"Taliban John" Walker Lindh to be released - justice undone

Inmate 45426-083

John Walker Lindh, or more properly, Inmate 45426-083, will be released from the federal penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana on May 23. Lindh is fortunate to still be alive, and fortunate to not be serving a life sentence at the Supermax prison in Colorado - both of which I find disappointing.

Lindh, now 38, is being released after serving 17 years of a 20 year sentence, a sentence reached in a plea deal to preclude the government from being questioned about Lindh's treatment after his capture on a battlefield in Afghanistan while fighting for the Taliban.

Many (including me) believe that Lindh could have prevented the death of CIA officer Mike Spann during a prison uprising in Mazar-i-Sharif. He was aware of the impending violence, but remained silent.

Inmate 45426-083 now prefers the nom de guerre Abu Sulayman al-Irlandi, reflecting his status as an Irish citizen - he acquired Irish citizenship through his grandmother, and has stated that he plans to emigrate to Ireland after his release. Fortunately, that is not going to happen anytime soon.

A federal judge has ruled that "Abu Sulayman" will be under supervised release for three years. Theoretically, during that time, he is precluded from having an internet-capable device without permission from his probation office, cannot view or access extremist or terrorism videos, and must allow the probation office to monitor his internet use.

Lindh must also undergo mental health counseling. I doubt that will do much good - he's not mentally ill, he's a committed jihadist.

Lindh has shown no remorse whatsoever for his past terrorist activities. Despite his father's continued crusade to whitewash his son's treasonous actions, he is a committed Islamist terrorist, and there is no reason to believe that he will not rejoin the jihad against the United States.

Frank Lindh and  Marilyn Walker

His father repeatedly speaks out about the government's "persecution" of his son. In his own words:

"John loves America. We love America. John did not do anything against America. John did not take up arms against America. He never meant to harm any American, and he never did harm any American. John is innocent of these charges."

Tell that to the family of Mike Spann.

At his sentencing, Lindh said he went to Afghanistan and joined the Taliban to fight what he saw as the anti-Muslim Northern Alliance and learned later about the Taliban’s close connection to al-Qa'idah leader Usamah bin Ladin. "I want the American people to know that had I realized then what I know now about the Taliban, I never would have joined them."

Dear Inmate 45426-083: I didn't believe you then and I don't believe you now. If it was up to me, you'd either be dead or rotting in an Afghan prison.

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Afghanistan is a disaster

I was supposed to be on CNN today, but was pre-empted. This is what I would have said.

Afghanistan is a disaster, one which we partially created. You can blame both the Bush 43 and Obama 44 administrations for getting us where we are. That said, after two years of the Trump 45 Administration, we see no improvement, just more of the same claims of progress, improvement, etc. Yet, no one has claimed "victory."

When the highest ranking officer in the country, US Marine Corps General Joe Dunford, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, declares in an international forum that the "Taliban are not losing," you have a problem. "Not losing" can mean two things: they're winning, or this is a stalemate.

Up until this summer, I was willing to give the Pentagon the benefit of the doubt about who was winning, but after the debacle in Ghazni that required a substantial intervention with American combat forces, I would say the Taliban now have the upper hand.

Why? Why after 17 years are we still involved in a small war thousands of miles from home, against an inconsequential adversary?

The answer is simple - we left the fight.

There never was much real interest in Afghanistan other than the removal of al-Qa'idah and the killing/capture of Usamah bin Ladin. That required the defeat of the Taliban government (great job by the US military and CIA), but we made the ridiculous "agreement" with the US-allied Northern Alliance at Tora Bora on the Pakistan border where we basically allowed Usamah bin Ladin to escape to Pakistan. After that mistake, there was no real role for a continued US military presence in Afghanistan.

But no, we have to "nation build," hoping that American style democracy would catch on in the country. Naivete on steroids. We tried anyway, to no avail.

In 2014, President Obama told the Taliban what date the US was ending its combat mission in the country and withdrawing the bulk of our forces. (We did the same thing in Iraq.) The message: "We're leaving, its all yours if you are willing to just wait." This is the folly of telling your enemy when you are leaving and going home.

During that misguided calculation, someone realized that we can't abandon the fledgling - and failing - Afghan government to the easily-predicted and totally-expected resurgence of the Taliban.

We spent massive amounts of money creating and training the Afghan army and security forces, but it hasn't worked. After years of training and billions of dollars - not to mention our most precious asset, the continued bloodshed by American troops - it is a dismal failure.

News flash - the Afghans just don't function well in Western-style military formations. Compare that to the Afghan mujahdin we trained in the 1980's, and to the Taliban, created by the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) - light guerrilla forces that are very effective.

Over the past year, the Taliban has retaken from the Afghan army much of the territory that American forces originally took from them, often at great cost. I am not sure pouring more American blood and treasure will make a difference. Yet, it gets worse - the deteriorating situation has allowed al-Qai'dah to return to the country, as well an increasing ISIS presence. The country is fast becoming "radical Islamist central."

The Afghan military and security forces are not going to be able to defeat these Islamist forces. Unfortunately, if the defeat of these groups is our policy (and I am not sure that it really is), it will require US (and NATO/other allies, but the bulk of it will be American) combat troops directly engaging them, not by troops tasked with "training and advising" the Afghans. It seems we are averse to actually winning wars anymore, instead opting to seek political objectives or "outcomes."

Now that the Bush and Obama administrations have gotten us here, I'd like to know what the Trump Administration has in mind, because what we're doing now is not working.

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Turkey - Operation Olive Branch: how far will they go?

Turkish tanks entering 'Afrin canton, Syria

First - and remember this as we go through this - for Turkey, it's about the Kurds. Turkey's perceived national interest in Syria has always been about the Kurds.

I will only talk only briefly about the background, because most of you who read my writings are very familiar with the intense animosity between the Turks and the Kurds - and that means any Kurds, be they resident in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and even Iran. I can somewhat understand the Turkish position - they have been fighting an insurgency against the Kurdish Workers' Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK) since 1984.

The casualties and costs have not been insignificant. Over 5,000 Turks and 35,000 Kurds have been killed, and millions of Kurds have been displaced. The monetary cost to the Turkish government is estimated to be between 300 and 450 billion dollars.

I have been in Turkey many times, have discussed this with Turks and Kurds alike, and still have friends and contacts among both. The Turks view their military as their own sons, very much as the Israelis do - both have universal conscription, so virtually everyone serves.

In 2012, I was in Turkey when the PKK killed 22 Turkish soldiers in a series of attacks near the Iraqi border. The reaction among average Turks was palpable, like losing a cousin. It registered with me - the Turks take their losses to the Kurds personally. Rather than cowering the Turks, it strengthens their resolve.

I was on CNN International earlier this week. I remarked that what Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is doing in Syria resonates with much of the Turkish electorate, particularly those in Anatolia. They support his hard-line stance and what they perceive as a proactive operation against a potential future threat: fight the PKK in Syria rather than having to fight them here in Turkey.

