May 24, 2019

Memorial Day 2019

As I do most years, I write an article for Memorial Day discussing my thoughts on those who have made the ultimate sacrifice for this country.

It is my way of reminding everyone that although the Memorial Day weekend marks the unofficial beginning of the summer season and is a great opportunity to pick up appliances on sale at the local big-box store, the day is meant to pay tribute to those who went off to fight our wars, but did not return.

Since the Revolutionary War, over 1,100,000 Americans have died in our wars. Almost 100,000 of those were on my watch (1970-1998). That's too many.

The photograph above is a compilation of the 17 members of the 6994th Security Squadron who were killed in action in the skies of Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War. All of them were aircrew members on EC-47 reconnaissance aircraft, affectionately called by those who flew on, and loved, them - "Electric Goons."

The unofficial nickname is based on the E designator for "electronic" and the common nickname of the DC-3/C-47 Skytrain, the "Gooney Bird." Note the tail numbers of the aircraft listed below - the first two digits indicate the year the aircraft was procured, in these cases by the U.S. Army Air Forces in 1943 through 1945.

EC-47 "Electric Goons" over Vietnam

These 17 airmen were communications intercept operators and analysts, monitoring Morse code and voice communications between Viet Cong (VC) units, and later communications of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA). That required the linguists to be trained in the Hanoi dialect of Vietnamese, markedly different from the dialect spoken in South Vietnam.

The aircrews, operating as a team on multiple aircraft, were able to locate VC and NVA units by employing a technique known as airborne radio direction finding (ARDF) - basically triangulating the signals. Once an emitter of interest was detected, operators on multiple aircraft would all take "cuts" on the signal, passing the data to the navigators who plotted the location of the target. The resulting intelligence - target coordinates - was passed on to battle managers who more often than not directed air strikes at those locations. It was an effective mission.

Monitoring these communications mostly transmitted on low-power radios, required the mission aircraft to operate at low altitudes and low speeds - the EC-47, the electronic reconnaissance version of the venerable C-47 aircraft of World War II fame, was a perfect airframe for the mission.

Operating over Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia at low altitudes searching for low-power radio signals is inherently dangerous. A slow lumbering vintage EC-47 aircraft was an easy target for enemy gunners. By the later years of the war, the NVA had moved highly-lethal Soviet-made 37mm antiaircraft guns into South Vietnam and Laos. We believe that at least two of the losses detailed below involved a 37mm gun.

These aircraft losses resulted in squadron deaths. These do not include the "front-end" crews of the 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing and its three subordinate squadrons - the no-nonsense pilots, navigators, and engineers who got us into the target areas. Many of them also paid the ultimate price.

- EC-47P tail number 43-49201 / March 9, 1967 / callsign Tide 86 / Nha Trang AB, Vietnam / three 6994th Security Squadron members killed

- EC-47Q tail number 45-1133 / February 5, 1969 / callsign
Cap 72 / Pleiku AB, Vietnam / five 6994th Security Squadron members killed

- EC-47P tail number 43-49100 / October 8, 1969 / callsign
Prong 33 / Phu Cat AB, Vietnam / two 6994th Security Squadron members killed

- EC-47P tail number 43-48402 / April 22, 1970 / callsign Cap 53 / Pleiku AB, Vietnam / one 6994th Security Squadron member killed

- EC-47Q tail number 43-49771 / November 21, 1972 / callsign Baron 56 / Nakhon Phanom AB, Thailand / one 6994th Security Squadron member killed

- EC-47Q tail number 43-48636 / February 5, 1973 / callsign Baron 52 / Nakhon Phanom AB, Thailand / five 6994th Security Squadron members killed

These seventeen airmen gave their lives in service to the country. I wish all of you a pleasant weekend - there is nothing wrong with enjoying time with family and friends.

I would ask, however, that at some point, take a moment and remember what this holiday is about.

May 10, 2019

Another intelligence analyst betrays his country - collusion with a reporter?

