Saudi Arabia and China nuclear cooperation - is Riyadh seeking nukes?

Saudi DF-3A missiles on parade (2014)

A recent story in The New York Times claims that the U.S. intelligence community believes Saudi Arabia is working with China on a program that could potentially lead to a nuclear weapons capability. According to the paper, Saudi Arabia may be in talks with China to develop an indigenous nuclear fuel production capability, a step often seen as the initial phase of a nuclear weapons program.

American intelligence agencies have discovered at least two facilities in the kingdom that may be undisclosed nuclear facilities. In addition to a small nuclear research facility near Riyadh, the Saudis are in discussions with five companies to build two reactors, with a plan to have 16 reactors on line by 2030. While the United States may believe Saudi Arabia with nuclear energy is no problem, it is concerned that a nuclear-armed Saudi Arabia might trigger a wider acquisition of the weapons in the area.

I think that puts the cart before the horse. It is not Saudi Arabia's potential acquisition of nuclear weapons that will catalyze a regional arms race - it is Iran. Most sane people are under no illusion that Iran does not have a nuclear weapons program. Despite the Obama Administration's ill-advised and abysmally-negotiated nuclear deal with Iran, the Iranians have continued their quest for a nuclear weapon.

Skeptics will claim that the International Atomic Energy Agency, tasked with monitoring Iranian compliance with the agreement, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), has found no evidence of Iranian violations of the agreement. Absence of proof is not proof of compliance, it merely means the IAEA has not found any violations. How could they? Although the JCPOA allows inspections of Iranian military facilities, the Iranians refuse to allow access, and the IAEA will not call them on it. Why not? The answer: pressure from the Europeans. The Europeans are not worried about an Iranian nuclear weapons program - Iran is not threatening them or their allies. So-called Iranian "compliance" with the JCPOA allows them to peddle their wares to the world's leading sponsor of terrorism.

Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability will trigger an immediate Saudi response. While I deplore the release of classified documents by the Wikileaks crowd, some of the information is interesting. Here is an excerpt from a February 2010 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh to the Secretary of State. (10RIYADH178, SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY CLINTON'S FEB 15-16 VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA, classified SECRET NOFORN. (My highlighting.)

9. (S/NF) COUNTERING IRAN: We expect that Saudi Arabia will continue to develop its ties with China, in part to counterbalance relations with the West. While the King's preference is to cooperate with the U.S., he has concluded that he needs to proceed with his own strategy to counter Iranian influence in the region, which includes rebuilding Riyadh-Cairo-Damascus coordination, supporting Palestinian reconciliation, supporting the Yemeni government, and expanding relations with non-traditional partners such as Russia, China, and India to create diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran that do not directly depend on U.S. help. The King told General Jones that if Iran succeeded in developing nuclear weapons, everyone in the region would do the same, including Saudi Arabia.

Saudi officials have also gone public, stating to a The New York Times reporter, "It would be completely unacceptable to have Iran with a nuclear capability and not the Kingdom."

Unlike some of the intelligence analysts who fear Riyadh might turn to China for the technology to develop weapons, or try to just acquire them from China, I don't find that likely. Why do some analysts think that the Saudis may turn to Beijing? Here we need to go back a few decades to 1987. I remember this well - I was with the Defense Intelligence Agency and followed this very closely.

In 1987, commander of the Royal Saudi Air Defense Forces, Lieutenant General (Prince) Khalid bin Sultan bin 'Abd al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud made several secret (or so he thought) trips to China. For those who do not understand Saudi names or know the leaders, let me elaborate. Khalid is the son of then-Minister of Defense Sultan, son of then-King Fahd. Khalid was later the commander of the Arab/Muslim troops in Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

Khalid was in China to acquire ballistic missiles. In 1987 and 1988, Iran and Iraq had been at war for over seven years. In 1988, Iraqi engineers modified the Soviet-provided Scud missiles into a longer range missiles dubbed the al-Husayn (after Muhammad's grandson and imam, not Saddam Husayn) by increasing the size of the fuel tank and decreasing the size of the warhead.

Tehran and Baghdad became almost nightly targets in early 1988. Having been in Baghdad in 1988 on the receiving end of Iranian Scud missiles, and later in Riyadh in 1991 on the receiving end of Iraqi al-Husayn missiles, I can attest to the impact on the population.

The Saudis wanted their own ballistic missile capability, but were not able to convince the United States to supply it. So, they turned to China. The Chinese provided Saudi Arabia with about 30 DF-3A medium-range missiles, armed with conventional warheads. The missile is very inaccurate, but since it was designed to carry a nuclear warhead, that was not an issue. It was the beginning of what today is known as the Royal Saudi Strategic Missile Force. The inaccuracy, as well as the time and difficulty in refueling the liquid-fueled missiles, led to the decision to not employ them during Desert Storm. It would have caused unnecessary civilian casualties and achieved very little militarily. Coalition airpower was much more effective.

The Saudi DF-3A missiles had not been seen publicly until they were displayed at a military exercise in 2014. The photo above is from the parade at the end of the exercise. Watch the video here - the caption reads: His Highness the Crown Prince attends the closing ceremony of Exercise "Sword of 'Abdullah" in Hafr al-Batin.

Why buy an inaccurate missile if you were not going to acquire the nuclear warhead that makes the system viable? I think it was just the first step in a long-range plan.

If the Saudis are not going to get nuclear warheads for the their Chinese-made missiles, where would they get them? Many of us who have followed events in the Kingdom for years believe the Saudis have had a plan for years. They will acquire the warheads from Pakistan. After all, they funded the Pakistani nuclear weapons program.

According to retired Pakistani Major General Feroz Hassan Khan, Saudi Arabia provided generous financial support to Pakistan that enabled the completion of the nuclear weapons program. It is possible that the Saudis provided the finding with the proviso that if needed, the Pakistanis would provide warheads for the DF-3A. Notorious Pakistani engineer AQ Khan revealed that Pakistan has the capability to produce such compatible warheads.

If Iran develops a nuclear weapons capability, it is almost certain Saudi Arabia will acquire that capability as well. It will not be limited to Saudi Arabia - other countries will do the same. I suspect we will see research and development in Turkey and Egypt, and possibly the United Arab Emirates.

Look for the Saudis to go shopping in Islamabad, not Beijing.

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Afghanistan is a disaster

I was supposed to be on CNN today, but was pre-empted. This is what I would have said.

Afghanistan is a disaster, one which we partially created. You can blame both the Bush 43 and Obama 44 administrations for getting us where we are. That said, after two years of the Trump 45 Administration, we see no improvement, just more of the same claims of progress, improvement, etc. Yet, no one has claimed "victory."

When the highest ranking officer in the country, US Marine Corps General Joe Dunford, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, declares in an international forum that the "Taliban are not losing," you have a problem. "Not losing" can mean two things: they're winning, or this is a stalemate.

Up until this summer, I was willing to give the Pentagon the benefit of the doubt about who was winning, but after the debacle in Ghazni that required a substantial intervention with American combat forces, I would say the Taliban now have the upper hand.

Why? Why after 17 years are we still involved in a small war thousands of miles from home, against an inconsequential adversary?

The answer is simple - we left the fight.

There never was much real interest in Afghanistan other than the removal of al-Qa'idah and the killing/capture of Usamah bin Ladin. That required the defeat of the Taliban government (great job by the US military and CIA), but we made the ridiculous "agreement" with the US-allied Northern Alliance at Tora Bora on the Pakistan border where we basically allowed Usamah bin Ladin to escape to Pakistan. After that mistake, there was no real role for a continued US military presence in Afghanistan.

But no, we have to "nation build," hoping that American style democracy would catch on in the country. Naivete on steroids. We tried anyway, to no avail.

In 2014, President Obama told the Taliban what date the US was ending its combat mission in the country and withdrawing the bulk of our forces. (We did the same thing in Iraq.) The message: "We're leaving, its all yours if you are willing to just wait." This is the folly of telling your enemy when you are leaving and going home.

During that misguided calculation, someone realized that we can't abandon the fledgling - and failing - Afghan government to the easily-predicted and totally-expected resurgence of the Taliban.

We spent massive amounts of money creating and training the Afghan army and security forces, but it hasn't worked. After years of training and billions of dollars - not to mention our most precious asset, the continued bloodshed by American troops - it is a dismal failure.

News flash - the Afghans just don't function well in Western-style military formations. Compare that to the Afghan mujahdin we trained in the 1980's, and to the Taliban, created by the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) - light guerrilla forces that are very effective.

