Biden's Iran Policy - Obama Failure 2.0?

Obviously satire, but let’s take a look at what is driving it. It’s simple – President Biden’s ill-advised and ill-timed policies on Iran, basically rolling back all of the gains of the Trump Administration to contain Iran, are dangerous. It’s almost like we are watching the implementation of Obama 2.0. That Iran policy was disastrous then, and it will be disastrous now.

 

Since taking office on January 20, Biden has signaled to both the Iranians and our allies alike that he will be attempting to engage the Iranians, despite the consistent Iranian repudiation of Obama’s efforts to do the same during his eight years in office. In the past few days, Secretary of State Tony Blinken, a former Obama official, has stated, “The path to diplomacy is open right now” with Iran.

 

Let’s follow that thought – just who will be advising Biden on his Iran foreign policy decisions? Three key advisors have roots in the Obama Administration – we know how its Iran policy turned out. Remember the optic of pallets of cash being flown to Iran just as American hostages were released. Although Obama insisted there was no linkage between the cash deliveries and hostage releases, Iranian officials have stated unequivocally that there was.

 

Blinken previously served in the Obama Administration as Deputy National Security Advisor from 2013 to 2015 and Deputy Secretary of State from 2015 to 2017. Before that, from 2009 to 2013, he was the National Security Advisor to Vice President Biden. His focus was, among other things, Iran’s nuclear program.

 

Then we have National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan. Sullivan worked in the Obama Administration as Director of Policy Planning at the Department of State, and as Deputy Chief of Staff to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, then as National Security Advisor to Vice President Biden from 2013 to 2014. He was also a senior advisor for the Iran nuclear negotiations.

 

Rounding out the Iran team is Special Representative for Iran Robert Malley. Malley’s claim to fame (or infamy) is being the lead negotiator (or capitulator) of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, the so-called Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). In the Obama Administration, Malley was designated the National Security Council “point man” for the Middle East, as well as the special advisor on the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, ISIS – the so-called “JV team,” according to Obama. Given the state of American foreign policy in the region when Obama left office, this is not a sterling résumé.

 

Biden has tasked Malley to bring both the United States and Iran into compliance with the JCPOA. I’m not sure that is technically possible, since the United States is no longer a party to the JCPOA. I take that as an indication where the Biden Administration is heading – a new round of concessions and capitulations to the mullahs in Tehran.

 

It could be worse. If John Kerry had not been named as the jet-setting Special Envoy on Climate Change, he would likely be advising Biden on Iran. Thank God for small mercies.

 

Former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said of Biden, “He has been wrong on nearly every major foreign policy and national security issue over the past four decades.” With these three – Blinken, Sullivan, and Malley – advising Biden on Iran, I don’t expect that record to improve.

 

In addition to this Obama-rerun cast of advisors, let’s look at some of the actions of the new administration in “containing” Iran.

 

Some of the first actions Biden has taken in the region was to freeze the sale of F-35 stealth fighter jets to the United Arab Emirates. Access to this advanced aircraft was a sweetener on the UAE-Israel track of the Abrahamic Accords. Of course, the Biden Administration may not care if that historic agreement falls through – it does not appear that Biden is that friendly to Jerusalem. 

After almost a month in office, Biden has yet to call Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu – you’d think that a call to America’s closest ally in the region would have already happened, but the Democrats have generally never been fond of Israel, especially when it is led by the Likud party.

 

Biden has also frozen impending sales of advanced munitions to Saudi Arabia, a measure of disapproval of Saudi (and UAE) military operations against the Huthi-led revolt in Yemen.

 

In an even more incredulous, and in my opinion, utterly moronic, move, Biden has removed the Huthi movement – a Shi’a militant group supported, trained, and armed by Iran – from the State Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.

 

It is ironic – right out of the gate, Biden has protected a terrorist group supported by the world’s leading state supporter of terrorism, and taken punitive measures against the two countries leading the fight in support of the Yemeni government which the United States recognizes.

 

Here’s what to watch in the near future. On February 15, a group believed to be associated with Iranian-supported Iraqi Shi’a militias claimed responsibility for an attack on a U.S. coalition facility in Irbil, the capital of the Kurdish Autonomous Region in northern Iraq. The attack killed a foreign worker and wounded several U.S. contractors, as well as wounding an American servicemember.

 

What will Biden do in response? If he does nothing, he will be perceived as weak. If that is the case, he will have failed the test – get ready for increased Iranian-sponsored militia attacks on US and allied coalition facilities and personnel.

 

With the Obama Administration holdovers, the team that brought us the dangerous and disastrous JCPOA, we have some insight as to where Biden’s policy toward Iran is likely headed.

 

It is not a good place.

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United Arab Emirates and Israel to normalize relations - my thoughts

Crown Prince Muhammad bin Zayid, President Trump, Prime Minister Netanyahu

In a surprise announcement last week, President Donald Trump revealed the successful conclusion of an agreement between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the State of Israel that will lead to the establishment of full diplomatic relations.

My first reaction: this is a good thing. The Gulf Arabs are coming to the realization that Israel does not pose a threat to them unless they pose a threat to Israel. There is no reason for the Gulf states to threaten Israel except for the myth of Arab - and in some cases Muslim - solidarity against the self-described Jewish state "for the sake of the Palestinians."

Having lived and served in a variety of these countries for many years, I assess that they are tired of the Palestinian "cause" and self-victimization, the Palestinian Authority, Lebanese Hizballah, and Hamas, to name a few. They are fearful of Sunni extremism (al-Qa'idah, ISIS, etc.), yes, but much more wary of Iranian support for Shi'a terrorist groups - the aforementioned Hizballah, as well as Iraqi Shi'a militias.

These Gulf Arab nations do not live in fear of Israel. For the most part, Israel tries to conduct itself as a member of the international community when permitted to by an overwhelmingly anti-Israel United Nations and European Union. In private, many senior and influential leaders of these Arab countries, those I would call "the enlightened" ones, actually want to be more like Israel.

The Arabs only have to look at Israel's advances in science, technology, medicine, and yes, weapons. Israel enjoys a qualitative edge in virtually every category when compared to the Arab countries. Many ask why this is the case, and the tired explanation that it is only the support of the United States for Israel that allows them to be so successful is losing its voice.

The United Arab Emirates has been blessed with a decades of enlightened leadership. Even during the presidency of Shaykh Zayid bin Sultan Al Nahayyan, he allowed the next generation the leeway to try and change the Emirates into a modern society. One only need look at Dubai when I served as the acting Defense Attache to the U.S. Embassy in the UAE in 1992, and when I visited two years ago - night and day.

As part of my duties, I dealt closely with the UAE Ministry of Defense and its armed forces. I found them to be well-educated, well-motivated, and for the most part nonpolitical. That extended to their views of Israel and the Palestinians. Most were more concerned with the self-styled Shi'a hegemon just a few miles across the Gulf - Iran. You will note I am not calling it the Persian Gulf - that's one of the things about which the Gulf Arabs can get a bit testy.