Watch the entire interview here:

The motivation and consequences of #turkey military offensive against #Kurds in #syria w @MiddleEastGuy @gaylelemmon https://t.co/VdvNyArfKo

— john vause (@vausecnn) January 23, 2018

That's fine, if you buy into the Turkish assertion that the PKK is synonymous with the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat, PYD) and its militia known as the People's Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, YPG).

While I take the point that the YPG and PKK have cooperated against Turkey in the past, much of that cooperation has been at the behest of the Syrian government. The Syrians and Turks have had major issues for decades over border security, and probably more importantly, the amount of flow of Euphrates River waters.

The PKK has been designated as a terrorist group by the United States, NATO, and technically by the European Union. It is listed as a Proscribed Group by the United Kingdom. The United Nations has not listed them as a terrorist organization. Only the Turks regard the YPG as a terrorist group.

The Turks are now seven days into Operation Olive Branch. They have virtual control of the airspace over 'Afrin canton, overwhelming firepower that state armed forces can provide, and almost complete encirclement of the alleged enemy, the so-called "terrorist" forces in northern Syria. Militarily, there is no doubt that the Turks could take over the entire 'Afrin canton area.

Unfortunately, there is little recourse for the United States. Although the YPG is arguably the most effective partner in the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the alliance of Kurdish, Arab and even Assyrian militias supported by the United States in the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), there was virtually no ISIS presence in the 'Afrin canton, thus little SDF ground operations and accompanying American support.

In August 2016, fearing the establishment of a continuous Kurdish-controlled area along the entire Syrian-Turkish border, the Turks launched Operation Euphrates Shield (dara' al-furat). While the stated goal of the operation was the eventual liberation of the ISIS self-declared capital of al-Raqqah, it was evident that the real goal of the operation was to split the Kurdish area into two pockets.

The Turks never came within 100 miles of al-Raqqah, and were essentially marginalized into a pocket between Kurdish forces to the east and west, and Syria forces to the south. It is important to note that the YPG and/or the SDF have no real fight with the Syrian government in Damascus - they are focused on the fight against ISIS.

Now the ISIS has lost almost all of its territory in Syria (and Iraq), the Turks are making their move to eliminate the YPG, first in 'Afrin canton. The question is, after they accomplish their objective, will they turn their attention and their quite capable military forces to the east, areas under the control of the American-backed SDF. We should also remember that there are about 2,000 American forces on the ground in these areas to the east of Turkish Operation Euphrates Shield forces.

After the Turks complete operations in 'Afrin, their next objective will be the city of Manbij, 100 km (60 miles) east of Afrin and east of the Euphrates Shield operations area. (I have underscored Manbij on the map above.)

In President Erdoğan's own words:

“With the Olive Branch operation, we have once again thwarted the game of those sneaky forces whose interests in the region are different. Starting in Manbij, we will continue to thwart their game. We will clear Manbij of terrorists ... No one should be disturbed by this because the real owners of Manbij are not these terrorists, they are our Arab brothers. From Manbij, we will continue our struggle up to the border with Iraq, until no terrorist is left."

Manbij is currently held by the SDF - the force there is a mix of Arabs, Kurds, and Assyrians. There are also American forces present in the area. There was initial thought that the Turks would attempt to secure the area held by the SDF in the Manbij area as far east as the Euphrates River, almost an undeclared boundary between the Turkish-back FSA (now calling themselves National Forces) and the SDF. Erdoğan's words suggest otherwise, that the Turks are not going to stop their eastward push at the river.

The Turkish president is also on record that he wants to establish a "security zone" of 30 kilometers (18.65 miles) inside Syria along Turkey's southern border. His plans are not without precedent. In the past, the Israelis have done the same thing inside Lebanon, and the Turks themselves have done so in northern Iraq in the 1990s.

However, this brings the Turks, a nominal NATO ally, into direct contact with not only the American trained, supported, and equipped SDF, but American troops as well. Do the Turks want to place themselves in a possible direct armed confrontation with American forces, another NATO member?

While I hope that both sides continue talking (initial talks have not gone well), it is not helpful when President Erdoğan refers to his NATO allies as "crusaders." Would he bristle at being called an Ottoman or a Saracen?

Another major unknown: Is the United States willing to risk a direct confrontation with a NATO ally over a commitment to a group of Syrian Kurds? The Kurds are wary of the Americans, for good reason. They believe the United States has abandoned them in the past, as far back as 1975. After entering into a virtual alliance with the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition, the SDF - primarily the Kurds - acquitted itself well on the battlefield. By most accounts, they were the most effective fighting force on the ground against the group, and were key to the reclamation of almost all of northern Syria from the group.

Senior American officials have indicated a desire to maintain American forces in northern Syria in support of the SDF until there is a political solution to the Syrian civil war. To provide some stability to the recently "liberated" area, the United States is reportedly training a "border security" force of almost 30,000 fighters drawn from the SDF. A major task for this force will be not only to prevent jihadists from entering Syria, but more importantly, preventing ISIS fighters from leaving and returning to their home countries and mounting terrorist attacks.

Predictably, the Turks have objected to this plan. They claim that there is no need for such a security force. Perhaps Mr. Erdoğan could explain how tens of thousands of jihadis entered Syria via Turkey over the last three years. It was the major route to join ISIS. I have been on both sides along most of the Syrian-Turkish border - it is well-marked and well-defended. Passing through that border would be difficult without someone turning a blind eye.

Watch what happens after 'Afrin. I think a move on Manbij is highly likely, but will the Turks cross the Euphrates and try to move east? If so, there could be direct confrontation between two NATO allies.

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Want to be a martyr? Reserve here!

Post on Hay'at al-Tahrir al-Sham website

The al-Qa'idah affiliated hay'at tahrir al-sham (هيئة تحرير الشام‎) - translated as "Organization for the Liberation of the Levant" and known by the initials HTS - is very active in Syria, particularly in Idlib governorate.

As the threat from the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) diminishes - the group has lost control of virtually of the territory it controlled from 2014 to 2017 - there is more attention being given to other jihadist groups operating in Syria.

HTS was formed in January 2017 via a merger of several Salafist groups, including what used to be called jabhat al-nusrah (the Victory Front), the original al-Qa'idah organization dispatched to Syria by al-Qa'idah in Iraq (AQI) in 2012 when it saw an opportunity to take advantage of the rapidly deteriorating situation in Syria. The group later joined with AQI to create the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. The union was short lived, and al-Nusrah became independent from ISIS and remained affiliated with al-Qa'idah.

The success of the multi-faceted fight against ISIS has made it more difficult to attract recruits to join the various jihadist groups in Iraq and Syria, to the point that the groups are now increasing advertising on the internet. The image above is one such posting.

A translation of the above mage:

Reserve your role in martyrdom (suicide) operations
- improvised explosive devices (has come to mean vehicle-borne IED)
- red gangs/bands
- behind enemy lines

[Telegram] at @aldogma

While most Westerners may find this type of posting almost laughable, it is deadly serious, and unfortunately effective. The fact that it was posted in Arabic indicates that the target audience is Arab youths.

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Russian military police as monitors in Syrian safe zones? Seriously?