Over the past year, the Taliban has retaken from the Afghan army much of the territory that American forces originally took from them, often at great cost. I am not sure pouring more American blood and treasure will make a difference. Yet, it gets worse - the deteriorating situation has allowed al-Qai'dah to return to the country, as well an increasing ISIS presence. The country is fast becoming "radical Islamist central."

The Afghan military and security forces are not going to be able to defeat these Islamist forces. Unfortunately, if the defeat of these groups is our policy (and I am not sure that it really is), it will require US (and NATO/other allies, but the bulk of it will be American) combat troops directly engaging them, not by troops tasked with "training and advising" the Afghans. It seems we are averse to actually winning wars anymore, instead opting to seek political objectives or "outcomes."

Now that the Bush and Obama administrations have gotten us here, I'd like to know what the Trump Administration has in mind, because what we're doing now is not working.

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The fall of Kabul - 15 years later

Kabul under Northern Alliance attack - November 2001

On November 14, 2001, the Afghan capital city of Kabul fell to the U.S.-supported Northern Alliance after a short but intense battle. The Northern Alliance was supported primarily by U.S. airpower controlled by American special operations troops and paramilitary officers of the CIA.

Fifteen years later, what have we accomplished?

Let's remember why the United States invaded Afghanistan. Following the al-Qa'idah attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the Taliban government of Afghanistan was given the opportunity to respond to a request (actually, it was a demand) to turn over al-Qa'idah leader Usamah bin Ladin to American authorities for trial.

The Taliban, citing the tribal code known as pashtunwali, refused, claiming that bin Ladin had been granted sanctuary in Afghanistan and turning him over to a foreign power would be a violation of their honor.

In response, President George Bush authorized the invasion of Afghanistan, pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40) passed by the Congress on September 14, 2001 - the President signed it into law four days later. The law authorized the President to employ the armed forces of the United States against those responsible for the attacks of September 11, 2001, as well as any entity who harbored said persons or groups.

By refusing to turn over Usamah bin Ladin to the United States, the Taliban met the criteria of the authorization. On October 7, 2001, American forces began the campaign known as Operation Enduring Freedom by dropping bombs and firing cruise missiles against Taliban military and communications facilities, as well as al-Qa'idah training camps in the areas of Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat.

It was the beginning of the longest war in American history.

On November 14, the capital fell. The Taliban was forced from power, and al-Qa'idah fell back towards the Pakistan border.

In the battle of Tora Bora - December 6 to December 17 - the United States relied on local Afghan allies, including the Northern Alliance, to arrange the "modalities" of bin Ladin's capture or surrender. I remember wondering who made that fateful, ill-advised decision - you cannot outsource your fighting. There were additional American troops available, but the U.S. military commander did not commit them to the fight. Big mistake.

The result was predictable. Whether tribal loyalties came into play, or money changed hands, or some other deal was struck, Usamah bin Ladin escaped across the border into the Pashtun-controlled tribal area of Pakistan. This event should have been a warning about any long term commitment to the Afghans.

At this point, the American military mission in Afghanistan was essentially complete, only partially accomplished, but complete. Al-Qa'idah no longer had a base of training and operations in Afghanistan, but they merely changed venues. They initially moved to Pakistan - who has been virtually no help - then to Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, North Africa, and even to Syria where they were the predecessor of the so-called and self-proclaimed Islamic State.

It was not until 2011 that justice was finally delivered to Usamah bin Ladin, then living in relative safety in Pakistan. Yet, for ten years preceding that raid, American forces were involved in a civil war in Afghanistan. Even after the killing of bin Ladin, American forces remain in Afghanistan. After 15 years, we have lost almost 2400 troops killed and over 20,000 wounded. Although the cost is pegged at over $700 billion, the actual costs when long-term medical and disability bills are included is much higher.

What have we accomplished in Afghanistan since the Battle of Tora Bora that justifies the blood and treasure? It depends on who you ask, but since this is my article, I'll answer.

What was the mission? Get al-Qa'idah and bin Ladin - once that was accomplished, the effort should have focused on the remnants of al-Qa'idah, not propping up the Karzai government, what most of us knew was going to a futile effort at creating a representative form of government. We are not very good at this.

So now we have been there for 15 years, and have accomplished what? The Afghan military is incapable of quelling the violence, the Taliban is on the ascent, and we insist that our "advise and assist" mission is still viable.

Solution? I guess we first need to define the goals. If it is to defeat the Taliban, say so and deploy enough troops to get it done (I am not advocating that). If it is an inclusive political settlement, get that process moving.

What we are doing now is not working.

Not much. Why not? Because have never really defined a mission beyond 2001. Why are we there? To defeat and expel al-Qa'idah from the country? That was accomplished years ago. To defeat the Taliban? The Taliban does not pose a threat to the United States.

Naysayers will counter that the Taliban will allow al-Qa'idah to return and re-establish training bases, and later mount operations against the United States and/or its allies. I think we have demonstrated that we are capable of devastating the country - again - if the Taliban is stupid enough to allow that to happen.

In simple terms, tell the Taliban - or whichever corrupt warlord eventually seizes power in arguably the most corrupt country on the planet - that if al-Qa'idah comes back to Afghanistan, so does American military power.

And we won’t be coming to nation-build….

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Ahmad Khan Rahami - the ISIS connection

A page from Rahami's blood-stained journal

In the official Department of Justice complaints filed against New York and New Jersey bomber Ahmad Khan Rahami, you will not find a connection noted between Rahami and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). It is there, nonetheless. The complaint did point to a connection between Rahami and al-Qa'idah.

First, here is the connection. Here is the text that is readable from a key page in Rahami's blood-stained journal. Anyone with a rudimentary understanding of jihadi Arabic terminology will see this immediately. I have expanded it for those who do not.

Raw text:
"...back to sham. But __ this incident show the risk are ___ of getting caught under ___. ___ I looked for guidance and alhumdulilah guidance came from Sheikh Anwar & Brother Adnani of Dawla. Said it clearly attack the kuffar in their backyard."

My expansion:
"...back to Syria. But __ this incident shows the risks are ___ of getting caught under ___. ___ I looked for guidance and thank God, guidance came from Sheikh Anwar al-Awlaki and Brother Abu Muhammad al-Adnani of the Islamic State (ISIS). It said it clearly: attack the infidels in their backyard."

Anwar al-Awlaki was a longtime propagandist for al-Qa'idah. A native born American citizen, he was responsible for inspiring and directing scores of terrorist attacks, mostly aimed at the United States. These attacks included Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (the "underwear bomber") and Fort Hood shooter Nidal Hasan. Awlaki was killed in a U.S. airstrike in Yemen in September 2011.

Abu Muhammad al-Adnani was the ISIS spokesman and its chief of external operations, responsible for a series of attacks in Europe, including the November 2015 attacks in Paris and the March 2016 bombings in Brussels. Adnani was killed in a U.S. airstrike near Aleppo on August 30, 2016.

Now, here is why I think the ISIS-Rahami connection is missing.

This Administration, and hence its Department of Justice and Department of State, does not want these attacks to be tied to ISIS. It does not fit President Obama's narrative - remember the "JV team" and the fact that he created the conditions that led to the rise of the organization that rapidly took over 30 percent of Iraq and Syria?

The fact that ISIS can inspire attacks in the United States shows the failure of the President's plan to eradicate ISIS. What the Administration does not want are constant references to ISIS while the Rahami case progresses through the justice system.

Ahmad Khan Rahami will be tried in the federal court system and if convicted, will spend the rest of his days at the United States Penitentiary, Administrative Maximum Facility, more commonly referred to as "the Supermax" in Florence, Colorado, in the company of many of his Islamist compatriots. If we can't send them to Guantanamo anymore, the Supermax will do.

That said, for the Administration - and the orders emanate from the White House - to ignore the ISIS connection is at best disingenuous, and at worst obstruction of justice.

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The Bowe Bergdahl exchange - a mixed blessing

PFC Bowe Bergdahl in Afghanistan - 2009

The backslapping and media frenzy has begun following the prisoner exchange that resulted in the release of U.S. Army Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl from the Taliban Haqqani network, and the release of what many consider the top five Taliban prisoners formerly held at the U.S. facility at Guantanamo, Cuba.

Over the next few days, the press will hound the Bergdahl family and lionize the now-free soldier. This is all understandable, but after the media circus dies down, there will be serious questions that need answers. I will pose some of them here.