At the embassy, located in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, I was the acting chief of the Defense Attache Office, the USDAO. Another section in the embassy was the security assistance office (SAO), now called the Office of Defense Partnership. These are the U.S. military officers who are there basically to sell U.S. weapons and training to the UAE. Fine officers and at time rivals - we jokingly referred to each other as the "spooks" (me) and "merchants of death (them)."

While there certainly was cooperation and coordination, at times we were acting at cross purposes. My role was to observe and report on UAE military capabilities, and to act as an intelligence liaison with the UAE Military Intelligence Directorate. Keep in mind that military attaches worldwide are declared intelligence officers, work for their country's military intelligence service - in my case, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency - and are accredited to the host country's chief of military intelligence.

When I arrived in Abu Dhabi, I made an office call on the Director of Military Intelligence, who later introduced me to Minister of Defense (since 1971 and still today) Shaykh Muhammad bin Rashid Al Maktum. If that name sounds familiar, it should - he is now Vice President of the UAE, Prime Minister of the UAE, Emir of Dubai, and as I said, Minister of Defense of the country.

"Shaykh Mo," as he asked us to call him, and I struck up a conversation about the Gulf War and my service as Central Command chief General H. Norman Schwarzkopf's interpreter. I think since we were fairly close in age, he asked if I would give him my analysis and opinion on the future of the UAE's armed forces. I knew he had been in rather heated discussions with representatives of the embassy's SAO over weapons purchases. At that time, the U.S. defense industry was pushing sales of the M-1 Abrams main battle tank and the Patriot air defense missile system.

Perhaps this is when I should have consulted with the security assistance people....

I told the shaykh/minister that in my opinion, and stressed that this was just my opinion, not the position of the U.S. Department of Defense, that he should pattern the UAE armed forces on the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), with one exception - the Israeli Army. Did I just note that the U.S. defense industry was pushing the M-1 tank?

I explained that as I saw it, the UAE's primary adversary was, and likely to be for the foreseeable future, Iran, or at least as long as it remained the Islamic Republic of Iran. Unless Iran was to develop a massive amphibious assault capability, there was little chance of a land invasion - special operations raids on oil and gas facilities, maybe, but a major ground assault? Unlikely.

Iran's major threats would come from the air, the sea (either the Gulf or Gulf of Oman), or terrorism. On point, in 2019 there was a terrorist attack on four ships in Emirati territorial waters in the Gulf of Oman off the coast of the Emirate of al-Fujayrah.

What the UAE needed, at that time and now, was a world-class air force, an effective air defense/anti-missile system, and a regionally competitive navy/coast guard. Ground forces like a national guard should suffice to face the minimal ground threat, and they needed to develop a serious counter-terrorism effort against Iran.

What the UAE did not (and does not) need is an armor-heavy army that should never deploy to fight an expeditionary war, or have to defend the territory of the UAE. They have strayed a bit from where they should be in Yemen, and I think they have learned that deploying their ground forces is not wise.

That said, buying M-1 tanks? Not a problem, but not a priority. Acquiring Patriot missiles? Yes, a high priority. F-16s? Absolutely the highest priority - get the best money can buy, and the UAE can afford it. I am satisfied to see that the UAE Air Force now flies some of the most advanced F-16s in the world.

It was a wide-ranging conversation - the shaykh was well-informed and cognizant of the current situation. I think my comments were merely confirmatory to his own thinking. However, reports of my conversation with the shaykh reached the ears of the SAO people at the embassy. I was immediately called to meet with the chief of the SAO, a soon-retiring U.S. Army colonel obviously looking for a position at Raytheon (Patriot missiles) or General Dynamics (M-1 Abrams tanks). Both are great weapon systems, but were they right for the UAE?

The security assistance function of the Department of Defense has always been suspect to us foreign area officers and intelligence specialists. Senior officers recommending ("selling") certain weapons systems to countries where they have served and then retire and end up working for companies named Raytheon, Boeing, General Dynamics, etc. It just sounds too convenient.

I told the shaykh what I thought he needed to know, not what the defense industry contractors (or the SAO officers) wanted to sell him. I was immediately challenged by the Army colonel who was chief of the embassy security assistance office. All in, he was a fine Army officer just doing his job, but peddling unnecessary arms to an ally did not seem to be kosher (pun intended) to me. Since we labored for different masters, we parted on rather icy terms.

As I said, I am pleased to see that the UAE has developed a very capable air force - if not world-class air force, it is certainly among the best in the Middle East. They have also developed a good naval and coast guard capability. I am disappointed that they have attempted to use their military as an expeditionary force in Yemen and Libya. I find it hard to believe that the Shaykh Muhammad of 1992 is allowing his forces to be used this way in 2020. The force structure we had talked about in 1992 was never meant to operate in this manner.

Still, the UAE has been a key American ally for decades. The use of the al-Dhafra air base outside Abu Dhabi has been an integral part of American air operations in the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

I often wonder why we have positioned U.S. Central Command (Forward) at the al-'Udayd (Al Udeid) air base in Qatar. Qatar is an ally, yes, but much more aligned with Turkey and its support for Islamist groups in Syria. Let's not forget that the anti-American satellite news network Al Jazeera is based in Doha, Qatar. For those of you who watch Al Jazeera English, the Arabic language network and the English language networks are totally different - the Arabic-language broadcast is exponentially much more anti-American and anti-western than the English language content. I digress.

What is driving the change in the UAE that they are willing to normalize relations with Israel? Easy - Iran. I guess we owe a debit of gratitude to former President Barack Obama and his terminally ineffectual Secretary of State John Kerry.

If Obama and Kerry had not spent so much time and treasure on the ill-advised Iran nuclear deal, the so-called Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), countries like the UAE and Saudi Arabia would not be so worried about a potential nuclear-armed Iran. (See my article from earlier this month, Saudi Arabia and China nuclear cooperation - is Riyadh seeking nukes?) The prospect of a Joe Biden-Kamala Harris administration and the probability of another ill-advised American effort to befriend the world's leading sponsor of terrorism is of great concern to our Gulf Arab allies.

I hope the United States is able to work with the leaders of Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait to follow in the UAE's footsteps. Saudi Arabia, who also cooperates with Israel silently, may take a bit longer.

The Israelis are smart to try and work with the Sunni Arabs. They share a common threat: the Islamic Republic of Iran and its Shi'a syndicate in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.

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What does withdrawal of US troops from Iraq mean? - American military expert explains

US Central Command Gen. Frank McKenzie paid an official visit to Baghdad for meeting with Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi on Tuesday. In the meeting, Gen. McKenzie announced a possible reduction of US troops in Iraq. Apart from this US withdrawal of Germany was announced previous months this year. Withdrawal or shifting military troops caused a great interest among experts and media. 

In order to find the answers about the US moves, Eurasia Diary took the opinions of military expert Rick Francona.

