Israeli Airstrike on Iranian Consulate in Damascus Kills Senior Iranian IRGC Leader

Iranian Consulate - Damascus, Syria

An Israeli airstrike in the early evening hours of April 1 on the Iranian consulate in Damascus, Syria, killed the apparent target of the operation, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi.

According to Iranian television, Zahedi was the commander of Qods Force units in Syria and Lebanon. The Qods Force is a capable special operations organization charged with much of Iranian activities in the region and around the world. A previous commander of the Qods Force, Qassem Soleimani, was killed in an American airstrike in Baghdad in January 2020.

According to the semi-official IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency, five other IRGC commanders and two advisers were killed in the consulate along with Zahedi. They include Zahedi's deputy and chief or staff. The Islamic Republic News Agency reported that the consulate building was completely destroyed. Syrian television added that everyone in the building was killed.

Mohammad Reza Zahedi

Zahedi is one the IRGC's top commanders with a wealth of operational and command experience. A combat veteran of the Irani-Iraq War, he previously served as the commander of the IRGC Air Force, then commander of the IRGC Ground Force, before taking command of all Qods Forces deployed to Lebanon and Syria - one of the key commands in the IRGC. 

The loss of Zahedi and virtually his entire senior staff is a severe blow to Iranian foreign policy in the region - this was a bad day for the Iranians.

I am impressed with the execution of the Israeli operation. 

I lived in Damascus not far from these Iranian diplomatic facilities - embassy, consulate, and ambassador's residence. These are located in crowded areas with civilian residential compounds and buildings. The Iranian diplomatic staff in Damascus reported that neither the ambassador nor any other personnel were injured in the attack - this shows the accuracy of the Israeli strike.

It also highlights the ability of the Israeli intelligence services to determine that at least eight IRGC commanders and advisers would be in the consulate building at the same time, and determine it in time to take action to eliminate the targets.

Impressive.

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Interesting Syrian Air Force Flight Activity

Syrian Air Force IL-76 YK-ATA

The Syrian Air Force (SYAF), officially the Syrian Arab Air Force, operates three Ilyushin IL-76T (NATO: Candid) heavy lift transport aircraft: YK-ATA, YK-ATB, and YK-ATD (shown top to bottom). A fourth aircraft (YK-ATC) has not been operational for almost 30 years.

These are older photos – all three aircraft are in need of depot-level maintenance, upgrade, and overhaul. This is done at at the Ilyushin facility in Ramenskoye, Russia. Based on publicly available flight tracking information, YK-ATD was overhauled in 2016, YK-ATB in 2018, and YK-ATA in 2019. 

I suspect that YK-ATD is in dire need of major maintenance - it has not flown since November 24, 2022, and then only for a short domestic flight. It appears to have become what we in the U.S. Air Force refer to as a “hangar queen.”

Do not let the colorful livery of SYRIANAIR (Syrian Airlines) fool you – I have flown on both SYRIANAIR and with the SYAF - they’re different. One is a second-tier Middle East airline with great passenger service, and the other is a third-rate air force transport operation that worried me. I have flown on SYAF Antonov AN-24 (NATO: Coke), Tupolev TU-134 (NATO: Crusty), and Yakovlev YAK-40 (NATO: Codling) aircraft – the condition of the YAK-40 and AN-24 was far below U.S. Air Force standards.

The three IL-76 aircraft are actually assigned to the 585th Transport Squadron of the Syrian Air Force 29th Air Transport Brigade, based at Damascus International Airport. 

The military ramp at the airport is southwest of the civilian terminal. I have been on the 29th Brigade ramp a few times to catch attaché flights on the extremely rare occasions when the Syrians included American officers in official attaché trips.

These transports were built in 1980 (YK-ATA and YK-ATB) and 1981 (YK-ATD) – I remember them in the original IL-76MD (military) configuration, complete with tail guns. In the early 2000s, all were converted to their current IL-76T configuration.

Over the past few years, the Syrian IL-76’s made almost daily resupply flights to the regime-controlled enclave of al-Qamishly in northeast Syria, and almost daily flights to Mehrabad airport in Tehran, Iran. Once in a while, one of the aircraft would fly to/from Moscow. 

That pattern has changed a bit.

I have noticed a massive increase of SYAF IL-76 flights between Damascus International Airport (read that as 29th Air Brigade) and Benghazi/Beninah International Airport (coincidentally also an air base at which SYAF fighter pilots were assigned to support Mu’amar al-Qadhafi in the 1970s). It is in the area of Libya controlled by Field Marshal Khalifah Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA). 

Syrian media reported that Haftar’s armed forces have airlifted relief supplies to victims of the February 6 earthquakes that have devastated part of northern Syria. Some of that aid was delivered by LNA aircraft to the Russian-leased Humaymim air base south of Latakia.

Looking over publicly available flight records for the past three months, an interesting international flight pattern emerges. 

YK-ATA has flown 13 round-trip flights between Damascus, Syria and Benghazi, Libya, which seems to be its primary route. It did fly to Moscow three times, Beirut once, and once to, for whatever reason, Oral in northwestern Kazakhstan.

YK-ATB flew seven round-trip flights between Damascus, Syria and Benghazi, Libya. It also flew to Tehran/Mehrabad airport, using a ramp dedicated solely to the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard (IRGC), four times. Additionally, it was used at least six times for the routine domestic flight from Damascus to al-Qamishly.

In the last 90 days for the Syrian Air Force, there have been at least:

• 20 round trip flights to Benghazi, Libya (most before the earthquake)

• 4 round trip flights to Tehran/Mehrabad, Iran

• 3 round trip flights to Moscow/Vnukovo, Russia

• 1 round trip flight to Beirut, Lebanon

• 1 round trip flight to Oral, Kazakhstan

I am puzzled by the number of flights to Libya, specifically to the area controlled by Khalifah Haftar. If anyone has any insight into the relationship between Syrian President Bashar al-Asad and Khalifah Haftar, please inform me.

I will note that after the earthquakes that created catastrophic damage in northern Syria, all return flights from Benghazi to Syria stopped first in Latakia, and in at least one case in Aleppo, both areas that have suffered catastrophic earthquake damage. I have to assume that these aircraft were transporting relief supplies from Benghazi.

My question: What were the Syrian IL-76 aircraft moving between Damascus and Benghazi before the earthquake?

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Biden's Iran Policy - Obama Failure 2.0?

Obviously satire, but let’s take a look at what is driving it. It’s simple – President Biden’s ill-advised and ill-timed policies on Iran, basically rolling back all of the gains of the Trump Administration to contain Iran, are dangerous. It’s almost like we are watching the implementation of Obama 2.0. That Iran policy was disastrous then, and it will be disastrous now.

 

Since taking office on January 20, Biden has signaled to both the Iranians and our allies alike that he will be attempting to engage the Iranians, despite the consistent Iranian repudiation of Obama’s efforts to do the same during his eight years in office. In the past few days, Secretary of State Tony Blinken, a former Obama official, has stated, “The path to diplomacy is open right now” with Iran.