The Price

Here are the five Taliban leaders who were released in exchange for Sergeant Bergdahl. Let's take a quick look at who they are - all were part of the Taliban government that brutalized what it called the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan from September 1996 until December 2001 when it was removed by American forces. As you read this, you might wonder why these Islamic fanatics are still alive.

Top left: Muhammad Nabi 'Umari (Mohammad Nabi Omari), served as the Taliban’s chief of communications and assisted in the escape of al-Qa'idah leaders to Pakistan, and was part of the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin militant group associated with al-Qa'idah.

Top center: 'Abd al-Haq Wathiq (Abdul Haq Wasiq), deputy chief of the Taliban intelligence service, also affiliated with al-Qa'idah's intelligence effort, and like 'Umari, a member of the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin militant group.

Top right: Nurallah Nuri (Norullah Noori), former governor of Balkh province during the Taliban rule and a key participant in the fight against the Northern Alliance.

Bottom left: Muhammad Fazl Akhund (Mohammad Fazl), army chief of staff in the Taliban government, and led the fighting against the American-led invasion in 2001. He is believed to be responsible for the killing of thousands of Afghan Shi'a between 1998 and 2001, and was also affiliated with al-Qa'idah.

Bottom right: Khayrallah Sa'id Wali Khayrkhwah (Khair Ulla Said Wali Khairkhwa), served as interior minister during the Taliban’s rule, and was directly associated with al-Qa'idah leader Usama bin Ladin, as well as Al-Qa'idah in Iraq (AQI) leader Abu Musa'ib al-Zarqawi. He also was a major opium drug lord.

My questions

A few words before I delve into the questions I feel are relevant to this case. Make no mistake - I, as all Americans should be, am pleased that Sergeant Bergdahl has been recovered. I am happy for the Bergdahl family that their son is now free and on his way home, and I am relieved that there are no remaining American prisoners of war, putting to bed any thought that we were going to leave any of our troops behind when we leave Afghanistan. Despite the circumstances surrounding Sergeant Bergdahl's capture (I will use that word for now), he is a U.S. Army soldier, and we could not break faith with him.

Now, for Sergeant Bergdahl:

1. What are the circumstances surrounding your "capture" on June 30, 2009. There are several versions, only one of which can be true. You say you were lost after you fell behind on patrol - that's been debunked. There are claims from your fellow soldiers that you simply walked away from your post with a few days supply of water. This came after you sent some bizarre emails to your family complaining about the war and how it was being conducted, as well as unflattering descriptions of the troops with whom you served. The Taliban claims you were drunk and outside the post. I am inclined to believe the words of your fellow soldiers.

2. Did you plan to desert? Your emails indicated that you were ashamed to be an American, you mailed home your uniforms and books (although your deployment was not over), and you asked a sergeant if you should take your weapon if you left the post (really?). This all sounds like you were planning to leave.

3. Did you have any communications with the Taliban before you came under their control? It is curious that the Taliban kept you alive - most Islamists torture and behead their captives. What did you tell them? Why did they keep you alive? It may have been to exchange you for the Taliban Five, but how could they know it would work?

4. Assuming that your departure from your post was voluntary, are you aware of the resources expended to try to locate and retrieve you? Five years of intelligence work and special operations, lots of money spent and time wasted because of your actions - not to mention the danger in which you put the people trying to find you.

5. Do you understand that your actions have led to the release of five dangerous Taliban militants?

6. Do you stand behind your rather inflammatory characterizations of American troops in Afghanistan. Yes, the same ones that spent time, sweat and blood trying to locate you, the same ones that were at risk at the turnover on May 31.

For the Administration:

1. Is it now U.S. policy to negotiate with terrorists?

2. What is the nature of the release of the five Taliban militants? Are they to be detained in Qatar, or will we find them on a battlefield in Afghanistan attacking American troops?

3. My understanding is that release of Guantanamo detainees requires Congressional authorization. Who in Congress was notified, and when?

4. Will Sergeant Bergdahl be called to answer for his actions in June 2009?

The list for both the sergeant and the Administration goes on and on. If I was interrogating Sergeant Bergdahl, it would take months. Eventually, the truth will come out. If he walked away from his post as it appears, given the information we have now, he needs to be held accountable. He has already been through hell, although possibly of his own doing, so I think any type of punishment is out of the question.

However, he could be given a less than honorable discharge. If that is the case, he should be enjoined from making any money from this ordeal - no book or movie deals, etc. Any monies generated from these kinds of endeavors should be put into a fund for the families of our fallen troops.

Bob Bergdahl

Then we have Bob, Bowe's father. I am willing to give him some leeway - no doubt the last five years have been traumatic, but it is how we conduct ourselves when faced with adversity that defines us. That said, I have some concerns about Bob Bergdahl. He appears to have, as we used to say in the human intelligence field, "gone native."

He has adopted the beard of devout Muslims, the Muslim-style skullcap, and recited the bismillah* during his remarks at the White House. I think he knows his son is likely in trouble and this may be his way of dealing with it. His tweets on Twitter are telling. See <@bobbergdahl>.

What's next?

As I said, the truth will come out. There will be long interrogations, sorry, interviews, ahead for Sergeant Bergdahl. It will become clear what happened that night in Yahya Khel, Afghanistan. I hope that this Administration provides that information to the public, although their track record with that is a bit spotty....

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* The bismillah is the Arabic phrase باسم الله الرحمن الرحيم (bismillah al-rahman al-rahim - In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful). It is the first phrase of every sura (chapter) of the al-Qur'an. It also appears on every piece of official stationery of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

A man left behind - "Zero Dark Thirty" and the Pakistani doctor

Last year, I wrote an article (repeated below) about the inexcusable actions of this Administration by leaving a man behind during the operation that resulted in the death of al-Qa'idah leader Usamah bin Ladin. No, we did not leave a Navy SEAL behind, but an intelligence asset that was key to the success of the operation - Pakistani physician Dr. Shakil Afridi.

After the recent Academy Awards show, the cast of the movie Zero Dark Thirty publicly called for the doctor's release. They need to direct that call to the President and the Administration which left this man behind. It will take action at that level to put enough pressure on the Pakistani government to release Dr. Afridi. Failure to do so will prolong one of the most shameful actions of this Administration.

Oh, and I do realize that no one in the military says "zero dark thirty." It is, and always has been, "oh dark thirty."

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Breaking faith: the CIA and the Pakistani doctor

Pakistani television reporting of 33-year sentence for Dr. Shakil Afridi

It is inexcusable. It is the first and most important lesson case officers are taught at "The Farm"* - you have a moral and professional responsibility to safeguard the security of an asset. Security is the key part of any successful operation - it is the first and last thing you cover with your asset each and every time you meet or communicate. No security means no operation at best, a dead or imprisoned asset at worst.

Somewhere in the operation that led to the killing of al-Qa'idah leader Usamah bin Ladin, someone forgot that most basic of concepts. A CIA asset, Pakistani physician Shakil Afridi, has just been sentenced by a Pakistani court to more than 33 years in prison for "conspiring against the state." His crime? Working with American intelligence against bin Ladin. Our crime? Allowing him to get caught.

How did this happen? Why was he allowed to remain in Pakistan after the operation? Was there no plan to extract him and his family immediately after the raid? This is basic Agency tradecraft, but in this case, the basics seem to have been ignored.

That said, the use of a local physician to collect DNA samples of residents in the area of Abbottabad under the guise of a vaccination program to verify the presence of bin Ladin was brilliant. It will be a teaching point at The Farm for years to come - as it should be. The case officer who came up with this method was thinking outside the box.

Unfortunately, somewhere up the chain of command, someone dropped the ball on ensuring the safety of the asset. Was Dr. Afridi considered a throwaway? A local source to be sacrificed for the greater good, a small pawn in the larger game of taking down Usamah bin Ladin? If so, this is not the same CIA that I knew. If this is how we treat our assets, why would any potential asset ever agree to work with or for American intelligence agencies again?

What makes this case ever more egregious is that it appears senior Administration officials did not even attempt to protect the doctor's identity. From the press reporting and the Administration spin, I cannot tell how the Pakistanis learned of Dr. Afridi's involvement, but what has come out is troubling.

There were Pakistani press reports, what they call the results of their own investigation - more likely a feed from the Pakistani intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate. Plausible, since the ISI can be an effective internal security service.

However, here is where it gets disturbing. Two senior Administration officials made statements to the press about the doctor's identity and the role he played in vetting information that bin Ladin was in Abbottabad.

