Russian Deployment of North Korean Artillery in Ukraine

 

170mm Koksan self-propelled howitzer in Iraq

A recent article in Military Watch magazine reported on Russia's use of North Korean-made heavy artillery in Ukraine. The article was based on comments made by the commander of the Ukrainian Defense Intelligence Directorate.

“Unfortunately, this gun is demonstrating itself quite well in battle. It’s firing from quite a long range, and it’s quite good in terms of accuracy. We have data that the Russian Federation was provided 120 pieces. But I think that supply will continue because these guns are demonstrating themselves quite well. This is unfortunate for us because this is artillery for long-range firing.” 

Why I am writing about a North Korean artillery piece being used by Russian forces in Ukraine? This is, after all, Middle East Perspectives by Rick Francona. Read on.

I am very familiar with the Koksan gun. In fact, I believe I am one of the few Americans who have ever had the opportunity to get in, on, and under the weapon. I took the above photograph in 1988 at an Iraqi Army artillery depot south of Baghdad. At the time, I was serving as a liaison officer to the Iraqi Directorate of Military Intelligence at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. It was the eighth year of the Iran-Iraq War; we had developed a relationship with the Iraqis to prevent a recurrence of Iraq's mistaken attack on the USS Stark in the Persian Gulf in 1987 in which 37 sailors were killed.

I wrote about this experience in my book, Ally to Adversary - An Eyewitness Account of Iraq's Fall from Grace. From the book:

PROJECT MORNING STAR

Our cooperative relationship with the Iraqis allowed us unprecedented access to the Iraqi military. For example, the Iraqis had captured a large artillery piece from the Iranians during the liberation of Al-Faw. They could not identify its origin and were perplexed by the unusual 170-mm bore. Artillery pieces worldwide are generally manufactured in standard bore sizes, normally 122-mm, 130-mm, 152-mm, 155- mm, 175-mm, and 203-mm. We knew they had captured this gun: Army Colonel Gary Nelson—our newly assigned defense attaché in Baghdad and an artillery officer by training—had seen it while it was on display at a victory celebration in Baghdad. We knew what it was, and we wanted it.

The Iranians had acquired this self-propelled howitzer in 1987. At that time, it was the longest-range artillery piece made anywhere in the world, capable of firing a rocket-assisted projectile to a range of almost sixty kilometers. It had been used by the Iranians to conduct harassment fire from the Al-Faw Peninsula into Kuwait’s northeastern oil fields. The Iranians were applying military pressure on the Kuwaitis in a variety of ways, as punishment for supporting Iraq in the war and for alleged violations of oil export and pricing policies of OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries). This artillery fire was complemented by Chinese-made “Silkworm” cruise missile attacks on Kuwait’s oil ports and by naval attacks on Kuwaiti shipping in the Gulf. 

The attacks were the catalyst for the March 1987 decision to register Kuwaiti oil tankers under the American flag (a procedure called “reflagging”) to offer some protection for oil shipping in the region. The U.S. Navy could not legally protect foreign shipping, but a merchant ship flying the U.S. flag was entitled to armed escort through the Persian Gulf war zone.

The high level of U.S. interest in the gun had little to do with the situation in the Persian Gulf and rested instead on the fact that the weapon had been designed half a world away to fire on the capital city of a close U.S. ally, South Korea. What the Iraqis had captured on the Al-Faw Peninsula, though they did not realize it, was a weapon designed and built by North Korea to fire on Seoul from the North Korean side of the Demilitarized Zone. The U.S. military refers to it as a Koksan gun.

While inspecting the gun (the project was called Morning Star), we discovered more evidence of Iraq’s use of nerve gas. As I rooted around the cramped driver’s station of the gun system looking for anything of intelligence value—maps, notes, logs, manuals, firing tables, communications charts, and so forth—I found several used atropine injectors. These auto-injectors had been manufactured in Iran and were similar to those I had found earlier on a battlefield on Al-Faw. I showed one of the injectors (and pocketed another) to both Majid and the brigadier general commanding the artillery depot, explaining that these used injectors indicated to me that a nerve agent had been used at Al-Faw. 

I was careful not to accuse the Iraqis, but the implication was clear. The brigadier general replied that Iraqi artillery doctrine calls for use of obscurant smoke in the preparatory artillery barrages. His “analysis” was that the Iranians mistook the smoke rounds for nerve gas and, therefore, self-administered atropine. 

Not wanting a confrontation while standing in the middle of an Iraqi military installation, I did not mention to the Iraqi officers that we had also discovered decontamination fluid in many places on the weapon, most noticeably trapped in the headlights. It would make no sense for the Iraqis to decontaminate the vehicle if they had only fired smoke rounds at the Iranians.

In the end, the Iraqis decided not to allow us to move the gun back to the United States, so I arranged for a small team of artillery experts and engineers to fly to Iraq and do a field exploitation of the piece. I remember that working on the gun in the blazing sun in the Iraqi desert was, and still is, the hottest I have every been. My insides felt like I was being roasted.

Just as the Ukrainian intelligence chief noted, the gun was well-engineered and manufactured. It was an intelligence boon - these guns pose a threat to U.S. forces in South Korea. 

Interesting Syrian Air Force Flight Activity

Syrian Air Force IL-76 YK-ATA

The Syrian Air Force (SYAF), officially the Syrian Arab Air Force, operates three Ilyushin IL-76T (NATO: Candid) heavy lift transport aircraft: YK-ATA, YK-ATB, and YK-ATD (shown top to bottom). A fourth aircraft (YK-ATC) has not been operational for almost 30 years.

These are older photos – all three aircraft are in need of depot-level maintenance, upgrade, and overhaul. This is done at at the Ilyushin facility in Ramenskoye, Russia. Based on publicly available flight tracking information, YK-ATD was overhauled in 2016, YK-ATB in 2018, and YK-ATA in 2019. 

I suspect that YK-ATD is in dire need of major maintenance - it has not flown since November 24, 2022, and then only for a short domestic flight. It appears to have become what we in the U.S. Air Force refer to as a “hangar queen.”

Do not let the colorful livery of SYRIANAIR (Syrian Airlines) fool you – I have flown on both SYRIANAIR and with the SYAF - they’re different. One is a second-tier Middle East airline with great passenger service, and the other is a third-rate air force transport operation that worried me. I have flown on SYAF Antonov AN-24 (NATO: Coke), Tupolev TU-134 (NATO: Crusty), and Yakovlev YAK-40 (NATO: Codling) aircraft – the condition of the YAK-40 and AN-24 was far below U.S. Air Force standards.