 

Let’s follow that thought – just who will be advising Biden on his Iran foreign policy decisions? Three key advisors have roots in the Obama Administration – we know how its Iran policy turned out. Remember the optic of pallets of cash being flown to Iran just as American hostages were released. Although Obama insisted there was no linkage between the cash deliveries and hostage releases, Iranian officials have stated unequivocally that there was.

 

Blinken previously served in the Obama Administration as Deputy National Security Advisor from 2013 to 2015 and Deputy Secretary of State from 2015 to 2017. Before that, from 2009 to 2013, he was the National Security Advisor to Vice President Biden. His focus was, among other things, Iran’s nuclear program.

 

Then we have National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan. Sullivan worked in the Obama Administration as Director of Policy Planning at the Department of State, and as Deputy Chief of Staff to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, then as National Security Advisor to Vice President Biden from 2013 to 2014. He was also a senior advisor for the Iran nuclear negotiations.

 

Rounding out the Iran team is Special Representative for Iran Robert Malley. Malley’s claim to fame (or infamy) is being the lead negotiator (or capitulator) of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, the so-called Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). In the Obama Administration, Malley was designated the National Security Council “point man” for the Middle East, as well as the special advisor on the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, ISIS – the so-called “JV team,” according to Obama. Given the state of American foreign policy in the region when Obama left office, this is not a sterling résumé.

 

Biden has tasked Malley to bring both the United States and Iran into compliance with the JCPOA. I’m not sure that is technically possible, since the United States is no longer a party to the JCPOA. I take that as an indication where the Biden Administration is heading – a new round of concessions and capitulations to the mullahs in Tehran.

 

It could be worse. If John Kerry had not been named as the jet-setting Special Envoy on Climate Change, he would likely be advising Biden on Iran. Thank God for small mercies.

 

Former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said of Biden, “He has been wrong on nearly every major foreign policy and national security issue over the past four decades.” With these three – Blinken, Sullivan, and Malley – advising Biden on Iran, I don’t expect that record to improve.

 

In addition to this Obama-rerun cast of advisors, let’s look at some of the actions of the new administration in “containing” Iran.

 

Some of the first actions Biden has taken in the region was to freeze the sale of F-35 stealth fighter jets to the United Arab Emirates. Access to this advanced aircraft was a sweetener on the UAE-Israel track of the Abrahamic Accords. Of course, the Biden Administration may not care if that historic agreement falls through – it does not appear that Biden is that friendly to Jerusalem. 

After almost a month in office, Biden has yet to call Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu – you’d think that a call to America’s closest ally in the region would have already happened, but the Democrats have generally never been fond of Israel, especially when it is led by the Likud party.

 

Biden has also frozen impending sales of advanced munitions to Saudi Arabia, a measure of disapproval of Saudi (and UAE) military operations against the Huthi-led revolt in Yemen.

 

In an even more incredulous, and in my opinion, utterly moronic, move, Biden has removed the Huthi movement – a Shi’a militant group supported, trained, and armed by Iran – from the State Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.

 

It is ironic – right out of the gate, Biden has protected a terrorist group supported by the world’s leading state supporter of terrorism, and taken punitive measures against the two countries leading the fight in support of the Yemeni government which the United States recognizes.

 

Here’s what to watch in the near future. On February 15, a group believed to be associated with Iranian-supported Iraqi Shi’a militias claimed responsibility for an attack on a U.S. coalition facility in Irbil, the capital of the Kurdish Autonomous Region in northern Iraq. The attack killed a foreign worker and wounded several U.S. contractors, as well as wounding an American servicemember.

 

What will Biden do in response? If he does nothing, he will be perceived as weak. If that is the case, he will have failed the test – get ready for increased Iranian-sponsored militia attacks on US and allied coalition facilities and personnel.

 

With the Obama Administration holdovers, the team that brought us the dangerous and disastrous JCPOA, we have some insight as to where Biden’s policy toward Iran is likely headed.

 

It is not a good place.

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United Arab Emirates and Israel to normalize relations - my thoughts

Crown Prince Muhammad bin Zayid, President Trump, Prime Minister Netanyahu

In a surprise announcement last week, President Donald Trump revealed the successful conclusion of an agreement between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the State of Israel that will lead to the establishment of full diplomatic relations.

My first reaction: this is a good thing. The Gulf Arabs are coming to the realization that Israel does not pose a threat to them unless they pose a threat to Israel. There is no reason for the Gulf states to threaten Israel except for the myth of Arab - and in some cases Muslim - solidarity against the self-described Jewish state "for the sake of the Palestinians."

Having lived and served in a variety of these countries for many years, I assess that they are tired of the Palestinian "cause" and self-victimization, the Palestinian Authority, Lebanese Hizballah, and Hamas, to name a few. They are fearful of Sunni extremism (al-Qa'idah, ISIS, etc.), yes, but much more wary of Iranian support for Shi'a terrorist groups - the aforementioned Hizballah, as well as Iraqi Shi'a militias.

These Gulf Arab nations do not live in fear of Israel. For the most part, Israel tries to conduct itself as a member of the international community when permitted to by an overwhelmingly anti-Israel United Nations and European Union. In private, many senior and influential leaders of these Arab countries, those I would call "the enlightened" ones, actually want to be more like Israel.

The Arabs only have to look at Israel's advances in science, technology, medicine, and yes, weapons. Israel enjoys a qualitative edge in virtually every category when compared to the Arab countries. Many ask why this is the case, and the tired explanation that it is only the support of the United States for Israel that allows them to be so successful is losing its voice.

The United Arab Emirates has been blessed with a decades of enlightened leadership. Even during the presidency of Shaykh Zayid bin Sultan Al Nahayyan, he allowed the next generation the leeway to try and change the Emirates into a modern society. One only need look at Dubai when I served as the acting Defense Attache to the U.S. Embassy in the UAE in 1992, and when I visited two years ago - night and day.

As part of my duties, I dealt closely with the UAE Ministry of Defense and its armed forces. I found them to be well-educated, well-motivated, and for the most part nonpolitical. That extended to their views of Israel and the Palestinians. Most were more concerned with the self-styled Shi'a hegemon just a few miles across the Gulf - Iran. You will note I am not calling it the Persian Gulf - that's one of the things about which the Gulf Arabs can get a bit testy.

At the embassy, located in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, I was the acting chief of the Defense Attache Office, the USDAO. Another section in the embassy was the security assistance office (SAO), now called the Office of Defense Partnership. These are the U.S. military officers who are there basically to sell U.S. weapons and training to the UAE. Fine officers and at time rivals - we jokingly referred to each other as the "spooks" (me) and "merchants of death (them)."

While there certainly was cooperation and coordination, at times we were acting at cross purposes. My role was to observe and report on UAE military capabilities, and to act as an intelligence liaison with the UAE Military Intelligence Directorate. Keep in mind that military attaches worldwide are declared intelligence officers, work for their country's military intelligence service - in my case, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency - and are accredited to the host country's chief of military intelligence.