First was Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta. Panetta was the CIA director at the time of the bin Laden raid. In January of this year, he appeared on CBS' "60 Minutes" and said, "I'm very concerned about what the Pakistanis did with this individual. This was an individual who, in fact, helped provide intelligence ... that was very helpful with regards to this operation. And he was not in any way treasonous toward Pakistan. He was not in any way doing anything that would have undermined Pakistan."

The second official was described as "a senior U.S. official with knowledge of counterterror operations against al-Qa'idah in Pakistan." This official stated, "The doctor was never asked to spy on Pakistan. He was asked only to help locate al-Qa'idah terrorists who threaten Pakistan and the United States. He helped save Pakistani and American lives. His activities were not treasonous, they were heroic and patriotic."

Given the tone and tenor of the statement, I assess that the "senior U.S. official" was none other than White House terrorism advisor John Brennan - it sounds just like him. Either John never attended the tradecraft course at The Farm (Brennan was a reports officer, not a case officer) or he missed the lecture on protecting your intelligence assets. You NEVER reveal the identities, access and most critically, the names of your intelligence assets. Never. The Farm - Rule Number One.

Now what?

Unfortunately, this colossal blunder does not leave the United States with many options to secure Dr. Afridi's release. First, let's disabuse ourselves of the notion that Pakistan is an ally. At best, they are a useful adversary and at worst complicit in the deaths of American troops in Afghanistan. The ISI was embarrassed by the raid and the fact that we have exposed them as either incompetents or complicit liars. I have worked peripherally with the ISI - they are not the former, so I have to go with the latter.

What would I do? I would not have missed the opportunity last week to address Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari while he attended the NATO summit in Chicago on Afghanistan. Rather than snub him as President Obama did, I would have had a private "come to Muhammad" meeting with the president and explained that unless the doctor was pardoned or released via whatever face-saving mechanism Zardari could work out, the relationship between the United States and Pakistan would undergo drastic changes.

First, the American ambassador in Islamabad would be recalled and our diplomatic presence downgraded to the chargé d'affairs level. Then all American financial aid (not the symbolic $33 million cut voted on by the Senate), military parts and supplies for Pakistan's American-built equipment and any military training assistance would be halted. Drone attacks would continue from American bases in Afghanistan, this time without Pakistani coordination. All Pakistani military officers attending courses in the United States would be returned to Pakistan, as would most of the Pakistani embassy staff. None of that would change until Dr. Afridi and family arrive in the United States.

Instead, the State Department tells us that "we have regularly taken up this matter with Pakistan" and will "continue to go forward." Forward? The man, an intelligence asset of the United States intelligence community was just sentenced to 33 years in prison, a virtual death sentence. Absolute drivel. Amateur hour.

Do something. Do it now.
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* "The Farm" is the CIA training facility "believed to be located at Camp Peary on the outskirts of Williamsburg, Virginia." Since I was trained at the facility, I can neither confirm nor deny that it is there....

Breaking faith: the CIA and the Pakistani doctor

Pakistani television reporting of 33-year sentence for Dr. Shakil Afridi

It is inexcusable. It is the first and most important lesson case officers are taught at "The Farm"* - you have a moral and professional responsibility to safeguard the security of an asset. Security is the key part of any successful operation - it is the first and last thing you cover with your asset each and every time you meet or communicate. No security means no operation at best, a dead or imprisoned asset at worst.

Somewhere in the operation that led to the killing of al-Qa'idah leader Usamah bin Ladin, someone forgot that most basic of concepts. A CIA asset, Pakistani physician Shakil Afridi, has just been sentenced by a Pakistani court to more than 33 years in prison for "conspiring against the state." His crime? Working with American intelligence against bin Ladin. Our crime? Allowing him to get caught.

How did this happen? Why was he allowed to remain in Pakistan after the operation? Was there no plan to extract him and his family immediately after the raid? This is basic Agency tradecraft, but in this case, the basics seem to have been ignored.

That said, the use of a local physician to collect DNA samples of residents in the area of Abbottabad under the guise of a vaccination program to verify the presence of bin Ladin was brilliant. It will be a teaching point at The Farm for years to come - as it should be. The case officer who came up with this method was thinking outside the box.

Unfortunately, somewhere up the chain of command, someone dropped the ball on ensuring the safety of the asset. Was Dr. Afridi considered a throwaway? A local source to be sacrificed for the greater good, a small pawn in the larger game of taking down Usamah bin Ladin? If so, this is not the same CIA that I knew. If this is how we treat our assets, why would any potential asset ever agree to work with or for American intelligence agencies again?

What makes this case ever more egregious is that it appears senior Administration officials did not even attempt to protect the doctor's identity. From the press reporting and the Administration spin, I cannot tell how the Pakistanis learned of Dr. Afridi's involvement, but what has come out is troubling.

There were Pakistani press reports, what they call the results of their own investigation - more likely a feed from the Pakistani intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate. Plausible, since the ISI can be an effective internal security service.

However, here is where it gets disturbing. Two senior Administration officials made statements to the press about the doctor's identity and the role he played in vetting information that bin Ladin was in Abbottabad.

First was Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta. Panetta was the CIA director at the time of the bin Laden raid. In January of this year, he appeared on CBS' "60 Minutes" and said, "I'm very concerned about what the Pakistanis did with this individual. This was an individual who, in fact, helped provide intelligence ... that was very helpful with regards to this operation. And he was not in any way treasonous toward Pakistan. He was not in any way doing anything that would have undermined Pakistan."

The second official was described as "a senior U.S. official with knowledge of counterterror operations against al-Qa'idah in Pakistan." This official stated, "The doctor was never asked to spy on Pakistan. He was asked only to help locate al-Qa'idah terrorists who threaten Pakistan and the United States. He helped save Pakistani and American lives. His activities were not treasonous, they were heroic and patriotic."

Given the tone and tenor of the statement, I assess that the "senior U.S. official" was none other than White House terrorism advisor John Brennan - it sounds just like him. Either John never attended the tradecraft course at The Farm (Brennan was a reports officer, not a case officer) or he missed the lecture on protecting your intelligence assets. You NEVER reveal the identities, access and most critically, the names of your intelligence assets. Never. The Farm - Rule Number One.

Now what?

Unfortunately, this colossal blunder does not leave the United States with many options to secure Dr. Afridi's release. First, let's disabuse ourselves of the notion that Pakistan is an ally. At best, they are a useful adversary and at worst complicit in the deaths of American troops in Afghanistan. The ISI was embarrassed by the raid and the fact that we have exposed them as either incompetents or complicit liars. I have worked peripherally with the ISI - they are not the former, so I have to go with the latter.

What would I do? I would not have missed the opportunity last week to address Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari while he attended the NATO summit in Chicago on Afghanistan. Rather than snub him as President Obama did, I would have had a private "come to Muhammad" meeting with the president and explained that unless the doctor was pardoned or released via whatever face-saving mechanism Zardari could work out, the relationship between the United States and Pakistan would undergo drastic changes.

First, the American ambassador in Islamabad would be recalled and our diplomatic presence downgraded to the chargé d'affairs level. Then all American financial aid (not the symbolic $33 million cut voted on by the Senate), military parts and supplies for Pakistan's American-built equipment and any military training assistance would be halted. Drone attacks would continue from American bases in Afghanistan, this time without Pakistani coordination. All Pakistani military officers attending courses in the United States would be returned to Pakistan, as would most of the Pakistani embassy staff. None of that would change until Dr. Afridi and family arrive in the United States.

Instead, the State Department tells us that "we have regularly taken up this matter with Pakistan" and will "continue to go forward." Forward? The man, an intelligence asset of the United States intelligence community was just sentenced to 33 years in prison, a virtual death sentence. Absolute drivel. Amateur hour.

Do something. Do it now.
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* "The Farm" is the CIA training facility "believed to be located at Camp Peary on the outskirts of Williamsburg, Virginia." Since I was trained at the facility, I can neither confirm nor deny that it is there....

Pakistan - part of the problem, not the solution

U.S. Army AH-64 Apache attack helicopter

The recent attack on two Pakistani border posts by NATO (read: American) combat aircraft and the political fallout it has generated highlights the fragile relationship between the United States and Pakistan. This incident comes at a time when the earlier damage to the relationship caused by the American special operations forces raid that killed Usamah bin Ladin was beginning to fade.