Traitor Daniel Everette Hale - the indictment - Traitor Jeremy Scahill

Daniel Everette Hale becomes the latest in a series of intelligence personnel to be charged with either treason, espionage, mishandling classified information or divulging classified material to unauthorized persons.*

This case is a bit different, however. Here we may have active collusion between a defense contractor (Hale) - with leftist "reporter" Jeremy Scahill. I realize it is a reporter's job to uncover government malfeasance, but in this case Scahill may have crossed the line between journalism and criminal activity.

Hale served in the U.S. Air Force from July 2009 to July 2013. During that time, he was assigned as a cryptologic linguist to the National Security Agency (NSA). During this assignment, Hale deployed to Afghanistan where he supported drone intelligence collection and kinetic kill/capture operations against a variety of targets.

After he left the Air Force in July 2013, he began work for a defense contractor with duties at the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). During all of this time, Hale held a Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information clearance. Hale was arrested on May 9 for unauthorized disclosure of classified information. Read the now unsealed indictment.

Reading federal indictments involves wading through a lot of legalese/law enforcement jargon. Here is a quick synopsis of what happened, and how Scahill acted more like a foreign intelligence officer rather than a professional journalist. In a perfect world, Scahill would be indicted as a co-conspirator and be in jail along with Hale.

In April 2013, while still on active duty and assigned to NSA, Hale sought out and personally met with Scahill in the Washington, DC. After that meeting, Scahill told Hale he wanted to tell "Hale's story" on drone operations in Afghanistan.

Contacts and meetings continued through July when Hale separated from Air Force, and beyond. Hale had provided his unclassified resume which described his participation in drone operations. He also revealed his experience in classification and declassification procedures, an indication that he fully understood the sensitive nature of classified material.

At this point, Scahill advised Hale to set up an encrypted chat capability using the Jabber program. In December 2013, Hale began work for defense contractor Leidos with duties at NGA headquarters on Fort Belvoir near Springfield, Virginia. Hale and Scahill used the encrypted chat program at least three times between September 2013 and February 2014.

Immediately after an encrypted chat on February 27, Hale accessed and printed one document marked Top Secret, and five documents marked Secret. None of the six documents were related to Hale's duties at NGA.

All six documents printed were later published in The Intercept, a publication of which Scahill is an editor and notorious for publishing classified government documents. It gained fame by publishing material provided to it by another traitor, Edward Snowden.

While employed as an NGA contractor, Hale printed 36 documents; 23 were unrelated to his duties at the agency. Of these 23 documents, Hale provided at least 17 to the Scahill; all were subsequently published in The Intercept.

On a related note, forensic analysis of Hale's computers and devices indicated the presence of Tor software and the Tails operating system, which were recommended by The Intercept in an article on how to anonymously “leak” documents. I am sure this is not coincidental.

As a professional intelligence officer, I consider what Scahill did to be tasking. In fact, since Hale obtained employment with Leidos that would place him at NGA headquarters, it will be interesting to find out if Hale was encouraged (tasked) to seek that job position by Scahill.

It further appears that since Hale began providing documents to Scahill almost immediately after beginning work at NGA, this amounts to what we in the intelligence business call "collection tasking." Note that Hale only worked for the contractor for a total of eight months, quitting one month after he provided the last document to Scahill. One could draw the conclusion that he accomplished what he had set out to do, or possibly fulfilled his taking, and then left the company.

We will eventually know exactly the relationship between the so-called journalist and his traitorous accomplice. In virtually all of these cases, the accused enters into a plea deal in return for lesser charges. In return, the accused agrees to provide a full accounting of his/her criminal activity.

Hale's lawyers will undoubtedly try the "whistleblower" defense. Whistleblowers, of course, deserve protection when they follow the guidelines. First, report via the chain of command, then the inspector general of the organization, and possibly even appropriately cleared congressional bodies. Note that the media is not among these channels.

Hopefully, Hale's future allocution will include details of Scahill's involvement into convincing, coercing, or even paying - Hale to violate his oath of allegiance to the United States, as well as a series of federal statutes.