When I arrived in Abu Dhabi, I made an office call on the Director of Military Intelligence, who later introduced me to Minister of Defense (since 1971 and still today) Shaykh Muhammad bin Rashid Al Maktum. If that name sounds familiar, it should - he is now Vice President of the UAE, Prime Minister of the UAE, Emir of Dubai, and as I said, Minister of Defense of the country.

"Shaykh Mo," as he asked us to call him, and I struck up a conversation about the Gulf War and my service as Central Command chief General H. Norman Schwarzkopf's interpreter. I think since we were fairly close in age, he asked if I would give him my analysis and opinion on the future of the UAE's armed forces. I knew he had been in rather heated discussions with representatives of the embassy's SAO over weapons purchases. At that time, the U.S. defense industry was pushing sales of the M-1 Abrams main battle tank and the Patriot air defense missile system.

Perhaps this is when I should have consulted with the security assistance people....

I told the shaykh/minister that in my opinion, and stressed that this was just my opinion, not the position of the U.S. Department of Defense, that he should pattern the UAE armed forces on the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), with one exception - the Israeli Army. Did I just note that the U.S. defense industry was pushing the M-1 tank?

I explained that as I saw it, the UAE's primary adversary was, and likely to be for the foreseeable future, Iran, or at least as long as it remained the Islamic Republic of Iran. Unless Iran was to develop a massive amphibious assault capability, there was little chance of a land invasion - special operations raids on oil and gas facilities, maybe, but a major ground assault? Unlikely.

Iran's major threats would come from the air, the sea (either the Gulf or Gulf of Oman), or terrorism. On point, in 2019 there was a terrorist attack on four ships in Emirati territorial waters in the Gulf of Oman off the coast of the Emirate of al-Fujayrah.

What the UAE needed, at that time and now, was a world-class air force, an effective air defense/anti-missile system, and a regionally competitive navy/coast guard. Ground forces like a national guard should suffice to face the minimal ground threat, and they needed to develop a serious counter-terrorism effort against Iran.

What the UAE did not (and does not) need is an armor-heavy army that should never deploy to fight an expeditionary war, or have to defend the territory of the UAE. They have strayed a bit from where they should be in Yemen, and I think they have learned that deploying their ground forces is not wise.

That said, buying M-1 tanks? Not a problem, but not a priority. Acquiring Patriot missiles? Yes, a high priority. F-16s? Absolutely the highest priority - get the best money can buy, and the UAE can afford it. I am satisfied to see that the UAE Air Force now flies some of the most advanced F-16s in the world.

It was a wide-ranging conversation - the shaykh was well-informed and cognizant of the current situation. I think my comments were merely confirmatory to his own thinking. However, reports of my conversation with the shaykh reached the ears of the SAO people at the embassy. I was immediately called to meet with the chief of the SAO, a soon-retiring U.S. Army colonel obviously looking for a position at Raytheon (Patriot missiles) or General Dynamics (M-1 Abrams tanks). Both are great weapon systems, but were they right for the UAE?

The security assistance function of the Department of Defense has always been suspect to us foreign area officers and intelligence specialists. Senior officers recommending ("selling") certain weapons systems to countries where they have served and then retire and end up working for companies named Raytheon, Boeing, General Dynamics, etc. It just sounds too convenient.

I told the shaykh what I thought he needed to know, not what the defense industry contractors (or the SAO officers) wanted to sell him. I was immediately challenged by the Army colonel who was chief of the embassy security assistance office. All in, he was a fine Army officer just doing his job, but peddling unnecessary arms to an ally did not seem to be kosher (pun intended) to me. Since we labored for different masters, we parted on rather icy terms.

As I said, I am pleased to see that the UAE has developed a very capable air force - if not world-class air force, it is certainly among the best in the Middle East. They have also developed a good naval and coast guard capability. I am disappointed that they have attempted to use their military as an expeditionary force in Yemen and Libya. I find it hard to believe that the Shaykh Muhammad of 1992 is allowing his forces to be used this way in 2020. The force structure we had talked about in 1992 was never meant to operate in this manner.

Still, the UAE has been a key American ally for decades. The use of the al-Dhafra air base outside Abu Dhabi has been an integral part of American air operations in the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

I often wonder why we have positioned U.S. Central Command (Forward) at the al-'Udayd (Al Udeid) air base in Qatar. Qatar is an ally, yes, but much more aligned with Turkey and its support for Islamist groups in Syria. Let's not forget that the anti-American satellite news network Al Jazeera is based in Doha, Qatar. For those of you who watch Al Jazeera English, the Arabic language network and the English language networks are totally different - the Arabic-language broadcast is exponentially much more anti-American and anti-western than the English language content. I digress.

What is driving the change in the UAE that they are willing to normalize relations with Israel? Easy - Iran. I guess we owe a debit of gratitude to former President Barack Obama and his terminally ineffectual Secretary of State John Kerry.

If Obama and Kerry had not spent so much time and treasure on the ill-advised Iran nuclear deal, the so-called Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), countries like the UAE and Saudi Arabia would not be so worried about a potential nuclear-armed Iran. (See my article from earlier this month, Saudi Arabia and China nuclear cooperation - is Riyadh seeking nukes?) The prospect of a Joe Biden-Kamala Harris administration and the probability of another ill-advised American effort to befriend the world's leading sponsor of terrorism is of great concern to our Gulf Arab allies.

I hope the United States is able to work with the leaders of Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait to follow in the UAE's footsteps. Saudi Arabia, who also cooperates with Israel silently, may take a bit longer.

The Israelis are smart to try and work with the Sunni Arabs. They share a common threat: the Islamic Republic of Iran and its Shi'a syndicate in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.

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Saudi Arabia and China nuclear cooperation - is Riyadh seeking nukes?

Saudi DF-3A missiles on parade (2014)

A recent story in The New York Times claims that the U.S. intelligence community believes Saudi Arabia is working with China on a program that could potentially lead to a nuclear weapons capability. According to the paper, Saudi Arabia may be in talks with China to develop an indigenous nuclear fuel production capability, a step often seen as the initial phase of a nuclear weapons program.

American intelligence agencies have discovered at least two facilities in the kingdom that may be undisclosed nuclear facilities. In addition to a small nuclear research facility near Riyadh, the Saudis are in discussions with five companies to build two reactors, with a plan to have 16 reactors on line by 2030. While the United States may believe Saudi Arabia with nuclear energy is no problem, it is concerned that a nuclear-armed Saudi Arabia might trigger a wider acquisition of the weapons in the area.

I think that puts the cart before the horse. It is not Saudi Arabia's potential acquisition of nuclear weapons that will catalyze a regional arms race - it is Iran. Most sane people are under no illusion that Iran does not have a nuclear weapons program. Despite the Obama Administration's ill-advised and abysmally-negotiated nuclear deal with Iran, the Iranians have continued their quest for a nuclear weapon.

