October 24, 2021

Movie Review – Official Secrets (2019)


Official Secrets poster

Here we have yet another fact-based movie about an intelligence officer who betrays her country and her oath. Here again, we have yet another whitewash by the entertainment industry who appear to hold these traitors in high esteem.

This is the story of a linguist – Katharine Gun – employed by the highly secretive Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the signals intelligence organization of the United Kingdom, the counterpart of the American National Security Agency (NSA).

Note how the movie is described by Netflix, Rotten Tomatoes, and IMDB.

You see the same mantra repeated over and over to the point that people start believing it. Terms like “whistleblower,” “illegal,” “spy,” and “unlawful” are just incorrect when applied to Katherine Gun and her betrayal. The movie also repeats these falsehoods ad nauseam, also adding the ludicrous charge that the United States was seeking information to blackmail fellow members of the United Nations Security Council.

Katharine Gun is not a whistleblower, which is a specific legal term here in the United States – I am not sure about British law. Here there are specific requirements for someone to qualify for “whistleblower” protection, including how and to whom to report illegal activities. None of those involve leaking highly classified defense or intelligence information to the media – which is exactly what she did.

Nothing that NSA did violates U.S. law – in fact, there are statutory legal protocols that allow for just this activity. Collecting intelligence from foreign communications is what NSA does. If the communications occur in the United States, it requires a warrant from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. None of the countries mentioned in the Koza email enjoy any immunity from surveillance by American intelligence services.


Read the email for yourself. I see no indication of blackmail or anything that would violate U.S. law.


Text of a Top Secret/Comint email claimed to have been sent by Frank Koza of the NSA Regional Threats (RT) office on January 31, 2003. The recipients were officials of NSA’s British counterpart, Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ): 


As you've likely heard by now, the Agency is mounting a surge particularly directed at the UN Security Council (UNSC) members (minus US and GBR of course) for insights as to how to membership is reacting to the on-going debate RE: Iraq, plans to vote on any related resolutions, what related policies/ negotiating positions they may be considering, alliances/ dependencies, etc - the whole gamut of information that could give US policymakers an edge in obtaining results favorable to US goals or to head off surprises. In RT, that means a QRC surge effort to revive/ create efforts against UNSC members Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Bulgaria and Guinea, as well as extra focus on Pakistan UN matters.

We've also asked ALL RT topi's to emphasize and make sure they pay attention to existing non-UNSC member UN-related and domestic comms for anything useful related to the UNSC deliberations/ debates/ votes. We have a lot of special UN-related diplomatic coverage (various UN delegations) from countries not sitting on the UNSC right now that could contribute related perspectives/ insights/ whatever. We recognize that we can't afford to ignore this possible source.

We'd appreciate your support in getting the word to your analysts who might have similar, more in-direct access to valuable information from accesses in your product lines. I suspect that you'll be hearing more along these lines in formal channels - especially as this effort will probably peak (at least for this specific focus) in the middle of next week, following the SecState's presentation to the UNSC.

Thanks for your help.

No one should be surprised that the U.S. and UK intelligence communities collect foreign communications – that is the core mission of both NSA and GCHQ. To imply that this email indicates illegal, illicit, or immoral activity is ludicrous.

As for the movie production itself – it has well-known British actors who are skilled at their craft. That said, I am disappointed that they chose to appear in this anti-American whitewash of treasonous activity. Are they condoning such behavior? It would appear so.

Pass on this one.




October 10, 2021

Movie Review – Snowden (Oliver Stone – 2016)

Against my better judgment, I decided to watch Oliver Stone’s production of the story of the traitor Edward Snowden. I often wonder at Stone’s predilection with anti-American themes, but that is an analysis for another time.

The film contains a mix-mash of intelligence community descriptions and definitions which, let’s say are only vaguely accurate. I could go through the list of inaccuracies, but I’ll give the filmmakers the benefit of the doubt since it is highly unlikely that any of them have ever been inside the operations and training facilities depicted. I only wish the operations spaces at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Agency (NSA) were as nice as these sets.


The workspaces in both agencies – I’ve worked in both – are what I would call “GSA* chic” and usually small, cramped, and filled with equipment and files. The smaller spaces are normal because much of the work being done is not only highly classified, but also compartmented. People working in one area are unlikely to be cleared for operations just ten feet away.


The movie attempts to portray Snowden as an intelligence officer at both agencies, but in reality, he was a communications technician, not an operations officer, and later as a technical contractor. This is obvious from the description of the training facility where Snowden received his training, referred to colloquially as “the Hill.”**


The facility exists, and is where the CIA trains people to become Telecommunications Information Systems Officers (TISO), technicians responsible for maintaining the agency’s communications systems around the world. Having worked with TISOs in many locations, they are competent professionals, but they are not field operations personnel – that training takes place at another CIA facility, commonly referred to as “the Farm.” ** The factitious and amateurish asset recruitment scenarios in which Snowden claims to have participated are comic at best, and obviously not part of the skill set provided in his position. I suspect he was attesting to “pad his CV.”