Rick Francona is an author, commentator and media military analyst. He is a retired United States Air Force intelligence officer with experience in the Middle East, including tours of duty with the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency. 

Q. Why does the US withdraw troops from Iraq and Germany? Does it mean Iran and Russia are not threats to the US like they were before? 

A. Let me address Germany—and Europe—first. The press release from the Department of Defense said the removal of troops from Germany will “enhance Russian deterrence, strengthen NATO, reassure Allies, improve strategic U.S. flexibility....” 

 The repositioning—not necessarily withdrawal—of American forces is long overdue. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, there has been no real need to maintain that much force presence in Germany. However, I am not advocating we return them to the United States. With the growing threat from Russia and the expansion of NATO to the east, I would hope that the United States is going to move the forces forward to either Poland or Romania or both. 

 Move the troops closer to where they will be needed, send a message to the Russians that we’re there to support/strengthen NATO while bringing the families and the accompanying unnecessary support infrastructure home. If we are going to have forces deployed opposite the Russians, keep them lean and mean—more tooth, less tail. 

As for Iraq, American troops returned to Iraq for one reason, to assist the Iraqis in their fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Remember, after what I believe was the premature withdrawal of US forces from Iraq by President Obama in 2011, the Iraqi Army was basically hollowed out by corruption, mismanagement, and a lack of leadership epitomized by the disastrous government of Nuri al-Maliki. That army collapsed as ISIS took the city of Mosul in 2014.

As ISIS continued to move south towards Baghdad and expand its territorial holdings in the country, it was clear that Iraqi security forces were incapable of stopping the group without external assistance. That assistance came in the form of a small US ground presence supported by massive amounts of coalition airpower. 

Unfortunately, al-Maliki also requested, and received, support from Iran, in the form of a series of Public Mobilization Units (hashed)—Iraqi Shi’a militias trained and armed (and I maintain, led) by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The hand of IRGC-Qods Force commander Qassem Solimani was readily apparent. 

With the increase in the capabilities of the US-revitalized Iraqi security forces (police, counterterrorism units, and military), a continued presence of American forces in the presence of an Iranian-dominated Iraqi government, has become no longer viable. Most Arab Iraqis don’t want a continued US presence, and there is little stomach in the United States for keeping troops there. Yes, Iran remains a regional threat to American interests in the region, but it will have to be addressed in other ways. The US does not need forces in Iraq to maintain freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf. 

Q. We observe that the Middle East has become a Russian-Turkish battlefield. Does the US think it is better to withdraw and let two powers weaken each other? 

A. We now have Russia and Turkey involved in two proxy wars in the region: Syria and Libya. While we have serious issues with Turkish “adventurism” on the part of President Erdoğan in both theaters, the bottom line remains: Russia presents a threat to the United States across a variety of fronts; Turkey is a key NATO ally. 

That said, Turkey has been singularly unhelpful in the US-led coalition fight against ISIS since the beginning of the effort in 2014. Erdoğan’s efforts were more focused on anti-Kurdish operations in Syria than on defeating ISIS – it was as if that the Turkish leader was supporting ISIS at the expense of the Kurds. Virtually all of Turkey’s incursions into north and northwest Syria did nothing to promote the defeat of ISIS, only to create what appears to be a semi-permanent Turkish and Turkish-backed Islamist presence in the country. 

Are we looking at the reintroduction of the Ottomans? Hardly, just a quagmire/standoff between Erdoğan and Putin, at the expense of the Syrian population caught in the crossfire. 

Libya is no better. While Turkish intervention has turned the tide of the fighting in favor of the GNA over the LNA, nothing seems to have been resolved. You have the Turkish-supported GNA on one side against the Russian-backed, Haftar-led LNA, which is now also supported by US allies Egypt and the UAE. Add what now appears to be Syrian government support to the LNA, while Turkey deploys Syrian mercenaries to fight for the GNA. 

This is a recipe for escalation. Elsewhere in the region, Erdoğan has acquired a military base in Qatar. This is more unnecessary and unhelpful Ottoman adventurism from “Sultan Recep.” He should focus on cleaning up his current debacles before creating a third. 

Q. The FBI director says China is a threat to US security. Can we expect the US will shift troops from these areas to Asia-Pacific? 

A. China is emerging as the key long-term future threat to US security, likely to surpass the Russians in the not-too-distant future. Although President Trump has slowed down the Obama “pivot to Asia,” the United States will eventually have to increase either its own force structure in the region, or alternately enter into a broad multinational alliance with countries like Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam, even India, and Australia to confront growing Chinese power and its seemingly willingness to use it. 

Chinese handling of the coronavirus has cost them some goodwill. The US and its allies should capitalize on Chinese malign behavior directed at the rest of the world and attempt to isolate Beijing to make them pay a price for unleashing—wittingly or unwittingly (although many believe it was the former)—the virus on the rest of the world. 

Interviewer: Ulvi Ahmedli

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The UAE Air Force returns to the skies over Syria

UAE Air Force F-16 Desert Falcons

One of the key Arab allies in the U.S.-led coalition formed to fight the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is the United Arab Emirates (UAE). UAE Air Force (UAEAF) F-16 "Desert Falcons" were among the first aircraft involved in the coalition airstrikes on Syria beginning in September 2014. The UAEAF flies one of the later versions of the venerable fourth-generation Lockheed Martin (originally General Dynamics) F-16.

On December 24, a Royal Jordanian Air Force (RJAF) F-16 crashed during an airstrike on a target in al-Raqqah, Syria, the self-proclaimed capital of ISIS's "Islamic State." The pilot was captured almost immediately, and was later brutally murdered. (See Downing of a Jordanian fighter aircraft and ISIS capture of the pilot, and The death of Lieutenant Mu'az al-Kasasbah - some thoughts.)

After the loss of the aircraft and the capture of the pilot, the Arab members of the coalition, including the UAE, ceased flight operations over Syria, leaving only the United States to conduct airstrikes in the country. UAE military officials complained that U.S. Air Force combat search and rescue (CSAR) forces were based in Kuwait, too far from the potential shootdown areas to be of use.

After the murder of the Jordanian pilot, Lieutenant Mu'az al-Kasasbah, the Jordanians reversed their moratorium on participation in coalition airstrikes and resumed operations against ISIS at an increased level. The U.S. Air Force repositioned its CSAR assets to a base in northern Iraq, and the UAE announced the deployment of a squadron of F-16 fighters to a Jordanian air base and the resumption of airstrikes in Syria. It was a welcome decision - both the RJAF and UAEAF are professional organizations.

Some background on the UAEAF.

I served as the acting Defense Attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi, UAE in the early 1990s - a short detour on my way to my real position as the Air Attaché at the American Embassy in Damascus, Syria. While in Abu Dhabi, I had several meetings with the UAE Minister of Defense, Shaykh Muhammad bin Rashid Al Maktum ("call me Shaykh Mo"). He is now the Vice President and Prime Minister of the UAE, the constitutional monarch of Dubai, and still the Minister of Defense.