Skeptics will claim that the International Atomic Energy Agency, tasked with monitoring Iranian compliance with the agreement, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), has found no evidence of Iranian violations of the agreement. Absence of proof is not proof of compliance, it merely means the IAEA has not found any violations. How could they? Although the JCPOA allows inspections of Iranian military facilities, the Iranians refuse to allow access, and the IAEA will not call them on it. Why not? The answer: pressure from the Europeans. The Europeans are not worried about an Iranian nuclear weapons program - Iran is not threatening them or their allies. So-called Iranian "compliance" with the JCPOA allows them to peddle their wares to the world's leading sponsor of terrorism.

Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability will trigger an immediate Saudi response. While I deplore the release of classified documents by the Wikileaks crowd, some of the information is interesting. Here is an excerpt from a February 2010 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh to the Secretary of State. (10RIYADH178, SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY CLINTON'S FEB 15-16 VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA, classified SECRET NOFORN. (My highlighting.)

9. (S/NF) COUNTERING IRAN: We expect that Saudi Arabia will continue to develop its ties with China, in part to counterbalance relations with the West. While the King's preference is to cooperate with the U.S., he has concluded that he needs to proceed with his own strategy to counter Iranian influence in the region, which includes rebuilding Riyadh-Cairo-Damascus coordination, supporting Palestinian reconciliation, supporting the Yemeni government, and expanding relations with non-traditional partners such as Russia, China, and India to create diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran that do not directly depend on U.S. help. The King told General Jones that if Iran succeeded in developing nuclear weapons, everyone in the region would do the same, including Saudi Arabia.

Saudi officials have also gone public, stating to a The New York Times reporter, "It would be completely unacceptable to have Iran with a nuclear capability and not the Kingdom."

Unlike some of the intelligence analysts who fear Riyadh might turn to China for the technology to develop weapons, or try to just acquire them from China, I don't find that likely. Why do some analysts think that the Saudis may turn to Beijing? Here we need to go back a few decades to 1987. I remember this well - I was with the Defense Intelligence Agency and followed this very closely.

In 1987, commander of the Royal Saudi Air Defense Forces, Lieutenant General (Prince) Khalid bin Sultan bin 'Abd al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud made several secret (or so he thought) trips to China. For those who do not understand Saudi names or know the leaders, let me elaborate. Khalid is the son of then-Minister of Defense Sultan, son of then-King Fahd. Khalid was later the commander of the Arab/Muslim troops in Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

Khalid was in China to acquire ballistic missiles. In 1987 and 1988, Iran and Iraq had been at war for over seven years. In 1988, Iraqi engineers modified the Soviet-provided Scud missiles into a longer range missiles dubbed the al-Husayn (after Muhammad's grandson and imam, not Saddam Husayn) by increasing the size of the fuel tank and decreasing the size of the warhead.

Tehran and Baghdad became almost nightly targets in early 1988. Having been in Baghdad in 1988 on the receiving end of Iranian Scud missiles, and later in Riyadh in 1991 on the receiving end of Iraqi al-Husayn missiles, I can attest to the impact on the population.

The Saudis wanted their own ballistic missile capability, but were not able to convince the United States to supply it. So, they turned to China. The Chinese provided Saudi Arabia with about 30 DF-3A medium-range missiles, armed with conventional warheads. The missile is very inaccurate, but since it was designed to carry a nuclear warhead, that was not an issue. It was the beginning of what today is known as the Royal Saudi Strategic Missile Force. The inaccuracy, as well as the time and difficulty in refueling the liquid-fueled missiles, led to the decision to not employ them during Desert Storm. It would have caused unnecessary civilian casualties and achieved very little militarily. Coalition airpower was much more effective.

The Saudi DF-3A missiles had not been seen publicly until they were displayed at a military exercise in 2014. The photo above is from the parade at the end of the exercise. Watch the video here - the caption reads: His Highness the Crown Prince attends the closing ceremony of Exercise "Sword of 'Abdullah" in Hafr al-Batin.

Why buy an inaccurate missile if you were not going to acquire the nuclear warhead that makes the system viable? I think it was just the first step in a long-range plan.

If the Saudis are not going to get nuclear warheads for the their Chinese-made missiles, where would they get them? Many of us who have followed events in the Kingdom for years believe the Saudis have had a plan for years. They will acquire the warheads from Pakistan. After all, they funded the Pakistani nuclear weapons program.

According to retired Pakistani Major General Feroz Hassan Khan, Saudi Arabia provided generous financial support to Pakistan that enabled the completion of the nuclear weapons program. It is possible that the Saudis provided the finding with the proviso that if needed, the Pakistanis would provide warheads for the DF-3A. Notorious Pakistani engineer AQ Khan revealed that Pakistan has the capability to produce such compatible warheads.

If Iran develops a nuclear weapons capability, it is almost certain Saudi Arabia will acquire that capability as well. It will not be limited to Saudi Arabia - other countries will do the same. I suspect we will see research and development in Turkey and Egypt, and possibly the United Arab Emirates.

Look for the Saudis to go shopping in Islamabad, not Beijing.

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What does withdrawal of US troops from Iraq mean? - American military expert explains

US Central Command Gen. Frank McKenzie paid an official visit to Baghdad for meeting with Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi on Tuesday. In the meeting, Gen. McKenzie announced a possible reduction of US troops in Iraq. Apart from this US withdrawal of Germany was announced previous months this year. Withdrawal or shifting military troops caused a great interest among experts and media. 

In order to find the answers about the US moves, Eurasia Diary took the opinions of military expert Rick Francona.

Rick Francona is an author, commentator and media military analyst. He is a retired United States Air Force intelligence officer with experience in the Middle East, including tours of duty with the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency. 

Q. Why does the US withdraw troops from Iraq and Germany? Does it mean Iran and Russia are not threats to the US like they were before? 

A. Let me address Germany—and Europe—first. The press release from the Department of Defense said the removal of troops from Germany will “enhance Russian deterrence, strengthen NATO, reassure Allies, improve strategic U.S. flexibility....” 

 The repositioning—not necessarily withdrawal—of American forces is long overdue. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, there has been no real need to maintain that much force presence in Germany. However, I am not advocating we return them to the United States. With the growing threat from Russia and the expansion of NATO to the east, I would hope that the United States is going to move the forces forward to either Poland or Romania or both. 

 Move the troops closer to where they will be needed, send a message to the Russians that we’re there to support/strengthen NATO while bringing the families and the accompanying unnecessary support infrastructure home. If we are going to have forces deployed opposite the Russians, keep them lean and mean—more tooth, less tail. 

As for Iraq, American troops returned to Iraq for one reason, to assist the Iraqis in their fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Remember, after what I believe was the premature withdrawal of US forces from Iraq by President Obama in 2011, the Iraqi Army was basically hollowed out by corruption, mismanagement, and a lack of leadership epitomized by the disastrous government of Nuri al-Maliki. That army collapsed as ISIS took the city of Mosul in 2014.

As ISIS continued to move south towards Baghdad and expand its territorial holdings in the country, it was clear that Iraqi security forces were incapable of stopping the group without external assistance. That assistance came in the form of a small US ground presence supported by massive amounts of coalition airpower. 

