Syria Reasserts Sovereignty Over Russian Bases

 

Russian Air Force Su-25 attack jets at Humaymim

On August 9, the Syrian Foreign Ministry announced that Damascus and Moscow have signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) addressing the future of Russia's two military facilities in Syria: the naval facility at Tartus and the air base at Humaymim (colocated with Latakia International Airport). 

The MOU comes after negotiations between the Russians and the new government of Syria following the removal of the Bashar al-Asad regime in December 2024.

 

Tartus has been used by Russian Navy ships for over 50 years. In 1971, Syria and the Soviet Union had signed an agreement to establish a Soviet naval logistics and support facility at the port. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the base remained open for use by the Russian Navy. 

In 2015, the Bashar al-Asad government requested Russian military assistance to help in the fight against anti-government groups and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The logisitics facility at Tartus then developed into a semi-permanent Russian naval presence. At the same time, the Russian Air Force deployed combat and support aircraft to Humaymim air base and established a logistics air bridge between Russia and the Syrian base.

In 2017, Russia secured renewable 49-year leases for both the naval facility at Tartus and the air base at Humaymim. These facilities became Russian exclusion areas. 

The Russians made extensive improvements to the air base to handle the expanded air force presence - runways extended, new taxiways and parking aprons, aircraft maintenance hangars, administrative buildings, and barracks built, as well as delployment of a state-of-the-art air defense and electronic warfare systems.

After the fall of the al-Asad government in December 2024, Russia withdrew its ships from the port at Tartus. It was not until the spring of 2026 that Russian Navy ships returned for a short time. While they continue to have access, there is not a restored permanent presence.

Today's agreement replaces the 49-year leases on both the naval facility and the air base. The key points of the MOU:

• The Syrian Ministry of Defense will gradually take over the administration of the air base at Humaymim and the commercial pier at the port of Tartus.
  
  
• The transfer will be completed and the new arrangements will take effect in three months.
  
  
• The Syria Civil Aviation Authority will take over the Latakia International Airport and begin its rehabilitation.
  
  
• The military facilities at Humaymim and Tartus will be transformed into joint Russian-Syrian training and qualification centers.

Russia's loss of the Syrian bases has forced them to seek alternative bases for its presence in the Mediterranean. Although they can still use Humaymim air base as a staging area for their operations in the Middle East and Africa, Libya is now being used more and more - Russia has access to as many as six air bases in the country. 

As Syria attempts to reconstitute its armed forces, it is increasingly turning to Turkey for assistance and training. What remains to be seen is where the Ahmad al-Shara' government will seek to acquire new weapons, including aircraft and air defenses. While it would be preferable to wean the Syrians off Russian equipment, I am not sure Western governments will be willing to supply Damascus with sophisticated weaponry.

"Palestinian Exhaustion" – Thoughts on Hamas and the Trump Plan

In a whirlwind of activity in the Middle East that has resulted in the success of the Trump plan for what appears to be a permanent ceasefire in the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza, one has to wonder about the thought process on the Hamas side that led to the agreement.

The question most of those of us who specialize in the Middle East are asking is, “Why would Hamas agree to give up what is their ace-in-the-hole during the entire two year confrontation, the Israeli hostages*?”

 The hostages were all that was preventing the Israelis from going what we Christians would call “Old Testament” on Hamas. If they had not had these “detainees,” I believe that the Israel Defense Forces would have laid waste to the entire Gaza Strip.

For those not familiar with the geography, the Gaza Strip is about 25 miles long and seven miles wide, home to about 2.3 million people. We do not have good number on how many of them support Hamas, but at one point, 70 percent of Gazans supported the attacks of October 7, 2023.

That has since declined as the IDF has turned the area into the rubble that resembles Dresden in 1945, but the remaining level of support for the group that is responsible for creating one the greatest humanitarian crises in modern times is astounding.

Let’s go back to the agreement between Hamas and Israel. I understand the pressure applied on Israel by President Donald Trump and other world leaders. What I remain curious about is the pressure applied on Hamas – and it was there – from Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey. I believe that it was the pressure from Turkey that may have carried the day.

It is no secret that Turkish President is an avowed Islamist, a behind-the-scenes supporter of both Hamas and the Islamic State – after all, how did all those ISIS fighters get into Syria and Iraq? I have spent a lot of time on both sides of the border between Turkey and Syria. It is a serious border, especially on the Turkish side, complete with fencing, lighting, guard towers, and minefields. ISIS fighters crossing from Turkey into Syria had to have assistance – either bribery, government collusion, or both.

As is the case with many countries in the Arab and Muslim worlds, Turkey has been a political and diplomatic supporter of Hamas. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has defined Hamas as liberation movement.  Even after the October 7, 2023 massacre, he was quoted as saying, “Hamas is not a terrorist organization, it is a group of mujahidin (holy warriors) defending their lands.”

Why was Turkey at the talks?

My take on this is that most of the Arab and Muslim world, and now likely including Turkey, is suffering from “Palestinian Exhaustion.” In other words, they are tired of the Palestinians in general, and Hamas in particular. Even countries that had previously supported the Palestinians — some even condoning the violence of October 7 — have watched for two years as Israel destroyed virtually the entire infrastructure of the Gaza Strip, with no indication that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu intended to stop before Hamas was completely eradicated.

I suspect that the leadership of Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey informed what is left of the leadership of Hamas that it was time to stop the fighting. At last count, according to the Palestinian Ministry of Health, the death toll in Gaza is over 67,000 with almost 170,000 injured, and as many as 11,000 missing (believed to be under the rubble). Hamas has lost most of its senior leadership inside and outside of the Gaza Strip, civilian casualties continue to mount, and there was no possible path to any sort of meaningful victory.

The Trump plan, among other things, calls for the immediate return of the 48 hostages (only 20 of whom are thought to be alive), phased withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Strip, and the disarming of Hamas. Hamas is still refusing to disarm.

I am surprised that Hamas has agreed to release the remaining hostages in the first phase. While the Israelis have begun the initial phase of their withdrawal, they are still in Gaza with overwhelming military force. Once the hostages are released, Hamas’s leverage is gone. It was their sole bargaining chip. Hamas will now have to rely on whatever security guarantees were made by the negotiating parties in Sharm al-Shaykh.

Hamas realistically had no choice. Support for Hamas in the Arab and Muslim world was declining, the Israelis were relentlessly pursuing Hamas members in the last bastion of Gaza City, and even the hard-core could see that it was only a matter of time before they would be all killed or captured.

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* When the international press referred to the Israelis taken on October 7 as “hostages” – the Arabic word is (رهائن – raha’in), most of the Arabic media was offended. They refer to those taken as “detainees” (محتجزين – muhtajazin), which must be some lesser category. When I was the interpreter for the U.S.-Iraqi talks at the end of Desert Storm, this was the agreed-upon word for Kuwaiti prisoners. The Iraqis had referred to them as “guests”( ضيوف – dhiyuf) until I officially objected.

Miniseries Review: "Rise of Empires: Ottoman – Mehmed vs Vlad" (Netflix - 2022)

 

The second season* of this docudrama about the Ottoman Empire focuses on the rivalry/enmity between Sultan Mehmed II** and Vlad III Dracula (also known as Vlad the Impaler), the Voivode of Wallachia, a vassal state under the Ottomans.