At the time when I was meeting with "Shaykh Mo," many defense contractors from a variety of nations - particularly the United States, United Kingdom and France - were trying to sell weapons to the Emirates. The weapons ran the gamut from fighter aircraft, main battle tanks, surface to air missiles, frigates, coastal defense systems, reconnaissance platforms - you name it, there was someone there trying to sell it to the Emirates armed forces. The recent successes of many of the systems in Operation Desert Storm was a key selling point.

In one of our meetings, the shaykh/minister mentioned that he was besieged with sales representatives and security assistance officers (that is military-speak for an officer who is theoretically advising on security needs, but is in reality an arms salesman for his country's defense contractors). I suggested he determine potential threats to the Emirates, formulate a defense strategy, then buy the weapons and systems that supported that strategy. At the time, he had hired a consultant to help him develop that strategy - I told him he didn't need a consultant.

The shaykh was intrigued by what I thought was a pretty simple analysis. He asked if I could come back and discuss this further - of course, I agreed. We met over dinner and began a rather informal assessment of the country's needs. I pointed at the map on the wall in his official dining room at the Ministry of Defense and asked who he needed to defend the UAE against. Of course, the obvious and really only threat was, and remains, Iran.

While the UAE may have minor issues with its Arab neighbors - Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Oman - the chances of actually going to war were pretty slim. However, there were major issues with the non-Arab Iranians across the Gulf - including sovereignty claims over a series of islands in the oil-rich areas of the southern Gulf.

I pointed out that given the geography of the UAE and the relations with its Arab neighbors, a ground war was unlikely or impractical. If there was to be a conflict with Iran, it would likely be an air and naval engagement. My recommendation was that the shaykh pursue the creation of a world-class air force and a credible navy, with less emphasis on his land forces.

When the contractors hawking tanks and armored personnel carriers heard of my advice, complaints were lodged with the ambassador and the Army colonel who headed the U.S. Security Assistance Office. The fact that I was right was of no consequence. It was "suggested" that I cease my security assistance advice to the shaykh and stick to being the Defense Attaché. I thought I was, but it seems I was interfering in potential multi-billion dollar contracts.

In any case, the shaykh either took my advice or figured it out for himself and embarked on the creation of one of the best air forces in the Arab world. The backbone of the service are 79 F-16E/F Block 60 fighters (three squadrons) with an additional 25 on order. The pilots are well-trained and routinely exercise with their American counterparts in both the United States and the UAE.

The UAEAF is a potent military force capable of delivering a wide range of precision-guided munitions in virtually all conditions, day or night. It is good to see them back in the skies of Syria taking the fight to ISIS.

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The Ron Insana Show - comments

On Friday morning (October 1), I was a guest on the Ron Insana radio show. Ron is a former anchor at CNBC, and he and I worked together when I was a CNBC Middle East military analyst during the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. I have been on his radio show periodically over the last few years.

Ron asked that I come on the show to discuss the elevated terrorist threat, given the recent arrests in Europe of a group of European nationals trained by al-Qa'idah to launch "Mumbai-style" attacks against Americans and other Westerners. This is in reference to the November 2008 attacks by members of the al-Qa'idah affiliated Pakistani terrorist group Lashkar-e Taiba in Mumbai. During the three day killing spree, a group of 10 terrorists who had infiltrated into India by inflatable boats were able to kill almost 175 people and wound over 300 others. Most of these attacks were aimed at hotels and tourist locations that cater to Westerners.

In response to Ron's questions, I made the point that this phenomenon of "home-grown" terrorists is an al-Qa'idah adaptation to our fairly successful military and intelligence operations against terrorist organizations. However, as bureaucracies are wont to fight the last war, to solve the last problem, American law enforcement and intelligence agencies had focused on Middle Eastern and South Asian nationals as potential terrorists.

Soon after the Bush Administration created the Department of Homeland Security, al-Qa'idah instructed its members to start recruiting "non-alerting" potential jihadis. They have been successful. They have recruited British-born and American-born Muslims to join the organization and to travel to Pakistan's Waziristan provinces for indoctrination and training on "martyrdom operations," which is jihadi-speak for suicide bombings.

The poster child for this effort is arguably American citizen Najibullah Zazi. Zazi is labeled as an naturalized citizen born in Afghanistan, but more importantly he is an American citizen of Pushtun descent. Pushtuns are the ethnic group that comprise the majority of the Taliban and who provide protection and support the the Arabs of al-Qa'idah in the Afghan tribal areas. "Tribal areas" is a euphemism for what I'll call Pushtunistan.

Zazi's status as an American citizen allowed him to move easily in and out of the United States, not drawing much attention. His American citizen status also protected him from many surveillance and investigative techniques that American law enforcement and intelligence agencies have used effectively against foreigners. We should not underestimate al-Qa'idah's ability to recognize such weaknesses and adapt to exploit those weaknesses.

Another case in point is the American-born radical cleric Anwar al-'Awlaqi, now believed to be resident in Yemen. The ACLU has mounted a legal challenge to the government's plans to kill al-'Awlaqi if possible. Although I think killing al-Awlaqi would be a good thing, the legal restrictions need to be addressed, not just for him, but for other and future American-citizen jihadis overseas as well. We all remember John Walker Lindh, or "Taliban John," who was accorded all rights of an American citizen despite the fact that he was captured on a battlefield in Afghanistan.

There was also an American-born Saudi member of al-Qa'idah who had to be transferred from Guantanamo to a Navy detention facility to allow him all the rights of an American citizen. If you take up arms against the United States, I do not agree that they are still American citizens, but then I'm not a lawyer. I'm just a retired intelligence operations officer who had to deal with such scum. As for Lindh, I'd have left him on a battlefield in Afghanistan; he would have not needed an attorney.

All that said, what do we do?

We need to allow our intelligence agencies to collect information on potential jihadis, regardless of their citizenship. I have no problem with getting warrants, but at least set up a system that works. If I was in charge, there would be no Department of Homeland Security. As far as I can tell, all they do is get in the way, that is, when they are not looking at former military members as potential terrorists. I cannot find any incident that was prevented in which DHS was the lead agency. Most of our successes have been the result of good old fashioned law enforcement or classic intelligence work, not the bloated bureaucracy that is DHS. Give the FBI the lead for this vital mission.

We also need to cooperate more closely with our European and Middle Eastern allies to track potential recruits as the travel for training and indoctrination. Right now the common denominator for the travel and training is Pakistan, specifically the Waziristan provinces.

Ron asked me the obvious question: why don't we pressure the Pakistanis to have their army move into the Waziristans and wipe all these guys out. We have, but the answer is not that simple. Pakistan was created out of British India and includes several ethnic minorities. One of these is the Pusthuns who inhabit both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area. Their loyatly is not to Pakistan or Afghanistan, it is to their fellow Pushtuns. Their law is Pustunwali, the unwritten code of the Pushtuns.