Unfortunately, al-Maliki also requested, and received, support from Iran, in the form of a series of Public Mobilization Units (hashed)—Iraqi Shi’a militias trained and armed (and I maintain, led) by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The hand of IRGC-Qods Force commander Qassem Solimani was readily apparent. 

With the increase in the capabilities of the US-revitalized Iraqi security forces (police, counterterrorism units, and military), a continued presence of American forces in the presence of an Iranian-dominated Iraqi government, has become no longer viable. Most Arab Iraqis don’t want a continued US presence, and there is little stomach in the United States for keeping troops there. Yes, Iran remains a regional threat to American interests in the region, but it will have to be addressed in other ways. The US does not need forces in Iraq to maintain freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf. 

Q. We observe that the Middle East has become a Russian-Turkish battlefield. Does the US think it is better to withdraw and let two powers weaken each other? 

A. We now have Russia and Turkey involved in two proxy wars in the region: Syria and Libya. While we have serious issues with Turkish “adventurism” on the part of President Erdoğan in both theaters, the bottom line remains: Russia presents a threat to the United States across a variety of fronts; Turkey is a key NATO ally. 

That said, Turkey has been singularly unhelpful in the US-led coalition fight against ISIS since the beginning of the effort in 2014. Erdoğan’s efforts were more focused on anti-Kurdish operations in Syria than on defeating ISIS – it was as if that the Turkish leader was supporting ISIS at the expense of the Kurds. Virtually all of Turkey’s incursions into north and northwest Syria did nothing to promote the defeat of ISIS, only to create what appears to be a semi-permanent Turkish and Turkish-backed Islamist presence in the country. 

Are we looking at the reintroduction of the Ottomans? Hardly, just a quagmire/standoff between Erdoğan and Putin, at the expense of the Syrian population caught in the crossfire. 

Libya is no better. While Turkish intervention has turned the tide of the fighting in favor of the GNA over the LNA, nothing seems to have been resolved. You have the Turkish-supported GNA on one side against the Russian-backed, Haftar-led LNA, which is now also supported by US allies Egypt and the UAE. Add what now appears to be Syrian government support to the LNA, while Turkey deploys Syrian mercenaries to fight for the GNA. 

This is a recipe for escalation. Elsewhere in the region, Erdoğan has acquired a military base in Qatar. This is more unnecessary and unhelpful Ottoman adventurism from “Sultan Recep.” He should focus on cleaning up his current debacles before creating a third. 

Q. The FBI director says China is a threat to US security. Can we expect the US will shift troops from these areas to Asia-Pacific? 

A. China is emerging as the key long-term future threat to US security, likely to surpass the Russians in the not-too-distant future. Although President Trump has slowed down the Obama “pivot to Asia,” the United States will eventually have to increase either its own force structure in the region, or alternately enter into a broad multinational alliance with countries like Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam, even India, and Australia to confront growing Chinese power and its seemingly willingness to use it. 

Chinese handling of the coronavirus has cost them some goodwill. The US and its allies should capitalize on Chinese malign behavior directed at the rest of the world and attempt to isolate Beijing to make them pay a price for unleashing—wittingly or unwittingly (although many believe it was the former)—the virus on the rest of the world. 

Interviewer: Ulvi Ahmedli

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"Iran is the main obstacle" - my interview in Eurasia Diary

I was interviewed by Eurasia Diary's Ulvi Ahmedli on U.S.-Iraq relations. (Read it on their website.)

'Iran is main obstacle' - American military analyst explains US-Iraq relations

2020 started with the reigniting of conflicts in the Middle East and followed global pandemics. The Middle East became burning pot again by the murdering of Iranian general Qasem Soleimani. Following the death of prominent Iranian General operating in the region, COVID-19 pandemics gave opportune situation for the reactivation of ISIS and attacks of militants against US bases.

Lt. Gen. Pat White, the commander of Operation Inherent Resolve said that ISIS claimed 152 attacks in 2019 and there were 151 claimed attacks in 2020 and according to CNN this year attacks occurred in recent weeks. These occasions left Iraq’s security fragile and urge strategic relations with neighbors and the US. The State Department of the United States offered strategic dialogue with the Iraqi government. The new government of Iraq under Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi seems positive on the relations with the US. Mike Pompeo was among the first politicians who send congratulations to him.

On the analyzing of the tight situation in Iraq and the relations with the US, EDNews.net took the interview with retired U.S. Air Force intelligence officer Lieutenant Colonel Rick Francona who was involved in several missions in Iraq and the Persian Gulf.

- The US and Iraq have common security interests in the fight against ISIS. Why can’t these two states defeat such a terrorist organization? What are the main obstacles?

- Great question. The problem is multifaceted. ISIS is enjoying a resurgence in the Sunni areas of the county, taking advantage of the world’s focus on COVID-19, while the Iranian-backed PMU militias (hashd) are more intent on attacking American forces in the country at the behest of their masters in Tehran than actually fighting ISIS.

The fight against ISIS is further exacerbated by the volatile internal political situation in Iraq as the Iraqis struggle to find a government that is acceptable to all parties. Iranian influencers have permeated virtually every state institution. The result is a government that is (correctly) viewed by the Sunnis an Iranian-controlled Shi’a cabal that does not represent their interests. It is no wonder that ISIS is finding willing supporters.

So, if the fight against ISIS is not going to involve regular Iraqi military units and the counterterrorism forces, but rely on the PMU militias, they will have no access to U.S. intelligence, and more importantly, U.S./Coalition air support. Without it, they PMU will continue to lose fighters to ISIS.

As long as the Iraqi government is controlled by the Iranians, it is doubtful real progress will be made in the effort to eliminate ISIS once and for all. The main obstacle is Iran.

- The US seems to have failed in institution-building, enhancing the government in Iraq, which also affects insecurity in the region. What are your views about this? Why it is hard to build a sustainable government in Iraq?

- True enough – America has failed at its attempts at “nation-building” in Iraq. Why? Detractors often cite the successful Marshall Plan following World War II in which America helped rebuild Europe, but have failed to do so in the Middle East.

I argue that this is not a valid comparison. Rebuilding Europe was about restoring democracies that had existed prior to the Nazis, while the effort in Iraq was about creating a democracy and functioning state institutions in an area where they had never truly existed.

I am not sure there will ever be a sustainable government in Iraq until all of the people, all of the religious and ethnic groups, have actual input to the composition and functioning of that government.

As long as the Iranians continue to push their Shi’a agenda and virtually control the government in Baghdad, there will not be a participatory government. The Sunnis and non-Arab ethnic groups will continue to feel marginalized.

- What kind of Iraq does the US want in the Middle East?

- I hate to keep focusing on the Iranian regime, but it is the main obstacle to most of the problems in Iraq. The United States wants a united Iraq with a government that represents and serves all of its citizens with no outside interference. Ideally, it would become a partner in regional security initiatives, which, in the American lexicon, is to counter Iranian malign behavior in the region.

I don’t see it any time soon.

- Currently, what are US interests in Iraq? Because the Trump Administration is going to withdraw troops from the country, could we understand this move as the reduction of US interests in Iraq?