The two leaders had a complicated relationship spanning two decades. In 1442, when Vlad was only 12, he and younger brother Radu were sent to the court of Ottoman Sultan Murad II (Mehmed’s father and predecessor) as collateral to assure the sultan that their father – Vlad II, then Voivode – would support Ottoman policies. It was here that Vlad learned to speak fluent Turkish and studied Ottoman culture, including its military strategies and tactics. It was also the time in which he was exposed to Mehmed, who was just two years his junior.

Vlad was released in 1448 after the assassination of his father and elder brother. Although he was able to replace his father, his reign lasted only two month. It was not until 1452 that he was able to reclaim the voivodate.

At this time, Wallachia was required to pay tribute to the Sultan. In return, the Ottomans stayed out of Wallachia’s internal affairs. It was a beneficial arrangement for both sides – Vlad had a throne, and Wallachia served as a buffer to the Kingdom of Hungary, which Mehmed, who had acceded to the sultanate after the death of Murad II, regarded as a threat.

After the fall of Constantinople in 1453, the victorious 21-year old Mehmed set his sights on expanding the Empire further into Europe.

Mehmed continued his conquests in Anatolia with its reunification and in Southeast Europe as far west as Bosnia. During this time, Vlad paid the tribute and remained on the Wallachian throne.

In 1459, Vlad stopped paying the tribute to the Sultan, considering a possible alliance with Hungary. Mehmed sent two envoys to remind Vlad of his obligations and to collect the tribute. Vlad ordered them to be impaled — his preferred method of execution. 

This act of diplomatic perfidy was too much for Mehmed – he mobilized an army of as many as 150,000 troops, including the well-disciplined and highly-trained Janissaries,*** to subdue Wallachia and remove Vlad from the throne.

Without spoiling the outcome of the struggle between Mehmed and Vlad, the conflict reached its zenith during the battle for the Wallachian capital city of Târgoviște in 1462.

After the battle, Vlad left a field filled with thousands of impaled victims as a deterrent to the Ottoman forces. He remains a Romanian folk hero for his fight against the far superior Ottoman forces.

I recommend it, but suggest keeping your internet search engine of choice handy to clarify things that might not be well-known to people who do not have a background in Middle East or Central European history. I needed it as well, since I normally begin my presentations about the Middle East with the defeat of the Ottomans in World War One and the breakup of the empire shortly thereafter.

Watch it on Netflix.

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* The first season of this series dealt with Mehmed’s successful conquest of the Eastern Roman Empire capital of Constantinople in 1453, after which it was renamed Istanbul. I reviewed the first season, and highly recommend it.

** Mehmed is the Turkish rendition of Muhammad. His full title was Fatih Sultan Mehmed II (Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror).

*** The Janissary corps was originally manned by Christian youths taken from the Balkan provinces, converted to Islam, and drafted into Ottoman service. Subject to strict rules, including celibacy, the Janissaries were known particularly for their archery, but by the 16th century had also acquired rudimentary firearms.

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Movie Review: The Swimmers (Netflix - 2022)

 

Sometimes you need a story that reminds you of the power and resilience of the human spirit. This movie does that in spades.

By August of 2015, the civil war in Syria had been going on for over four years. Having lived in Syria and covering much of the civil was as a military analyst for CNN, this was of great interest.

The violence was non-stop; irreplaceable antiquities were destroyed as multiple factions began killing each other; a flood of refugees* created a humanitarian disaster and forever changed the character of numerous European cities; our nominal Turkish NATO allies strained the unity of the alliance with senseless interventions focused not on the new threat from the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), but on a generated/perceived threat from the Kurds in northern Syria while turning a blind eye to their almost open borders allowing jihadi terrorists from the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe to join ISIS in Syria; and American air support of the only group – Kurds – willing to take on ISIS.

The situation was so chaotic that a month later, the Russians deployed troops to bolster – and save – the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad, their puppet in Damascus. The Russian intervention was not driven by love for Bashar al-Asad, but to guarantee continued access to a naval base on the Syrian Mediterranean coast at Tartus, and an air base just south of the port city of Latakia.

It was against this backdrop that two teenage sisters, Yusra and Sarah Mardini, decided that the violence in their Damascus suburb of Darayya had gotten so bad that they would try to leave Syria and seek refuge in Europe.

I am very familiar with the Darayya area. When I was posted as the air attaché at the American embassy in Damascus, I lived a mere half of a mile from the area. It is located on the edge of a Syrian air force base which was often the venue of sensitive activities. I took note – the role of an attaché is to observe and report.

Darayya saw massive destruction as the city was initially controlled by opposition groups. Given the sensitive location near the al-Mazzah air base, the regime decided to commit whatever force was necessary to bring it back under control. There was substantial damage to the city, and there were numerous civilian casualties in what became known as the “Darayya massacre.”

These two sisters are not just any teenagers. Both of the girls, especially the younger Yusra, were world class competitive swimmers, and had competed internationally.  Yusra’s goal was to swim in the Olympics. Training at that level during the ongoing civil was impossible, despite being trained by their father, a champion swimmer himself.

I did note that there is almost no mention of the Bashar al-Asad regime in the movie. I am not surprised - the family appears to be proud Syrians, and, the key here, Christian. During the civil war, most Christians sided with the government, fearing the backlash if a more Islamist regime replaced the secular Ba'ath party regime.

I do not want to spoil the flow of the movie. It is an incredible story of the Mardini sisters who finally realized their dreams. I am sure some of it is dramatized, but considering what these girls went through, I can live with it.

Yusra has become a United Nations goodwill ambassador, and Sarah became a volunteer assisting refugees in 2016 on the Greek island of Lesbos, where they arrived in Europe in 2015. Although she was arrested for her activities, she was allowed to post bond and leave Greece. Note to Sarah: Don’t go back.

Sarah and Yusra Mardini

When the movie was released at the Toronto Film Festival, the audience gave a four-minute standing ovation for the two sisters and the two Lebanese actresses (Manal and Nathalie Issa). Well deserved, in my opinion.

It’s a good movie and a great story - watch it on Netflix.

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* I think the correct term is refugee. These people are not going back to Syria. Why would they?

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Turkey may have halted plans to turn former Istanbul church into a mosque

According to a Turkish news outlet (read article here), the Turkish government may be reconsidering the August 2020 decision by self-styled new sultan President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to reconvert the Church of the Holy Savior museum to a mosque. (Read my initial thoughts on that decision - "Sultan" Erdogan converts another museum to a mosque.)

 

The church/museum in the Chora (Kariye) section of Istanbul is considered one of the most beautiful examples of a Byzantine church. In the 16th century, the church was converted into a mosque by the city’s new Ottoman rulers, and it became a secularized museum in 1948. The interior of the building is covered with fine mosaics and frescoes. It is listed as one of the top 30 “must-see museums” in the world. 

The original church was built in the early 5th century to the south of the Golden Horn, and stood outside of the 4th century walls of Constantine the Great; it became incorporated within the city's defenses later that century.