Russian Military Police in Syria

At least two senior Russian Federation government officials have announced the deployment of additional Russian Army military police to monitor and provide security for the "de-escalation zones" as part of a three-party agreement reached by Russia, Turkey and Iran. The agreement took effect on May 6. (See my last article, "De-escalation" zones in Syria - call me skeptical)

Neither the Syrian government, the United States, nor any of the opposition groups are party to the agreement. The Syrian government, not surprisingly, has followed the bidding of its Russian and Iranian masters and has proclaimed support for the pact.

The Russian announcements may be a bit premature at best, or a downright power play at worst. The agreement is somewhat ambiguous - call me conspiratorial, but when the Russians write anything, they make sure there are loopholes - okay, I will be kind, ambiguities - that serve their interests.*

According to the text of the agreement, security zones along the lines of the de-escalation zones are to be established in order to prevent incidents and military confrontations between the combatants. This security includes checkpoints and observation posts, and "administration of the security zones" - all conducted by the forces of the three signatories.

Although the agreement allows for third party forces to be introduced, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Mu'alim** has rejected any "international" presence. I take that as a reference to the United Nations or powers not acceptable to the regime of Bashar al-Asad. Why have anyone interfere with the Russians?

So let me see if I have this right. Two key provisions:

- Russia, Turkey and Iran signed an agreement on "de-escalation" zones in Syria, without buy-in from the opposition, the Kurds, or the U.S.-led coalition, but dictate who can and cannot fly or conduct ground operations in specific areas of the country.

- The agreement charges the three powers to deploy their forces to lines around the safe zones, and then establish checkpoints, observation posts and "administer" those zones.

So, in effect, we have the military forces of primarily Russia (with possibly some Iranian and Turkish units) surrounding the areas of the country that remain under opposition control. The Russians then control movement into and out of the opposition areas while monitoring the enemies of the very regime that the Russians are in Syria to protect.

What could possibly go wrong?

When this ceasefire, like those in the past, fails - the Russians will be in perfect position to usher in Syrian and Iranian troops, and begin airstrikes with tactical air control parties already in place. No doubt, the Syrian forces, with their Iranian and Hizballah supporters, are redeploying and resupplying for that day.

That's what could go wrong.

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* For an example of Russian skill at wordsmithing, see my article on Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and former Secretary of State John Kerry, Iran's ballistic missile program - more fallout from the "Kerry Collapse"

** Personal anecdote:

When I was the Air Attache to the U.S. Embassy in Damascus, I met with Dr. al-Mu'alim on several occasions, including an extended conversation on his Syrian Air Force VIP jet flying to and from the air base at Humaymim, now the primary Russian base in Syria. I found him to be a very capable representative of his government - tough and committed, but a pleasant conversant. He graded my Arabic language as A-.

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Idlib Governorate - the next Syrian offensive

Russian Air Force Sukhoi SU-25 attack aircraft

As the Syrian Army consolidates its gains following its success in retaking the city of Aleppo, it is slowly turning its attention to Idlib Governorate, the next major stronghold of the various opposition groups. Idlib has become the new center of the Syrian revolution.

The Syrian Army is stretched thin - it is about half the size it was prior to the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in March 2011. It has been wracked with defections, desertions, and battlefield losses. Without the support of its foreign allies, it is doubtful that it could be considered a viable combat force.

The Syrians' principal supporters are Russia (air, air defense, missiles, field and rocket artillery, special forces), Iran (special forces, troops, logistics, air bridge resupply), Hizballah (troops), Iraq (Shi'a militias) and Afghanistan (Shi'a militias). Over half the combat power of the forces supporting the regime of President Bashar al-Asad are foreign.

Immediately after their success in Aleppo, most military analysts believed that the Syrians would turn their attention to Idlib Governorate - it made sense. One of the main reasons is to secure a reliable and direct main supply route between regime-controlled territory around Hamah and the newly "liberated" areas around Aleppo.

Red=regime / yellow=rebels / purple=SDF / gray=ISIS / striped=mixed control
Click on image for larger view

The main highway through Syria, from the Jordanian border in the south to the Turkish border in the north is officially called the M5 or the International Highway - most people just call it the Aleppo highway. On the map, it is clear that the opposition controls a small section of the highway between Homs and Hamah, and almost all of the highway from just north of Hamah to the outskirts of Aleppo.

Because of the opposition control of major sections of the highway, the Syrian forces must use a secondary road from Homs to the northeast through al-Salamiyah, then north to Syrian forces in Aleppo - note the thin red line on the map.

It is not a great road (I say this from personal experience) and has been cut occasionally by the opposition. Becuase of the importance of this line of communication, the Syrians make every effort to regain control quickly. Militarily, it is not an ideal situation.

Immediately after the retaking of Aleppo, Syrian forces began to move east from Aleppo towards the city of al-Bab, most likely in preparation for an eventual assault on the self-proclaimed capital of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The Russian Air Force, operating from Humaymim air base just south of Latakia, however, diverted the bulk of its attack sorties to rebel-held cities in Idlib Governorate.

North of Aleppo, the opposition consists of Free Syrian Army (FSA) units backed by the Turkish army and air force. In a rare instance of cooperation between the regime and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the joint Syrian Kurdish and Arab force backed by the United States, the opposition forces have been contained in an enclave along the Turkish border, effectively marginalizing the Turks. See my earlier piece, SYRIA: Has Turkey been marginalized and the Americans thrust into the fight?

The Syrians also mounted an assault on the ISIS-held city of Palmyra, ostensibly an attempt to open the road to Dayr al-Zawr on the Euphrates river. The city, with a Syrian air base and large army garrison, is surrounded by ISIS. Control of Palmyra has gone back and forth between the regime and ISIS - currently, it is in the hands of the regime.

The regime appears to be maintaining its positions in the Palmyra/east Homs Governorate area, but is only slowly advancing, if at all, towards Dayr al-Zawr. The Syrian military in the besieged city is being kept alive by supplies airdropped by Syrian, Russian and Iranian military cargo planes. The civilian population in the surrounded enclave are resupplied by United Nations airdrops.

It appears now the Syrian military is finally focusing its main effort in Idlib Governorate. This makes sense - the Syrian regime can seek to reduce the opposition-held areas on the Homs-Aleppo axis while maintaining its positions to the east. Although ISIS controls a large area of Syria - about one-third of the country - the organization is steadily losing ground to the SDF. The SDF has isolated the city of al-Tabaqah, home to Syria's largest dam and an airbase - part of the larger strategy to encircle and then attack al-Raqqah.

In the fight in Idlib Governorate, we have seen a significant increase in both the quantity and lethality of air strikes, especially by the Russian Air Force. Fully 75 percent of all sorties flown in Syria on behalf of the regime are being flown by the Russians. Syrian Air Force sorties have decreased following the American missile strike on al-Sha'yrat air base, in which over 20 aircraft (SU-22 and MiG-23 fighter-bombers) were destroyed. Those losses represent about 20 percent of the Syrian Air Force's operational fighter inventory.