There are also many Pusthuns in the Pakistan Army, which is a good military force. The Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), the country's major intelligence agency, is also heavily-populated by Pushtuns. Many of these officers are sympathetic to the Taliban and al-Qa'idah, and are certainly not in favor of mounting extensive, bloody military operations against their fellow tribesmen.

The government in Islamabad maintains an uneasy balance of the ethnic groups. Upsetting that balance is a risk not to be taken lightly, for Pakistan or the United States. What we do not need is the fall of the Pakistani government and the rise of a radical Islamic state with an arsenal of nuclear weapons and the missiles and aircraft with which to deliver them. Take that one step further and imagine these weapons transferred to al-Qa'idah.

It is a difficult problem, but one we have to address. We need real homeland security run by proffesionals who will not dismiss every al-Qa'idah plot as "lone wolf" operations as they did with Fort Hood killer Major Nidal Hasan, Christmas-day "underwar bomber" 'Umar Faruq 'Abd al-Mutalab, failed New York subway bomber Najibullah Zazi and failed Times Square bomber Faisal Shazad.

We've been lucky. That won't last. We need effective leadership.

Mr President - take a lesson from the ambassador

President Obama, you constantly use the phrase, "Let me be clear."

Take a lesson in clarity from Yusif 'Utaybah, the distinguished ambassador of the United Arab Emirates to the United States. Call him - he's at (202) 243-2400; I am sure he'll take your call.

You can't be much more clear than this. Ambassador 'Utaybah was speaking at the Aspen Ideas Festival about the Iranian nuclear program. The ambassador stated that if sanctions fail to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, the UAE supports an American military strike to halt the program. He went on to explain that the consequences of such an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities - and there certainly will be consequences - are far less damaging in the long term than Iran in possession of nuclear weapons.

In his words: "I think it's a cost-benefit analysis - I think despite the large amount of trade we [UAE] do with Iran, which is close to $12 billion … there will be consequences, there will be a backlash and there will be problems with people protesting and rioting and very unhappy that there is an outside force attacking a Muslim country; that is going to happen no matter what."

Here is where he gets even clearer: "We cannot live with a nuclear Iran. The United States may be able to live with it; we can't."

The UAE is not the only Gulf Arab country to have these views. I would estimate that neither Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar nor Oman want to be neighbors with a nuclear-armed Iran. However, as the ambassador points out, if the United States will not fulfill its traditional leadership role in the region - which includes protection for the Gulf Arab states - these states will be forced to either make an accommodation with Iran, or in the case of larger countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, acquire their own nuclear arsenal.

Failure to stop Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, in the eyes of these countries, will be an abdication of America's role in the Gulf - it will be the end of our status as the key power in the region. On top of that, we do not need a nuclear arms race in the Persian Gulf.

Most of us who speak with people in the Middle East have heard comments similar to those of Ambassador 'Utaybah. I was a bit taken aback by a remark by Representative Jane Harmon (D-CA) that she had never heard an Arab government official say this before. Either she meant that she never heard them say it publicly, or she's not listening. I'll give her the benefit of the doubt.

I served as the defense attaché at the American embassy in Abu Dhabi - it was a privilege to work with the defense officials and military officers of the UAE. Reading the ambassador's words reaffirms my high regard for the Emiris - they get it.

How about some clarity on Iran, Mr. President - a clear, simple statement that the United States will not allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. Take a lesson from the ambassador.

U.S. arms sales and deployments to the Gulf - interesting timing

The United States has announced the deployment to the Persian Gulf region of warships and air defense systems capable of engaging short and medium range ballistic missiles. Defense Department officials have publicly acknowledged the presence of eight U.S. Army Patriot air defense batteries in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. At the same time, additional U.S. Navy ships equipped with the Aegis Combat System are augmenting existing naval and air units in the Gulf.

These deployments represent a significant increase in the air defense capabilities of the four host countries, as well as that of American forces in the area. In addition, the United States announced a series of multibillion-dollar arms deals with the Gulf Arab states. The UAE is not only buying the Patriot system, but also the new Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). Others may follow suit, especially if there is no resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue.

The purchases of these American systems by multiple countries in the Gulf, combined with American deployments of identical or compatible systems, creates a formidable defensive umbrella in the region. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has often referred to this "umbrella" over our Gulf allies as it became obvious that the Obama Administration's efforts to "engage" have been an abject failure.

A main concern in the region is Iran's growing inventory of ballistic missiles capable of striking anywhere in the Middle East, including Israel. Iran has had this capability for some time, and Israel has repeatedly warned that it considers a nuclear-armed Iran an "existential" threat to the Jewish state. Iran has also threatened to attack American allies and interests in the region should it be attacked by either Israeli or American military forces.

What is driving the deployment and sales at this time? It would appear that patience with the Iranians has or is running out. The question is, whose patience is running out - Israel, the United States, the United Nations, or the Europeans? Certainly not the Chinese....

If I were an Iranian intelligence officer - I've known some, they're pretty good - I would be concerned about what I was seeing. Part of the intelligence analysis business is a discipline called "indications and warning." There is a list of "indicators" - a template of events that are part of a larger event or significant change in the situation. Once enough indicators are present, a warning is issued.

Increased U.S. Navy deployments to the Persian Gulf are certainly an indicator for the Iranian intelligence services. Deployments of Aegis-equipped warships is likely an even stronger indicator of a change in the situation. Add to that the deployment of eight U.S. Army Patriot batteries to the Arab countries across the Gulf to augment those countries' already capable air and missile defenses, and alarm bells might start ringing. Then the announcements of multibillion dollar arms sales of even more and in at least one case better systems - something has changed to warrant this increase in capability.

The intelligence analysts in Tehran have to determine the significance of the deployments and arms sales, as well as their timing. The United States will claim, of course, that the moves are merely defensive in nature, increasing the pressure on Iran while at the same time demonstrating support for the Gulf Arabs.

If you are an Iranian intelligence officer, you cannot ignore the possibility that these moves are the preliminary steps that lead to military action against Iran. The Israelis would not mount an attack on Iran without notifying the United States, despite the cool relationship between President Obama and Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu. These moves may be in anticipation of an Iranian reaction to that attack.

Something has changed the calculus in Washington. Do we know of an impending Israeli operation? Have the Israelis determined that Iran is too close to developing a nuclear weapon and plan to act? Have the Gulf Arabs expressed concern that Israel might attack and place them at risk of Iranian retaliation?

I know the questions, but not the answers. If I were an Iranian intelligence officer, I would already have issued a warning. Something is up.

Iranian ascendancy - an opportunity for U.S. policy

Iran's rising influence in the Middle East is causing concern in the Gulf Arab states, long rivals of the Persian country across the water. That presents some opportunities for U.S. foreign policy in the area.

Every time Iran announces another missile test launch, introduction of a new weapon system, a large scale military exercise or advancements in its nuclear research program, the level of anxiety climbs in the countries that comprise the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) - Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Oman.