Reporting on government operations is one thing - tasking, aiding and abetting the unauthorized release of classified national defense information is another.

We know Hale violated the law. If what Scahill did does not constitute criminal activity, it should.

* See my earlier comments on two other former U.S. Air Force intelligence linguists who have been indicted and/or convicted of similar crimes.

- Reality (is the) Winner - former NSA contractor pleads guilty

- The indictment of former Air Force intelligence specialist Monica Elfriede Witt

April 20, 2019

Movie Review: "Operation Finale" (MGM - 2018)

Operation Finale is a 2018 American historical drama about the 1960 Israeli intelligence operation to capture Nazi SS officer Adolph Eichmann in Argentina and transport him to Israel to stand trial. It is the story of a well-planned and well-executed operation that should have made a great movie.

Unfortunately, the screenwriters took far too many liberties with actual events when there was no need to do so - the actual story is fascinating and deserving of just being told, not embellished.

That said, the performances of Ben Kingsley and Lior Raz go a long way to making up for the historical inaccuracies.

What was in reality a excellent Mossad operation comes across as a poorly-executed amateurish effort that barely succeeded. The Mossad is one of the world's best intelligence agencies, and this was one of their signature successes, but you wouldn't know that from this account.

This movie is available on Amazon video - not included in Amazon Prime, so you'll have to cough up about six dollars to watch it. I'd recommend you try to find the much better account The House on Garibaldi Street, a 1979 made-for-TV movie. That earlier effort is much more faithful to the excellent book (of the same name) written by Isser Harel. Harel was the director of the Mossad and personally oversaw the operation.

April 18, 2019

"Taliban John" Walker Lindh to be released - justice undone

Inmate 45426-083

John Walker Lindh, or more properly, Inmate 45426-083, will be released from the federal penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana on May 23. Lindh is fortunate to still be alive, and fortunate to not be serving a life sentence at the Supermax prison in Colorado - both of which I find disappointing.

Lindh, now 38, is being released after serving 17 years of a 20 year sentence, a sentence reached in a plea deal to preclude the government from being questioned about Lindh's treatment after his capture on a battlefield in Afghanistan while fighting for the Taliban.

Many (including me) believe that Lindh could have prevented the death of CIA officer Mike Spann during a prison uprising in Mazar-i-Sharif. He was aware of the impending violence, but remained silent.

Inmate 45426-083 now prefers the nom de guerre Abu Sulayman al-Irlandi, reflecting his status as an Irish citizen - he acquired Irish citizenship through his grandmother, and has stated that he plans to emigrate to Ireland after his release. Fortunately, that is not going to happen anytime soon.

A federal judge has ruled that "Abu Sulayman" will be under supervised release for three years. Theoretically, during that time, he is precluded from having an internet-capable device without permission from his probation office, cannot view or access extremist or terrorism videos, and must allow the probation office to monitor his internet use.

Lindh must also undergo mental health counseling. I doubt that will do much good - he's not mentally ill, he's a committed jihadist.

Lindh has shown no remorse whatsoever for his past terrorist activities. Despite his father's continued crusade to whitewash his son's treasonous actions, he is a committed Islamist terrorist, and there is no reason to believe that he will not rejoin the jihad against the United States.

Frank Lindh and  Marilyn Walker

His father repeatedly speaks out about the government's "persecution" of his son. In his own words:

"John loves America. We love America. John did not do anything against America. John did not take up arms against America. He never meant to harm any American, and he never did harm any American. John is innocent of these charges."

Tell that to the family of Mike Spann.

At his sentencing, Lindh said he went to Afghanistan and joined the Taliban to fight what he saw as the anti-Muslim Northern Alliance and learned later about the Taliban’s close connection to al-Qa'idah leader Usamah bin Ladin. "I want the American people to know that had I realized then what I know now about the Taliban, I never would have joined them."

Dear Inmate 45426-083: I didn't believe you then and I don't believe you now. If it was up to me, you'd either be dead or rotting in an Afghan prison.