The three IL-76 aircraft are actually assigned to the 585th Transport Squadron of the Syrian Air Force 29th Air Transport Brigade, based at Damascus International Airport. 

The military ramp at the airport is southwest of the civilian terminal. I have been on the 29th Brigade ramp a few times to catch attaché flights on the extremely rare occasions when the Syrians included American officers in official attaché trips.

These transports were built in 1980 (YK-ATA and YK-ATB) and 1981 (YK-ATD) – I remember them in the original IL-76MD (military) configuration, complete with tail guns. In the early 2000s, all were converted to their current IL-76T configuration.

Over the past few years, the Syrian IL-76’s made almost daily resupply flights to the regime-controlled enclave of al-Qamishly in northeast Syria, and almost daily flights to Mehrabad airport in Tehran, Iran. Once in a while, one of the aircraft would fly to/from Moscow. 

That pattern has changed a bit.

I have noticed a massive increase of SYAF IL-76 flights between Damascus International Airport (read that as 29th Air Brigade) and Benghazi/Beninah International Airport (coincidentally also an air base at which SYAF fighter pilots were assigned to support Mu’amar al-Qadhafi in the 1970s). It is in the area of Libya controlled by Field Marshal Khalifah Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA). 

Syrian media reported that Haftar’s armed forces have airlifted relief supplies to victims of the February 6 earthquakes that have devastated part of northern Syria. Some of that aid was delivered by LNA aircraft to the Russian-leased Humaymim air base south of Latakia.

Looking over publicly available flight records for the past three months, an interesting international flight pattern emerges. 

YK-ATA has flown 13 round-trip flights between Damascus, Syria and Benghazi, Libya, which seems to be its primary route. It did fly to Moscow three times, Beirut once, and once to, for whatever reason, Oral in northwestern Kazakhstan.

YK-ATB flew seven round-trip flights between Damascus, Syria and Benghazi, Libya. It also flew to Tehran/Mehrabad airport, using a ramp dedicated solely to the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard (IRGC), four times. Additionally, it was used at least six times for the routine domestic flight from Damascus to al-Qamishly.

In the last 90 days for the Syrian Air Force, there have been at least:

• 20 round trip flights to Benghazi, Libya (most before the earthquake)

• 4 round trip flights to Tehran/Mehrabad, Iran

• 3 round trip flights to Moscow/Vnukovo, Russia

• 1 round trip flight to Beirut, Lebanon

• 1 round trip flight to Oral, Kazakhstan

I am puzzled by the number of flights to Libya, specifically to the area controlled by Khalifah Haftar. If anyone has any insight into the relationship between Syrian President Bashar al-Asad and Khalifah Haftar, please inform me.

I will note that after the earthquakes that created catastrophic damage in northern Syria, all return flights from Benghazi to Syria stopped first in Latakia, and in at least one case in Aleppo, both areas that have suffered catastrophic earthquake damage. I have to assume that these aircraft were transporting relief supplies from Benghazi.

My question: What were the Syrian IL-76 aircraft moving between Damascus and Benghazi before the earthquake?

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Movie Review: Security Risk (Allied Artists, 1954)

Normally I review movies and series that are based on or about the Middle East. However, I did spend my entire career as a professional intelligence officer – about half the time as a signals intelligence officer and the other half as a clandestine human resources intelligence officer, more commonly referred to as a case officer.

 

One of my pet peeves is the arbitrary use of the term spy. I was not a spy – I recruited spies, foreign officers and officials who had access to their government’s secret and sensitive information to provide that information clandestinely to U.S. intelligence services. They were the spies – I was an American intelligence officer “running” or “handling” them on behalf of my country. Spies agree to betray their countries for a variety of reasons, some honorable, some not – it depends on which side of the equation you are.

 

Security Risk is a 1954 film by Allied Artists, directed by Harold Schuster, and written by Jo Pagano and John Rich. The film stars John Ireland, Dorothy Malone, Keith Larsen, Dolores Donlon, John Craven and Susan Cummings. It’s just 69 minutes long, so it does not require a huge investment of your time.

The write-up on several classic movie sites describes this as an American action film. I would call it an espionage drama, but in terms of the genre in 1954, it might also qualify as an action thriller. There is a lot of action packed into just 69 minutes.

 

The story line: (I will avoid spoiling the film for those of you who plan to watch it.)

 

In the early 1950’s as the Cold War between the two major post World War II powers – the United States and the Soviet Union – heated up, the Soviets were very interested in knowing what research and development was taking place in the greater Los Angeles area. At that time, southern California was the epicenter of American high-tech defense and aerospace research and development.

 

The film synopsis describes the scientist who is the focus of a Soviet espionage cell as a nuclear physicist. I never got that from the film – all we are really told is that he was a government researcher and was working on an undefined “formula.” The cell was tasked with acquiring the formula from the scientist.

 

The venue for the story is the Big Bear ski resort in San Bernardino County. The resort is 100 miles east of Los Angeles, about a three-hour drive in 1954. The scientist, Dr. Lanson (we never hear his first name), decides to take a short respite from his research by going skiing at Big Bear. Obviously, the cell tasked with acquiring his research notes and “the formula” had him under surveillance; at least three members of the cell follow him to the resort.

 

There is also a support asset in residence at Big Bear, which leads me to believe that the Soviets considered the area a popular area for the defense and aerospace researchers and contractors in the Los Angeles area, and likely similar facilities in Palmdale and Edwards Air Force Base.

 

As you would expect, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was concerned with the activities of Soviet and other hostile intelligence services – the Bureau is the primary counterintelligence agency in the United States. As such, there is an FBI agent in Big Bear to make sure these hostile intelligence services are kept at bay. You decide whether he is successful.

 

So as not to spoil the viewing experience for those who wish to watch the movie, I will only say that the Soviet cell at some point in the past recruited Dr. Lanson’s assistant at whatever research facility that employed him. This sets up a series of events that are interesting, and yet a bit implausible. It is the assistant who is tasked by the cell to clandestinely acquire the research papers and “the formula” from Dr. Lanson’s personal effects in the lodge suite that he shares with his assistant.

 

Okay, you see why I am baffled by this. If the cell has already recruited Dr. Lanson’s assistant, there should be no need to even mount this operation in Big Bear. Recruiting the assistant would have been a major intelligence coup, providing direct access to virtually all of the doctor’s research projects. Even if much of it was compartmented and not directly accessible by the assistant, the chances of accessing at the main research facility are far greater than a chance acquisition at a ski resort. Of course, without that, there would be no basis for the movie.