These Arab countries rightfully concerned. Since the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 removed Saddam Husayn, Iran has tried to assert itself as the major power broker in the region. The Iranian leadership believes that the removal of Saddam cleared the way for them to increase their influence in one of the countries that has traditionally been a rival at best and a deadly foe at worst.

Iran continues its meddling in Iraqi affairs, especially in the Shi'a-dominated southern part of the country. For years Iran has provided weapons and training to various Shi'a militias, militias that have killed hundreds of American troops. One of Iran's primary clients in Iraq is the jaysh al-mahdi of radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.

On the Iraqi political front, Iran has tried to develop and maintain close relations with the majority Shi'a political parties, including that of Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. When American troops depart Iraq, there will be a struggle over who will emerge as the key power broker in the Gulf region. Will it be Iran, Saudi Arabia or the United States?

It is almost as if Iran has been preparing for that day. Since 2003, Iran has continued an ambitious militarization program across the spectrum, including the development of long-range ballistic missiles. The country has large, fairly well-trained and experienced armed forces, as well as a good special operations capability.

Although on paper the GCC appears to also have capable military forces, it is difficult to imagine them taking on Iran militarily. Add nuclear weapons to Iran's current capabilities - there is little doubt that Iran is intent on acquiring them - and it makes for an intimidating neighbor.

The recent overtures by Saudi Arabia to the Syrian government are a reaction to what is happening in Iran, not in Syria. Syria is the only Arab state aligned with Iran. Other factions in the Arab world, particularly Lebanese Hizballah (created by the Iranians in 1982) and Palestinian Hamas, also are aligned with the regime in Tehran. It is this Syrian-Iranian alliance that provides Tehran its gateway to Lebanon - the international airport in Damascus is the conduit for Iranian money and weapons to Hizballah, as well as other terrorist groups.

The Obama administration has also made overtures to Syria for the same reason - Iran. U.S-Syrian relations have been strained since Syria was allegedly complicit in the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri. If - and this is a big "if" - either the United States or Saudi Arabia is successful in breaking Syria away Iran, it would be extremely helpful to American diplomacy in the region. Not only would it virtually strangle Hizballah, it would set the stage for meaningful talks between Syria and Israel. As long as Syria allows Iran to support Hizballah via its territory, Israel will not return the occupied Golan Heights. Those are the two main points for peace between Syria and Israel.

The Obama administration should be actively engaging our Gulf Arab allies - we need to maintain our relationships in the region, including access to a series of military bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE. As long as these countries perceive Iran as as threat, we have a unique opportunity to increase our influence in the region by being thought of as the guarantor of their security. Threatening to use nuclear weapons against the Gulf Arabs, or even against Israel, is one thing. Threatening to use them against the world's superpower is not credible. Our diplomats should try to convince the Gulf Arabs that the key to answering the Iranian challenge is close relationship with the United States.

As long as the United States imports two-thirds of its oil from abroad, it is essential that we have the ability to guarantee the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf. Good relationships with the Gulf Arabs will not only provide security for them, it will allow the United States to maintain its role as a key power in the region.

UAE defense spending in a global recession

Stryker Armored Vehicle being loaded onto USAF C-17
Click for larger image (DOD photo)

The United Arab Emirates announced a series of arms deals this week totaling over $4 billion. The Persian Gulf nation ordered four Boeing C-17 long-range airlifters and 12 Lockheed Martin C-130J tactical airlifters. Earlier, it ordered three Cobra air defense surveillance radars from a European consortium and 12 combat vessels from the Abu Dhabi Shipbuilding Company. In December 2008, the UAE signed a contract for over $3 billion to purchase the advanced version of the Patriot air defense missile system.

Seven billion dollars committed to military hardware despite a global economic downturn indicates the importance the UAE attaches to its own defense. The United States and the UAE have a close working military relationship going back to the days of the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980's. U.S. Navy ships conduct more port calls in the UAE than anywhere in the world except the United States itself. U.S. Air Force fighter, reconnaissance, tanker and unmanned aircraft have used al-Dhafra air base for decades.

I was the acting defense attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi for a period of four months in late 1992. At that time, I had great relationship with the UAE military, especially the UAE military intelligence staff. One of the roles of my office and the Security Assistance Office was to advise the UAE military leadership of the threat (my job) and recommend force structure and weapons (the SAO job) for effective defense of the oil-rich country.

Given that the main threat to the UAE was (and remains) Iranian adventurism, we advised the UAE defense minister to tailor his country's armed forces to defend UAE airspace and territorial waters against Iranian aircraft and naval vessels. Iran and the UAE have argued over the legal ownership of some Persian Gulf islands for decades. Since then, Iranian missiles have emerged as a real threat to the UAE.

We recommended that the UAE develop a first rate air force and air defense system, if necessary at the expense of the ground forces. A navy is important as well, but should be a coastal defense force rather than on ocean-going force. To that end, the UAE has purchased the F-16E/F Block 60 (officially the Fighting Falcon but more commonly called the Desert Falcon). With the addition of the Patriot air defense system, the UAE has a good capability against not only Iranian aircraft and ships, but against ballistic and cruise missiles as well.

The C-130J tactical airlifter will be useful to move personnel and materiel around the UAE and the region. There is some question as to why the UAE needs four long-range C-17 airlifters. The official explanation is to support future humanitarian efforts. Fine, but when many fellow Muslims suffered in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami, there was little relief provided by the Arab states. I suspect the UAE is acquiring airlift capability to assist in bringing foreign (read: American) troops and equipment into the Emirates in case of Iranian (or other) threats.

The contract for the four C-17's and 12 C-130J's totals about $3 billion. The per unit cost of a C-17 is about $300 million, and the C-130J about $65 million. Doing the math for that package adds up to about $2 billion. Where is the other $1 billion? When these contracts are made, the package usually includes training and initial maintenance. There is nothing sinister here.

We are awaiting the award of yet another high-dollar contract, $7 billion for the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system that will improve the UAE's anti-balistic missile defense capability.

Many have questioned the reliability of our Gulf Arab allies. The UAE has stood with us for decades and with these purchases appears committed to continue that stance. Good allies.

Pakistan singled out for special treatment?

This article appeared on MSNBC.com

Pakistan singled out for special treatment?
Francona: The U.S. fails to demand the same reforms in other countries

COMMENTARY
By Lt. Col. Rick Francona
Military analyst
MSNBC


In the aftermath of President Pervez Musharraf’s suspension of Pakistan’s constitution, there have been calls for re-evaluation of the relationship between Washington and Islamabad. There have also been threats that the United States might suspend aid to the Pakistani military, most of it intended to assist in their fight against terrorism, specifically al-Qaida and the Taliban. That assistance is estimated to be about $140 million dollars per month.

One of the basic tenets of many American administrations, including that of George Bush, is to support democratic reform around the world. In recent months, the administration has pressured Musharraf to make changes it believes are retarding progress to democracy: step down as army chief, enter a power-sharing arrangement with former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and hold free elections.