As expected, there are conflicting reports about exactly what happened. NATO and Afghan forces claim that artillery was fired at them from the vicinity of the two Pakistani border posts. The Pakistanis, of course, deny this claim. One senior Pakistani officer went so far to make the ludicrous claim that this may have been a deliberate attack on the part of NATO.

I have to assume that there was artillery fire from the Pakistani side of the border. The question is who conducted the fire - was it Pakistani troops or members of the Taliban using Pakistani territory as a safe haven, knowing that NATO and Afghan forces cannot legally follow them or attack them in Pakistan? The Americans responded, as they should have, with overwhelming firepower.

The thought that it may have been Pakistani artillery is not out of the question - the Pakistani army and intelligence services are full of Taliban (and al-Qa'idah) sympathizers. More likely, though, the fire was from Afghan Taliban fighters operating right under the nose of the Pakistani troops who have rarely intervened to prevent the Afghan Taliban from using Pakistani territory. Note that the Pakistanis have taken action against the Pakistani Taliban, but often ignore at best - and support at worst - the Afghan Taliban.

The relationship between the United States and Pakistan can hardly be called an alliance. Much of that is due to the fact that Pakistan is hardly a viable country. It is yet another country cobbled together in the waning days of the British Empire. It has disparate ethnic groups that have not truly reconciled themselves into being a nation. One of these groups is the Pushtuns, the same group that comprises the largest ethnic group across the border - an artificial construct diving the Pushtuns - in Afghanistan.

I have always wondered about Pakistan and other countries in the region whose borders were drawn by failed European colonialists, where the loyalties of many of the tribal and ethnic groups lie. Are the Pushtuns of Pakistan more loyal to the government in Islamabad or to their blood relatives on either side of an imaginary line drawn by a foreign power? Will the Pushtuns of Afghanistan take up arms against the Pushtuns in Pakistan based on orders issued by a multi-ethnic government in Kabul?

The Pakistanis have retaliated for the incident by demanding that the CIA leave a Pakistani air base in Baluchistan from which the controversial - and highly effective - Predator armed unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operation is conducted. I am not sure that will really happen. If you look at the targets killed by the UAVs, the program benefits Pakistan more than the United States. Since the attacks are launched from Pakistani soil against targets also on Pakistani soil, the targets must be approved by the Pakistani intelligence service, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate. Therefore, all of the militants killed by American UAV-launched missiles are actually those that the Pakistanis want dead, almost exclusively Pakistani Taliban members. It is the militants that appear on both the Pakistani and American lists that are targeted. Why would the ISI halt an operation that furthers its interests at almost no cost to them?

The targets who are missing from the UAV program targets are the al-Qa'idah and Afghan Taliban militants that the United States wants dead - but the Pakistanis may not. The ISI is manned by officers who were responsible for the creation of the Taliban and by officers who were at least sympathetic to Usamah bin Ladin. There are some analysts (me included) who believe that the ISI was also protecting bin Ladin, necessitating the unilateral American special operations raid on the bin Ladin compound in Abbottabad, a city full of retired Pakistani military and intelligence officers and home to the country's military academy. Most of the analysts I speak with believe that the Pakistanis are either complicit or incompetent in the bin Ladin case. I am not sure which is more palatable.

Pakistan has tried, with some success, to manipulate the United States because it believes that the Americans need Pakistan to prosecute the war on al-Qa'idah. That may have been the case in 2001, but much less so today. This is where I take exception with the Obama Administration's policy on the war on Afghanistan, as I did with the Bush Administration as well. The war in Afghanistan was launched to attack and destroy al-Qa'idah. That objective, as far as Afghanistan is concerned, was met that same year. The remnants of al-Qa'idah fled to Pakistan, and later Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Somalia. Operations against al-Qa'idah in Pakistan were impossible - after all, the Pakistanis or elements in the Pakistani military and intelligence services were providing support to al-Qa'idah.

For whatever reason, the United States embarked on a nation-building exercise in Afghanistan which of necessity included military operations against the Taliban. Until that time, the Taliban had never been a threat to the United States. At some point, America was engaged in a war against a group that had not threatened the United States in a country that has no national security interest to the United States. The enemy - al-Qa'idah - had mostly fled to Pakistan.

At best, Pakistan made virtually no effort to take on the al-Qa'idah Organization (tanzim al-qa'idah). At worst, the Pakistani military and intelligence establishments either actively or passively supported the terrorist group. The group's leader was found living in a compound virtually in the Pakistani government's backyard almost 10 years later.

Bottom line for me: the United States should no longer be engaged in military operations in Afghanistan. Our mission there should have ended with the removal of the Taliban government and the flight of the al-Qa'idah vermin to Pakistan. Our attention should then have shifted to Pakistan. Our attempts to ally with Pakistan have failed - we are doing their bidding in their war against the Pakistani Taliban while they continue to support the Afghan Taliban and any remaining elements of al-Qa'idah.

The Pakistanis are not part of the solution - they are part of the problem.

Iran picks up the pieces - again

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad hosted a meeting with the presidents of Afghanistan and Pakistan in Tehran recently. The focus of the meeting was the future of the region after the upcoming withdrawal of American and NATO forces from Afghanistan, Iran's neighbor to the east. Iran's concerns and plans coincide with its focus on the future of Iraq, its neighbor to the west, after the withdrawal of American forces from that country later this year.

Interestingly, all three nations represented are Islamic republics. The official titles of the three are: Islamic Republic of Iran, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Despite the fact that Pakistan and Afghanistan are predominantly Sunni Muslim and Iran is over 90 percent Twelver Shi'a Islam, the leaders in Tehran believe that Islamic governments in all three countries can be a unifying factor. That includes unity against the West.

The truth is that both Iranian Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution (rahbare mo'azzame enghelab, literally "Leader of the Revolution") Ali Khamenei and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are positioning themselves to become the key power brokers in Afghanistan, much as they have done to the west in Iraq. Following the American invasion of Iraq and removal of the Saddam Husayn regime, the Iranians immediately began a campaign to solidify relations with the Shi'a majority in Iraq. As that Shi'a majority gained the prominent position in Iraqi politics by virtue of its sheer numbers, the Iranians were quick to offer all types of support.

The Iranians succeeded beyond their wildest expectations in Iraq. With the election of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, the Iranians got a virtual puppet in charge in Baghdad - al-Maliki is derisively known as al-irani, the Iranian. After his first term, he was able to retain the prime minister position despite not winning the most number of seats - it was Iranian influence that led to the formation of a new government with al-Maliki still in charge.

Although it was American military power that removed a ruthless dictator in Iraq - at great cost in terms of blood and treasure - it was ultimately the Iranians who benefited the most from that action. The brutality of the Saddam Husayn regime has been replaced by a new government allied with an equally brutal regime in Tehran.

With Iraq firmly in their sphere of influence, the Iranians are now turning their attention to the east. The Iranians have attempted to influence events in the Herat area of western Afghanistan for years, including dispatching elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to provide the same things the IRGC has done elsewhere in the region to destabilize situations - money, weapons and training to subversive elements.

Just as they have supported insurgencies and uprisings in Lebanon, Kurdish Iraq during the Saddam years, Croatia, Chechnya, Gaza and post-Saddam Iraq, the IRGC's al-Qods (Jerusalem) Force has provided material support to the Taliban. It is important to note that in the mid-1990's, the Taliban (Sunni Islamist) and the Iranians (Shi'a Islamist) were enemies. Mutual hatred of the United States transcends the differences between the two Islamist groups.

In Pakistan, relations between the United States and Islamabad are strained, especially in the wake of a U.S. special operations raid into Pakistan in which American troops killed al-Qa'idah leader Usamah bin Ladin under the noses of an either complicit or incompetent Pakistani intelligence service (I'm betting on complicit). Iran is attempting to exploit this ebb in the Pakistani-American relationship, with some success.

In the two years since Barack Obama took office and instituted his policy to engage the Iranians, Iranian influence in Iraq, the Persian Gulf and now South Asia has increased markedly. The Iranians are also pursuing the development of a nuclear weapon almost unchecked, yet there appears to be no change of strategy in Washington.

Mr. President, is that what you had in mind when you took office? Perhaps it's time to reassess this "engagement" policy - it's clearly not working.

Pakistan - our "ally"

Usamah Bin Ladin compound - Abbottabad, Pakistan

In the aftermath of the successful U.S. special operations assault on the Usamah bin Ladin compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, there has been a chilling of relations between the intelligence services of the two countries. This is understandable since the United States and Pakistan are supposed to be allies, yet a team of U.S. Navy SEALs launched a covert raid from Afghanistan into Pakistan, conducted an attack on a residential compound and killed al-Qa'idah leader Usamah bin Ladin (among others) and removed his body from the country. How would we react to such a raid on American soil?