- The reason the United States has had its forces in Iraq since 2014 is to continue the fight against ISIS. As the threat of ISIS diminished, the need for American forces decreased.

Of course, the resurgence of ISIS following the loss of its territory and the inability of the Iraqi security forces to defeat the organization has required a continued American presence. Despite the efforts of the PMUs – which seem to have been given the mission by the Iraqi government – ISIS has not only survived but has become an even greater threat. As long as the Iranians are more focused on the American presence than defeating ISIS, the situation will not improve.

- The unilateral approach of Iran to the region is also another problem for US interests. Do you believe in that the US and Iran could reach a common agreement on the security of the region? Which situation is needed for forming this agreement?

- No, I don’t, and I hope the Trump Administration does not believe that any accommodation with the Islamic Republic can work. Just look at the disastrous JCPOA “nuclear deal” – the regime cannot be trusted.

If the Iranians want an end to the tensions in the Gulf, all they have to do is stop causing them.

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Syria resumes sanctioned flights from Iran that US says are carrying weapons

Note: I provided much of the information in this article by journalist Albin Szakola for The National, a leading English-language news service based in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.

Syria resumes sanctioned flights from Iran that US says are carrying weapons

- Damascus-owned cargo jet fleet paused operations because of Covid-19

Albin Szakola - April 21, 2020

A Syrian-government operated cargo jet fleet that the United States says is carrying weapons from Iran has resumed deliveries after a pause caused by the outbreak of Covid-19.

On Monday afternoon Ilyushin IL-76 jet, registered as YK-ATA, flew to Latakia from Tehran Mehrabad International Airport, which is used by Iran's air force, aviation data portal FlightRadar24 said.

The flight was the first in more than a month from Iran by a fleet of cargo jets ostensibly operated by Syria Airlines, the country's civilian flag carrier, the website said.

On March 12, another Ilyushin IL-76 jet, registered as YK-ATB, flew from Tehran to Damascus, the day after YK-ATA flew the same route. Damascus International Airport announced it was not accepting international commercial traffic 10 days later.

Hours after YK-ATA touched down in Latakia, Syria's Transport Ministry said Syrian Airlines was resuming international cargo flights into and out of the country. The U.S. sanctioned Syrian Airlines and its fleet of cargo planes in 2013 for allegedly ferrying cargo on behalf of the Iran's elite Qods Force, the foreign operations arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Hizballah helped to organize the flights, which were taking mortars, small arms, rockets and light anti-aircraft guns to Syria at the time, the U.S. Department of Treasury said.

Lieutenant Colonel Rick Francona, a retired U.S. Air Force intelligence officer (and former air attache at the American Embassy in Damascus) who closely follows Iranian flights to Syria, said the jets "belong to the Syrian Air Force 585th Transport Squadron of the 29th Air Brigade."

"The Syrians try to maintain the fiction that all of the 29th Brigade's aircraft are civilian airliners," Colonel Francona said.

The jets are mainly used in an air bridge to al-Qamishly, where the Syrian government has an enclave in the largely Kurdish controlled north-east of the country, he said. They also take military equipment into Syria to support IRGC operations, Colonel Francona said.

He believed the YK-ATA flight on Monday "was a resumption of the past IRGC resupply flights."

Unlike Monday's flight to Latakia International Airport, which shares its facilities with Russia's Humaymim military airbase, past flights by Syria's cargo fleet have normally landed in Damascus.

"It will be interesting to see if Latakia/Humaymim becomes the newest stopover point for the flights," Colonel Francona said.

He said the base was safe from Israeli air strikes.

Israel has carried out strikes on Syrian airports, including Damascus International Airport, in recent years.

State media reported that Syrian air defenses intercepted an Israeli attack near the eastern Homs province city of Palmyra on Monday evening and shot down "hostile targets."

On March 31, Syria said it had intercepted an Israeli strike in the country's central Homs province, state news agency Sana reported.

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights in Britain said Israel attacked Al Sha'yrat airbase after a cargo plane flew out.

Monday's flight from Iran comes soon after a similar flight by an Iranian cargo plane. An Ilyushin IL-76 Pouya Air jet flew into Latakia on Saturday afternoon, FlightRadar24 data showed. The US sanctioned Pouya Air in 2014 for working on behalf of the Qods Force to take illicit cargo, including weapons, to Syria.

Iranian Foreign minister Javad Zarif this week visited Damascus to meet Syrian President Bashar Al Assad.

(Updated: April 22, 2020 2:02am)

Read the original article on The National website.

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Middle East oil pumping stations and military air bases

Tiyas Air Base, also known as T-4, located east of Hims, Syria© Google Earth

Over the last year, there have been a series of confrontations between the Israelis on one side, and the Iranians and their Syrian allies on the other, at an airbase in western Syria. The air base is located between the Syrian cities of Hims (Homs) and Tadmur (Palmyra). The base has been identified as both Tiyas, and as T-4, depending on the media outlet doing the reporting.

In the above image, the Arabic descriptions give both names. Which is correct? Actually, both are.

The name Tiyas comes from the name of the closest village. It is customary in the Syrian Air Force to name bases and installations for the nearest city, town, or village. However, the base is not just close to the village of Tiyas, it is also close to the location of an oil pumping station in Tiyas designated as T-4. The T-4 designator goes back to the early days of oil exploration and transport in Iraq as far back as the 1930s.

This map shows the oil pipelines used to move oil from the Kirkuk oilfields in Iraq to Mediterranean ports - Haifa, (now in Israel but then in British-mandated Palestine) and Tarablus al-Sham (Tripoli, in French-mandated Lebanon).

The K-prefix indicates pumping stations on the Kirkuk pipeline, which transported the oil from Kirkuk to a station near the city of al-Hadithah. At Hadithah, the oil was routed into the Tripoli triple pipeline or the Haifa double pipeline. Pumping stations on the Tripoli pipeline are designated with a T prefix, while the Haifa pipeline stations are designated with an H prefix.

Not only were the pipelines accessible by the series of roads paralleling the lines, the Iraq Petroleum Company constructed private airstrips to move men, supplies, parts, etc. between stations and facilities. Many of the airstrips still exist in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan. Many of them were converted into civil airports, some into military air bases, and some into shared civil/military facilities. K-1, K-3, T-3, T-4, H-2, H-3, H-5 all were/are major air bases. The current T-4 air base is about four miles west of the original Iraq Petroleum Company airstrip.

Tiyas was the location of the fourth pumping station on the al-Hadithah-Tripoli pipeline. There are three such stations in Syria, all in use today. T-2 is located just inside the Syrian border near the city of Albu Kamal, the site of a large Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) base populated by both IRGC personnel as well as Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi'a militia groups.

The station at T-3 is now the shared military air base and civilian airport in the city of Tadmur (also known as Palmyra, site of ancient Aramean, Arabic, and Roman ruins).

The air base at T-4 is used by not only the Syrian Air Force, but by Russian forces in Syria, and elements of the IRGC. Having been there a few times, I can vouch for the description as being "in the middle of nowhere."