 

Continuing, when the assistant gets a chance to search the doctor’s desk, papers, and personal effects at the lodge, he pretty much ransacks the place. This is counterproductive. The goal of a clandestine intelligence operation is to acquire the information without anyone knowing that the acquisition has even occurred. Tossing an office or room only tells the security officials that something has likely been compromised.

 

Of course, this begs the question – why was Dr. Lanson in possession of these highly classified papers while ostensibly on vacation? Isn’t the purpose of a vacation to vacate your mind from the job? Merely having the materials with him and working on them in a non-secure facility violates virtually every security protocol there is.

 

The assistant is successful in discovering the research papers, including “the formula.” As any good intelligence asset, he properly photographed all of the materials. He is discovered while photographing the documents, a fight ensues, and the assistant is able to make his escape.

 

Read this-> When the assistant leaves the lodge, he leaves behind the documents out (he should have replaced them) and get this, leaves his camera there. In other words, he left the very items he was sent to acquire. Sort of like the current joke, “You had one job….”

 

The very first thing you learn at the Intelligence Operations Course, Tradecraft 101, or just plain old “spy school” is GET THE INTELLIGENCE. That’s why we do this.

 

Bottom line: It’s an entertaining story, especially if you have any background in intelligence operations.

 

Watch it for free at the Russian classic film site Odnoklassniki:  https://ok.ru/video/1735416220340

 

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What does withdrawal of US troops from Iraq mean? - American military expert explains

US Central Command Gen. Frank McKenzie paid an official visit to Baghdad for meeting with Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi on Tuesday. In the meeting, Gen. McKenzie announced a possible reduction of US troops in Iraq. Apart from this US withdrawal of Germany was announced previous months this year. Withdrawal or shifting military troops caused a great interest among experts and media. 

In order to find the answers about the US moves, Eurasia Diary took the opinions of military expert Rick Francona.

Rick Francona is an author, commentator and media military analyst. He is a retired United States Air Force intelligence officer with experience in the Middle East, including tours of duty with the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency. 

Q. Why does the US withdraw troops from Iraq and Germany? Does it mean Iran and Russia are not threats to the US like they were before? 

A. Let me address Germany—and Europe—first. The press release from the Department of Defense said the removal of troops from Germany will “enhance Russian deterrence, strengthen NATO, reassure Allies, improve strategic U.S. flexibility....” 

 The repositioning—not necessarily withdrawal—of American forces is long overdue. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, there has been no real need to maintain that much force presence in Germany. However, I am not advocating we return them to the United States. With the growing threat from Russia and the expansion of NATO to the east, I would hope that the United States is going to move the forces forward to either Poland or Romania or both. 

 Move the troops closer to where they will be needed, send a message to the Russians that we’re there to support/strengthen NATO while bringing the families and the accompanying unnecessary support infrastructure home. If we are going to have forces deployed opposite the Russians, keep them lean and mean—more tooth, less tail. 

As for Iraq, American troops returned to Iraq for one reason, to assist the Iraqis in their fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Remember, after what I believe was the premature withdrawal of US forces from Iraq by President Obama in 2011, the Iraqi Army was basically hollowed out by corruption, mismanagement, and a lack of leadership epitomized by the disastrous government of Nuri al-Maliki. That army collapsed as ISIS took the city of Mosul in 2014.

As ISIS continued to move south towards Baghdad and expand its territorial holdings in the country, it was clear that Iraqi security forces were incapable of stopping the group without external assistance. That assistance came in the form of a small US ground presence supported by massive amounts of coalition airpower. 

Unfortunately, al-Maliki also requested, and received, support from Iran, in the form of a series of Public Mobilization Units (hashed)—Iraqi Shi’a militias trained and armed (and I maintain, led) by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The hand of IRGC-Qods Force commander Qassem Solimani was readily apparent. 

With the increase in the capabilities of the US-revitalized Iraqi security forces (police, counterterrorism units, and military), a continued presence of American forces in the presence of an Iranian-dominated Iraqi government, has become no longer viable. Most Arab Iraqis don’t want a continued US presence, and there is little stomach in the United States for keeping troops there. Yes, Iran remains a regional threat to American interests in the region, but it will have to be addressed in other ways. The US does not need forces in Iraq to maintain freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf. 

Q. We observe that the Middle East has become a Russian-Turkish battlefield. Does the US think it is better to withdraw and let two powers weaken each other? 

A. We now have Russia and Turkey involved in two proxy wars in the region: Syria and Libya. While we have serious issues with Turkish “adventurism” on the part of President Erdoğan in both theaters, the bottom line remains: Russia presents a threat to the United States across a variety of fronts; Turkey is a key NATO ally. 

That said, Turkey has been singularly unhelpful in the US-led coalition fight against ISIS since the beginning of the effort in 2014. Erdoğan’s efforts were more focused on anti-Kurdish operations in Syria than on defeating ISIS – it was as if that the Turkish leader was supporting ISIS at the expense of the Kurds. Virtually all of Turkey’s incursions into north and northwest Syria did nothing to promote the defeat of ISIS, only to create what appears to be a semi-permanent Turkish and Turkish-backed Islamist presence in the country. 

Are we looking at the reintroduction of the Ottomans? Hardly, just a quagmire/standoff between Erdoğan and Putin, at the expense of the Syrian population caught in the crossfire. 

Libya is no better. While Turkish intervention has turned the tide of the fighting in favor of the GNA over the LNA, nothing seems to have been resolved. You have the Turkish-supported GNA on one side against the Russian-backed, Haftar-led LNA, which is now also supported by US allies Egypt and the UAE. Add what now appears to be Syrian government support to the LNA, while Turkey deploys Syrian mercenaries to fight for the GNA. 

This is a recipe for escalation. Elsewhere in the region, Erdoğan has acquired a military base in Qatar. This is more unnecessary and unhelpful Ottoman adventurism from “Sultan Recep.” He should focus on cleaning up his current debacles before creating a third. 

Q. The FBI director says China is a threat to US security. Can we expect the US will shift troops from these areas to Asia-Pacific? 

A. China is emerging as the key long-term future threat to US security, likely to surpass the Russians in the not-too-distant future. Although President Trump has slowed down the Obama “pivot to Asia,” the United States will eventually have to increase either its own force structure in the region, or alternately enter into a broad multinational alliance with countries like Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam, even India, and Australia to confront growing Chinese power and its seemingly willingness to use it. 

Chinese handling of the coronavirus has cost them some goodwill. The US and its allies should capitalize on Chinese malign behavior directed at the rest of the world and attempt to isolate Beijing to make them pay a price for unleashing—wittingly or unwittingly (although many believe it was the former)—the virus on the rest of the world. 