April 13, 2019

Movie Review: "Queen of the Desert" (Benaroya Pictures - 2015)

(Note: This movie is available on Netflix.)

I often make presentations on the Middle East to various audiences, including cruise ships. Surprisingly, there is great interest in the history of the region, particularly how the current borders were drawn by the United Kingdom and France.

A friend recommended this film to me as it touches on that history. Of course, as soon as I saw the name Gertrude Bell, I had to watch it. She was one of the key British advisers as the Ottoman Empire was carved up after World War One, at a time when women were not readily accepted in this role.

Queen of the Desert is a 2015 film that purports to be a biography of Gertrude Bell. I found it to be condescending and petty - Gertrude Bell was a pioneer who made major contributions to not only the British Empire (she was made a Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire), but to the nascent Kingdom of Iraq as an adviser to King Faysal. It was Gertrude Bell that proposed the borders between Iraq, Syria and Jordan, borders that remain virtually identical today. It was her understanding of the relations between the tribes in that region where the three countries and Saudi Arabia are closest that allowed the British to maintain political influence in the area.

Although there are glitches and gaffes in every movie, one stands out to me. The opening scene is labeled as taking place in 1914 at the British Arab Bureau in Cairo, in which senior British officials (including Winston Churchill) and military officers are discussing the eventual carving up of the Middle East after the war. The war had just begun at that time, and the agreement being discussed at this meeting - the Sykes-Picot Agreement between France and Great Britain - was not reached until the spring of 1916.

The film was harshly treated by critics. While I often like movies that critics do not, in this instance, I agree with their assessment. This could have been a hard-hitting biography of a woman who is a role model for other women today, but seemed to focus on her personal failures rather than her professional accomplishments. I was not surprised to discover that the $36 million project grossed only $2 million dollars at the box office.

That said, Nicole Kidman did the best she could with the script she had. I would compliment her on her accurate pronunciation of the Arabic phrases that she used in the film.

Pass on this one. Letters from Baghdad (Between the Rivers Productions - 2018) is a better choice.

April 12, 2019

Movie Review: "Beirut" (Radar Pictures - 2018)

(Note: This movie is available on Amazon video.)

I recently made a series of talks on the Middle East during a cruise - yes, a tough job - and one of the movies available to stream in the passenger staterooms was Beirut. Bottom line: Watch it - it is two hours of tense action with a reasonable story line. As a glimpse into Beirut in 1982, it is plausible. As an "inspired by actual events" documentary of the situation at that time, not probable.

The movie opens with a really well-done scene set in 1972 at the Beirut home of the main character Mason Skiles, played by Jon Hamm of Mad Men fame. Skiles, a Sate Department diplomat, is hosting a cocktail/dinner party for a visiting congressional delegation - those of us who have served at American embassies in the Middle East will recognize the scenario. Skiles delivers an explanation of the situation in 1970's Lebanon that is brilliant, and alone worth the price of admission.

The party is interrupted by an attack by Palestinian terrorists which sets up much of the later action in the movie. I will not go into too much detail so as not to spoil the movie for those who have not yet seen it.

The remainder of the movie takes place in 1982, a few weeks prior to the Israeli invasion. Skiles, who has retired, is called back into service to negotiate the release of a CIA officer who has been kidnapped by a Palestinian group. This takes place in the context of rising tensions between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization - the drums of war are beating as Skiles tries to arrange a hostage exchange.

I enjoyed the interplay between the various factions that make up the American country team and the outsiders. The ambassador, CIA station chief, a visiting colonel from the National Security Council, and a CIA officer played (well) by Rosamund Pike, all functioned pretty much as they would in real life, with some minor exceptions in the station chief's activities, but this was Beirut in 1982. It was a wild time, as I recall. The Israeli angle is a bit overplayed, but it does make for good fiction.

I recommend the movie as good entertainment, but not necessarily an insight into the situation in Lebanon at the time.