Since the April 4 Syrian chemical attack on Khan Shaykhun and the retaliatory American missile strike on April 7, the Russians have increased the use of both incendiary cluster munitions and thermobaric weapons. Both of these weapons are extremely destructive and lethal, causing large numbers of civilian casualties and major damage to the infrastructure.

Russian Air Force dropping thermobaric bombs in Syria

It also appears that the Russians and Syrians both are continuing their systematic attacks on hospitals and other medical facilities, now in Idlib Governorate just as they did in the battle for Aleppo last year. The Russians have been deliberately attacking medical facilities since at least early 2016, and likely since their forces arrived in Syria in September 2015. See my earlier piece on these war crimes, Russian Air Force targeting hospitals - war crimes, Mr. Kerry?

Idlib Governorate is becoming the primary location for the various groups that comprise the Syrian opposition. This includes, among others, the FSA and other non-Islamist groups. There is also a major presence of several Islamist groups, notably the former al-Qa'idah affiliate known as the Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). HTS was formed by a merger of several Islamist groups and has emerged as the key opposition group after the FSA. Two other Islamist groups, Jaysh al-Sham and Ahrar al-Sham, are also involved in the fighting in Idlib.

Accurate numbers are hard to determine, but the two sides are probably close when it comes to personnel. However, the Syrian Army is supported by large amounts of Russian airpower, as well as Iranian and Hizballah forces on the ground. Since the fall of Aleppo, the regime has held the upper hand on the battlefield, slowly reducing pockets of opposition resistance. The army will continue to mount attacks on rebels in the Idlib pocket until they have them surrounded and cut off.

At that point, there may be an opportunity for a negotiated solution. We have seen a willingness on the part of both sides to reach agreements whereby the government forces assume control of an area in return for free passage of opposition fighters. The opposition fighters, with a few exceptions, are transported to locations in Idlib Governorate. That only works until there is no place left to go.

I have said in the past that given the Russian commitment to the regime of Bashar al-Asad, it is highly unlikely that the opposition will be able to win a victory on the ground. The fighting in Idlib will likely follow the template of the fighting in Aleppo. The Syrian military, backed by its allies, will isolate and besiege pockets of opposition fighters, attack them with overwhelming air and ground delivered firepower until they are forced to surrender.

The battle for Idlib? It is only a matter of time. If Bashar al-Asad can restrain himself from further use of chemical weapons and maintains the support of the Russians and Iranians, he will eventually reassert control over the entire Idlib Governorate.

After that, the remaining pockets of resistance - the eastern suburbs of Damascus, some isolated pockets in southern Syria and a small presence in the north, will fall as well. As for Bashar al-Asad and the Russians - as we used to say in Pittsburgh - "he owes them big."

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U.S. Air Force strike on Al-Qa'idah affiliate headquarters in Syria

The video above was produced by the Arabic-language STEP News Agency, which provides detailed reporting on the situation in Syria. I suspect they have anti-regime leanings, but I find their reporting to be concise and accurate.

This clip is just 42 seconds long, but conveys the essence of the recent U.S. Air Force strike on what has been described as a headquarters of the Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (JFS).

The Arabic jabhat fatah al-sham translates to the Levant Conquest Front, the new name of Jabhat al-Nusrah, or the Victory Front. In July 2016, al-Nusrah renounced its affiliation with al-Qa'idah and adopted the JFS moniker. No one buys it - we all consider them to still be loyal to al-Qa'idah.

Here are my translations of the captions on the video:

- American B-52 bombers of the international coalition

- Took off from the Incirlik air base in Turkey

- And targeted a headquarters of the Jabhat Fatah al-Sham in Sarmada in the Idlib Countryside

- Resulting in the destruction of the headquarters and the killing of 25 members of the group

- Also, 11 [other leaders] were killed over the last two days in coalition bombing of two cars belonging to the group

- Including commanders of the highest level

Sarmada is located in Idlib governorate about 20 miles north of the city of Idlib and about 20 miles west of the city of Aleppo.

This is an area in which U.S. drones have mounted strikes against JFS targets for some time. In fact, the initial American Tomahawk missile and air strikes in Syria in 2014 targeted al-Qa'idah related positions in this area.

Other reports place the death toll at 30, resulting from the attack by U.S. Air Force B-52 bombers firing at least four conventional air-launched cruise missiles (CALCM). The standard warhead of the CALCM is 3000 pounds of high explosives.

Reactions to the strike were interesting. While most analysts agree that JFS targets are not affected by the recent Russian-Turkish negotiated ceasefire, critics asked why it was possible for American aircraft to strike JFS targets, yet could not support anti-regime rebels or protect safe zones in northern Syria. They also want to know why the Americans are targeting a group that is anti-regime and also anti-ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria).

My answer to the critics: Al-Qa'idah is a special case for Americans. It was al-Qa'idah that came to our shores in 2001 and killed over 3000 of us. It has been the policy of the United States, with overwhelming popular support regardless of party or politics, to hunt down and kill these thugs - whoever, whenever and wherever. These just happened to be in Syria.

It may take years, even decades, but in the end, the United States will continue to either bring these killers to justice, or as we have seen here in Syria, bring justice to them.

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The fall of Kabul - 15 years later

Kabul under Northern Alliance attack - November 2001

On November 14, 2001, the Afghan capital city of Kabul fell to the U.S.-supported Northern Alliance after a short but intense battle. The Northern Alliance was supported primarily by U.S. airpower controlled by American special operations troops and paramilitary officers of the CIA.

Fifteen years later, what have we accomplished?

Let's remember why the United States invaded Afghanistan. Following the al-Qa'idah attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the Taliban government of Afghanistan was given the opportunity to respond to a request (actually, it was a demand) to turn over al-Qa'idah leader Usamah bin Ladin to American authorities for trial.

The Taliban, citing the tribal code known as pashtunwali, refused, claiming that bin Ladin had been granted sanctuary in Afghanistan and turning him over to a foreign power would be a violation of their honor.

In response, President George Bush authorized the invasion of Afghanistan, pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40) passed by the Congress on September 14, 2001 - the President signed it into law four days later. The law authorized the President to employ the armed forces of the United States against those responsible for the attacks of September 11, 2001, as well as any entity who harbored said persons or groups.

By refusing to turn over Usamah bin Ladin to the United States, the Taliban met the criteria of the authorization. On October 7, 2001, American forces began the campaign known as Operation Enduring Freedom by dropping bombs and firing cruise missiles against Taliban military and communications facilities, as well as al-Qa'idah training camps in the areas of Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat.

It was the beginning of the longest war in American history.

On November 14, the capital fell. The Taliban was forced from power, and al-Qa'idah fell back towards the Pakistan border.

In the battle of Tora Bora - December 6 to December 17 - the United States relied on local Afghan allies, including the Northern Alliance, to arrange the "modalities" of bin Ladin's capture or surrender. I remember wondering who made that fateful, ill-advised decision - you cannot outsource your fighting. There were additional American troops available, but the U.S. military commander did not commit them to the fight. Big mistake.

The result was predictable. Whether tribal loyalties came into play, or money changed hands, or some other deal was struck, Usamah bin Ladin escaped across the border into the Pashtun-controlled tribal area of Pakistan. This event should have been a warning about any long term commitment to the Afghans.