The program that Snowden seems to have found so egregious has to do with the intelligence community’s access to the meta data of phone calls of American citizens. When I was in the signals intelligence business (when dinosaurs roamed the earth), we referred to this information as “externals” – date, time, numbers connected, duration, etc., as opposed to “internal” information, the actual content of the communication.


What is the difference in how the data is used?


The internal information, the content, is used for intelligence information – that’s easy. It is the use of the externals, the meta data, that is extremely useful in uncovering networks – the term is network analysis – who is talking to whom.


Let’s use a real-world scenario. Although I do not consider the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID) to be an ally, they have been useful at times when their counterterrorism goals coincide with ours. The ISID develops intelligence – or we apprise them – of the presence of an al-Qa’idah operative in Quetta.


ISID officers obtain whatever warrant or authorization necessary (I suspect it is none) to “kick in” the location. One of the most valuable items in the venue will be electronics – cell phones, satellite phone, tablets, computers, hard drives, thumb drives, etc. It is a treasure trove of data.


Let’s focus on the cell phones, although all of the media involved will yield similarly useful data. If this venue, say that al-Qa’idah believed to be a safe house, was occupied and/or used by a known al-Qa’idah operative, wouldn’t you want to know who with whom he has been communicating? That’s a rhetorical question – of course you would. If these contacts were located in the United States, doesn’t that take on a greater sense of urgency? Of course.


The claimed issue (I don’t buy it) for Snowden was the intelligence community’s access to American citizens’ meta data. Granted, the warrants required to access this data, issued via the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) courts, are easy to obtain – but shouldn’t they be? An al-Qa’ida operative in Pakistan is talking to someone in the United States; we need to take a look at that.


Although Stone never developed it fully in the movie, the thought that warrants should be limited to the future – in other words, once we have the phone numbers from the Pakistani ISID – the intelligence community and FBI obtain warrants for future communications. The problem: once these safe houses are raided, al-Qa’idah (or whatever group) closes all the accounts and stops using the devices the now assumed to be compromised. We need to know what has happened in the past.


Recent legislation has limited the intelligence community’s access to that historic information, thanks to the overreaction of Snowden’s treason. Unfortunately, our Congress, both houses but primarily the House, have aided in that limitation. If the intelligence community cannot ascertain who these terrorists were connecting with in the United States, we have less of a chance of preventing a future terrorist event.


My primary issue with the movie, which Stone admits is not a documentary or a historical account but a fictionalized version of reality, is the attempt to portray Snowden as a whistleblower rather than the traitor he chose to become. There is no historical record of Snowden contacting the proper whistleblower channels – supervisors, inspector generals, or members of Congress – before he decided to contact the media.


Snowden is not a whistleblower – he went to the media, who he arranged to meet not in the United States, but Hong Kong. Yes, Hong Kong, now a part of the Peoples Republic of China. After meeting with journalists there and releasing classified data, fled to Moscow – yes, Russia – to evade capture.


Call me skeptical. Edward Snowden, who publicly to international media, released highly classified U.S. national security information, and that – and more – did not end up in the hands of Chinese and Russian intelligence? I did this for a living for almost three decades. Whatever sensitive, classified information he had, they now have. From colleagues in the intelligence community, we may never recover from the losses he caused.


So, my views of Ed’s future? If it was up to me, I would go further than former CIA director and NSA director General Mike Hayden’s (a personal acquaintance) comments that Snowden will die in Moscow. I would cause it – but that’s just me, someone who has lost agents in the field because of traitors like Snowden. If he is allowed to return to the United States, I’d like to have a one-on-one conversation.


Bottom line: Edward Snowden is not a whistleblower, and as Oliver Stone would have you believe, he is not a hero. He is a traitor, weak of character, and easily manipulated. This cinematographic attempt to justify his actions borders on abetting treason.


If you must watch, the film is available on Netflix:



* General Services Administration, the agency of the U.S. government responsible for the outfitting and basic functioning of official facilities. Think “lowest bidder.”


** These facilities exist, but officially not by these nicknames – I have chosen not to identify them. I received my clandestine operations training at the facility referred to as “the Farm.” I am sure anyone doing a Google search will figure out where they are, but my secrecy agreements prevent me from identifying them.


August 15, 2021

The fall of Kabul – who did not see this coming?


A U.S. helicopter flies over Kabul (Rahmat Gul - AP)

Thanks to the Biden Administration’s disastrous handling of the withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan, the world is about to witness another botched evacuation reminiscent of the fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975. Those of us who served in Vietnam will never forget the disturbing images of Huey helicopters evacuating people from the rooftop of the American embassy.


It appears that history is about to repeat itself.


President Biden announced, probably against the advice of his senior military leadership, that the United States would withdraw all of its forces by the end of August. I can’t say that I blame Biden for not listening to the same generals who created the absolute disaster that Afghanistan has become.