Note: Given the political situation following the 1948 creation of Israel, and later political turmoil in both Syria and Lebanon, the Iraqis constructed an alternate pipeline from al-Hadithah to Faysh Khabur on the Turkish border, then west to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. It is still in use today.




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Fallout from the killing of Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani

Iran-backed militia members outside US Embassy in Baghdad
Note red boxes contain names of Kata'ib al-Imam 'Ali (left) and Kata'ib Hizballah (right)

These are my responses to an interview request from Eurasia Diary. I will post a link to the actual article once it is published.


Q. Colonel Francona, attacks organized by radical Shi’a groups on the U.S. embassy in Baghdad protesting U.S. airstrikes against Iran-backed militia Kata’ib Hizballah on the last day of 2019. As a result, the U.S. Secretary of Defense ordered the deployment of additional troops to the region. An American drone strike killed Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani. Do you think that such actions could ignite a war between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran, in Iraq, or elsewhere in the region?

A. I have no doubt there will be reactions, both by Iraqi Shi’a groups/militias, and possibly even the Iranians directly. While in the past, we have seen the Iranians conducting their operations in the region via their Iraqi, Lebanese, even Afghan and Pakistani proxies, the U.S. killing of Qasem Soleimani may cause a direct Iranian response on an American target. I suspect it will be against an American target in the region, possibly the Persian Gulf.

A quick word on the killing of Soleimani. There has been speculation in some media that the intelligence used to support the decision to kill Soleimani and Kata’ib Hizballah leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis was not as definitive as portrayed by U.S. Administration officials.

My response is that there has been sufficient cause for years to eliminate Soleimani. It was Soleimani who was behind proxy Iraqi Shi’a militias which caused the death of over 600 American troops, and the wounding of hundreds more. That alone, to me, is enough reason to kill him. Killing al-Muhandis? A bonus.

It appears that Iran’s initial response, other than the almost elevation of Soleimani to sainthood in the Shi’a- controlled media in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon, has been a non-binding resolution in the Iraqi majlis an-nuwab (Council of Representatives, or Parliament) to expel “foreign” forces from the country.

Note that this was what we in the United States would call a “party line” vote – the Shi’a representatives, to no one’s surprise, overwhelming followed Tehran’s urging to demand the removal of coalition – but aimed at the United States – forces from the country. I suspect this was for domestic consumption and an attempt by Shi’a lawmakers to appease their masters in Tehran.

The Iraqi majlis should be careful what they wish for. There is little support in the United States for continued American presence in Iraq. Most Americans understand the need to continue the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), but are weary of the actions of the Iranians in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, etc.

I have even heard what I believe is a short-sighted claim that since we (the United States) no longer are dependent on any foreign oil or gas, we should not be putting our troops at risk in the Middle East.

Let’s assume for the sake of argument that the calls for the removal of American and coalition forces becomes actual legislation in Iraq – I don’t think it will but let’s examine that possibility. Are the Iraqis – even with their Iranian masters’ support – capable of defeating the remaining ISIS presence in the country? A look at Iraqi operations would tell you it’s not likely. The Iraqis still rely heavily on U.S. intelligence and airstrikes to take the fight to ISIS.

In the unlikely event there is actual legislation to expel U.S. forces, it will be 2011 all over again.


Q. About 2011, you have repeatedly said that it was major mistake for the U.S. to leave Iraq in 2011, in essence leaving it to Iran. Do you still believe this?

A. I do. I had to laugh when I read the comments of one of the Shi’a legislators today – it may have even been the prime minister, who is essentially an Iranian puppet. He said (and this is my interpretation of his remarks in Arabic) that there were no foreign forces in Iraq from 2011 to 2014, and that they did just fine.

Seriously? Let’s remember what actually happened. With no residual U.S. troops in the country (thanks to the decision of President Obama to not push for a new Status of Forces Agreement), the Shi’a proved themselves incapable of resisting the bribery, graft, and corruption that effectively hollowed out the Iraqi Army, a once-proud army that collapsed in the face of an inferior ISIS force.

Are the Iranians going to be able to replicate the capabilities of the anti-ISIS coalition? I doubt it – the Iranians are not in Iraq for the Iraqis, they are in it for the Iranians. As the self-appointed guardians and leaders of all things Shi’a, the Iranians believe they are destined to be the key power broker in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and as much of Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and even Azerbaijan as they can.


Q. After the killing of Soleimani, what are the next steps likely to be taken by Washington in Iraq?

A. Good question. I hope that after the initial anger wears off, cooler heads will prevail and the two sides can continue to work towards the elimination of ISIS, and the eventual development of Iraq as secular republic.

Do I think those things will happen? Yes and no. On one hand, the Iraqis will realize that to defeat ISIS completely, they need U.S. support.

On the other hand, the killing of Soleimani was a serious and visceral blow to the pro-Iranian groups – the Shi’a proxies if you will – which rely on Tehran for leadership and funding, by what they believe is “the Great Satan” in Iranian parlance. They regard this as just the latest attack on the Islamic Republic by the United States.

We’ve been tap-dancing around a major confrontation between the United States and Iran since 1979. This event may bring the animosity between the two governments to a head. If there is a lethal Iranian attack on an American facility, I think we have to assume that there will be an American response – I believe there will have to be. Anyone who is watching the region cannot help but notice the buildup of American military capabilities. The Iranians should be very circumspect in their next moves.

One last comment – unless something changes in Iraq, it will continue to be a failed state. The government and its institutions do not serve the interests of the Iraqi people. I think the Iraqi people are beginning to realize that they are in effect a vassal state of Iran. The recent spate of protests against Iranian influence indicate that awakening.

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The power vacuum in Iraq was exploited by the Iranians - US Intelligence Officer - Exclusive to Eurasia Diary

Iraq at the present time is one of the important countries in the Middle East is subjected much attention at the scene of international politics, due to collapse of the government as results of mass protests, rallies, bloody clashes between them and security forces, also foreign countries strive for extending their influence in the country. Iraq has now covered difficult situation and deadlock need strong and capable government to resettle political, economic and social problems.

Eurasia Diary's highlight interview with retired intelligence officer Lieutenant Colonel Rick Francona who was involved in several missions in Iraq and the Persian Gulf during the Saddam period.

Rick Francona is an author, commentator and media military analyst. He is a retired United States Air Force intelligence officer with experience in the Middle East, including tours of duty with the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Q. Prime Minister of Iraq, Abdul-Mahdu has resigned, now caretaker government is going to be formed, and mass protests continue in Baghdad and other cities of the country. From your viewpoint, could current situation in Iraq lead country to deep and unsolved long-term destabilization?

I think the country is already in a “deep and unresolved long-term destabilization,” and it’s not a new phenomenon. The country has been unstable since the removal of Saddam Husayn – it was his brutal authoritarian rule and rather skillful manipulation of the various constituencies that kept the country together. Once he was no longer in the picture, the internal pressures have taken their toll.