That appeared to be on track until the recent spate of violence in the country, causing Musharraf to suspend the constitution. After the announcement of the state of emergency on Nov. 3, there have been repeated demands made of Musharraf to reconsider his actions and not delay the elections scheduled for January. The situation in the nuclear-armed country has prompted visits from concerned senior U.S. officials, including Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte.

I find it interesting that the United States has singled out Pakistan to be denounced for its slow progress towards democracy, while all but ignoring the abysmal human rights records of its other allies — kingdoms and theocracies that make no pretense of being representative governments. Is there a double standard for different allies?

Several states in the region come to mind: the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Emirate of Qatar, the State of Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. These countries are long-time allies of the United Sates, yet not one is a representative democracy. Granted, some have low level elections for positions like municipal offices, but in none of these countries does the population have real input to national level decisionmaking and there is no true electorate.

All of the countries above provide some sort of support to the U.S. military, such as basing rights, overflight permission, use of logistics facilities, pre-positioning of military equipment, etc. They all enjoy another important distinction: they are customers of large American defense contractors. These countries buy large quantities of expensive military hardware and are not recipients of American aid because they don’t need it.

Let’s take another example, a country more analogous to Pakistan. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is an American ally. It has been a strong ally in the Middle East for years with the notable exception of Jordan’s support of Saddam Hussein following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Jordan is not a wealthy country and cannot afford to buy American military equipment on its own. Over the years the kingdom has received billions of dollars of American economic and military assistance in return for desert training opportunities and intelligence sharing.

Despite some moves toward a more representative assembly, Jordan is not a democracy and the ultimate authority remains the king. Yet I don’t recall the United States dispatching John Negroponte to Jordan to push for free elections and democratic reforms. I have not seen any past or current American administration apply real pressure on any of our Gulf Arab allies to hold elections and step down as monarchs.

Why not? Could it be that these autocratic regimes are spending huge amounts of money on expensive American weapons? Maybe, but what about Jordan? Jordan, like Pakistan, receives American aid. Pakistan must become a democracy, but Jordan does not?

Bottom line: If you are an autocratic state spending huge amounts of money on American weapons and allowing U.S. forces to use your territory, you get a pass. If you are Pakistan, receiving billions in American assistance, you need to be moving toward democracy unless you fall into some undefined category like Jordan.

Why don’t we treat Pakistan like Jordan? This sounds like a double standard to me.

© 2007 MSNBC Interactive

Gulf Arabs draw a red line against Iran

This article appeared on MSNBC Hardball Hardblogger

Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad will be heading to New York to address the United Nations in hopes of convincing the world that his country’s nuclear research program is for energy and not weapons. He has complemented that effort with rhetoric that a military strike on his country’s nuclear facilities will lead to dire consequences.

The Arab countries across the Gulf from Iran are watching this unfolding situation with great concern. An expected consequence of a military strike on Iran is an Iranian attempt to the close the Straits of Hormuz, a narrow waterway between Oman and Iran. About 25 percent of the world’s oil supply moves through the straits – most of it from the Gulf Arabs. For years, Iran has been developing military capabilities that will allow it to close the strategic waterway.

Disruption of the flow of oil through the straits is of concern to not just the Gulf Arabs, but the rest of the world as well. Although the United States imports less than 20 percent of its oil from the Gulf, oil is a fungible commodity. If that much oil was taken off the markets, the countries that normally buy this oil will compete with us for oil from our normal sources, driving prices up dramatically.

Threats to the straits are a “red line” for these countries. At least one Gulf Arab country – Bahrain – has declared that the Gulf countries are ready to “respond with force” if Iran attempts to block the straits.

Bahrain - a key U.S. ally in the Gulf - is home to the American Fifth Fleet, whose ships patrol the Persian Gulf and adjacent waters. The normal U.S. Navy presence in the Gulf has been reinforced recently to include two carrier strike groups. As the Iranians have spent years and resources developing the ability to close the straits, the U.S. Navy likewise has developed the means to keep them open.

The Iranians have experience confronting the U.S. Navy. In the 1980’s, during the Iran-Iraq war, American warships escorting Arab tankers often came under attacks, including mine warfare. In 1988, the Iranians challenged the Americans in a significant surface action, with disastrous results. The Economist described Iran’s move as "how to waste a navy."

The Gulf Arabs ability to respond with force against Iran is limited. While most of the six nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates) have capable air forces, their naval capabilities are not sufficient to re-open the Straits of Hormuz. If there is action in the Gulf against the Iranians, it will be by American forces.

The more important point here – the Gulf Arabs have made it clear to Tehran that they are willing to use force to keep the oil flowing through the straits. Just as the world needs to buy the oil, they need to sell it. Should the crisis erupt into an armed confrontation, they will be standing with the United States. If we are concerned about base – naval and air – access in these countries for a coming confrontation with Iran, now is the time to ask.

Ahmadinejad is doing what the Americans have been unable to do – create a coalition against Iran.

MSNBC Hardball - Port Issue

On March 2, I appeared on Hardball with Chris Matthews to discuss the possible involbement of Dubai with the management of terminals at some American ports. Here is the transcript:


MATTHEWS: Thank you, David Gregory. Now the Dubai ports deal, of course, the hot issue of the week. The Bush administration has triggered a national security investigation of another Dubai-based company with plans to buy U.S. plants that manufacture military parts for defense contractors.

Are we becoming too dependent on overseas companies to provide services that are critical to our national security. And would the Dubai ports deal make us less safe?

Frank Gaffney is a former assistant secretary of defense during the Reagan administration. He‘s now the president of the Center for Security Policy.

And Lieutenant Colonel Rick Francona served as the defense attache at the U.S. embassy in the United Arab Emirates. He was there when the emir was the defense minister. Colonel Francona is now an MSNBC military analyst.

Colonel Francona, you‘re on a lot of security matters, so let‘s ask you on this one. Is it OK by your security instincts to allow the UAE to control our ports?

LT. COL. RICK FRANCONA, MSNBC MILITARY ANALYST: On the surface of it, Chris, I don‘t have a problem with the UAE running our ports. Dubai has been a terrific ally of ours. We‘ve got a lot of defense cooperation, they understand our security interests, so I don‘t have a problem with a Dubai company running any of our ports.

MATTHEWS: Frank Gaffney, do you?

FRANK GAFFNEY, PRESIDENT, CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY: I do. I think that we‘ve got already too many vulnerabilities associated with these ports. I‘ve just come from a hearing with the House Armed Services Committee.

The testimony from some of my colleagues about how serious those problems are, just reinforce my belief that we don‘t want to do anything, even that might marginally make matters worse and I think this would at least make things marginally worse in three senses. One, there would be personnel hiring decisions made by this company. There will be some involvement with cargo and management of cargo.

And at the very least, there‘s going to be—some of the employees are going to be let in on security plans of the ports, each of which create, what I think is—as the lawyers would call an attractive nuisance. It‘s like having a swimming pool without a fence around it. Somebody is going to get in there and get in trouble.