The frescoes and mosaics, plastered over by the Ottomans, are being restored. They are stunning, almost overwhelming. I have seen mosaics in other early Christian Churches throughout the Middle East, but nothing like these.

In August 2020, the government ordered the re-conversion of the museum into a mosque. The move came shortly after a similar decision to re-convert Istanbul’s Hagia Sophia into a mosque from a museum, despite outcries from the international community. That conversion took place and the building is now known as the Ayasofya-i Kebîr Câmi-i Şerifi (Hagia Sophia Holy Grand Mosque).

 

President Erdoğan was scheduled to inaugurate the newly converted mosque last October, but the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), Turkey’s top religious authority, cancelled the event the day before to allow for continued restoration work. 

The church/museum remains closed as the work continues, giving hope that it will remain a museum. Others maintain that the delay is merely a result of the Turks exercising great care when covering the Christian art. 

Let’s hope for the former and not the latter. 

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Movie Review: The Promise (Survival Pictures - 2016)

The Promise is a 2016 film (released in the United States in 2017) that uses a romantic triangle just before and during the Armenian Genocide of 1915. It is a rather interesting concept - the use of the interplay of two men in love with the same woman to focus attention on one of the worst atrocities in modern history. I will let the readers decide if it works.

The three main characters are an Armenian pharmacist who wants to be a doctor, an Armenian woman traveling in the Ottoman Empire with the third character, a journalist reporting on what will later be called World War One.

In order for the pharmacist to pursue a medical degree, he leaves small village in southern Turkey and moves to Constantinople (now called Istanbul). To afford the tuition and expenses in the city, he agrees to marry a girl from his village in return for a generous dowry - I believe this is "the promise."

Once in Istanbul, the triangle develops. At the same time the three are involved in romantic relationships, what is portrayed as a systemic government effort to eradicate the Armenian population in the country begins and continues until the three are miraculously reunited and rescued. It was difficult to believe - no amount of the suspension of disbelief would help.

Of note, almost immediately after The Promise was released, three Turkish film companies released a movie titled The Ottoman Lieutenant. It portrayed the genocide as localized random acts of violence rather than a concerted, government-directed campaign. Read my review of that film.

Neither of the two competing movies did well at the box office. The Ottoman Lieutenant cost over $40 million to make, but grossed just over $400,000 worldwide. The Promise cost almost $100 million - all bankrolled by Armenian-American investor Kirk Kerkorian - and grossed only $12.4 million.

The producers of both films claim the money was not important - the message was. Producers of The Promise have labeled The Ottoman Lieutenant as an attempt to counter their film. I would not be surprised if the Turkish government of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was behind the effort.

Criticisms: The Armenian Genocide was a massive human rights atrocity. It just seems to me to use a romantic triangle is not giving it the gravity it deserves. The counter argument is that it was a way to get people to watch it. It didn't work, obviously.

I don't understand the significance of the title. If it was the agreement for the pharmacist to marry a local girl in exchange for the dowry that was to enable his studies in Constantinople, it really had little to do with the plot.

I was disappointed in the movie and story line, but not the cast. Christian Bale, Charlotte La Bon, Isaac Oscar, and one of my favorite actresses, Shohreh Aghdashloo, gave solid performances, but not even actors of that level could save the script.

Despite that, I do recommend it because of the attention it does draw to the Armenian Genocide. It is available on Netflix.

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Movie Review: The Ottoman Lieutenant (Netflix - 2017)

Initial comment - let's remember that the first rule of fiction, even historical fiction, is the suspension of disbelief. That means as you are watching a movie or reading a book that is not history or a biography, you need to keep telling yourself that this is not true, it's entertainment. However, when you watch a movie set in actual historic events, you expect the author to at least adhere to some aspects of reality.

If you decide to watch The Ottoman Lieutenant, be prepared to engage in a major suspension of disbelief. That said, you may want to watch it. Let me give you some information that will inform your decision. Consider that the movie production cost was about $40 million, but grossed worldwide just over $400,000 (less than $250,000 in the United States).

If you can imagine it, the movie is a Turkish-American romantic story set in the city and environs of Van, in eastern Anatolia (present-day Turkey) in the opening days of World War One. At the time, Van was a city with a majority Armenian and Kurdish population. The Armenians were arming themselves and forming militias, knowing full well that war was coming, and they would likely be caught between the Ottoman and the Russian armies. The Ottoman Empire entered the war on the side of Germany in October 1914.

The love triangle in the movie, which I found to be unlikely, involves an American doctor (Josh Hartnett) working in an American-sponsored hospital in Van, established and run by an older doctor (Ben Kingsley). An American nurse (Hera Hilmar), who met the young doctor while he was in the States on a fundraising trip, decides to bring much-needed medical supplies and a truck to the hospital. A bit far-fetched.

Bringing the supplies to eastern Anatolia requires permission from the Ottoman authorities. Ottoman Army Lieutenant Ismail Veli (Michiel Huisman) is assigned to escort the nurse to the hospital in Van. You see where this is going - young doctor, young nurse, young officer.

As someone whose professional focus has been the Middle East, I find the historical aspects of the lead-up to World War One of interest, and was curious as to how the producers were going to treat the obvious issue: the Armenian genocide that began in 1915.

The disappointing answer: the producers either ignored it or adhered to the official Turkish government position. I should have known how this was likely to be handled since the major investors in the project are Turkish, the production companies are Turkish, and the final cut of the movie was done in Turkey.

The film treats the Armenians as the cause of the problem - blame the victims. In the Turkish view, Ottoman attacks on Armenians were reactions to armed Armenian gangs roaming the countryside raiding travelers and Ottoman villages. The killings of Armenians were part of this violence, unorganized in nature, but in no way an organized government genocide.

After I watched the movie, I did more research and discovered that there is a school of thought that this movie was a response to another movie - The Promise - that depicts the Armenian genocide as just that, an organized attempt to eliminate the Armenians in what is now Turkey. I plan to watch and review it. Where this movie smacks of denial, perhaps The Promise will better address the issue.

It is hard to generate any sympathy for the Turks, given the recent actions of their megalomaniac president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In July of this year, he revoked the museum status of the Hagia Sophia, the sixth century church and later mosque, into a mosque. The Hagia Sophia houses some of the world's greatest Christian art, which will now be recovered. Just last week, he did the same thing to another former church/museum, the Chora Church. (See my article: "Sultan" Erdogan converts another museum to a mosque.)

Add to that, Erdoğan's actions in Syria since 2015 have been unnecessary, unhelpful, and dangerous. It appears to many of us Middle East observers that he is tacitly supporting the Islamists in Syria, much as he facilitated the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria in their earlier years. Think not? How did all of the foreign fighters in Syria actually get to Syria?

Now the self-styled sultan is trying to expand what I call his neo-Ottoman reach to Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean, has established a military base in Qatar. (Read more of my articles on how unhelpful Erdoğan has been.)

If you're a fan of Turkey and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, you may like the movie. Otherwise, save yourself the 106 minutes.

It is available on Netflix.

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"Sultan" Erdogan converts another museum to a mosque

Following the re-conversion of Istanbul's world-famous Hagia Sophia museum to a mosque earlier this year, Turkish President "I want to be the Sultan" Erdogan does the same to the Chora (Kariye) Church Museum, also in Istanbul.