That said, it is important to consider the nature of the alliance between the United States and Pakistan as well as the intelligence cooperation aspect of that alliance. The American military and intelligence establishments have had a longstanding relationship with the Pakistani intelligence service, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, more commonly known as the ISI. That relationship was very close in the 1980s during the American effort in support of the Afghan mujahidin fighting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

Virtually all American support to the mujahidin, be it money, weapons or training, was funneled through the ISI. That was not without its controversies. Chief among these was the lack of strict accountability of the FIM-92 Stinger man-portable, shoulder-fired air defense missile system, regarded by many even today as the most effective system of its type in the world. Its use was one of the key factors that led to the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan.

The U.S. Defense Department was concerned that a lack of strict control of the Stingers might lead to them falling into the hands of potential adversaries, and that the missiles might in the future be used against American pilots. This is exactly what happened. At least one Stinger captured later from the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was traced to a shipment sent to the the ISI for provision to the mujahidin.

Since the Stinger-IRGC issue, there has been a well-deserved skepticism of the trustworthiness of the ISI. That has been compounded by the ISI's role in the creation of the Taliban and that group's subsequent seizure of power in Afghanistan.

Following the Afghanistan-based al-Qa'idah attacks on the United States in September 2011 and then-Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's decision to support American military operations against the Taliban and al-Qa'idah in neighboring Afghanistan, there has been suspicion of the ISI's true loyalties and allegiance. This suspicion on the part of the U.S. military and intelligence service extended to elements of the Pakistani military as well. Given the lack of alternative allies, working with the Pakistanis was the only, albeit unpalatable, option.

The recent successful hunting down and killing of Usamah bin Ladin has again called into question the loyalties and allegiance of our Pakistani "allies." The world's most wanted man was living in a city that is home to many retired military and intelligence officials, and home to Pakistan's military academy. Bin Ladin had been living there for as long as seven years. The thought that no one in the Pakistani military or intelligence services were not aware of his presence, or that he was not being assisted by some members of these organizations stretches the bounds of credibility.

We are left with one of two conclusions - either the Pakistani military and intelligence services are complicit, or they are incompetent. Neither conclusion is comforting.

I am voting for complicity. Governments, or more properly, regimes in this part of the world survive through the creation of excellent internal security services. To think that the Pakistani intelligence and security agencies were not aware of the presence of Usamah bin Ladin in their country is hard to believe. The recent arrests of those who supported the American operation against bin Ladin seem to bear out my theory.

How better to silence any witnesses that might be knowledgeable of Pakistani complicity than to place them under arrest? From reading reports of Pakistani treatment of suspects, being under arrest in Pakistan at the hands of the dreaded ISI is potentially life threatening. This is exacerbated by Pakistan's foot dragging on issuing visas for the American investigators with whom the Pakistanis have agreed to cooperate.

Al-Qa'idah's General Command (al-qiyadat al-'amah lil-jama'at al-qa'idah al-jihad)* issued a statement that Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri has been named as the new new leader of the organization, succeeding Usamah bin Ladin.

One has to ask the question - where is al-Zawahiri? Most analysts believe he is in Pakistan, just as was bin Ladin. Can we expect cooperation from our "allies" the Pakistanis in hunting down and killing Ayman al-Zawahiri? Probably as much as we got in the hunt for Usamah bin Ladin.

Call me cynical....

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* The Arabic used in the al-Qa'idah statement is interesting. Normally they refer to themselves as tanzim al-qa'idah, or "the al-Qa'idah organization." This statement used the words jama'at qa'idah al-jihad, which translates to "the al-qa'idah jihad group." Does this indicate the organization describing itself as a parent group of subordinate terrorist entities?

Will death stop terror? No, says one expert

Medford, Oregon - May 8, 2011

Will death stop terror? No, says one expert

By Paul Fattig
Mail Tribune
May 08, 2011 2:00 AM

Like the overwhelming majority of Americans, Rick Francona was mighty glad to see the last of Osama bin Laden.

But the Port Orford resident, while understanding the desire of many to express jubilation over the demise of the 9/11 mastermind responsible for the deaths of nearly 3,000 in that attack alone, found the high-fiving demonstrations in poor taste.

"Some of it looked like a European soccer victory celebration," he observes. "People need to remember this was a very dangerous military operation in which we had up to 40 young American lives at risk.

"This is not a circus — this is deadly serious business," he adds.

What's more, he takes exception to the Monday-morning quarterbacking following Sunday night's (our time) raid by Navy SEALS on bin Laden's walled compound in Pakistan.

"I am a little disturbed that some are now second-guessing these Navy SEALS," he says. "You want an overwhelming force because that leads to fewer casualties on both sides when you seize the objective. There are so many unanswered questions going into a dangerous mission like this."

By now you rightfully suspect that Francona knows a bit more about the subject than your average resident along Oregon's picturesque coast.

Or anywhere across the nation, for that matter.

Francona, 59, is a nationally known Middle East expert. He is a retired U.S. Air Force intelligence officer whose focus was the Middle East. The former lieutenant colonel is fluent in Arabic and was Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf's personal interpreter during the Gulf War.

He is the author of Ally to Adversary: An Eyewitness Account of Iraq's Fall From Grace, a book praised by critics at The London Times and the Washington Post. He also is an expert resource called by national TV news shows in the years following 9/11 to get his perspective on the evolving situation.

A Vietnam War veteran, he has worked with the shadow agencies — the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. During one of his missions with the CIA, he slipped covertly into northern Iraq to help groups that opposed Saddam Hussein.

But his intelligence experience wasn't restricted to the Middle East: He worked closely with SEALs in Bosnia when they were deployed to arrest five war criminals.

His wife, Emily, also is a former intelligence officer in the Air Force, having retired as a lieutenant colonel.

Although you won't see Francona much on national programs now that the wars have become old news, he still is called upon for public speaking engagements and writes a blog — rickfrancona.com — about the Middle East.

The death of bin Laden doesn't mean the end of terrorism as we know it, he concludes. In fact, al-Qaida on Friday acknowledged bin Laden's death and has vowed revenge.

"No, I don't think his death will change much the threat from al-Qaida," he says. "It has metastasized into various areas in the Middle East."

And the hottest spot now appears to be Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula, where American-born cleric Anwar al-Awlaki is leading al-Qaida's faction in that country, he says.

"That seems to be the new power base for al-Qaida, especially with the weak government in Yemen," he says. "Yemen could be the new Afghanistan.

"Once the president of Yemen steps down, and we know it is going to happen, we don't know who will replace him," he adds. "We don't know if the replacement will be friendly to the U.S."

What experts do know is that the killing of bin Laden was a necessary step in the fight against terrorism, he says.

"It was a good step which had to be done, but I don't think it will lessen the terrorist threat," he reiterates. "His death has a greater impact on our capabilities, giving our military and intelligence people a shot in the arm."

Meanwhile, what many are calling the Arab Spring uprisings, as people throughout the Middle East revolt against dictatorships, merits close watching, he stresses, noting the political upheavals could provide openings for terrorist groups.

"There are some real opportunities there for chaos and mayhem," he says. "I think we are on the verge of some dangerous times."

Reach reporter Paul Fattig at 541-776-4496 or email him at pfattig@mailtribune.com.

Pakistan's release of CIA contractor a sensible solution

Ray Davis is now back in American custody. That's the good news, and long overdue. It was only a matter of time before the Pakistani government engineered a way to release Davis before the issue created a real rift between Islamabad and Washington. The Pakistanis also ran the risk of having their country branded as a pariah nation for refusing to adhere to provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961.

The Vienna Convention covers diplomatic immunity, but it is not always clear exactly who is covered. I have served at American embassies and have had diplomatic immunity, yet I have never technically been a diplomat. In most cases, I was assigned as a military attaché or as an advisor assigned to the military attaché office. I was issued a diplomatic passport (also called in the American system a black passport because of its color) by the State Department.

Having a diplomatic passport in and of itself does not confer diplomatic immunity, contrary to what many people think. Normally, when you are assigned to an embassy, your name is submitted to the host government, who issues you a local identification card. In the Arabic-speaking countries, it is called an iqamah, or residence permit. If you are in a position entitled to diplomatic immunity, your name is added to the diplomatic list. Once your name is added to that list, or in my case, when my credentials were accepted by the host military intelligence service*, you have diplomatic immunity.