March 8, 2019

Iran continues its missile research and development efforts - thank you, John Kerry

John Kerry and Javad Zarif - also known as "Give and Take"

According to a recent article by David Wainer for Bloomberg, U.S. Warns Wary UN Security Council on Iran Ballistic Missiles, the United States is calling on the United Nations Security Council to take action against Iran for its continued ballistic (and cruise) missile research and development program.

A letter from Ambassador Jonathan Cohen, the acting U.S. representative to the body, claimed that Iran “has conducted several activities that defy” a UN resolution urging it to refrain from actions related to “ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons.”

Ambassador Cohen is referring to UNSCR 2231 of July 2015 which was adopted as the United Nations agreed to the disastrous Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the so-called Iran nuclear deal.

Cohen's letter claims that any UN member state supporting Iran’s ballistic missile program is in violation of the resolution, that all members “have an obligation under that resolution not to supply, sell, or transfer to Iran ballistic missile-related items, materials, equipment, goods, and technology absent advance, case-by-case approval from the Security Council.”

Pushing back against the American letter, Russia and China - both permanent members of the Security Council with veto power - noted, correctly in my opinion, that UNSCR 2231 does not prohibit Iran from testing ballistic missiles, as UNSCR 1929 (June 2010) did.

UNSCR 1929 stated that "Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles...." The new resolution, watered down at Iran's request, states that Iran is "called upon not to" develop ballistic missiles.

Thank you, John Kerry

Yes, it was the terminally ineffective John Kerry who caved in to Iran's demands to alter the wording of UNSCR 1929. In Kerry's negotiations (and I use the word reluctantly) with Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif - or as I call the duo, "Give and Take" - he agreed to the change, claiming that the new words carried the same restrictions as the former wording.

I am not a lawyer (John Kerry is), but even I know the difference between "shall not" and "called upon not to." Evidently, Kerry does not. Here is an exchange between then Secretary of State Kerry and Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ) of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ: Mr. Secretary, I'm seriously concerned about the lifting of the arms embargo that creeped its way into this deal. As I read the Security Council resolution on page 119, the ban on Iranian ballistic missiles has, in fact, been lifted. The new Security Council resolution is quite clear. Iran is not prohibited from carrying out ballistic missile work. The resolution merely says, quote, "Iran is called upon not to undertake such activity." Previously, in Security Council Resolution 1929, the council used mandatory language where it said, quote, "It decides that Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons." Why would we accept inferior language that changes the mandatory shall to a permissive call upon. We often call upon a lot of countries to do or stop certain actions in the U.N., but it doesn't have the force of shall not which has consequences if you do. Can you answer simply, is Iran banned from ballistic missile work for the next eight years?

SECRETARY KERRY: That is not accurate. The exact same language in the embargo is in the agreement with respect to launches. And that is under Article 25 of the U.N. And that is exactly where it is today in the language. But in addition to that, Iran did not want it, and we insisted on it. They are restrained from any sharing of missile technology, purchase of missile technology, exchange of missile technology, work on missiles. They cannot do that under Aticle 41, which is Chapter VII and mandatory. And it does have the language still.

MENENDEZ: It seems -- I'm reading to you from the Security Council resolution that was adopted, codifying the...

KERRY: Yes, this agreement. The security council resolution.

MENENDEZ: And that security council resolution says Iran -- Mr. Secretary, I'm reading you explicit language. I'm not making this up. Iran is called upon...

KERRY: Correct.

MENENDEZ: ... not to undertake...

KERRY: That's the article 25, it's exactly what it is.

MENENDEZ: That's far different than shall not.

KERRY: Senator, that's exactly what it is today. It's the same language as it in the embargo now. We transferred it to this and that's what it is.

MENENDEZ: Not the same language as Security Council resolution 1929.

It goes on, but you get the idea. While Secretary Kerry may not grasp the difference, the rest of the world has. A sane person believes that John Kerry either wanted to make a deal with the Iranians no matter what the cost, or that he does not grasp the difference between "shall not" and "called upon not to." Perhaps both are true.