At least I was able to see the fabulous art before they cover it again.

The Church of the Holy Savior in Chora is considered one of the most beautiful examples of a Byzantine church. In the 16th century, the church was converted into a mosque by the Ottoman rulers, and it became a secularized museum in 1948. The interior of the building is covered with fine mosaics and frescoes. It is listed as one of the top 30 “must-see museums” in the world.

The original church was built in the early 5th century to the south of the Golden Horn, and stood outside of the 4th century walls of Constantine the Great; it became incorporated within the city's defenses later that century.

The frescoes and mosaics, plastered over by the Ottomans, are being restored. They are stunning, almost overwhelming. I have seen mosaics in other early Christian Churches throughout the Middle East, but nothing like these.

See my photographs of the art that is about to be lost to the world.

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What does withdrawal of US troops from Iraq mean? - American military expert explains

US Central Command Gen. Frank McKenzie paid an official visit to Baghdad for meeting with Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi on Tuesday. In the meeting, Gen. McKenzie announced a possible reduction of US troops in Iraq. Apart from this US withdrawal of Germany was announced previous months this year. Withdrawal or shifting military troops caused a great interest among experts and media. 

In order to find the answers about the US moves, Eurasia Diary took the opinions of military expert Rick Francona.

Rick Francona is an author, commentator and media military analyst. He is a retired United States Air Force intelligence officer with experience in the Middle East, including tours of duty with the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency. 

Q. Why does the US withdraw troops from Iraq and Germany? Does it mean Iran and Russia are not threats to the US like they were before? 

A. Let me address Germany—and Europe—first. The press release from the Department of Defense said the removal of troops from Germany will “enhance Russian deterrence, strengthen NATO, reassure Allies, improve strategic U.S. flexibility....” 

 The repositioning—not necessarily withdrawal—of American forces is long overdue. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, there has been no real need to maintain that much force presence in Germany. However, I am not advocating we return them to the United States. With the growing threat from Russia and the expansion of NATO to the east, I would hope that the United States is going to move the forces forward to either Poland or Romania or both. 

 Move the troops closer to where they will be needed, send a message to the Russians that we’re there to support/strengthen NATO while bringing the families and the accompanying unnecessary support infrastructure home. If we are going to have forces deployed opposite the Russians, keep them lean and mean—more tooth, less tail. 

As for Iraq, American troops returned to Iraq for one reason, to assist the Iraqis in their fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Remember, after what I believe was the premature withdrawal of US forces from Iraq by President Obama in 2011, the Iraqi Army was basically hollowed out by corruption, mismanagement, and a lack of leadership epitomized by the disastrous government of Nuri al-Maliki. That army collapsed as ISIS took the city of Mosul in 2014.

As ISIS continued to move south towards Baghdad and expand its territorial holdings in the country, it was clear that Iraqi security forces were incapable of stopping the group without external assistance. That assistance came in the form of a small US ground presence supported by massive amounts of coalition airpower. 

Unfortunately, al-Maliki also requested, and received, support from Iran, in the form of a series of Public Mobilization Units (hashed)—Iraqi Shi’a militias trained and armed (and I maintain, led) by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The hand of IRGC-Qods Force commander Qassem Solimani was readily apparent. 

With the increase in the capabilities of the US-revitalized Iraqi security forces (police, counterterrorism units, and military), a continued presence of American forces in the presence of an Iranian-dominated Iraqi government, has become no longer viable. Most Arab Iraqis don’t want a continued US presence, and there is little stomach in the United States for keeping troops there. Yes, Iran remains a regional threat to American interests in the region, but it will have to be addressed in other ways. The US does not need forces in Iraq to maintain freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf. 

Q. We observe that the Middle East has become a Russian-Turkish battlefield. Does the US think it is better to withdraw and let two powers weaken each other? 

A. We now have Russia and Turkey involved in two proxy wars in the region: Syria and Libya. While we have serious issues with Turkish “adventurism” on the part of President Erdoğan in both theaters, the bottom line remains: Russia presents a threat to the United States across a variety of fronts; Turkey is a key NATO ally. 

That said, Turkey has been singularly unhelpful in the US-led coalition fight against ISIS since the beginning of the effort in 2014. Erdoğan’s efforts were more focused on anti-Kurdish operations in Syria than on defeating ISIS – it was as if that the Turkish leader was supporting ISIS at the expense of the Kurds. Virtually all of Turkey’s incursions into north and northwest Syria did nothing to promote the defeat of ISIS, only to create what appears to be a semi-permanent Turkish and Turkish-backed Islamist presence in the country. 

Are we looking at the reintroduction of the Ottomans? Hardly, just a quagmire/standoff between Erdoğan and Putin, at the expense of the Syrian population caught in the crossfire. 

Libya is no better. While Turkish intervention has turned the tide of the fighting in favor of the GNA over the LNA, nothing seems to have been resolved. You have the Turkish-supported GNA on one side against the Russian-backed, Haftar-led LNA, which is now also supported by US allies Egypt and the UAE. Add what now appears to be Syrian government support to the LNA, while Turkey deploys Syrian mercenaries to fight for the GNA. 

This is a recipe for escalation. Elsewhere in the region, Erdoğan has acquired a military base in Qatar. This is more unnecessary and unhelpful Ottoman adventurism from “Sultan Recep.” He should focus on cleaning up his current debacles before creating a third. 

Q. The FBI director says China is a threat to US security. Can we expect the US will shift troops from these areas to Asia-Pacific? 

A. China is emerging as the key long-term future threat to US security, likely to surpass the Russians in the not-too-distant future. Although President Trump has slowed down the Obama “pivot to Asia,” the United States will eventually have to increase either its own force structure in the region, or alternately enter into a broad multinational alliance with countries like Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam, even India, and Australia to confront growing Chinese power and its seemingly willingness to use it. 

Chinese handling of the coronavirus has cost them some goodwill. The US and its allies should capitalize on Chinese malign behavior directed at the rest of the world and attempt to isolate Beijing to make them pay a price for unleashing—wittingly or unwittingly (although many believe it was the former)—the virus on the rest of the world. 

Interviewer: Ulvi Ahmedli

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Miniseries Review: "Caliphate" (Netflix - 2020)

The Netflix series Caliphate is centered around an operation by the Swedish Security Service (Säkerhetspolisen, SÄPO) to uncover and hopefully disrupt a coordinated terrorist attack being planned by members of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The targets are in Sweden; the planning is being done mostly in al-Raqqah, Syria.

Obviously set in either 2016 or 2017 before the anti-ISIS coalition assault on ISIS's self-proclaimed capital, the story tends to validate U.S. and most coalition partner fears that attacks against the West were actively being planned in al-Raqqah. It was this assessment that drove the timeline for the coalition's decision to use the Syrian Democratic Forces to lead the assault on al-Raqqah over strident (not to mention unhelpful, unnecessary, and counterproductive) Turkish objections over using the SDF to liberate al-Raqqah.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan objected to the mere existence of the SDF because its key component was the Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units, known more commonly by the initials YPG. The Turks regard the YPG as nothing more than an extension of the Turkish Kurdish separatist group People's Workers' Party, or PKK.