Interviewer: Ulvi Ahmedli

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Syria resumes sanctioned flights from Iran that US says are carrying weapons

Note: I provided much of the information in this article by journalist Albin Szakola for The National, a leading English-language news service based in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.

Syria resumes sanctioned flights from Iran that US says are carrying weapons

- Damascus-owned cargo jet fleet paused operations because of Covid-19

Albin Szakola - April 21, 2020

A Syrian-government operated cargo jet fleet that the United States says is carrying weapons from Iran has resumed deliveries after a pause caused by the outbreak of Covid-19.

On Monday afternoon Ilyushin IL-76 jet, registered as YK-ATA, flew to Latakia from Tehran Mehrabad International Airport, which is used by Iran's air force, aviation data portal FlightRadar24 said.

The flight was the first in more than a month from Iran by a fleet of cargo jets ostensibly operated by Syria Airlines, the country's civilian flag carrier, the website said.

On March 12, another Ilyushin IL-76 jet, registered as YK-ATB, flew from Tehran to Damascus, the day after YK-ATA flew the same route. Damascus International Airport announced it was not accepting international commercial traffic 10 days later.

Hours after YK-ATA touched down in Latakia, Syria's Transport Ministry said Syrian Airlines was resuming international cargo flights into and out of the country. The U.S. sanctioned Syrian Airlines and its fleet of cargo planes in 2013 for allegedly ferrying cargo on behalf of the Iran's elite Qods Force, the foreign operations arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Hizballah helped to organize the flights, which were taking mortars, small arms, rockets and light anti-aircraft guns to Syria at the time, the U.S. Department of Treasury said.

Lieutenant Colonel Rick Francona, a retired U.S. Air Force intelligence officer (and former air attache at the American Embassy in Damascus) who closely follows Iranian flights to Syria, said the jets "belong to the Syrian Air Force 585th Transport Squadron of the 29th Air Brigade."

"The Syrians try to maintain the fiction that all of the 29th Brigade's aircraft are civilian airliners," Colonel Francona said.

The jets are mainly used in an air bridge to al-Qamishly, where the Syrian government has an enclave in the largely Kurdish controlled north-east of the country, he said. They also take military equipment into Syria to support IRGC operations, Colonel Francona said.

He believed the YK-ATA flight on Monday "was a resumption of the past IRGC resupply flights."

Unlike Monday's flight to Latakia International Airport, which shares its facilities with Russia's Humaymim military airbase, past flights by Syria's cargo fleet have normally landed in Damascus.

"It will be interesting to see if Latakia/Humaymim becomes the newest stopover point for the flights," Colonel Francona said.

He said the base was safe from Israeli air strikes.

Israel has carried out strikes on Syrian airports, including Damascus International Airport, in recent years.

State media reported that Syrian air defenses intercepted an Israeli attack near the eastern Homs province city of Palmyra on Monday evening and shot down "hostile targets."

On March 31, Syria said it had intercepted an Israeli strike in the country's central Homs province, state news agency Sana reported.

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights in Britain said Israel attacked Al Sha'yrat airbase after a cargo plane flew out.

Monday's flight from Iran comes soon after a similar flight by an Iranian cargo plane. An Ilyushin IL-76 Pouya Air jet flew into Latakia on Saturday afternoon, FlightRadar24 data showed. The US sanctioned Pouya Air in 2014 for working on behalf of the Qods Force to take illicit cargo, including weapons, to Syria.

Iranian Foreign minister Javad Zarif this week visited Damascus to meet Syrian President Bashar Al Assad.

(Updated: April 22, 2020 2:02am)

Read the original article on The National website.

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Russian airstrike on Turkish troops in Syria - predictable and avoidable. Now what?

Turkish military convoy in northwestern Syria

An airstrike by Russian Air Force fighter-bombers on a Turkish supply convoy in Syria's Idlib governorate on February 27 resulted in the deaths of 33 Turkish troops, and the wounding of at least 30 others. This represents a major escalation in the confrontation between Russian forces supporting Syrian troops attempting to re-establish Syrian government control over the area held by primarily Islamist opposition forces - those forces are backed by Turkey. In recent weeks, Turkish support has escalated from logistics and supplies to air, artillery, and special operations forces support.

I will leave the blow-by-blow coverage of the actual operation to the media. Suffice it to say, the Russian Air Force has determined that it will no longer tolerate Turkish or Turkish-backed opposition groups firing man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) at their aircraft operating in support of Syrian troops. There has been a marked increase in the use of these systems, forcing Russian pilots to alter their tactics, to include the use of flares and other countermeasures, and flying at higher altitudes.

Although there have been tensions between the Russians and Turks in the past in northwestern Syria, including the shootdown of a Russian SU-24 fighter-bomber in November 2015, and smaller exchanges of artillery fire between Syrian and proxy forces and the Turks and Turkish-backed forces in the past, this airstrike is a major escalation of tensions that have been brewing for years.

The obvious questions - why are the Turks and Russians in Syria?

The short answers: the Russians have been in Syria since September 2015 when it became obvious to Moscow that the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Asad was incapable of surviving the threats posed by either the forces of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or the various opposition groups, including al-Qa'idah affiliated or other Islamist groups supported by the government of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Were the Russians "true believers" in the Ba'ath Party ideology of the Syrian regime? No - the Russians were there for much more pragmatic reasons. Russian President Vladimir Putin has decided to reassert Russian influence in the Middle East, influence that had been lacking since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The obvious choice of venue was Syria - the country was wracked by civil war, and in need of help beyond that offered by the bevy of Iranian-supported militias from Lebanon, Iraq, and even Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The prize for the Russians? Re-entry to the Mediterranean in the form of access to Syrain military facilities - Humaymim (often incorrectly rendered as Khmeimim) air base on the northwest coast near the port city of Latakia, and the former Soviet naval facility at the port of Tartus. Putin was able to secure renewable 49-year leases on both facilities, creating a permanent Russian presence in the eastern Mediterranean.

The Russians claim they deployed military forces to Syria to combat ISIS, but their actions showed they they were there for one reason - the survival of the al-Asad regime. The vast majority of the airstrikes and operations were focused on opposition forces, not ISIS.

The Russian vision of a permanent presence in the eastern Mediterranean depends on a government in Syria that the Russians can influence, if not outright control. Watching how Putin treats al-Asad in both Syria and Russia lend me to believe it is the latter, not the former. When the civil war eventually ends, the key power broker in Syria will be the Russians and Vladimir Putin.