The Iranians obviously know the difference between the two phrases, and have exploited that Kerry-provided loophole to continue their aggressive missile research and development program. They now have the support and protection of the Russians and Chinese.

Thanks, John Kerry.

February 23, 2019

U.S. to leave 400 troops in Syria - is it enough?

U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers in Syria

In what appears to be a significant - and welcome - policy reversal, the United States now plans to keep about 400 troops in Syria. This is yet another change to the complete withdrawal plan voiced earlier by President Donald Trump, which then became a small residual force of 200, and now has grown to a force of 400.

The American forces will not be operating alone in Syria. The French and British - two allies with troops on the ground in Syria supporting the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the primarily Kurdish force providing the ground component in the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) - will only remain if there is a U.S. presence. This residual U.S. force addresses that requirement.

Note that I did not include alleged NATO ally Turkey. While the Turks definitely have forces on the ground in Syria, they are not allied with the SDF nor are they helping in the fight against ISIS.

In fact, the Turks are threatening to attack the SDF. They consider the Kurdish People's Protection Units, known by the Kurdish initials YPG, as the Syrian branch of the Turkish Kurdish separatist Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK). The YPG is the main component of the SDF.

So, in essence, we have a NATO ally threatening to attack the most effective ground force taking the fight to ISIS. I have been consistent in labeling the multiple Turkish incursions into northern Syria as unhelpful and unnecessary.

The President is contemplating a larger force of Western allies of between 800 and 1500 troops. The presence of these troops will be to monitor the Kurdish areas to prevent a resurgence of ISIS - there are sleeper cells who have begun reconstituting what was the Islamic "state" as an insurgent group.

It also serves what I believe is a more important purpose: it interposes a NATO/Western force between the SDF - the Kurds if you will - and the Turks. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdo─čan has threatened military action against the Kurds to create a "safety zone" inside Syria running virtually the entire length of the Turkish border. The Turks continue to be unhelpful in defeating ISIS, and unhelpful in creating stability in northern Syria.

It also maintains a NATO/Western presence to protect the SDF/Kurds from the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Asad. The regime wants to reassert Syrian control over the newly liberated areas of northern Syria. At one point, the SDF had hoped that the Syrian government might agree to some form of Kurdish autonomy similar to the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq. The Syrian leader, backed by his Russian masters, has rejected any such notion.

With all that said, can the presence of only 400 American troops, as part of a potential allied force of 1500, be enough to prevent a resurgence of ISIS, a reassertion of Syrian rule, and a foolhardy Turkish military operation against the YPG?

The short answer is yes. The longer answer is a bit more complicated.

The key factor to success in achieving the three objectives I posited above is continued U.S. access to Iraq, specifically to 'Ayn al-Asad air base in western al-Anbar. None of this works without access to Syria via Iraq. Jordan cannot fill the bill, and Turkey won't.

The second factor is the force structure of the 400 troops. Half of the American forces will be deployed to the al-Tanf area to maintain a presence in the Syria-Iraq-Jordan tri-border. One of the missions of this deployment is to remain a blocking force to prevent Iranian-backed Shi'a militias from completing a land bridge from Tehran, Iran to Beirut, Lebanon via Iraq and Syria. Personally, I think this "threat" is a bit overplayed - the Iranians have been supplying Hizballah via a Tehran-Damascus air bridge for well over three decades.

The other half of the American troops will remain in northeast Syria to continue to work with the SDF and other allies, hopefully British and French troops. Although the numbers will be reduced, the ISIS threat has diminished as the last pocket of the "caliphate" at Baghuz is eliminated. The SDF will have to continue to root out remaining cells as ISIS attempts to reconstitute itself as an insurgency.

The right combination of U.S. special operations forces will be able to provide the support the SDF requires, while keeping the Syrians and Turks at bay. In my opinion, the latter is the key mission.

February 22, 2019

Repentant "ISIS bride" wants to return to the United States

(Click for larger view)

Hoda Muthana in her own words

Hoda Muthana, a 24-year old woman who grew up in the United States, was captured by Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Syria after she attempted to flee from the last remaining pocket of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). She tells her captors she “deeply regrets” travelling to Syria to join the terror group and has asked that she be allowed to reunite with her family in Alabama.