At this point, the American military mission in Afghanistan was essentially complete, only partially accomplished, but complete. Al-Qa'idah no longer had a base of training and operations in Afghanistan, but they merely changed venues. They initially moved to Pakistan - who has been virtually no help - then to Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, North Africa, and even to Syria where they were the predecessor of the so-called and self-proclaimed Islamic State.

It was not until 2011 that justice was finally delivered to Usamah bin Ladin, then living in relative safety in Pakistan. Yet, for ten years preceding that raid, American forces were involved in a civil war in Afghanistan. Even after the killing of bin Ladin, American forces remain in Afghanistan. After 15 years, we have lost almost 2400 troops killed and over 20,000 wounded. Although the cost is pegged at over $700 billion, the actual costs when long-term medical and disability bills are included is much higher.

What have we accomplished in Afghanistan since the Battle of Tora Bora that justifies the blood and treasure? It depends on who you ask, but since this is my article, I'll answer.

What was the mission? Get al-Qa'idah and bin Ladin - once that was accomplished, the effort should have focused on the remnants of al-Qa'idah, not propping up the Karzai government, what most of us knew was going to a futile effort at creating a representative form of government. We are not very good at this.

So now we have been there for 15 years, and have accomplished what? The Afghan military is incapable of quelling the violence, the Taliban is on the ascent, and we insist that our "advise and assist" mission is still viable.

Solution? I guess we first need to define the goals. If it is to defeat the Taliban, say so and deploy enough troops to get it done (I am not advocating that). If it is an inclusive political settlement, get that process moving.

What we are doing now is not working.

Not much. Why not? Because have never really defined a mission beyond 2001. Why are we there? To defeat and expel al-Qa'idah from the country? That was accomplished years ago. To defeat the Taliban? The Taliban does not pose a threat to the United States.

Naysayers will counter that the Taliban will allow al-Qa'idah to return and re-establish training bases, and later mount operations against the United States and/or its allies. I think we have demonstrated that we are capable of devastating the country - again - if the Taliban is stupid enough to allow that to happen.

In simple terms, tell the Taliban - or whichever corrupt warlord eventually seizes power in arguably the most corrupt country on the planet - that if al-Qa'idah comes back to Afghanistan, so does American military power.

And we won’t be coming to nation-build….

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Trump accuses Obama and Hillary of "founding" ISIS

I have been asked to appear on CNN Tonight with Don Lemon to discuss Donald Trump's remarks accusing President Barack Obama and former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton of founding the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

Trump: "He’s the founder of ISIS. He founded ISIS. I would say the co-founder would be Crooked Hillary Clinton."

I wish Mr. Trump would be a bit more reticent in his description of these things--after all, words are important.

CNN asked if I thought Obama was "responsible" for ISIS, to which I honestly answered, "I could make the case that he is."

Here's how I came to that conclusion:

Soon after Trump's remarks, Mrs. Clinton's supporters retorted that the responsibility for the creation of ISIS rests with President George W. Bush, based on the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Whether you support the decision to invade Iraq--as Mrs. Clinton did--or not, by the time President Bush left office in January 2009, the surge and accompanying "Sunni Awakening" (both engineered by General David Petraeus) had effectively defeated both the Shi'a militia (primarily the jaysh al-mahdi, JAM) as well as al-Qa'idah in Iraq (AQI).

The U.S. military mission in Iraq was in the process of changing to training Iraqi security forces and keeping a watchful eye on the Shi'a-dominated government of Nuri al-Maliki. That was the situation that President Obama inherited as he took office.

The failure of the Obama Administration to secure a new Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Iraq to replace the one signed in 2008 is an important factor in what happened afterwards. In my opinion, the President wanted out of Iraq so badly that he did not even try to hammer out a new SOFA with the Iraqis, who were willing to negotiate. Against the advice of his military commanders, President Obama ordered the complete withdrawal of American forces in late 2011.

Almost immediately after the departure of U.S. troops, we saw the reconstitution of AQI concurrent with the hollowing out of the Iraqi military as al-Maliki replaced his competent--mostly Sunni--commanders with his unqualified cronies, all Shi'a. Corruption skyrocketed and the Iraqi Army became the impotent force that collapsed in the defense of Mosul in June 2014.

AQI began operations in the western part of Iraq, retaking al-Fallujah and Ramadi fairly quickly. The resurgence of AQI came as no surprise. When you announce a date certain that you are withdrawing your forces from the country, adversaries merely wait until you are gone and resume their operations.

Meanwhile, across the border in Syria, the "Arab Spring" demonstrations had deteriorated into a bloody civil war. In 2012, the Free Syrian Army asked for help. To her credit, Secretary Clinton (as did the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) favored providing weapons and other assistance to the rebels. They were overridden by the President.

With no help going to the rebels from the West, AQI sent forces to Syria to take advantage of the deteriorating situation, on one hand to assist the FSA, but mostly to carve out territory for an Islamic state. They formed the al-Qa'idah element in the Levant, calling themselves the Victory Front (jabhat al-nusrah, JN). Soon afterwards, AQI and JN merged to form ISIS, changing later to just the Islamic State.

According to Mr. Trump (and in this specific claim, I agree) it was President Obama's premature withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, and his refusal to assist the Syrian opposition in 2012--both against the advice of his senior advisers--that created the power vacuums (plural) that directly led to the formation of ISIS.

However, for Mr. Trump to say that Obama and Clinton are the "founders" of ISIS is not just misleading, it is untrue. However, I do think the President and former Secretary of State bear responsibility for the rise of ISIS--he more than she.

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Secretary of State Kerry - Russian aircraft in Syria are "basically force protection"

In the words of Secretary of State John Kerry, "It is the judgment of our military and experts that the level and type represents basically force protection."

Kerry's comments are in line with pronouncements made by Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu to Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, claiming that the deployment of over three squadrons of combat aircraft and hundreds of naval infantry troops was "defensive in nature" and there to protect the joint Russian-Syrian naval facility in the port city of Tartus.

The naval facility the Russian forces are ostensibly protecting is 30 miles south of the Humaymim air base near Latakia that the Russians now occupy. I understand why the aircraft are at the air base, but the troops should be at the naval base.

I am not sure who is being more disingenuous, Kerry or Shoygu. I understand Shoygu making the statement, but why is Kerry accepting his explanation? The force package that the Russians have deployed to Syria goes far beyond "force protection." The various vehicles and weapons systems provide not only the capability to defend the air base south of Latakia and the naval facility at Tartus, but the capability to launch offensive operations as well.

It is this offensive capability that has analysts concerned. There are three types of fixed wing aircraft in addition to Mi-24 (NATO: HIND) helicopter gunships deployed to Humaymim. The fixed wing aircraft include four Sukhoi SU-30SM (NATO: FLANKER C) multirole fighters, 12 SU-25 (NATO: FROGFOOT) ground attack/close air support fighters, and 12 SU-24 (NATO: FENCER) tactical interdiction fighter-bombers.