Why are the Turks in Syria? That is a really good question, for which there are plenty of answers, just not good ones.

The Turks became nominal members of the US-led coalition formed to defeat ISIS, but were never really committed to the fight. It took years before Erdoğan allowed the coalition to fully use the Incirlik air base just north of Syria to conduct offensive operations against ISIS. It was not until ISIS launched lethal attacks inside Turkey that the Turks relented.

Two curious things here - it was always suspected that the Turks were supporters of many of the Islamist groups that were part of the anti-al-Asad alliance under the banner of the Free Syrian Army. That support at times probably included ISIS. Of course, the primary route for the thousands of Middle Eastern and European jihadis that came to Syria to fight for ISIS came via Turkey. I have spent a lot of time on both sides of the Syrian-Turkish border - I would never attempt to cross the mined, fenced, and heavily-guarded frontier without the acquiescence or support of Turkish officials.

Turkey's role in the coalition continued to be obstructionist and unhelpful. As the US-led coalition armed and trained the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to be the "boots on the ground" to fight ISIS, the Turks vehemently objected to the presence of the Kurdish fighters known as the YPG, believing them to be nothing more than an extension of the Turkish PKK separatist group, a designated terrorist group. As the coalition began the fight against ISIS, the Turks often obstructed SDF movements, even to the point of armed confrontation. Despite this, the SDF was successful, pushing ISIS back to its self-proclaimed capital of al-Raqqah.

As part of Turkey's "contribution" to the anti-ISIS effort, it invaded northern Syria in two operations and two locations. Operation Euphrates Shield moved into the are northeast of Aleppo, mostly in support of the Islamist and opposition elements which had relocated there following successful Syrian (albeit Russian and Iranian backed) military operations as the Syrians began to retake those areas that had previously fallen to the opposition.

Operation Olive Branch moved against Kurdish elements in the 'Afrin area of northwest Syria. As in Euphrates Shield, much of the fighting was done by Turkish proxy forces.

At this point, Erdoğan demanded that the coalition allow Turkish troops to liberate al-Raqqah. This was a ridiculous demand - Turkish troops were over 100 miles from al-Raqqah. To liberate al-Raqqah would have required the Turks to traverse SDF-controlled territory, something the Kurds in the coalition found unacceptable, given Turkey's recent obstruction of the fight against ISIS.

After the successful SDF liberation of al-Raqqah and the almost complete expulsion of ISIS fighters from Syria, Erdoğan then demanded that the coalition agree to a "security zone" almost 20 miles deep all along the Syrian border with Turkey. To the Turks, security zone is a euphemism for a Kurdish-free zone. Inexplicably, the United States went along with Erdoğan's petulance and basically created a small security zone in previously Arab areas along the border.

As the Syrian government continued to recover more of its territory, opposition elements were removed to opposition-controlled areas, culminating in the creation of a large enclave of the remaining Islamist and opposition groups in Idlib governorate, setting up the final battle between these elements and the Syrian regime.

Fearing that his allies were about to be soundly defeated, Erdoğan moved Turkish troops into Idlib, ostensibly to provide safe areas to prevent civilian casualties. In my opinion, Turkey's commitment to prevent civilian casualties in Idlib was about as sincere as Russian efforts to combat ISIS.

Although there was a face-saving agreement - the Astana agreement - between the Turks and the Russians to legitimize the presence of Turkish "observation posts" in Idlib, this was merely setting up the inevitable clash between the the foreign powers.

The battle of Idlib is in full swing. Backed by overwhelming Russian airpower, the Syrians are steadily progressing against the Turkish-backed militias. The Turks have responded by providing weapons and fire support to the Islamist and opposition groups, striking not only Iranian-backed militias, but Syrian regime forces as well. Of course, as is the nature of combat, the fighting has spilled over, directly involving the Turks and Russians.

Now we have the Russians and Turks engaging each other. Despite the claims by the Russians that since the Turks have provided armored vehicles and other weapons to the opposition, it is impossible for them to distinguish between the Turkish-supported groups and the Turks themselves. I don't get the impressions the Russians really care.

Now we come to nascent East-West crisis brewing in northern Syria.

Now that Erdoğan's Ottoman revanchism has backed Turkey into a corner in which it is suffering serious casualties - which will not play well at home - the Turkish leader wants to play the NATO card. He wants to rely on the alliance he has basically turned his back on over the last year to bail him out.

Ironically, his first request was to the United States to deploy Patriot air defense systems to Turkey to defend his forces and facilities from potential Russian or Syrian attacks. This is the same system he refused to buy in favor of the Russian S-400. This move resulted in the United States removing Turkey from the F-35 fifth generation stealth fighter program. It appeared that Turkey was drifting more towards the Russians to replace aging Turkish military equipment.

The NATO charter has two articles that might apply here - Article 4 and Article 5. Article 4 can be invoked by any member state "whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened." This has happened numerous times in the past, including several requests from Turkey. It does not trigger a NATO military response.

Article 5 is the key to the alliance. The key passage: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all...." What has happened does not meet the threshold of Article 5 - the Russians or Syrians would have to launch an attack on Turkish territory. The Russians are well aware of the NATO charter and Article 5 - they have lived with it for decades. Conversely, if the Turks launch attacks on Russian forces in Syria from Turkish soil, will this trigger a Russian response against targets in Turkey?

This is where Erdoğan's adventurism, always dangerous and unnecessary, risks expanding the crisis in Syria into an East-West confrontation neither side wants or needs.

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Turkey, Erdoğan, the S-400 and the F-35

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan - is anyone else tiring of him?

I was asked a few questions about the Turks and the delivery of the Russian S-400 (NATO: SA-21) air defense system. My replies.

Q. The US Senate starts to discuss sanctions on Turkey, but Trump doesn't want such a move. How do you think is it possible that we can see the US impose sanctions on Turkey for this issue?

A. There are bipartisan demands in Congress for sanctions on Turkey for purchasing the Russian S-400 air defense system. The President is hoping that he can walk a fine line between economic sanctions on Turkey and just removing Turkey from the F-35 program. I am not sure he will be able to do that - there is US law that would require sanctions. He may be legally able to waive the sanctions, but he will be taking a political risk among his Republican supporters.

In any event, Turkey has to be removed from the F-35 program. That means the jets Turkey has already purchased and are located on a US Air Force base in Arizona will not be delivered to Turkey. The Turkish Air Force pilots there for training have already been restricted from access to the aircraft and its systems.