Ray Davis fell into a gray area of the diplomatic immunity protocol. As a contractor for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) - carrying a Glock sidearm gave him away; the military carries Berettas - not only was he not a diplomat, he was not even a U.S. government employee. He was assigned on a temporary basis to the American embassy in Islamabad, more specifically to the CIA station. As a former U.S. Army Special Forces soldier, his skills are in great demand by the CIA Special Activities Division. His skills would be in especially great demand in Pakistan, safe haven of many al-Qa'idah and Taliban fighters.

Since Davis was in Pakistan for a short period, it is doubtful that he presented any credentials to the local government. He was probably listed as a technician working at the embassy of one of the U.S. consulates in the country. The technician position would not necessarily carry diplomatic immunity, and he most certainly would not have been on the diplomatic list.

That said, all countries do this. They assign intelligence and special operations personnel to their embassies to conduct operations that at times contravene local laws, particularly laws that govern espionage. They, and we, expect that diplomatic immunity extends to these personnel, even those assigned on a temporary basis. It is one of those "understandings" between intelligence services.

Normally, the issues do not involve the shooting of local nationals. That not only creates a legal problem for the host government, but an emotional issue for the local population. In Lahore, Pakistan, where Americans are not viewed with favor, the killing of two locals caused an uproar that put the government in an impossible position. Of course, no one mentions that the two locals were armed and possibly trying to rob, or who knows, kill Davis.

Because of local sensitivities, the Pakistanis felt that they had to take Davis into custody as though they were going to prosecute him. I am guessing that they were trying to figure a way out of this dilemma as soon as it happened, thinking, "How do we get out of this diplomatic situation without appearing to placate the Americans and their billions of dollars of assistance?"

What the Pakistanis came up with is probably as good as it was going to get. Davis's notoriety after killing two locals demanded something more than releasing him because of diplomatic immunity. Had he been on the diplomatic list, there would have been no question, but he was not.

According to some media reports, the Pakistani intelligence service, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, scooped up the families of the two persons who had been killed by Davis. The families were brought to the prison where he was being held, and in front of a judge pardoned the American. According to Islamic law, Davis had to be freed.

It appears to me that the ISI engineered this whole kabuki dance to allow Davis to be released without just letting him go. There was probably "blood money," an accepted Islamic practice, paid to the families. Fine, it served both countries. The United States got its man released, and the families received what passes for justice in northeast Pakistan.

The ISI probably had to get involved since there were Islamist groups demanding that Davis be tried and executed. In the end, though, it was probably the best solution we could hope for. Actually, it was pretty resourceful, whoever thought of it. Pakistan realized that holding an American who carried a diplomatic passport was a nonstarter and needed a way out.

__________
* In most countries, military attachés are assigned to the military intelligence service, and are accredited to the host nation military intelligence service. In the United States, all military attachés are assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency. Foreign military attachés in Washington are accredited to the Director, DIA.

The Taliban and Pakistani intelligence - longtime allies

Here's a bit of non-news: the Pakistani intelligence service is actively supporting the Taliban. That includes urging the radical Islamist militant group to attack American forces in Afghanistan. The recent attacks on NATO supply convoys in Pakistan are part of that effort.

Why is anyone surprised by this?

The Pakistan Army Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, more commonly referred to as ISI, is Pakistan's primary intelligence agency. It has responsibility for both internal and external operations, including covert operations. These covert operations included assisting the United States Central Intelligence Agency in its support of the Afghan mujahidin during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980's.

The cooperation between CIA and ISI was not without controversy. All weapons and supplies for the mujahidin were required to be funneled through ISI. Since Pakistan is arguably one of the most corrupt countries on the planet, it stands to reason that some of the money and/or weapons were diverted to serve ISI's pet projects elsewhere, or more likely, to enrich ISI's senior officers.

For example, in the latter years of American support for the mujahidin, the U.S. Navy seized an Iranian ship in the Persian Gulf suspected of laying mines. Sailors found on that ship a battery pack for an American-made Stinger air defense missile. The serial numbers indicated that the battery was part of a shipment sent to the ISI but destined for the mujahidin.

The ISI is manned primarily by members of the Pushtun ethnic group. Keep in mind that Pakistan is yet another artificial country created by the British as their empire shrank. Just as the British created the countries of Iraq and Jordan in the aftermath of World War One, they created Pakistan from their Indian colony. Pakistan is made up of several disparate ethnic groups that vie for power in the country. Pushtuns are often found in the military and intelligence ranks.

The ISI was instrumental in the creation of the Taliban in the early 1990's. The ISI had easy access to Afghan refugees in the camps near Peshawar; it was from these camps that the Taliban drew its first recruits. Pakistan, via the ISI, supported the Taliban takeover of the government in Afghanistan, and was one of only a handful of nations that formally recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of the country.

After al-Qa'idah's attacks on the United States in September 2001, Pakistan allied with the United States and allowed American forces to use its airspace in its operations against the Taliban and al-Qa'idah. There was considerable American pressure put on then-President Pervez Musharraf to drop support for the Taliban and assist the United States. Many of Pakistan's senior military and intelligence officers did not support that decision. The Pushtuns in these services have always been sympathetic with the Taliban, and by extension, al-Qa'idah.

Sympathy is one thing; actively urging the Taliban to attack American targets is quite another. There is an internal struggle in Pakistan over how much the government in Islamabad should continue to provide support to American efforts in Afghanistan. The United States has repeatedly put pressure on Pakistan to step up its efforts against militants in the tribal areas (read: Pushtun areas) along the Afghan border. These efforts are aimed at what many ethnic Pushtuns in the military and ISI regard as their tribal homeland. It is not surprising that they do not support their government's efforts to move against their tribal brethren.

It is also not surprising, but nonetheless alarming, that members of the ISI are actively encouraging their Taliban allies to attack American targets. What we need to know is what the Pakistani government is prepared to do about it.

NATO supply lines are now under pressure. Taliban militants are attacking them, setting fire to scores of fuel tankers. They are doing so with either the acquiescence or even support of the ISI. If the Pakistani government is not willing to stop these attacks and take action against its own treasonous intelligence officers, the United States needs to rethink its financial support, to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars, to Islamabad and seek other ways to resupply its forces in Afghanistan.

If that happens, the United States should also wreak havoc on the Taliban and al-Qa'idah forces using the Pushtun tribal areas as safe havens. Drone attacks can only do so much. Might concentrated American air power be a better alternative?

The Ron Insana Show - comments

On Friday morning (October 1), I was a guest on the Ron Insana radio show. Ron is a former anchor at CNBC, and he and I worked together when I was a CNBC Middle East military analyst during the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. I have been on his radio show periodically over the last few years.

Ron asked that I come on the show to discuss the elevated terrorist threat, given the recent arrests in Europe of a group of European nationals trained by al-Qa'idah to launch "Mumbai-style" attacks against Americans and other Westerners. This is in reference to the November 2008 attacks by members of the al-Qa'idah affiliated Pakistani terrorist group Lashkar-e Taiba in Mumbai. During the three day killing spree, a group of 10 terrorists who had infiltrated into India by inflatable boats were able to kill almost 175 people and wound over 300 others. Most of these attacks were aimed at hotels and tourist locations that cater to Westerners.

In response to Ron's questions, I made the point that this phenomenon of "home-grown" terrorists is an al-Qa'idah adaptation to our fairly successful military and intelligence operations against terrorist organizations. However, as bureaucracies are wont to fight the last war, to solve the last problem, American law enforcement and intelligence agencies had focused on Middle Eastern and South Asian nationals as potential terrorists.

Soon after the Bush Administration created the Department of Homeland Security, al-Qa'idah instructed its members to start recruiting "non-alerting" potential jihadis. They have been successful. They have recruited British-born and American-born Muslims to join the organization and to travel to Pakistan's Waziristan provinces for indoctrination and training on "martyrdom operations," which is jihadi-speak for suicide bombings.

The poster child for this effort is arguably American citizen Najibullah Zazi. Zazi is labeled as an naturalized citizen born in Afghanistan, but more importantly he is an American citizen of Pushtun descent. Pushtuns are the ethnic group that comprise the majority of the Taliban and who provide protection and support the the Arabs of al-Qa'idah in the Afghan tribal areas. "Tribal areas" is a euphemism for what I'll call Pushtunistan.