MATTHEWS: Colonel Francona, Duncan Hunter, who chairs the Armed Services Committee in the House, he‘s a real tough soldiers kind of guy, he doesn‘t want to do it. He said that the problem with Dubai is not just that it‘s a state-owned operation here, which some people are against if principle. He says Dubai, the UAE, has had a bad track record.

He talks about high-speed electrical switches being sent through there, other materials that might be helpful to a nuclear program whizzing through the UAE‘s ports thanks to this company. Does that concern you?

FRANCONA: Well, yes, it concerns me, but I think you have to separate out all these incidents and look at them each. You know, is this the government doing this? Is there government complicity in this, or are the companies in the UAE being used either with or without knowledge? So I mean saying that something is happening in the UAE doesn‘t mean that the UAE government is doing it. So I think we have to be a little circumspect in how we look at these incidents.

MATTHEWS: Frank, if this was an Egyptian company or a Jordanian company, would you have the same concern?

GAFFNEY: I would. Frankly, I have the same concern about the fact that many of our ports are run by Chinese communists.

MATTHEWS: No, would you be coming on television to concern—show your concern?

GAFFNEY: I would be—I would be probably be raising the same kinds of alarms.
MATTHEWS: Even if it were Dutch or Belgian?

GAFFNEY: This is particularly worrying, Chris, because not only do you have the track record that Duncan Hunter was talking about, but we also know that this isn‘t necessarily a wrap on the government or even the company, but we also know the territory of the United Arab Emirates was where most of the operational planing and financing of the 9/11 attacks took place. So whether the government is complicit or simply missing the boat...

MATTHEWS: Well, so is Germany, if you want to get into that. Btu that‘s where a lot of these guys came from.

GAFFNEY: That‘s true. All of these raise questions, which is why I think the American public is so alive to this problem about whether we want to have control in other people hand‘s.

MATTHEWS: That‘s a cost. Risk is a cost, right? What are benefits, Colonel, and the costs of not doing this deal? Let‘s flip it around and look at the other side.

FRANCONA: OK.

MATTHEWS: What is the advantage of doing this deal, sticking with it in terms of helping our relationship with Dubai? And what are the costs if we drop the deal, if we dump it?

FRANCONA: Yes, assuming you‘re going to allow foreigners to run our port, you can‘t cut out the UAE, because that would offend Dubai. Dubai has been a great ally for two decades. Look at the strategic position they occupy on the Arabian peninsula. They straddle the Straits of Hormuz. They have ports not only in the Persian Gulf, but on the Gulf of Oman.

I mean, this is a critical operational location for the U.S. Navy. Sixty-five port visits a month. There‘s no place else in the area that gives us that kind of access. We need those ports to project power, not only in the Persian Gulf, but into the Gulf of Oman.

MATTHEWS: React to that.

GAFFNEY: Well, I‘m willing to stipulate to all of that. I think that‘s true and it‘s why it‘s regrettable...

MATTHEWS: But you‘d pay the cost of dumping this deal?

GAFFNEY: It‘s why it‘s regrettable that this deal has been allowed to come to this. It should have been turned off. But the defective process by which it was evaluated put us in this position where we have...

MATTHEWS: What happened in this administration? You‘re politically conscious. What happened to this administration‘s nervous system? Why did didn‘t they pick up on this?

GAFFNEY: I‘m going to take that as a compliment, I think.

MATTHEWS: I think I am.

GAFFNEY: It‘s because the process, this so-called Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, is a black box. The president didn‘t know what was going on until it was a done deal. The secretary of defense didn‘t know what was going on...

MATTHEWS: He said he didn‘t know.

GAFFNEY: ... until it was a done deal.

MATTHEWS: You really think Rummy know about this at all?

GAFFNEY: Because it was done at a very low level. That‘s the way these things have been run by a Treasury Department-led effort when the Treasury Department is responsible for promoting foreign investment in the United States. It‘s designed to give rise to these kinds of outcomes.

MATTHEWS: Why didn‘t somebody say to Rummy, hey, boss, I think we got a problem here?

GAFFNEY: I think partly because he‘s missing some middle level management that can‘t get through Carl Levin in the Senate. We‘ve got serious problems with the process. We‘ve got some I think legitimate concerns about how this plays out in a post 9-11 world. And I think at this moment, it‘s very healthy to have a debate, as we did in the Armed Services Committee.

MATTHEWS: Well, we‘re having one here.

(CROSSTALK)

MATTHEWS: A little late, but we‘re having one here. Thank you, Colonel Francona and Frank Gaffney. Thanks for—both of you for joining us.

Dubai - Strategic Importance of the UAE

The recent firestorm over the potential sale of P & O, a British-owned operator or terminals in six major American ports, to a company controlled by the emirate of Dubai, threatens to damage an important, maybe vital security partnership between the U.S. military and the United Arab Emirates, formerly known as the Trucial States or the Trucial Coast.

Dubai is the second largest of the seven , but probably the most in tune economically with the west. It is a major banking and trading center not only in the Persian Gulf and Middle East, but around the world. Dubai's emir, Shaykh Muhammad Bin Rashid Al Maktum serves as the prime minister of the UAE. "Shaykh Mo," as he is known in defense circles, is the former minister of defense and a long-time ally of the United States. I served as the defense attache at the American Embassy when the shaykh was the defense minister.

The UAE occupies a strategic location on the Arabian peninsula, with ports on both the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. It sits directly opposite Iran and practically straddles (with a small piece of Oman) the important Straits of Hurmuz, through which passes 25 percent of the world's oil traffic every day.

For decades, the UAE has allowed the United States Central Command access to its military facilities and commercial ports. Both are vitally important to America's ability to project military power into the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. In addition to allowing the basing of U.S. Air Force (and other coalition air forces during Operation Desert Storm) combat aircraft at Al-Dhafra air base, it allows the U.S. Navy to use the airfield at Fujayrah on the Gulf of Oman.

More importantly, however, is access to the port facilities in the Persian Gulf at Mina' Jabal 'Ali and Mina' Zayid, as well as Fujayrah and Khawr Fakhan in the Gulf of Oman. It is access to these world-class ports that allows the U.S. Navy to operate effectively in this part of the world. The port at Mina' Jabal 'Ali is so large it is visible from space with the naked eye - it is one of the few ports in the world that can dry dock an aircraft carrier. Without the excellent logistics and maintenance available in the UAE's ports, American ships would have to return to the United States for major maintenance.

The UAE's ports are so important that the country hosts more U.S. Navy port calls than any other foreign country in the world. When I was the defense attache, I had a five-person Port Liaison Element at the embassy that did nothing but arrange these port calls. The Central Command had two officers in Dubai that did nothing but arrange logistics and pay the bills. While the Central Command's Navy headquarters is in Bahrain, it's ships use Emiri ports - with no security problems.

We need to keep this in mind as we discuss the impending sale of P & O to Dubai.