A closer look at this force package belies the "force protection" description accepted by Secretary Kerry. The SU-30SM is considered a 4th-plus generation fighter-bomber - it is one of the newer aircraft in the Russian inventory and is on par with American aircraft like the U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle and the U.S. Navy F/A-18 Super Hornet.

The SU-30SM has the ability to act as a command-and-control platform for a group of aircraft - it is likely for this capability the Russians deployed four of these aircraft to Syria. They will be used to guide and support the SU-24 and SU-25 fighters should they be tasked to conduct air strikes.

The SU-24 is an attack/tactical interdiction fighter bomber - the Syrian Air Force uses these aircraft extensively against both ISIS and rebel targets. The aircraft is similar to the now-retired U.S. Air Force F-111 Aardvark. It has only a nominal defensive role - it was built to strike targets deep inside enemy territory, not defend friendly formations or conduct close air support. Calling the SU-24 a "force protection" weapon is a bit of a stretch.

The SU-25 is a close air support aircraft akin to the U.S. Air Force A-10 Thuderbolt II (more commonly called the Warthog). You could make the case that the aircraft has a force protection role - it, along with the MI-24 helicopter gunships, could provide defensive air support if Russian positions came under attack.

The coastal areas of Latakia (including Jablah where the Humaymim base is located) and Tartus thus far have not seen any fighting, although the rebel groups, including those allied with the al-Qa'idah affiliate in Syria - Jabhat al-Nusrah (The Victory Front) have indicated a desire to take the fight to the 'Alawi homeland. President Bashar al-Asad and most of his senior civilian and military leadership are members of the quasi-Shi'a 'Alawi sect of Islam.

There has been some notable activity by the Russian task force since the defense chiefs of Russia and the United States had their conversation in which Minister Shoygu claimed that the Russian deployment is defensive in nature. Almost immediately after the deployment of the fighter aircraft to Syria, the Russians began manned and unmanned flights over Idlib province.

Flights over Idlib is interesting since one of the stated reasons behind the Russians military deployment to Syria is the threat posed by the Islamic State (also known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, or ISIS) to Syria and Russia. Idlib is not controlled by ISIS, but rather by the rebel groups that pose the most serious threat to al-Asad regime military and militia forces. In the past few month, a coalition of rebel groups, many of them Islamist, have routed the Syrian Army from most of Idlib province.

I think we can assume that the Russians have gone far afield of what would be legitimate "force protection" for their naval facility at Tartus. The force package that has been deployed possesses sufficient combat power to commence offensive operations against either ISIS or the various rebel groups and tactical coalitions arrayed against the Syrian regime. The U.S.-led coalition has been conducting operations against ISIS targets in Syria (and Iraq) for over a year. The anemic nature of that campaign no doubt led to the Russian decision.

That said, it appears to me that we may have another what I will call the "Turkish conundrum" on our hands. The Turks agreed to allow the United States and its coalition partners the use of several Turkish air bases just north of the Syrian border - drastically reducing flight time to ISIS targets in both Syria and Iraq. The Turks also committed to conduct airstrikes against ISIS targets.

However, an overwhelming majority of Turkish air strikes have concentrated on facilities of the Kurdish Workers Party, known by its Kurdish acronym PKK; the PKK has been designated a terrorist organization by the United States and other countries. Not complaining about the Turkish operations appears to be the price paid by the United States for access to the Turkish air bases.

The Russians have claimed they are in Syria to address the threat posed by ISIS. Yet, it appears from their initial reconnaissance and familiarization flights that they are actually there to prop up the failing al-Asad regime. They may actually do both, which presents us with yet another awkward situation.

The Russians have joined the Iranians, Iraqis and Syrians in the formation of an anti-ISIS coordination and intelligence exchange center in Baghdad. While this is a prudent step, it excludes the U.S.-led coalition, although coalition operations information exchanged with the Iraqis no doubt will find it way to the "other coalition."

It should come as no surprise that the Russians are in Syria to protect Russian interests, primarily continued access to the Mediterranean. That access is a vital interest to Russia - they need the al-Asad regime to survive. That is the tactical mission in furtherance of a strategic policy objective. While Secretary Kerry and Secretary Carter might accept the fiction that this is "basically force protection" - I don't.

I suspect we will see Russian air attacks against anti-regime rebels in the near future.

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U.S. and Turkey to launch "comprehensive" operation against ISIS

Turkish Air Force F-16 fighters

The Turkish foreign minister announced that Turkey and the United States will soon commence what he called "comprehensive" air operations to force fighters of the self-proclaimed "Islamic State" (more commonly called the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, or ISIS) from a security zone to be established in northern Syria.

The establishment of this security zone has been a longstanding Turkish requirement for its cooperation in the fight against ISIS, and was no doubt a condition in the recent agreement by which American forces can conduct operations from three Turkish air bases just north of the Syria's border with Turkey. U.S. Air Force F-16's deployed to Incirlik Air Base near Adana have already conducted airstrikes in both Syria and Iraq. Armed Predator drones are also being flown from the base.

Turkish participation in the fight against ISIS is welcome, and according to some analysts (including me), long overdue. Turkey has been the primary conduit for thousands of foreign fighters to enter Syria and join ISIS. ISIS still controls a portion of the Syrian border with Turkey north of Aleppo. It is this area that the Turks want to declare a security zone. The Turks hope that the hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees will return to this area and alleviate the huge burden on Turkish social services.

Declaring a security zone and establishing it are two different things. As can be seen on the map, the area designated as the security zone - a 50 mile stretch of land along the Turkish-Syrian border - is firmly under control of ISIS.

Given the generally anemic air campaign conducted over the past year, it is doubtful that even with Turkish Air Force participation air power alone will clear ISIS fighters from the area. At some point, some ground force is going to have to move into the area and occupy the territory.

This is a key piece of territory - again, it is the only remaining portion of the Turkish border that is still controlled by ISIS. Cutting ISIS's access to the border - now easily traversed despite the large presence of Turkish troops - will staunch the flow of arms and recruits to the Islamist group. Without this portal to Turkey, logistics support and manpower replacements become exponentially more difficult, as does the sale and transport of black market oil to unscrupulous Turkish dealers.

According to the announcement by the Turkish official, American and Turkish aircraft will provide air support for a force of "moderate Syrian rebels" who will remove ISIS forces from the area. This is laughable - thus far the United States has only trained somewhere in the neighborhood of 200 "moderate Syrian rebels" willing to forego their main objective of removing Syrian President Bashar al-Asad and confront ISIS on behalf of the United States.

These few untested troops constitute our "boots on the ground." Add to this the fact that many of the initial group of 60 have been killed or co-opted by the Jabhat al-Nusrah, the al-Qa'idah affiliate in Syria. Pitiful. To think they are going to remove ISIS from this rather large area is fantasy.

There are Kurds in the area willing to be the proverbial "boots on the ground" - in fact, they have functioned in that role in the areas to the east of the erstwhile security zone. The successful defense of Kobani with Kurdish forces on the ground and substantial American airpower shows how effective this match-up can be. The Turks have vetoed any Kurdish participation, fearing that Kurdish control of almost the entire border area will lead to either Kurdish autonomy or an effort to establish an independent Kurdish homeland.

