lip service that flows out of the Department of Defense and the U.S. Central Command - the Turks are not a close ally, they have been and continue to be a major part of the problem.

The impending crises - and there will be several because of this irresponsible invasion - will be a direct result of Erdoğan's foolhardy decision to invade, and Trump's unfathomable acquiescence. Certainly our access to Turkey's Incirlik Air Base is not that critical.

I hate to say this, but when the fighting between Turkish troops and the YPG starts, I am rooting for the Kurds. The Turks haven't fared well in their previous incursions into Syria: Operation Olive Branch in the Afrin area, and Operation Euphrates Freedom to the northeast of Aleppo.

In both of these operations, the Turks claimed to be fighting ISIS, when in reality they were attacking the Kurdish People Protection Units, known by the Kurdish initials YPG. The Turks, of course claim the YPG is nothing more than an extension of the designated terrorist group, the Turkey-based Kurdish Workers' Party, known more commonly by the Kurdish initials PKK. Now they are using this faulty rationale as the excuse to invade northern Syria.

A few of my predictions:

- the Kurds will stop offensive operations against the remaining ISIS pockets in the country and redeploy to fight the Turks
- the Kurds will move their forces from guarding the tens of thousands of ISIS fighters and their families, and redeploy to fight the Turks
- ISIS will get a breather from Syrian Democratic Forces attacks and regroup
- the Syrian regime will start operations to re-establish its sovereignty over the Kurdish-controlled areas
- the PKK may step up their attacks inside Turkey
- the United Nations will make noise but basically do nothing

If the Turks are looking for a fight, they may just find a tough one in northeastern Syria. I cannot believe that President Trump is going to sit by and watch a blood bath ensue in Syria. This whole situation is unnecessary and unhelpful. The responsibility for whatever happens rests with Presidents Erdoğan and Trump.

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Miniseries Review: "The Spy" (Netflix - 2019)

Eli Cohen was arguably one of Israel's best, if not the best, intelligence assets in its relatively short history. This new miniseries certainly highlights his value as an Israeli agent who penetrated the highest levels of the Syrian government. The producers attempted - with a modicum of success - to tell Cohen's story.

Most people are aware of the basic facts of this case: Eli Cohen, an Egyptian-born son of Syrian Jews from Aleppo, immigrated to Israel, where he twice applied to work for the Mossad, the Israeli intelligence service. While working as an accountant, he was finally offered employment with Mossad in 1959. Cohen's assignment was to penetrate the Syrian political and military establishments.

The Israelis developed a legend (that's the technical term for a cover story) using the name Kamil Amin Thabit. The legend had Cohen/Thabit move to Argentina, where he posed as a businessman. He made it known that he was anxious to "return" to Syria. He soon befriended military attaché Colonel Amin al-Hafiz at the Syrian embassy in Buenos Aires.

In 1962, Cohen made the move to Damascus, where his extravagant spending and parties gained him popularity among the wealthy and influential in the country. As luck would have it, Colonel al-Hafiz returned to Damascus, after which he participated in the 1963 Ba'th Party coup and later became the president of Syria.

You would think as an intelligence operation, it doesn't get any better than that. Actually, it does - later in the operation, Cohen became a senior adviser to the Syrian minister of defense. This gave him access to particularly sensitive military information. In the series, Cohen was named deputy minister of defense - just one of the theatrical licenses taken.

In the end, Cohen was captured and executed. I won't spoil the how and why for those who have not seen the miniseries.

My comments. I enjoyed the history, but not the theatrical license the producers took to tell it. The ridiculous story of the Israeli farmer on the border and the cameo appearance by a 7-year old Usamah bin Ladin are two such examples. They were both contrived and unnecessary - the actual story is compelling enough.

I have always been interested in the Eli Cohen story, on a professional and personal level. Professionally, I had hope to see more of the tradecraft used by Cohen - his communications systems, secret travel to/from Israel, use of dead drops if any. There were instances in the series where Cohen took photographs of classified Syrian military documents. How did he get the photographs back to the Mossad? Gathering information is sometimes the easy part, it's the getting it to headquarters that's hard.

On a personal level, when I was assigned as the Air Attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Damascus, I visited what we called the "Eli Cohen apartment" in the Abu Rumanah section of the city. In fact, the embassy leased the apartment as part of the housing pool. It was fascinating to stand there on the balcony that looks over what was the Ministry of Defense compound in Cohen's time.

As for history, we often visited Marjah Square, the site of Cohen's public execution. By the time I was there in the 1990s, public hangings had been moved to the much larger 'Abbasiyin Square. As with Cohen, the bodies of those executed were allowed to hang for hours, ostensibly as a deterrent.

It is an interesting story. I'd recommend it with the caveat that there is more sensationalism than needed. This is a real-life drama that would have stood on its own. That said, I think Sacha Baron Cohen gave a good performance. It is available on Netflix.

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