My initial reaction to this was similar to that of many others who follow the Middle East - why should we allow her to come back? She made her bed, literally, having taken not one ISIS husband, but three, taking a new fighter as her husband as the previous ones were killed by U.S.-led coalition forces. Let her live out her years in a Syrian or Iraqi prison. Failing that, declare her an illegal/enemy combatant and send her to Guantanamo with her fellow terrorists.

The question of Muthana's future hinges on her citizenship status. Is she or is she not an American citizen? Ultimately, it will be settled in court. Was Muthana's father a Yemeni diplomat or a permanent resident alien at the time of his daughter's birth? There are conflicting dates and various subtleties that the lawyers will debate ad nauseum.

My hope, futile I know, is that the lawyers on both sides will focus on the legal issues and not allow her Islamist activist lawyer Hassan Shibly to turn this admitted terrorist - read her own words above - into a celebrity or a sympathetic creature.

Hoda Muthana is neither - she was a willing participant in one of the most brutal terrorist organizations in the world, attempted to incite violence against innocent Americans, advocated an assassination attempt against a sitting U.S. President, encouraged other women to join ISIS, and sought funds for "jihad" (holy war).

If the courts decide she is in fact not a U.S. citizen, the argument is basically over. She's on her own in Syria, Iraq, or wherever she ends up. It is not, nor should it be, a concern of the United States. Not one dime of taxpayer money should be spent on her.

If the courts decide Hoda Muthana is a citizen of the United States, the legal case against her appears strong. Again, her actions and words were in violation of the law. Several would-be ISIS terrorists are currently serving long sentences in American prisons for conspiracy to provide material support to a terrorist organization, in many cases ISIS.

In this case, we have an actual ISIS terrorist - she is facing decades, possibly life, in prison for her crimes. I sympathize with her plight, but am not willing to excuse it. Despite her claims that she "deeply regrets" her actions, she shouldn't get a do-over.

I also hope her lawyers, again probably futile, spare us the "she was only 19 years old" in 2014 when she decided to go to Syria and join a terrorist organization. Thousands of young Americans decide at age 18 and 19 to join the U.S. armed forces to protect this country against groups like ISIS, and by extension, people like Hoda Muthana.

Muthana claims that she is willing to face American justice in order to provide some sort of life for her son. It's always the children who pay the price for the mistakes of the parents. I wonder if that is truly the case here, or is she merely hoping to escape fending for herself in Syria, Iraq, or possibly Tunisia (original home of her child's father). In any case, she doesn't get to determine if she faces American justice - the people of the United States determine that.

I suspect that the courts will rule in Muthana's favor and declare that she is a U.S. citizen. If that happens, I hope that same legal system holds her accountable for her crimes.

Although part of me would prefer she be left to rot in a Middle Eastern prison, it would not be a bad thing to put her on trial in the United States and send the message that we will hold our own citizens accountable for their actions.

February 16, 2019

The indictment of former Air Force intelligence specialist Monica Elfriede Witt

The "Wanted by the FBI" circular for Witt

The recent indictment of a former U.S. Air Force intelligence specialist and counterintelligence agent raises serious questions beyond the information released in the the court filings. If you have time, read the indictment here. I have, and will try to clarify much of the legalese and intelligence community phraseology, while omitting the boilerplate miscellany.

Here is my review of the facts as we know them from the actual text of the indictment, from reading "between the lines" of the indictment based on my similar military background and training, and other publicly available information.

Monica Witt enlisted in the Air Force in August of 1997, and served on active duty for over ten years until March of 2008. After enlistment and basic training, she attended the Defense Language Institute (DLI) in Monterey, California, from February 1998 to April 1999. At DLI, she was trained as a Persian Farsi linguist. For those not familiar with Middle East languages, Persian Farsi is the language spoken in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Between the summer of 1999 and the end of 2003, Witt deployed overseas as an aircrew member on board the U.S. Air Force RC-135 Rivet Joint reconnaissance platform. Given her language specialty, it is not hard to figure out what "overseas locations" mentioned in the indictment means.