The United States and some of its allies have designated the PKK as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), mostly as a courtesy to a fellow, albeit nominal, NATO ally. I have been vocal in my criticism of Turkey and Erdoğan and their disastrous policies in Syria and half-hearted fight against ISIS. See my latest on this subject, Syria and Turkey - the NATO realities.

In the series, the two lead characters are a SÄPO case officer (they use the term handler) named Fatima Zukić in Stockholm and a Turkish-Swede ISIS bride named Pervin trapped in al-Raqqah. Fatima is herself a Bosnian-born Muslim, although that facet of her character is only marginally explored.

The story is about the attack plot and Fatima's handling of Pervin, but it also touches on the tension between Sweden's ethnic Scandinavians and the Muslims who have resettled there from Iraq, Syria, Bosnia, etc. There is also a sizable Kurdish population in the country - all this thanks to Sweden's policy of allowing large numbers of refugees into the country.

Once getting her hands on a contraband cell phone in al-Raqqah, Pervin contacts a former teacher in Stockholm. The teacher contacts Fatima, hoping that the Swedish service can assist the trapped wife and her daughter return to Sweden. Once Fatima and Pervin are in contact, Pervin provides information that her husband's ISIS cell is actively planning a spectacular attack in Sweden. Of course, that sets in motion an intelligence-driven counter-terrorism operation to uncover and stop the attack.

As a case officer, I was intrigued at the thought of running an intelligence operation by phone. Running an asset requires trust and the ability to assess and vet the subject - both are difficult over a phone. Pervin was basically the electronic equivalent of a "walk in," someone who volunteers to become an asset, usually in return for something.

In this case, Pervin wanted to get herself and her daughter out of Syria and back to Sweden. My case officer mind immediately thought - she may be making this up (it's called "fabrication" in the vernacular) to get what she wants. I felt vindicated when Fatima's supervisor said the exact same thing. Walk ins can be the real thing, but mostly they are not.

In covering Pervin's story of coming from Sweden to Syria so her husband could join the fight as a member of ISIS, the series uncovers the deceit, radicalization, and treachery involved in the recruiting of not only fighters for ISIS, but also young women to become ISIS brides.

We do observe the movement of a group of young women to Syria via the Turkish city of Gaziantep. I've driven almost the entire Syrian-Turkish border (on both sides). It's about a seven-hour drive from Ankara to Gaziantep, which is a fairly nice city - good food, great sights. From Gaziantep, the major hub for moving ISIS fighters and brides into Syria, there are a few ways to go, depending on who controls what parts of northern Syria. I'd probably go further east, then two hours south to the border, then another five hours to al-Raqqah.

It is an arduous trip. As I said, I've been on both sides of that border. I would not attempt to cross it going either direction unless I had "hired a guide." It's heavily guarded, fortified, and in places, mined. I still believe that there was some collusion between ISIS (and other Islamist groups in Syria) and the Turkish government to let the crossings happen, if not actually facilitating them - that is just my opinion.

Without spoiling the story, there were some facets that strained the necessary "suspension of disbelief" required in most fictional accounts. In some places, there is too much coincidence, and of course, since it's fiction, everything falls nicely into place. In the real world of intelligence, it usually doesn't work that way. There is a lot more guesswork and estimation - we like to call it "analysis."

There was one phrase that sticks with me. One of the ISIS recruiters described al-Raqqah to potential recruits as "a magical place." I've been to al-Raqqah - it was okay before the war, right on the Euphrates River, but I have never heard it described as magical. Imagine it under ISIS rule.

Watch it, enjoy it. It is well written and well produced. With only a few minor glitches in the Arabic translations, it's solid entertainment.

There is to be a Season 2, to be released in early 2021. You can watch Season 1 here.

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Russian airstrike on Turkish troops in Syria - predictable and avoidable. Now what?

Turkish military convoy in northwestern Syria

An airstrike by Russian Air Force fighter-bombers on a Turkish supply convoy in Syria's Idlib governorate on February 27 resulted in the deaths of 33 Turkish troops, and the wounding of at least 30 others. This represents a major escalation in the confrontation between Russian forces supporting Syrian troops attempting to re-establish Syrian government control over the area held by primarily Islamist opposition forces - those forces are backed by Turkey. In recent weeks, Turkish support has escalated from logistics and supplies to air, artillery, and special operations forces support.

I will leave the blow-by-blow coverage of the actual operation to the media. Suffice it to say, the Russian Air Force has determined that it will no longer tolerate Turkish or Turkish-backed opposition groups firing man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) at their aircraft operating in support of Syrian troops. There has been a marked increase in the use of these systems, forcing Russian pilots to alter their tactics, to include the use of flares and other countermeasures, and flying at higher altitudes.

Although there have been tensions between the Russians and Turks in the past in northwestern Syria, including the shootdown of a Russian SU-24 fighter-bomber in November 2015, and smaller exchanges of artillery fire between Syrian and proxy forces and the Turks and Turkish-backed forces in the past, this airstrike is a major escalation of tensions that have been brewing for years.

The obvious questions - why are the Turks and Russians in Syria?

The short answers: the Russians have been in Syria since September 2015 when it became obvious to Moscow that the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Asad was incapable of surviving the threats posed by either the forces of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or the various opposition groups, including al-Qa'idah affiliated or other Islamist groups supported by the government of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Were the Russians "true believers" in the Ba'ath Party ideology of the Syrian regime? No - the Russians were there for much more pragmatic reasons. Russian President Vladimir Putin has decided to reassert Russian influence in the Middle East, influence that had been lacking since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The obvious choice of venue was Syria - the country was wracked by civil war, and in need of help beyond that offered by the bevy of Iranian-supported militias from Lebanon, Iraq, and even Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The prize for the Russians? Re-entry to the Mediterranean in the form of access to Syrain military facilities - Humaymim (often incorrectly rendered as Khmeimim) air base on the northwest coast near the port city of Latakia, and the former Soviet naval facility at the port of Tartus. Putin was able to secure renewable 49-year leases on both facilities, creating a permanent Russian presence in the eastern Mediterranean.

The Russians claim they deployed military forces to Syria to combat ISIS, but their actions showed they they were there for one reason - the survival of the al-Asad regime. The vast majority of the airstrikes and operations were focused on opposition forces, not ISIS.

The Russian vision of a permanent presence in the eastern Mediterranean depends on a government in Syria that the Russians can influence, if not outright control. Watching how Putin treats al-Asad in both Syria and Russia lend me to believe it is the latter, not the former. When the civil war eventually ends, the key power broker in Syria will be the Russians and Vladimir Putin.

Why are the Turks in Syria? That is a really good question, for which there are plenty of answers, just not good ones.

The Turks became nominal members of the US-led coalition formed to defeat ISIS, but were never really committed to the fight. It took years before Erdoğan allowed the coalition to fully use the Incirlik air base just north of Syria to conduct offensive operations against ISIS. It was not until ISIS launched lethal attacks inside Turkey that the Turks relented.