A lot is made of the obvious Sunni Arab, Shi’a Arab, and Kurdish competition for resources and political power. The power vacuum created by the removal of Saddam was exploited by the Iranians to a large extent, and to a lesser degree by the Turks hoping to gain more influence in the north with the Turkmen minority and to continue to contain the Kurds.

The real winners here had been the Iranians and their influence over the Shi’a majority. However, they have overplayed their hand – not only are the Sunnis resentful of the Iranian influence in the government, now even the Shi’a parties are resentful of Tehran’s attempts to control events in Iraq.

That is what is driving the current demonstrations and protests.

Q. According to numerous news, majority in mass protests against Iran-backed government belong to Shia sector. We have not seen yet that Sunnis and Kurd join demonstrations. Is it mean that there is big hostility among Iraqi Shias to Iran?

Yes, surprisingly so. The Iranians believe themselves to be the guardians, and by extension, the leaders of all the Shi’a, regardless of location. We see this in their attempts to extend their influence not only in Shi’a-majority Iraq, but also in Bahrain, Syria (conveniently considering the ‘Alawis to be Shi’a), Lebanon, Yemen, the eastern province of Saudi Arabia, and even Azerbaijan.

The Iraqis have grown to resent Tehran’s heavy-handed approach to Iraq. The Iranians are attempting to use not only Iraq, but Lebanon and Syria in their efforts to control the “Shi’a Crescent” – controlling the area from Tehran to Beirut. One could say they have done a fair job in acquiring influence to do just that. Now we see pushback in both Iraq and Lebanon. It remains to be seen how effective the Iranians will be in retaining its influence.

Q. Some media outlets claim that Iraqi security forces spoke Farsi, while they were violently dispersing protests. Is there any evidence that reveal Iran intervention in bloody crushing of protests were struggling overthrow of its backed government?

I have seen the reports. I am sure the Iranians are playing a role, but I am not sure if they are actually involved in the violent repression of the Iraqis. If that was proven to be true, I think it would hurt Iran’s efforts to regain its level of influence. Iranian Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani is ruthless, but not stupid.

Q. Could we think that Iraq is now unfolded to the area of political battle between Iran and United States?

The political battle between Iran and the United States will go on regardless of what happens in Iraq. While Iraq is important to the United States in the continuing fight against the Islamic State/ISIS, the differences between Washington and Tehran are much larger than what happens in Iraq.

Q. What kind of government in future could find magic formula to prevent tensions, resolve social and economic problems, and ensure safety in Iraq?

Ah, the million-dollar question. I can envision a government that could do all that, but so I believe it will happen? I hope so, but I remain skeptical. There will not be a resolution until the Shi’a are willing to allow the Sunnis to participate in a meaningful way. Since the removal of Saddam Husayn and the rise of Iranian (again, guardians and leaders of all things Shi’a) influence, the Shi’a have used the power of their majority at the ballot box to run roughshod over the Sunnis. Only when that changes will there be a chance of a resolution.


Interviewed by Abdullayev Yunis. Read the original here.

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President Trump's decision to call off strikes on Iran - why?

U.S. Navy RQ-4 drone, tracking and video of shootdown

Following the shootdown of a U.S. Navy RQ-4 Global Hawk unmanned reconnaissance aircraft over the Gulf of Oman on June 20 by air defense units of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), President Trump ordered - and cancelled - retaliatory missile strikes on Iranian targets.

Although the Iranians claim that the aircraft had violated Iranian airspace, video footage taken from another surveillance aircraft (probably a U.S. Navy P-8 Poseidon) annotated with geographic coordinates clearly indicates the incident occurred about 20 miles from the Iranian coast, well-beyond the 12 miles recognized as sovereign airspace.

Following the strike, the commander of U.S. Air Forces Central (the USAF component of U.S. Central Command) provided scant details of the incident, reiterating that the aircraft had remained in either international or allied (United Arab Emirates and Sultanate of Oman) airspace at all times, never entering either Iran's recognized or even claimed airspace.

After briefing Congressional leaders of both parties at the White House, the President ordered preparations for strikes on Iranian targets. As these preparations were underway, the President cancelled the strikes.

The President explained via Twitter:

On Monday they shot down an unmanned drone flying in International Waters. We were cocked & loaded to retaliate last night on 3 different sights when I asked, how many will die. 150 people, sir, was the answer from a General. 10 minutes before the strike I stopped it, not proportionate to shooting down an unmanned drone. I am in no hurry, our Military is rebuilt, new, and ready to go, by far the best in the world. Sanctions are biting & more added last night. Iran can NEVER have Nuclear Weapons, not against the USA, and not against the WORLD!

Of course, the media/pundit-sphere erupted, mostly along party or factional lines. Hawks decried it as a sign of weakness, Democrats were relieved - Senate Minority Leader Schumer had worried about the President "bumbling" into another war.

A few think-tank analysts thought it was a smart move, while others compared it to former President Obama's failure to enforce his own red line when the Syrian regime used chemical weapons on its own citizens.

What do I think?

Initially, I thought that we would have to respond militarily to the downing of the aircraft or risk being seen as Obama 2.0, talking tough and doing nothing, acquiescing to the Iranians yet again.

The Iranians, like most others in the Middle East, understand and respect power and decisive action. They also recognize and exploit weakness.

However, I agree with the President's cancellation of this particular target set. A military response that kills 150 people - although these would almost certainly be IRGC personnel, not innocent civilians - is, in the President's words, disproportionate. I have no problem with disproportionate retaliatory strikes, but concede the point on the high number of deaths.

Certainly the targeting shop at CENTCOM intelligence can come up with a target set that sends an overwhelming message, a disproportionate message if you will, that the United States will not tolerate further attacks, yet with less risk to personnel.

The unofficial unsanctioned motto of the Air Force is "kill people, break things." In this case, I would opt for the latter, but break a lot of things. If the Iranians continue to attack or escalate, the gloves come off and we remind the mullahs who they are trying to intimidate. Make it known if they kill more Americans, we will redefine "disproportionate."

Should the President have ordered the attack to proceed and U.S. missiles killed over 100 IRGC fighters, it would allow Iran to play the role of victim rather than perpetrator. That Iranian stance might succeed with our JCPOA*-loving European allies who desperately want to continue to peddle their wares to Iran. If we "over react," they may not be willing to re-impose sanctions when Iran openly violates the JCPOA.

I believe they have been violating it from the outset by refusing to make the required possible military dimension declaration, the so-called PMD. In addition, since the International Atomic Energy Agency refuses to compel Iran to open their military sites for inspection - allowed under the JCPOA -they have no way of knowing if Iran is in compliance. I am guessing they are not.

All that said, the shootdown of the aircraft requires a response. Unless the Iranians admit an error - the President gave them an out when he said he was not sure the action was intentional and perhaps it was a general who gave the order to engage the RQ-4 in error - and offer compensation for the loss, there will have to be consequences.

I don't see that happening. So, break things - break lots of expensive things.

_________________
* Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action - the Iran nuclear deal of 2015 from which the United States withdrew in May 2018.

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