As a CNN military analyst, I was interviewed about this subject. American and Turkish aircraft acting in concert can bring enormous firepower to the fight. However, someone is going to have to remove ISIS fighters - firmly ensconced in the area. The force of a handful of "moderate Syrian rebels" are not up to the task. I asked then, and I ask now, who is going to do it?

I fear that without the Kurds as our "boots on the ground," we will employ massive amounts of airpower and still not dislodge ISIS from the area. It is as if we are setting this up for failure. The Turks are going to have to either let the Kurds participate or they will have to introduce Turkish troops to confront ISIS.

More half measures - when are we going to get serious?

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Jordan to exchange suicide bomber for its pilot - professional opinion and personal comment

Sajidah al-Rishawi and 1st Lt Mu'az al-Kasasbah

Jordan has agreed to release a convicted suicide bomber to the group calling itself the Islamic State or Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in exchange for the release of a Royal Jordanian Air Force (RJAF) pilot who was captured by ISIS in Syria after his jet went down during a bombing mission near the self-proclaimed ISIS capital of al-Raqqah. That exchange was supposed to take place on the Turkish-Syrian border before sunset on January 29.

That deadline passed as the Jordanians asked for proof that 1st Lt Mu'az al-Kasasbah is still alive. See my earlier article on the December 24, 2014 on the downing of the Jordanian F-16, Downing of a Jordanian fighter aircraft and ISIS capture of the pilot.

Jordan's agreement is a stark reversal of Jordan’s normally hardline refusal to negotiate with terrorists, and could set a precedent for future concessions to terrorist organizations. I understand the position of Jordanian King 'Abdullah II - the Kasabah family is large and influential in the kingdom. The Kasasbahs have been long-time supporters of the Hashemite dynasty that has ruled the country since its founding in the aftermath of World War One.

Before we cast stones at Jordan's seeming acquiescence to ISIS, we should remember that just last year, the United States made a deal with the Taliban in which it released five senior Taliban officials from the detention center in Guantanamo in exchange for U.S. Army Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl, who many believe deserted his post in Afghanistan. See my article on this from June, The Bowe Bergdahl exchange - a mixed blessing.

As I said, I understand King 'Abdullah's position - I can only imagine the pressure he is under from not only the Kasasbah family, but from popular demonstrations in the kingdom against Jordanian involvement in the U.S.-led coalition against ISIS.

While many in the kingdom - those demonstrating for sure - believe that this is not Jordan's fight, most rational thinkers understand that Jordan is probably next on the agenda for ISIS. ISIS fighters have already skirmished with Jordanian army units on the border with Iraq.

A major question is what will Jordan's role be in the coalition after this issue is resolved, one way or the other? If Jordan withdraws from active participation in the coalition - its stance since the loss of the F-16 and capture of Lt. al-Kasasbah - will they still allow coalition access to Jordanian air bases, a key to effective air operations against ISIS in Syria?

In my professional opinion, Jordan is making a mistake in changing its position in dealing with ISIS. That said, I understand why they are willing to do so, although they may regret it later. I was also against the U.S. (read President Obama) decision to release five senior Taliban leaders in exchange for a likely deserter.

Now to my personal comments. I realize that I am supposed to be a Middle East analyst, and a military analyst - I am paid for my professional opinions. However, I am going to diverge here for a few minutes and talk about my personal opinion - please bear with me.

In the mid-1990s, I was an adviser to the Jordan Armed Forces. While many of the details of that assignment remain classified, suffice it to say that I gained a healthy respect for my colleagues in the storied "Arab Legion" (the Jordanian Army) and the RJAF. They are professionals with whom I am proud to have served.

The suicide bomber the Jordanians have agreed to release is Sajidah al-Rishawi. She is originally an Iraqi and was recruited to become a suicide bomber by a Jordanian national who was the head of al-Qa'idah in Iraq (AQI), Abu Musa'ib al-Zarqawi. As we all know, AQI is the forerunner of ISIS. The couple was assigned to detonate explosive vests at the Raddison Hotel in Amman, Jordan. While attempting to do just that on November 9, 2005, her vest failed. Her accomplice/husband pushed her aside and detonated his vest - Sajidah survived.

The attack on the Radisson - where I have spent many nights - was part of a coordinated attack on three Amman hotels frequented by foreigners and wealthy Jordanians. The other attacks took place at the Grand Hyatt and the Days Inn.

It is the attack at the Grand Hyatt - where I have also stayed - that is germane. A suicide bomber named Rawad Jasim Muhammad 'Abid, operating in collaboration with Sajidah al-Rishawi and her husband, detonated his explosive vest, killed seven hotel employees and Syrian-American movie producer Moustapha Akkad (Mustafa al-'Aqad), along with his 34 year-old daughter, Rima.

Moustapha Akkad was born in Aleppo, Syria and emigrated to the United States with his family. He ended up as a Hollywood filmmaker, producing "The Message" and "Lion of the Desert," both starring Anthony Quinn and Irene Pappas. His younger brother Usamah - known to those of us who know him as Sam - ended up as an instructor of the Arabic language at the Defense Language Institute (DLI), located at the Presidio of Monterey, California. I was among Sam's many Arabic language students there and later got to know Sam much better when I served on the faculty of the Arabic department at DLI in the late 1970s.

In 2005, I called Sam and offered my condolences, but what really can you say? We have had numerous conversations since then on the current state of affairs in the region. Until today Sajidah al-Rishawi, one member of the conspiracy that ended with Sam's brother's death, was in custody and sentenced by a Jordanian military court to death by hanging and remained on death row.

I get the Jordanian government's decision to exchange her for their pilot. I almost understand (but still disagree with) the Obama Administration's agreement to release five senior Taliban officials for a likely deserter.

I get it, but I don't like it - it's personal.

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Syrian regime recruits Sunni tribes - a page from the American playbook

Dayr al-Zawr

Dayr al-Zawr is a key city on the Euphrates River between the city of al-Raqqah - self-claimed capital of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS, or "The Islamic State" as they prefer*) and the internationally-recognized border with Iraq. The city has been contested between the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad and Syrian rebel forces, most notably the Free Syrian Army (FSA).

Control of parts of the city have vacillated between the two sides since the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011. Much of the city's interesting and architecturally significant infrastructure has been destroyed, including several iconic bridges over the Euphrates River. Overall, the fighting has been a stalemate with neither side achieving full control of the area which sits at the heart of the critical Syrian oil industry - most of Syria's oil is located in the fields surrounding the city.

Dayr al-Zawr air base

Key facilities in Dayr al-Zawr are the air base (which doubles as the city's now-closed civil airport) and an adjacent air defense center. These two military facilities have been targets of the Syrian rebels for years. The base was on the verge of collapse late last year as ISIS joined the fight to take the base. See my article, The likely fall of Syria's Dayr al-Zawr air base - another slaughter on the horizon?