Two curious things here - it was always suspected that the Turks were supporters of many of the Islamist groups that were part of the anti-al-Asad alliance under the banner of the Free Syrian Army. That support at times probably included ISIS. Of course, the primary route for the thousands of Middle Eastern and European jihadis that came to Syria to fight for ISIS came via Turkey. I have spent a lot of time on both sides of the Syrian-Turkish border - I would never attempt to cross the mined, fenced, and heavily-guarded frontier without the acquiescence or support of Turkish officials.

Turkey's role in the coalition continued to be obstructionist and unhelpful. As the US-led coalition armed and trained the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to be the "boots on the ground" to fight ISIS, the Turks vehemently objected to the presence of the Kurdish fighters known as the YPG, believing them to be nothing more than an extension of the Turkish PKK separatist group, a designated terrorist group. As the coalition began the fight against ISIS, the Turks often obstructed SDF movements, even to the point of armed confrontation. Despite this, the SDF was successful, pushing ISIS back to its self-proclaimed capital of al-Raqqah.

As part of Turkey's "contribution" to the anti-ISIS effort, it invaded northern Syria in two operations and two locations. Operation Euphrates Shield moved into the are northeast of Aleppo, mostly in support of the Islamist and opposition elements which had relocated there following successful Syrian (albeit Russian and Iranian backed) military operations as the Syrians began to retake those areas that had previously fallen to the opposition.

Operation Olive Branch moved against Kurdish elements in the 'Afrin area of northwest Syria. As in Euphrates Shield, much of the fighting was done by Turkish proxy forces.

At this point, Erdoğan demanded that the coalition allow Turkish troops to liberate al-Raqqah. This was a ridiculous demand - Turkish troops were over 100 miles from al-Raqqah. To liberate al-Raqqah would have required the Turks to traverse SDF-controlled territory, something the Kurds in the coalition found unacceptable, given Turkey's recent obstruction of the fight against ISIS.

After the successful SDF liberation of al-Raqqah and the almost complete expulsion of ISIS fighters from Syria, Erdoğan then demanded that the coalition agree to a "security zone" almost 20 miles deep all along the Syrian border with Turkey. To the Turks, security zone is a euphemism for a Kurdish-free zone. Inexplicably, the United States went along with Erdoğan's petulance and basically created a small security zone in previously Arab areas along the border.

As the Syrian government continued to recover more of its territory, opposition elements were removed to opposition-controlled areas, culminating in the creation of a large enclave of the remaining Islamist and opposition groups in Idlib governorate, setting up the final battle between these elements and the Syrian regime.

Fearing that his allies were about to be soundly defeated, Erdoğan moved Turkish troops into Idlib, ostensibly to provide safe areas to prevent civilian casualties. In my opinion, Turkey's commitment to prevent civilian casualties in Idlib was about as sincere as Russian efforts to combat ISIS.

Although there was a face-saving agreement - the Astana agreement - between the Turks and the Russians to legitimize the presence of Turkish "observation posts" in Idlib, this was merely setting up the inevitable clash between the the foreign powers.

The battle of Idlib is in full swing. Backed by overwhelming Russian airpower, the Syrians are steadily progressing against the Turkish-backed militias. The Turks have responded by providing weapons and fire support to the Islamist and opposition groups, striking not only Iranian-backed militias, but Syrian regime forces as well. Of course, as is the nature of combat, the fighting has spilled over, directly involving the Turks and Russians.

Now we have the Russians and Turks engaging each other. Despite the claims by the Russians that since the Turks have provided armored vehicles and other weapons to the opposition, it is impossible for them to distinguish between the Turkish-supported groups and the Turks themselves. I don't get the impressions the Russians really care.

Now we come to nascent East-West crisis brewing in northern Syria.

Now that Erdoğan's Ottoman revanchism has backed Turkey into a corner in which it is suffering serious casualties - which will not play well at home - the Turkish leader wants to play the NATO card. He wants to rely on the alliance he has basically turned his back on over the last year to bail him out.

Ironically, his first request was to the United States to deploy Patriot air defense systems to Turkey to defend his forces and facilities from potential Russian or Syrian attacks. This is the same system he refused to buy in favor of the Russian S-400. This move resulted in the United States removing Turkey from the F-35 fifth generation stealth fighter program. It appeared that Turkey was drifting more towards the Russians to replace aging Turkish military equipment.

The NATO charter has two articles that might apply here - Article 4 and Article 5. Article 4 can be invoked by any member state "whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened." This has happened numerous times in the past, including several requests from Turkey. It does not trigger a NATO military response.

Article 5 is the key to the alliance. The key passage: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all...." What has happened does not meet the threshold of Article 5 - the Russians or Syrians would have to launch an attack on Turkish territory. The Russians are well aware of the NATO charter and Article 5 - they have lived with it for decades. Conversely, if the Turks launch attacks on Russian forces in Syria from Turkish soil, will this trigger a Russian response against targets in Turkey?

This is where Erdoğan's adventurism, always dangerous and unnecessary, risks expanding the crisis in Syria into an East-West confrontation neither side wants or needs.

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Miniseries Review: "Rise of Empires: Ottoman" (Netflix - 2020)

Netflix poster for Rise of Empires: Ottoman

The year was 1453, almost 40 years before the initial Christopher Columbus voyage to the new world. The Ottoman Empire has a new ruler, Sultan Mehmed* II, who assumed the position in 1451 upon the death of his father, Sultan Murad II.

Sultan Mehmed II (1432-1481), also commonly known as Mehmed the Conqueror (in Turkey, you will see it written as Fatih Sultan Mehmet, and you will see it on a lot of things), was the seventh Ottoman sultan. Technically, he ruled twice, first when he was 12 years of age for two years before his father Murad realized he was not ready and re-assumed the position himself, and again at age 19 when his father died. He remained the sultan until his death in May 1481.

This six-episode (4.5 hours) docudrama series begins with the death of Murad II and the uneasy transition of power to Mehmed II. Through a series of flashbacks, we learn about Mehmed's youth and formative years, and the attachments with his step-mother Mara Branković- a Serbian princess admitted to his father's harem - and Grand Vizier Çandarlı Halil Pasha, who also served Mehmed II until his execution on the orders of the sultan following the fall of Constantinople. These two people were very influential in Mehmed's early life.

As Mehmed assumed and consolidated power, he remained focused on his childhood dream of seizing the city of Constantinople, the seat of the Byzantine Empire (also called the Eastern Roman Empire or Byzantium). At the time of Mehmed's assumption of power, Constantinople was ruled by Emperor Constantine XI.

The sultan was also concerned with the presence of the city of Galata, located north of Constantinople on the opposite side of the Golden Horn. Galata was a colony of the Republic of Genoa.

Mehmed believed that these lands properly belonged to the Ottoman Empire. For the most part, it appears Mehmed was willing to allow the Greek Orthodox and Roman Catholic Christians to live in the areas, but under the auspices of the Ottoman sultan.

Most people believe the Ottomans approached and assaulted Constantinople (located in Thrakia, on the European side) from Anatolia, on the Asian side of the Bosphorus. Actually, the capital of the Ottoman Empire was also on the European side, in Edirne. Edirne is located 150 miles northwest of what is now Istanbul, in present-day Turkey - the producers could have been a bit clearer on the geography and included more maps.