I do not believe the United States is willing to have the world's most advanced fifth-generation stealth aircraft be delivered to a country that is operating a near-state-of-the-art Russian air defense system. The risk to sensitive technology ending up in Moscow is much too high.

Q. If the US imposes sanctions, what can be the response of Turkey (within the cooperation with China (SCO))?

A. It appears that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has made a conscious decision to pivot to the east - that includes better relations with what I would consider our (U.S.) adversaries and potential enemies: Russia, China, Iran, and even Pakistan. If he thinks he will be able to continue this eastern foreign policy reorientation and at the same time maintain a good relationship with the United States, I believe he is miscalculating.

The NATO alliance is important to the United States and our European allies - Turkey included, at least for now. If Erdoğan wants to remain a NATO ally, he needs to start acting like one again. Procuring an air defense system from our principal antagonist is not the act of an ally. There will be a price.

Q. Turkey invested in the F-35 project, does the US have the right to reject the sale within international law?

A. The reality of this is that the F-35 program is American technology and in the end the United States will determine where that technology is allowed to be exported. The parts of the program in Turkey will be moved to another location. They lose the business and the aircraft capabilities.

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Turkey receives Russian S-400 air defense system - a symptom of "Erdoğan disease"

Russian Air Force AN-124 at Murted Air Base, Turkey

On Friday, July 12, two Russian Air Force AN-124 (NATO: Condor) heavy lift aircraft delivered initial components of the S-400 Triumph (NATO: SA-21 Growler) air defense system to Murted air base on the outskirts of Ankara, Turkey. Turkey's purchase of the Russian system is the latest in a series of issues between members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Turkey, a key member of the transatlantic alliance, is also, at least currently, a member of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program. The F-35 is a fifth generation stealth fighter produced by Lockheed Martin and in service with at least 10 air and naval forces around the world. Turkey is a Level 3 participant in the program, having ordered 30 of possibly 120 aircraft. The initial four aircraft have been delivered to the Turkish Air Force at the F-35 pilot training facility at Luke Air Force Base, Arizona. Turkish Air Force maintenance personnel are also being trained at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida.

The Turks have been warned that acquisition of the S-400 from Russia will halt their acquisition of the F-35 and terminate their participation in the distributed manufacturing program. The U.S. Air Force has stopped pilot training for Turkish pilots, and restricted access to the aircraft and training materials. Congress has passed legislation prohibiting the transfer of the Turkish jets in Arizona to Turkey pending the resolution of the S-400 issue.

The United States has been clear. The words of Acting Secretary of Defense to his counterpart, Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar: “If Turkey procures the S-400, our two countries must develop a plan to discontinue Turkey’s participation in the F-35 program. While we seek to maintain our valued relationship, Turkey will not receive the F-35 if Turkey takes delivery of the S-400.”

This was reinforced by Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen Lord: “Turkey still has the option to change course. If Turkey does not accept delivery of the S-400, we will enable Turkey to return to normal F-35 program activities. Turkey is a close NATO ally and our military-to-military relationship is strong.”

As of today, I would say that the issue has been settled. It seems that Erdoğan either does not think the American Administration is serious about removing Turkey from the F-35 program, or he has made a calculation that his relationship with the United States and NATO is not that important to his country's future.

I do not think the Trump Administration is bluffing. It is inconceivable that the United States would allow the same country that is operating a Russian near state-of-the-art air defense system to operate the world's most advanced aircraft, replete with sensitive avionics and reduced radar cross section technology.

While one might think that NATO ally Turkey would allow American intelligence access to the Russian S-400 system, the fact is that the "modified for export" version is delivered without source codes, advanced radar modes, and uses downgraded electronics.

When the Russians, or the United States for that matter, export these advanced systems, it is assumed that much of that technology will end up in foreign hands. We assume that exported U.S. technology will end up in Moscow or Beijing. The Russians will want to exploit the technology for intelligence and countermeasures, and the Chinese will just steal and clone the technology.

The S-400 purchase is just another symptom of what I will call "Erdoğan disease" - the myopic, blundering foreign policy moves that has cost Turkey much of its standing and likely its economy. Erdoğan seems to have pivoted to the east, favoring his burgeoning relationships with Russia and Iran at the expense of what used to be Turkey's attempts to align itself with Europe.

Other manifestations of Erdoğan disease?

When the United States began operations in Syria against the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Turkey, actually Erdoğan himself, was grossly unhelpful. The fact that most foreign ISIS fighters found their way into Syria via Turkey is not lost on the West.

I've spent a lot of time on both sides of the Turkey-Syria border. It is not a border I would attempt to cross clandestinely - it is replete with guard towers, minefields, patrols, etc. Turkish guards have orders to shoot anyone attempting to cross in either direction. Whoever crossed into Syria did so with Turkish help - either officially or unofficially.

As the U.S.-supported Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) - whose main component is the Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (know by their Kurdish initials YPG) - did the lion's share of the ground fighting that eventually dislodged ISIS from controlling territory in Syria, they were attacked by Turkish military forces.

Erdoğan considers the YPG to be just an extension of the designated Turkish Kurd terrorist PKK armed insurgency. The Turkish president insisted that Turkish troops be the forces to liberate the main ISIS stronghold of al-Raqqah, even though his forces were months away and would have had to fight their way though the SDF. The whole concept was so ludicrous that U.S. commanders dismissed it out of hand.

The ill-fated al-Raqqah plan was followed by the Turkish invasion of 'Afrin - claimed to be an anti-terrorism operation, but in realty was just an excuse to attack the YPG in northern Syria and prevent the YPG/Kurds from controlling the Syrian side of the border from the Iraqi border to Idlib province.

Then there is the Turkish presence in Syria's Idlib province, ostensibly to prevent the Syrians - with their Russian and Iranian-backed allies - from eliminating the remaining rebels and Islamists who are bottled up in the province. One might get the impression the Turks are protecting the al-Qa'idah faction and other jihadists. There is probably a reason for that impression....

Decision time is coming for Turkey, for the Turks and for Erdoğan. The three might not be the same thing. Erdoğan is fast losing internal support - the recent elections in Istanbul were a blow to Erdoğan and his AKP party. His popularity, especially in Trakya, has been steadily waning. Cozying up to the Russians and Iranians will not help.

Is there a cure for Erdoğan disease? Turkey and the Turks will have to figure that out.

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Interview on Israeli I24 NEWS "Perspectives"

My interview on the Israeli television network I24 NEWS this morning with anchor Tracy Alexander (who asked good questions) on remarks made by the Russian ambassador to Israel. We talked about ISIS, Turkey, Israel, and Syria.

Alternatively, watch on YouTube.

Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir visits Syria - on a Russian Air Force jet

Syrian President Bashar al-Asad and Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir
at Damascus International Airport

With his arrival at Damascus International Airport today, Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir ('Umar al-Bashir - عمر حسن أحمد البشير - becomes the first Arab leader to visit Syria since the outbreak of the civil war in March 2011.

It is interesting that al-Bashir is the first Arab leader to visit - the Sudanese president is under indictment by the International Criminal Court (ICC); warrants have been issued for his arrest. The charges include genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes in Darfur. The charges are opposed by the African Union, the League of Arab States, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the governments of Russia and China.

The irony of the visit by an indicted war criminal was not lost on some observers. Hillel Neuer, Executive Director of United Nations Watch quipped, "Always nice when a president wanted for genocide visits with a president committing genocide. Sudan sits on the UN committee overseeing human rights [nongovernmental organizations]; Syria holds leadership position on UN decolonization committee that fights 'subjugation of peoples.'"

I draw your attention to the photograph (above) of the two presidents at the airport. Note the color pattern on the jet used to transport al-Bashir from Khartoum to Damascus - it is the official livery of the BBC России (Russian Air Force), as noted on the tail of the aircraft.

The Russians dispatched this TU-154M (RA-85155) VIP transport aircraft from Moscow to Khartoum (via the Russian air base at Humaymim, south of the Syrian port city of Latakia) to pick up al-Bashir, fly him to Damascus, wait for him to have his meetings with Syrian officials, including President Bashar al-Asad, then return him to Khartoum.

This fits in with Russian President Vladimir Putin's attempts to increase Russian influence in the Middle East and Africa. Putin and al-Bashir have met on at least two occasions in the last year to discuss continued and increased cooperation. Russia is the major supplier of arms to the Khartoum government. On both of those occasions, like today, Putin sent a Russian Air Force jet to ensure al-Bashir's safety while traveling out of Sudan, keeping him out of reach of the ICC.

The visit of an indicted war criminal does raise the question: Will Bashar al-Asad be held accountable for his war crimes?

On a lighter note, let's not feel sorry for the Russian pilots and crew tasked with this long VIP transportation mission. The weather in Moscow today was 5 degrees Fahrenheit and snowing. Damascus was party cloudy and 60 degrees, while Khartoum was sunny and 90 degrees.

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Syrian S-300 Update #2 - the Russians "dumb down" the weapon system

Russian brochure for the S-300-PMU-2 "Favorit"

Note: This is another follow-up to my two earlier articles on the Russian delivery of the S-300 air defense system to Syria:
- Syrian S-300 Update - It's likely three S-300PM battalions (October)

- Syria to receive S-300 air defense system from Russia (September)

The Takeaway:
The Russians hastily delivered to Syria three battalions of a version of the S-300 air defense system that is not normally exported. Having second thoughts, Russian technicians are now converting the system to the less capable export version. Although still a lethal system, it is not the "latest and greatest" as that used by Russian troops.

The Details
Almost immediately after the mistaken downing of a Russian Air Force intelligence collection aircraft during Israeli operations near Syria's Mediterranean coast, the Russians began a massive airlift to deliver three battalions of the very capable S-300PM-2 (NATO: SA-20 Gargoyle) air defense missile system. These systems were recently withdrawn from service and placed in storage.

According to Russian media, the weapons originally belonged to the 531st Antiaircraft Missile Regiment based in the Alexandrovsk district of Murmansk Oblast in the Russian Arctic. The systems were accompanied to Syria by Russian air defense troops where they were to train Syrian operators.

At some point, the Russian technicians and advisers tasked with standing up the air defense system in Syria realized that the system was not the downgraded export version known as the S-300PMU-2 (NATO: SA-20B), but the more capable S-300PM-2 version authorized for use by only Russian air defense units.

In order to safeguard some of the advanced electronics from possible acquisition and exploitation by potential adversaries (read: American, British, and Israeli), the Russian technicians are now removing some of the more sensitive Russian-only components from the system.

When completed, the newly-acquired air defense systems will have been converted to the S-300PMU-2 export standard. There is one notable exception, however - the Russians are leaving the more advanced target detection radar and identification-friend-or-foe (IFF) system associated with the Russian-only S-300PM-2 in Syrian hands.

Why change the modes and codes, in essence "dumbing down" the system?

Simple. The Russians are not the only air force in the region with sophisticated signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities. The Russians do not want their most advanced electronic systems in the hands of demonstrably incompetent Syrian troops whose use of the system will transmit the capabilities of their air defenses to the antennas of Western intelligence agencies.

In addition to the Russian Air Force Il-20M (NATO: Coot-A) electronic intelligence (ELINT) platform - like the one mistakenly downed by a Syria S-200 (NATO: SA-5 Gammon) missile that prompted the S-300 delivery - at a minimum, the Israelis, the United Kingdom, and the United States operate a variety of airborne collection platforms that can easily access the S-300's electronic and communications signals.

While the Russians have deployed Russian-only S-300 and S-400 systems with their own forces in Syria, they have been extremely judicious in their use to limit Western access to system capabilities.

The S-300PMU-2 Favorit - the system that the Syrians will eventually own - can track and engage multiple targets out to a range of over 100 nautical miles. Remember that it is not the range of the S-300PMU-2 system that is the threat, it is the improved capability. The existing S-200 missiles in the Syrian inventory have a longer range (190 miles versus 108 nautical miles), but it is the lethality of the S-300PMU-2 missile system and its ability to operate in a dense electronic warfare environment that make it more dangerous.

It remains to be seen just how the Syrians will integrate the new system into the existing Syrian air defense network, but it will certainly raise the threat to Israeli and U.S.-led coalition aircraft.

That said, Syria's new capabilities will be more in line with the air defense capabilities of other countries that have been sold the S-300PMU-2 system, many which have trained with (and against) U.S., NATO, and Israeli pilots.

For a more thorough analysis on the S-300 system, please see the "airlandbattle" article here.

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Syrian S-300 Update - It's likely three S-300PM battalions

(Click on link to read article)

Middle East analysts have been waiting to learn what variant of the capable S-300 air defense system was delivered to the Syrian armed forces over the last few weeks. This should be read in conjunction with my earlier article, Syria to receive S-300 air defense system from Russia.

Almost immediately after the September 18 mistaken shoot down of a Russian Air Force IL-20M electronic reconnaissance aircraft by a Syrian air defense S-200 (NATO: SA-5 Gammon) missile while Israeli Air Force fighter bombers were operating off the Syrian coast, Russia announced that it would provide the S-300 system to their Syrian allies.