I suspect that given ISIS's brutal treatment of captured Syrian and Iraqi troops, the Syrian armed forces have put up a valiant defense of the base, pouring in reinforcements by air from garrisons further to the west. Control of the base is critical to the resupply and reinforcement effort. Should the situation worsen, an air evacuation may be the only way out for the Syrian soldiers defending the base.

In addition, the Syrian military seems to have taken a page from the American playbook of 2006-2007 in neighboring Iraq - the "Anbar Awakening." They approached the shaykhs of the local Sunni tribes in or near the areas controlled by ISIS and asked them if the Islamic state being created by ISIS is the form of government under which they wish to live. Of course, in these tribal areas in eastern Syria, the tribes are powerful and the shaykhs are not wont to lose that power to ISIS and live under what is arguably the most repressive form of Islam on the planet.

As it did in Iraq, the appeal resonates with the tribal leaders. As a result, some of the tribes have allied with the Syrian army and the locally formed National Defense Forces (NDF), which is a militia mostly composed of Ba'ath Party members. These militia are often referred to as shabihah** - "ghosts" or "phantoms" - by the rebels.

According to Syrian media, the combined forces of the Syrian armed forces, the NDF militias and the tribal units have been able to stop the ISIS advance on the base. Further reporting on January 27 claims that they have secured the entire perimeter of the base and pushed ISIS forces back at least one kilometer.

Failure to seize the air base has been a major setback for all of the opposition groups, be they the Free Syrian Army or ISIS. While on the map, it appears to be a flat area that should be easily overrun, in reality, the air base and adjacent air defense facility sit atop a plateau overlooking the city and the Euphrates River. The ridge is fairly steep - I remember standing in the city and being surprised at just how high and steep the approaches to the military bases were.

The stalemate continues in the east with neither side able to make lasting headway. Either ISIS or the FSA attack the military facilities, enjoy some temporary success, then are pushed back by reinforced Syrian troops. The bloodletting goes on unabated.
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* In Arabic, it is الدولة الاسلامية في العراق والشام, or al-dawlat al-islamiyah fil-'iraq wal-sham. That translates to "the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (Syria or the Levant)." Much of the Arabic-language media uses an acronym comprising the first letters of the Arabic words - داعش, or da'ish, to describe the group, as have some official government spokespersons. The group punishes people for using the perceived derogatory term.

** In the trivia department, it is derived from the same root word used to describe American stealth aircraft.

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The confluence of Charlie Hebdo, al-Qa'idah and ISIS

Said Kouachi - Cherif Kouachi - Amedy Coulibaly - Hayat Boumeddiene

We are all familiar with the actions that began in France on January 7 in which three Islamist terrorists murdered 17 people, including two police officers, and four citizens who had been taken hostage. The three terrorists, all French-born nationals, were killed in two separate, simultaneous police operations on January 9 following a massive manhunt.

The identities and backgrounds of the three perpetrators have been widely publicized. Two were brothers - Said and Cherif Kouachi, ages 32 and 34, who were trained by the al-Qa'idah affiliated group in Yemen known as al-Qa'idah in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Both received training on small arms and possibly explosives in 2011 under the tutelage of American-born cleric Anwar al-'Awlaqi (before he was killed in an American drone strike).

The third terrorist, Amedy Coulibaly, 32 years old, was radicalized in France and belonged to a cell with the two Kouachi brothers and possibly other radical Islamists known as the "Buttes Chaumont Terror Group" - named for the park at which members of the cell met and conducted physical training.

The details of the actual attacks have been adequately covered by the media. What I want to address are some interesting facts that have emerged during and after the attacks on the Charlie Hedbo offices, the streets of Paris and the kosher supermarket.

According to the available reporting on the training received by the Kouachi brothers, the pair traveled to Oman and were smuggled into the Marib area of Yemen, a known AQAP area. They were there for two weeks - they received enough training to properly handle the types of weapons they later used in the attack on the Charlie Hebdo offices.

The two brothers entered the offices with AK-47 assault rifles, a shotgun and an RPG* launcher. These weapons, especially the RPG launcher, are not easily obtainable in France. It will be interesting to know where the weapons originated and how the brothers obtained them. Are there other members of the Buttes Chaumont Terror Group cell that may have assisted with the logistics for the attacks?

The fact that the shooters wore body armor and face masks tells me they planned to survive the initial attack, probably to prolong the event as long as possible for the maximum impact. If they were planning to die in that attack, they could have used a suicide vest and killed everyone.

Crashing their car while departing the attack scene may have complicated whatever initial escape plan the brothers had, but after they hijacked another car, they should have had a place to go with money, food, weapons, clothing, another vehicle, etc., rather than resorting to robbing a gas station for food and fuel.

Although the brothers handled the weapons well and were disciplined and ruthless shooters, their post-attack planning was not that professional. The fact that Said Kouachi's identification card was dropped and found later by police in their vehicle indicates the lack of proper planning - they should not have been carrying any identification.

AQAP later claimed to have ordered the attacks, which may or may not be true. In an interview they granted to a reporter during the hostage portion of the event, the Kouachi brothers declared that they were operating on behalf of the al-Qa'idah affiliate.

Contrast the affiliation of the Kouachi brothers with that of fellow Buttes Chaumont Terror Group cell members Amedy Coulibaly and his Islamic-law wife (France does not recognize the religious marriage). These two claim to have an affiliation with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

In a video and again during an interview during the hostage stage of the event, Coulibaly declared his allegiance to the Islamic Caliphate (as ISIS sometimes refers to itself) and Caliph Ibrahim (also known as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi), the head of ISIS. The fact that Coulibaly arranged for his wife to enter Turkey and make her way to Syria underscores their commitment to ISIS.

This apparent dichotomy in the allegiance of members of the same cell - some loyal to AQAP and others loyal to ISIS - is telling. While we have seen periods of cooperation and alliance between the two Islamist groups - al-Qa'idah in Iraq was the founder of ISIS, after all - neither of the two have resolved their differences in how an Islamic caliphate should be or will be structured and managed.

It appears to me that these four Islamists were able to put aside the ideological issues between the two groups which they represented in order to be able to conduct these attacks - a tactical alliance to achieve a common objective. We should also be careful not to read too much into this mutual assistance arrangement. First, it is not an indication that the two groups are entering an alliance - events in Syria between the two groups bear that out.

Second, we should not assess that since they were not members of larger al-Qa'idah or ISIS groups that there are not many more Islamists terrorists already in place in France and other European countries. The nature of cells may have precluded them from knowing of others of similar bent. We have already seen threats from ISIS that these attacks are but the first wave - it would be unwise not to assume that there are more sleeper cells in the country.

If this is the first wave of attacks, they may not be limited to France or even Europe. Although there are much fewer American Islamists who have returned from the battlefields of the Middle East, it only takes one or two who are willing to die.

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Note: The French transliterate Arabic names mush differently than the English-speaking countries. In the transliteration system used by the U.S. and UK governments, the names of the two brothers and the wanted woman would be rendered as Sa'id al-Kawashi, Sharif al-Kawashi and Hayat Bumaydin. Amedy Coulibali is a Senegalese name.

* Later determined to be an anti-tank missile launcher similar to the M72 LAW.

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