If you were not familiar with the history, you would come away with the impression that the seige was launched from Anatolia, across the Bosphorus, then southwest along the shore. While the Ottomans did build a fortress (Rumelihisarı, which has been restored and a tourist attraction today) in 1451 on the strait to block Christian reinforcements coming from the Black Sea towards Constantinople, the action took place almost exclusively on the European side.

Since there are four and a half hours, the series was able to devote sufficient time to discuss the military aspects of the campaign. One of the interesting topics that covered included the use of large-caliber artillery to attack fortifications. The walls of Constantinople were reputed to be among the strongest in the world - construction started in the 4th Century, and improvement were continuous.

A Hungarian engineer named Orban offered his cannon-making skills first to Emperor Constantine, and when the emperor declined because of the expense, to Sultan Mehmed. Mehmed funded the construction of a huge cannon that required 60 oxen to move. I suspect that when Constantine watched the walls of the city being reduced to rubble, he second guessed that fateful decision.

On the other side, the series documented the fighting skills of the Genoese mercenaries hired by Constantine to defend the city. Although they extracted a price from the Ottomans - and there were times the battle could have gone either way - in the end, the overwhelming numbers and some daring decisions on the part of Sultan Mehmed led to an Ottoman victory.

Those decisions included the use of Serbian miners to tunnel under the walls in an effort to weaken them, the use of a naval blockade to prevent Genoese reinforcements and resupply (they got through), and transporting dozens of Ottoman navy ships overland to circumvent the iron chain blockade of the entrance to the Golden Horn. Attrition and treachery from the Galatans gave the Ottomans the upper hand.

The only hope for the besieged city would be the arrival of the Venetian fleet, which never came. The Ottomans launched the final assault on the city, and took it, on May 29, 1453.

The city became the empire's fourth and final capital, lasting until the end of the abolition of the Ottoman Sultanate (which had existed since 1299) on November 1, 1922. On November 11 of that year, Ankara was named as the capital of the new Republic of Turkey. At the same time, the name of Constantinople was officially changed to Istanbul.

For anyone who has visited Istanbul, this docudrama is a fascinating history - the graphics are well-done and are easily recognizable to what the city looks like today. The mix of reenactment and scholarly comment is well-done. A few years ago, I was able to walk the walls and venues of much of the fighting of the final battles in Istanbul - this series puts it into great perspective. I wish I had been able to watch this before walking the terrain; it would have been more understandable.

I highly recommend it, but suggest keeping your internet search engine of choice handy to clarify things that might not be well-known to people who do not have a background in Middle East history.

Here is the link to the Netflix series.

___________
* Mehmed is the Turkish rendition of Muhammad.

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Erdoğan demands the United States extradite Syrian Kurdish leader to Turkey

In what can only be described as delusional arrogance, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan asked the United States to extradite Syrian Kurdish leader Mazlum Abdi to Turkey, claiming the commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is a terrorist wanted by Turkey and the subject of an Interpol red notice.

Someone might want to tell the self-styled sultan just what an an Interpol red notice is. It is merely a request from the issuing country for assistance from other countries to find a wanted person - it is not an arrest warrant. According to the Department of Justice manual, red notices do not meet our probable cause standard. No country is legally obligated detain somebody based on a red notice - each member determines what legal status to give a red notice. I hope President Trump gives this red notice the respect it deserves - none.

The SDF is composed a variety of Syrian groups unified in the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) - the majority of SDF fighters are members of the People's Protection Units, more commonly known by the Kurdish initials YPG.

The Turks believe the YPG is nothing more than an extension of the Turkish Kurd separatist - and designated terrorist - organization. There is debate on whether or not that is true - personally, I believe there are PKK sympathizers in the YPG, but not actual PKK members.

That was not always the case. In past years, former Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad, father of the current president, allowed the PKK to establish safe havens inside Syria along the Turkish border. Hafiz's motive was not about supporting the PKK, but serving his own interests.

As the Turks built and filled the then-largest dam in the world on the Euphrates River, it reduced the flow of water into Syria. Hafiz allowed the PKK to lauch cross-border raids into Turkey to pressure Ankara into a higher rate of water flow.

It worked, and using the PKK to pressure Turkey on other issues became a foreign policy tool for Damascus. That said, I cannot find any evidence of an attack inside Turkey mounted by the Syrian Kurdish YPG. Their fight is not against the anti-Kurd government in Ankara, but against the anti-Kurd government in Damascus.

Ironically, the YPG is now working with that very Syrian government to resist the unnecessary and unjustified Turkish incursion into northeastern Syria, the Kurdish area of Syria.

Now Erdoğan wants the United States to extradite its ally, the leader that led the fight against ISIS, to Turkey, who arguably has blood on its hands for its unwillingness to staunch the flow of jihadist fighters flowing through Turkey from Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East into Syria and Iraq. It was not until ISIS mounted attacks in Turkey that Erdoğan took any action against the terrorist group.

It gets better - when the Turks decided they were going to engage ISIS, or at least claimed that they were going to engage ISIS in Syria, what we saw then is what we are seeing now. The Turks, in two military incursions into northern Syria, proceeded to fight the Kurds, which, of course, they identified as terrorists. Despite our admonitions that the SDF/YPG were allies in the fight against the actual enemy, the Turks insisted on attacking the YPG.

For my earlier thoughts on the recent American and Turkish actions in northern Syria, see:
- Trump, Turkey, and the Kurds - a study in perfidy
- Syria and Turkey - the NATO realities

Yesterday, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu demanded that American officials refuse to meet with General Abdi. "Our allies' dialogue with a terrorist wanted with a red notice is unacceptable."

Two comments about Çavuşoğlu's tone-deaf remarks. First, I will risk the pun and label the Turkish claims as "trumped up charges."

Second, the Turks really need to think about the term "our allies." If they want to remain NATO allies, they need to start acting like NATO allies. They haven't done that since before 2003. Their recent actions take them closer to the Russians than to NATO and Europe. Of course, that may be what Erdoğan has in mind - re-establish the Ottoman Empire, focusing on Asia.

This is the National Oath map that is displayed in Erdoğan's office - looks fairly obvious to me.

Today, highly-regarded Swiss jurist Carla del Ponte stated that Turkey’s intervention in northern Syria had broken international law. Del Ponte is a former Swiss attorney general who prosecuted war crimes in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia, and a former member of the U.N. Commission of Inquiry on Syria.

Del Ponte: "For Erdogan to be able to invade Syrian territory to destroy the Kurds is unbelievable. An investigation should be opened into him and he should be charged with war crimes."

Here's a thought: why doesn't Switzerland - Ambassador del Ponte surely has influence - issue an Interpol red notice on Turkey's Ottoman-revivalist President Erdoğan? We can detain him next month pursuant to the red notice request and extradite him to Switzerland for trial.

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Syria and Turkey - the NATO realities

Turkish troops in northern Syria - unnecessary and  unhelpful

The situation in northern Syria is in complete disarray, and changing by the hour. If you could take a snapshot of what is going on, it would have all the makings of confusing international geopolitical suspense movie.