In late 2003, Witt left the cryptologic linguist specialty and became a special agent for the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI). In addition to its criminal investigative mission, AFOSI is the Air Force organization charged with counterintelligence operations.

These are sensitive missions - Witt's fluency in Farsi would be a useful tool in determining Iran's intelligence operations against the U.S. Department of Defense. After separating from the Air Force in 2008, she continued to work as an AFOSI special agent until August 2010 as a contractor with Booz Allen Hamilton.

Here is where it gets a little murky. There is nothing that tells us what happened between Witt's termination of her contract in 2010 until she makes a trip to Iran in January 2012 to attend a conference sponsored by an organization with ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). During this trip, she appeared in a video, admitted to being a U.S. military veteran, and made anti-American statements. (FLAG)

Upon her return to the United States, Witt was approached by the FBI and warned that based on her military experience and training, she was a prime target for recruitment by Iranian intelligence services. As you would suspect, Witt claimed she would never reveal classified information to the Iranians.

Witt continued an association with at least one Iranian official with ties to an Iranian intelligence agency - I suspect this is a reference to the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). During one of the exchanges in October 2012, when complemented on her U.S. Air Force training, she replied that she was happy to be able to use her skills for "good rather than evil." (FLAG)

In June 2013, Witt traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan, where she confided in a former colleague that she had gone to the Iranian embassy there and "told all," and mentioned that she might become another Edward Snowden. (FLAG)

Despite all these flags - and there are others, there appears to be no attempt to stop Witt from divulging classified information to Iranian intelligence services. Of course, by now, it is too late. In August 2013, she goes to Dubai, and then to Iran where she defects.

Once in Iran, Witt becomes an eager asset for the Iranian intelligence services. Not only does she tell them what she knows about U.S. signals intelligence (SIGINT) operations and capabilities against Iran, she offers the names of her fellow AFOSI special agents conducting operations against the Islamic Republic.

It gets worse - she participates in cyber operations against these American officers, and helps develop target packages against them, providing "spotting and assessing" insights and personal details. Having conducted human intelligence operations, these details and insights are invaluable.

How much damage can a former U.S. Air Force Technical Sergeant (that is the rank associated with the pay grade of E-6) do? From her participation in SIGINT operations, she has no doubt told the Iranians not that we are conducting SIGINT collection operations against them - they know that - but what our successes and capabilities are, and maybe more importantly, what problems and challenges the U.S. government is facing in those operations. It is extremely helpful when you know which of your communications are secure, and which are vulnerable.

From Witt's participation in AFOSI counterintelligence operations, she will have identified any U.S. or allied operatives of whom she was aware. This is where lives are at stake - the Iranians execute people on mere suspicion. While the identity of U.S. Air Force counterintelligence agents is harmful, it is the assets they run who face mortal danger.

With Witt in Iran and working with the Iranian intelligence services, it is unlikely that she will face justice in the United States. If she is foolish enough to leave Iran, she might be arrested in a country that has an extradition treaty with the United States, but her previous statements indicate she is aware of that danger. Failing a change of government in Iran - we can always hope - she may never see the inside of an American court or prison.

There is no doubt that there is an internal investigation in the U.S. counterintelligence community - as there should be. This woman, a trained SIGINT specialist and counterintelligence special agent, travels to Iran, participates in an anti-American conference sponsored by the most ruthless of the Iranian intelligence services, and despite warnings from the FBI, continues to communicate with Iranian intelligence operatives for over a year, and no one can make a case to detain her, or at least prevent her from traveling to Iran?

Why did it take six years from her initial cooperation with Iranian intelligence services in 2012, her defection in 2013, and her continuing work since 2014 against the United States to file an indictment in 2018 and try to bring her to justice?

Someone has some explaining to do.