The Russians are assuming that the advanced electronics (including better friend-or-foe capabilities) of the S-300 will preclude future incidents such as this. I have spent much of my professional life studying the Syrian armed forces, especially the air force and air defense. It's not the systems the Syrians are using that is the problem, it is the lack of training and competence in the operation of even these older systems. Add to that the atrophy of the Syrian military caused by seven years of civil war.

The S-300 is a large family of air defense systems, dating back to the initial deployment of the original S-300P (NATO: SA-10 Grumble) system in 1978.

According to TASS, citing military sources, Russia delivered three battalions of the S-300PM (NATO: SA-10C Grumble C) surface-to-air missile system. Each firing battalion of the S-300PM consists of eight launchers, for a total of 24 launchers.

As far as I know, the article in TASS (click on image above to read the article) was the first semi-official report of the exact variant delivered to the Syrians. If true, it underscores the Russian leadership's commitment to provide an enhanced air defense capability to the Syrians.

The S-300PM battalions are not the export version, but refurbished regular versions formerly used by Russian air defense units that have now been upgraded to newer systems. Given the flight paths of the Russian Air Force AN-124 (NATO: Condor) heavy lift aircraft used to deliver the systems to Syria, it appears that these systems came from units in the Murmansk area.

S-300PM  transporter-erector-launcher and radar

The S-300PM is an upgraded version of the S-300P; it entered service around 1990. It is intended to defend against aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. According to the military source, Russia delivered over 100 surface-to-air guided missiles for each battalion.

That is a lot of missiles, which partially explains the high number of AN-124 flights to Syria in a short amount of time. The entire system - command and control center, three firing battalions and extra missiles - was delivered in about 10 days.

If in fact the missile battalions provided to the Syrians are the S-300PM, it does not pose as great a threat as the expected S-300VM "Antey-2500" (NATO: SA-23 Gladiator Giant).

That said, the S-300PM is a capable air defense system and does complicate planning for both Israeli and U.S.-led coalition air planners. The Russians build excellent air defense systems - the presence of the S-300PM should not be taken lightly.

That said, there will be a long and steep learning curve for the Syrians to effectively use this (or any) system, and NATO and Israeli aircrews have flown against the export version of this particular system in the past.

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Humaymim or Khmeimim Air Base - what's in a name?

Humaymim Air Base, Syria  -  القاعدة حميميم الجوية، سوريا

Since September 2015, the Russian Air Force has maintained a large presence at a Syrian Air Force base south of the major port city of Latakia on the country's northeast Mediterranean coast. The name of the base - حميميم‎ - is transliterated in English as Humaymim, and in Russian as Хмеймим, although it is often seen in the media as Khmeimim.

The air base is located approximately 12 miles south of the city of Latakia adjacent to the small village of Humaymim (population 3700). For map nerds, its location is 352411N 0355659E. The Russian presence at the base is roughly equivalent to that of a U.S. Air Force expeditionary wing. The Russians have used the base not only for support of their forces in Syria, but as a staging/stopover base for military and diplomatic flights to Europe and Africa.

The air base shares airfield facilities with Martyr Basil al-Asad* International Airport, which serves the city of Latakia and is in the homeland of the 'Alawi religious sect to which the al-Asad family belongs. The base has undergone major improvements since the Russians basically took over the base - runways have been extended; new taxiways, aprons, aircraft maintenance hangars, admin buildings, and barracks were built; and state-of-the-art air defense and electronic warfare systems deployed.

Humaymim is also home to the Syrian Navy's 618th Maritime Warfare Squadron, which operates Mi-14 (NATO: Haze), Ka-25 (NATO: Hormone), and Ka-27 (NATO: Helix) antisubmarine warfare (ASW) helicopters. During the seven-year Syrian civil war, these ASW helicopters have been used to drop naval mines on civilian targets.

In 2017, Russian President Vladimir Putin secured a 49-year renewable lease for Russian use of the air base, as well as a 49-year extension on an existing lease for use of a naval facility at the port of Tartus, about 30 miles south of the air base.

Transliteration Issues

As noted above, the true name of the Syrian air base is حميميم‎. People will ask how it is spelled - the Arabic script is the actual spelling. What they are really asking is how is the Arabic name transliterates into other alphabets - Latin, Cyrillic, Hebrew, etc. The differences in transliteration not only cause confusion, but at times have placed American forces at risk.

In addition to being an extremely difficult language to learn**, the Arabic alphabet creates its own set of problems. The writing system consists of 28 consonants; the three vowels are not normally written. As with Hebrew and the other languages that use the basic Arabic alphabet (Persian, Urdu, Malay, etc.), the script is written from right to left.

The problem is how to properly transliterate the Arabic script. Although there is only one correct spelling in Arabic, converting it to something readable in Latin letters can be confusing. For example, was it Saddam Hussein or Saddam Husayn? Technically, neither can be correct/incorrect since the actual spelling is the Arabic letters hah sin yah nun. Most media used the transliteration Hussein, although Husayn is closer to the Arabic script.

The United States intelligence community is required to use a standardized system, especially in the era of computerized databases that require specific letters. That system is the U.S. Board on Geographic Names (BGN) transliteration system developed jointly with the government of the United Kingdom. See Romanization of Arabic for a technical explanation of the system.

An example of the consequences of not adhering to the mandated system is the U.S. Army destruction of an Iraqi munitions storage depot in the days immediately following the end of the Gulf War in 1991. Operating under orders to destroy all Iraqi military facilities in the area under coalition control, Army officers checked the databases to determine if the Al-Khamisiyah depot was used to store chemical weapons. Unfortunately, the records indicating that artillery shells filled with the nerve agent Sarin were stored at Al-Khamisiyah were filed under a different – and non-BGN – transliteration. When the facility was blown up, American forces (me included) were exposed to low levels of the nerve agent.

So, while the media prefers to use the transliteration Khmeimim, the better transliteration - and that mandated for official U.S. government use - is Humaymim.

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* The late Basil al-Asad was the older brother of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad, who until the time of his death in an automobile accident in 1994, was being groomed by the brothers' father Hafiz as the successor to the presidency. Following Basil's death, the mantle of heir apparent was passed to the next eldest brother (Basahr). Although the President's presumption of the dynastic selection of his son as the next president did not sit well with many Syrians - the ones who were under the delusion that the Syrian Arab Republic actually had a democratic government - they really had no vote.

** The State Department's Foreign Service Institute considers Arabic to be a Category IV language, the most difficult for native English speakers to learn. The others are Chinese, Korean, and Japanese.

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