Just a few days ago, the United States and its in-name-only NATO ally Turkey had arrived at an uneasy status quo in which military forces of the two countries were conducting combined patrols along the Syrian-Turkish border. The patrols were in essence a confidence-building measure by which the U.S.-allied, trained, and equipped Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) attempted to convince the Turks that they were not a terrorist organization, and that they posed no territorial (or other) threat to Turkey. The Turks were gathering intelligence on the best attack axes.

The SDF is composed of mostly Syrian Kurds from the militia known as the People's Protection Unit - known more commonly by the Kurdish initials YPG - along with some Arab, Assyrian/Syriac, Armenian, and other militias. Turkish press accounts aside, these fighters were the key ground combat unit that removed the scourge of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) from its territorial holdings in the country.

Why was this a problem? We have a U.S.-led coalition conducting an effective air campaign in support of an indigenous - Syrians all - on the ground. The SDF did the bulk of the fighting against ISIS, at the cost of over 10,000 killed in the fighting. This combination of forces required the presence of less that 1,000 American troops on the ground in Syria.

This was an effective use of American air power and special operations forces to leverage local militias - this is right out of the textbook taught at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg.

The problem, as far as the Turks are concerned, was the training and equipping of the SDF, or more specifically the YPG, by the United States and its allies - including key NATO allies the United Kingdom and France. Turkey believes that the SDF is an illegitimate organization.

To the Turks, the YPG is nothing more than extension of the Turkish Kurd separatist party known as the Kurdish Workers' Party, or by the Kurdish initials PKK. The PKK has been designated as a terrorist group by Turkey, the United States, European Union (EU), and Japan. The United States and the EU may have made the designation as a favor to their NATO ally.

As the U.S.-led coalition and the SDF successfully pushed ISIS out of city after city, the Turks were sidelined. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan insisted that the liberation of ISIS's capital city of al-Raqqah had to be done by Turkish troops. The only problem was that the YPG was not about to let the anti-Kurd Turks access to their areas of northern Syria. When Turkish troops pushed into northern Syria near the city of Manbij, the Kurds fought them to a standstill - they were stuck in place over 100 miles from al-Raqqah.

The SDF was ready to make the assault on al-Raqqah, a city that was crying out for relief from ISIS atrocities. It would have taken the Turks months to get there, having had to fight their way through the U.S.-allied SDF/YPG.

I remember saying at the time that the Turks were going to be a problem after ISIS was defeated. For the Turks, it was not, and is not, about ISIS. It's about the Kurds, specifically the Kurds in neighboring Syria. What better time that during a civil war in Syria to mount a cross border operation and destroy what is perceived to be a threat?

True to form, as soon as the ISIS threat abated, the Turks renewed their threats of a military incursion to "clear the area of terrorists." It was only a matter of time. The presence of a handful of American special operations forces on the border was not going to stop them.

Map and annotations: IHS Markit and the New York Times

President Trump, to my chagrin, was not forceful enough to convince Erdoğan that this was unnecessary and unhelpful, especially since ISIS remained a threat in parts of Syria and Iraq. For some time, Erdoğan had been moving Turkey more toward being an Islamic state rather than the secular republic envisioned and established decades earlier by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Atatürk would hardly recognize what Erdoğan has wrought.

I am not sure if it was by accident, or if someone in the Erdoğan government (I would call it an Islamist regime, but they are technically still a NATO ally) actually understands the reality of NATO politics. Would the United States side with the SDF/YPG against a NATO ally? We all know the answer to that - it's a resounding no.

While we believe we have an obligation to protect the YPG - protect them not only from Turkish troops, but against the marauding, undisciplined, bloodthirsty former al-Qaidah and Free Syrian Army (FSA) rebels now used as proxies by Ankara.

The NATO alliance is almost sacrosanct among the members. Sacrosanct, it appears, except to its sole majority Muslim and Asian member. Turkey may think it's a European country, but it would be the only one that thinks that, given Erdoğan's AKP party moves toward Islamism.

Why is Turkey so important to the United States that it balks at defending the Kurds? A look at the map of the region should be enough.

Turkey is not only the bridge between Asia/East and Europe/West, it also sits astride the Bosporus and Dardanelles, the two narrow waterways that control access between the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea. In practical terms, it is the only sea route from the Russia Navy's ice-free port at Sebastopol (in what many call "occupied Crimea") and the best route to the Russian-leased Syrian port of Tartus.

Unhindered access to the Turkish straits and a route to Tartus (the red line on the map) is strategically and tactically important to Russia. So, Russian intervention in Crimea and Syria within just a few years of each other - coincidence?

So, now the unintended consequences of Turkey's ill-advised incursion into Syria will visit us.

As mentioned, the lead elements of the Turkish assault into northern Syria - after the air and artillery strikes - were not even minimally-disciplined Turkish troops, but former al-Qa'idah, FSA, and other Islamists. These undisciplined thugs ran amok, executing any Kurdish officials they encountered, ransacked homes, and caused unnecessary civilian casualties.

Faced with no U.S.-led coalition support, the SDF, or probably more correctly, the YPG made a deal with Syrian President Bashar al-Asad, yes, the same Bashar al-Asad who on several occasions had ordered the use of chemical weapons on Syrian citizens.

The Kurds, still Syrians, were now faced with a Turkish onslaught with no hope of support from the U.S.-led coalition with whom they had battled ISIS. They requested the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) move forward to fight the Turkish incursion.

What choice did they have? For Kurds in Syria, in Iraq, in Turkey, in Iran - as they say, there are no friends but the mountains. They believed, probably correctly, that they were now on their own.

So now we have the Syrian army entering the fight on the side of, and at the request of, the SDF. What we may see are the national forces of two countries - Turkey and Syria - fighting each other, escalating the fighting from an army on one side and militias on the other, to a battle between two states.

Unfortunately, the way this has unfolded with Turkish President Erdoğan's unnecessary and unhelpful actions against the U.S.-allied SDF, many observers are now siding with the murderous Syrian regime against a NATO ally.

Some history for those who "have not read history and are doomed to repeat it."

- Our involvement with the Kurds in Iraq in 1975 at the behest of the Shah of Iran was about Iran, not them.
- Our involvement with the mujahidin in the 1980s in Afghanistan was about the Soviet Union, not them.
- Our involvement with the Iraqis in 1988 was about Iran, not them.

And as realpolitik goes, our involvement with the SDF/YPG was about ISIS, not them.

Bottom line, whether we like it or not, our relationship with the Kurds was a tactical alliance to defeat ISIS. The NATO/U.S. alliance with Turkey is a strategic alliance about the Russians.

Despite American issues with Turkey's acquisition of the S-400 air defense system from Russia, Ankara's removal from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, its support of Islamist movements, and Erdoğan unwise incursion into Syria, the strategic NATO relationship supercedes any tactical relationship with the YPG.

Vice President Mike Pence and Secretary of Defense Mark Esper have been dispatched to Turkey to discuss the situation. This is an easy one. President Erdoğan, adhere to an immediate ceasefire, let's start a dialogue, and the sanctions on Turkey's economy will continue until that happens.

Yes, Turkey is a strategic partner which NATO needs, but we need to extract a price for this ill-advised course of action. Erdoğan, not our friend, needs to recognize he isn't the new Sultan.

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