Zazi's status as an American citizen allowed him to move easily in and out of the United States, not drawing much attention. His American citizen status also protected him from many surveillance and investigative techniques that American law enforcement and intelligence agencies have used effectively against foreigners. We should not underestimate al-Qa'idah's ability to recognize such weaknesses and adapt to exploit those weaknesses.

Another case in point is the American-born radical cleric Anwar al-'Awlaqi, now believed to be resident in Yemen. The ACLU has mounted a legal challenge to the government's plans to kill al-'Awlaqi if possible. Although I think killing al-Awlaqi would be a good thing, the legal restrictions need to be addressed, not just for him, but for other and future American-citizen jihadis overseas as well. We all remember John Walker Lindh, or "Taliban John," who was accorded all rights of an American citizen despite the fact that he was captured on a battlefield in Afghanistan.

There was also an American-born Saudi member of al-Qa'idah who had to be transferred from Guantanamo to a Navy detention facility to allow him all the rights of an American citizen. If you take up arms against the United States, I do not agree that they are still American citizens, but then I'm not a lawyer. I'm just a retired intelligence operations officer who had to deal with such scum. As for Lindh, I'd have left him on a battlefield in Afghanistan; he would have not needed an attorney.

All that said, what do we do?

We need to allow our intelligence agencies to collect information on potential jihadis, regardless of their citizenship. I have no problem with getting warrants, but at least set up a system that works. If I was in charge, there would be no Department of Homeland Security. As far as I can tell, all they do is get in the way, that is, when they are not looking at former military members as potential terrorists. I cannot find any incident that was prevented in which DHS was the lead agency. Most of our successes have been the result of good old fashioned law enforcement or classic intelligence work, not the bloated bureaucracy that is DHS. Give the FBI the lead for this vital mission.

We also need to cooperate more closely with our European and Middle Eastern allies to track potential recruits as the travel for training and indoctrination. Right now the common denominator for the travel and training is Pakistan, specifically the Waziristan provinces.

Ron asked me the obvious question: why don't we pressure the Pakistanis to have their army move into the Waziristans and wipe all these guys out. We have, but the answer is not that simple. Pakistan was created out of British India and includes several ethnic minorities. One of these is the Pusthuns who inhabit both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area. Their loyatly is not to Pakistan or Afghanistan, it is to their fellow Pushtuns. Their law is Pustunwali, the unwritten code of the Pushtuns.

There are also many Pusthuns in the Pakistan Army, which is a good military force. The Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), the country's major intelligence agency, is also heavily-populated by Pushtuns. Many of these officers are sympathetic to the Taliban and al-Qa'idah, and are certainly not in favor of mounting extensive, bloody military operations against their fellow tribesmen.

The government in Islamabad maintains an uneasy balance of the ethnic groups. Upsetting that balance is a risk not to be taken lightly, for Pakistan or the United States. What we do not need is the fall of the Pakistani government and the rise of a radical Islamic state with an arsenal of nuclear weapons and the missiles and aircraft with which to deliver them. Take that one step further and imagine these weapons transferred to al-Qa'idah.

It is a difficult problem, but one we have to address. We need real homeland security run by proffesionals who will not dismiss every al-Qa'idah plot as "lone wolf" operations as they did with Fort Hood killer Major Nidal Hasan, Christmas-day "underwar bomber" 'Umar Faruq 'Abd al-Mutalab, failed New York subway bomber Najibullah Zazi and failed Times Square bomber Faisal Shazad.

We've been lucky. That won't last. We need effective leadership.

Some leaked documents a breath of fresh air

Admiral Mike Mullen with Pakistani ISI Officers

In all the furor of the leaked documents posted on the leftist anti-war website Wikileaks, there is some information now in the public domain that actually might do some good. Finally, we are able to see documentary evidence that the United States actually knows, or at least believes, that the Pakistanis may not be part of the solution in Afghanistan, but are in reality a major part of the problem, and that the Iranians are supporting the Taliban in their operations against American forces. While many of us have suspected this all along, it is good to see it in real government documents.

Pakistan
America's relationship with Pakistan has had its ups and downs over the years, much of influenced by how much they could do for us in furthering our national interests. That is, after all, what foreign policy is all about. During the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, Pakistan's intelligence service, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) was the conduit for virtually all American weapons and money to the Aghfan mujahidin.

Any one who knows Pakistan or the Pakistanis realizes that not all of the money nor weapons reached their intended recipients. The CIA officers responsible for the operation knew that there was going to be a certain amount of corruption, but that it was the price of doing business - there was no viable alternative to dealing with the ISI. The more important mission was getting weapons to the fighters in Afghanistan.

The weapons provided to the mujahidin included, as glamorized in the movie Charlie Wilson's War (see my comments on Charlie and "his" war), the FIM-92 Stinger shoulder-launched heat-seeking air defense missile system, to this day arguably the finest shoulder-fired system in existence.

As feared by many officers at the Pentagon when Representative Wilson basically forced the U.S. Army to provide Stingers to the ISI for the mujahidin, some of the missiles ended up in the hands of people we did not want to have them. In September 1987, while the CIA was still sending Stingers to the ISI, the U.S. Navy found Stingers on board the Iranian mine-laying ship Iran Ajr in the Persian Gulf. The serial numbers indicated that they had been shipped to the ISI for delivery to the mujahidin. A gift to the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps from our "allies."

After the Soviets were driven out of Afghanistan in 1988, our assistance to the mujahidin stopped almost overnight. The mujahidin were disappointed that we did not continue our support, but our operation in Afghanistan were not about them, it was about the Soviets. Once the Soviets left, our foreign policy objective was achieved and we turned to other matters.

No longer needing the cooperation of the Pakistanis, the U.S. Congress began scrutinizing Pakistan's nascent nuclear weapons and missile programs. In 1990, once it was assessed that Pakistan was in fact developing a nuclear weapon, the United States halted delivery of additional F-16 fighter aircraft (that had already been paid for) under the terms of the Pressler Amendment. Relations between Islamabad and Washington chilled.

In the early 1990's, the ISI was involved in the creation of the fundamentalist Taliban - its charter members were drawn from the millions of Afghan refugees in northern Pakistan. When the Taliban took over in Afghanistan, they were supported by the ISI, and diplomatically recognized by Pakistan. There is more to the relationship between the ISI and Taliban than than Pakistani national interest.

As with many countries in the Middle East and South Asia, ethnic and tribal loyalties trump almost everything else. Many of the ISI are ethnic Pushtuns, as are most of the Taliban. It is the Pushtun tribesmen in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (especially in North and South Waziristan, the semi-autonomous regions along the Afghanistan border) that have extended protection to al-Qa'idah leaders Usmah bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar. There is also a large Pushtun contingent in the Pakistani armed forces.

The thought that the ISI and many in the Pakistani army are going to be fully supportive of the Pakistani government's efforts to move against their fellow tribesman in the Waziristans is wishful thinking. In fact, the exact opposite seems to be the case - the ISI, or at least some officers in the ISI, along with some Pakistani army officers are actively supporting the Taliban in their operations against American and coalition forces.

Regardless of what Obama spokesman Robert Gibbs would have you believe - and the documents tend to make him out as less than truthful - the Pakistanis are not serious about helping us eradicate an organization that they created. To think otherwise defies logic.

Iran
The Iranians likewise are much more involved in supporting the Taliban in its operations against American and coalition forces than the administration would have us believe. The Iranians, as they did with the Iraqi Shi'a militias such as the jaysh al-mahdi (JAM) of Muqtada al-Sadr, have been providing weapons and other support to the Taliban. Although the Taliban and the Iranians have many ideological differences, their mutual hatred of the United States supersedes any reluctance to cooperate with each other.

There are also the much-touted Obama outreach efforts to Iran - all of which have been rebuffed by the Iranians and have been a dismal failure. Could a desire to not offend the Ahmadinejad regime have played into the downplaying of Iran's support for the Taliban? I have my suspicions.

Last words
Julian Assange, the self-righteous arrogant co-founder of Wikileaks is joined by Amnesty International in its condemnation of American involvement in Afghanistan and what they believe is a high level of civilian casualties. Why don't they spend as much time condemning the Taliban and its murderous activities? They act like the Taliban is a legitimate entity rather than a bunch of murdering jihadist fanatics.

Finally, if U.S. Army intelligence analyst Specialist Bradley Manning turns out to be the source of the leaked documents, I urge the Secretary of Defense to pursue treason charges and seek the death penalty. Release of these classified documents when American troops are involved in combat operations rises to that level - if he did it, he deserves to die.