Let’s review how we got here. Soon after the al-Qa’idah attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush delivered an ultimatum to the Taliban to surrender ‘Usamah bin Ladin to the United States. The Taliban refused, triggering the U.S. invasion of the country and the removal of the Taliban, to be replaced by the Northern Alliance. The American military began operations to eliminate al-Qa’idah, including bin Ladin.


By early December, the U.S. and its allies (including Northern Alliance, British, and German forces) had forced the remnants of al-Qa’idah to seek shelter from the relentless air attacks in the Tora Bora cave complex near the border with Pakistan. An Afghan militia leader claimed that he had negotiated the surrender of al-Qa’idah, including bin Ladin, and they were working out the “modalities of bin Ladin’s surrender.”


I remember shaking my head in disbelief. Rather than committing U.S. forces to the capture or killing of bin Ladin, we agreed to “outsource” it to an unreliable Afghan warlord. I said to anyone who would listen that there is no way this group of Afghans was going to turn over a fellow Muslim, a fellow warrior, to the United States. It was just not going to happen. President Bush refused to commit U.S. forces to an attack, believing Pakistani lies that they would apprehend bin Ladin if he tried to enter Pakistan.


We all know what happened – this “working out the modalities” was merely a ploy to buy time to allow tribal forces on both sides of the border to spirit bin Ladin into Pakistan, where he remained until U.S. forces tracked him down in Abbottabad, Pakistan on May 2, 2011. The Pakistanis had no idea where he was for almost ten years? I find that hard to believe.


After the end of the Battle of Tora Bora, I maintain that the United States had achieved its major objective of the invasion of Afghanistan – to remove al-Qa’idah from the country. The survivors of the organization who accompanied bin Ladin into Pakistan dispersed to other areas to continue the fight – Iraq, Syria, Yemen, the Maghreb.


So why did the United States feel compelled to remain in Afghanistan, a country that has been known as “the graveyard of empires?” You would think that knowledgeable people in the American intelligence, military, and diplomatic communities would have recognized the folly of committing a large military force to Afghanistan except to oversee the orderly withdrawal of U.S. troops.


For reasons that I cannot fathom, some bright light, probably at the State Department, came up with the idea that we should try to introduce Western-style democracy into this tribal society. This phenomena – starting out to do one thing (removing al-Qai’dah) and morphing into another (nation building) – is called “mission creep.” We Americans excel at it.


The obvious, but faulty, analogy that some will point out is the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe after World War II. There is nothing remotely similar to reintroducing democratic institutions in Europe and creating democracy from nothing in Afghanistan.


Of course, the first step in any of these efforts is to establish security – that usually means more troops. The American military presence continued to grow to combat the threat still posed by the resurgent Taliban. In my view, at that time, the Taliban did not represent a threat to the United States. Al-Qa’idah did, and was dealt with.


Did I want the Taliban to resume control of Afghanistan? No. Did I think that the continued presence of American and allied troops would prevent it? No. I thought the presence of foreign troops would only be able to postpone the Taliban’s return to power, but in the end not prevent it. Why didn’t our supposedly bright military leaders tell the President(s) that? If you can’t win a war, don’t fight it.


As we have seen time and time again, a smaller, committed force can outlast a superpower and defeat the incompetent indigenous forces supposedly trained and equipped by their sponsors. The Afghan army was never a capable fighting force, despite the huge expenditure of American and allied resources and massive training efforts.

Why not? Because their hearts were not in it. Most of the troops willing to join the Afghan military or security forces were doing it for a paycheck, not a burning desire to keep democracy alive in Afghanistan.


On the other hand, the Taliban fighters are true believers. They will fight to the death to achieve their objective – the reintroduction of an Islamic state in Afghanistan. They also enjoy enough popular support to continue to fight on despite the efforts of the United States and its allies.


It is only the presence of foreign forces that prevent the Taliban from retaking the entire country. With the irresponsible manner of the Biden withdrawal, it is only a matter of time – I give it days – before the Taliban regain control.


In a press conference on July 8th, Biden claimed that a Taliban victory was not inevitable, citing the fact that the Afghan military of 300,000 was among the best equipped in the world, and capable of defeating the 75,000 Taliban fighters. Just two days ago, the Pentagon spokesman claimed that Kabul was not in imminent danger. Clearly, neither one of them has a grasp on the reality of the situation.


My bottom line: We should have left Afghanistan after ‘Usamah bin Ladin was allowed to “escape” to Pakistan in an act of perfidy in 2001, or at the latest in early 2002, and prevented the loss of thousands of lives and trillions of dollars.



June 28, 2021

Film Review: From the Sky (Ian Ebright, 2014)

From the Sky is a short film, only 18 minutes long, but it’s worth the watch. 

The film was released in the spring of 2014, so I am estimating that it was probably filmed in 2013. The producers did this on a small budget, and filmed it in of all places, the state of Washington. It works well enough for what they were trying to accomplish.


The stated premise of the film: A peaceful father (Hakim) and troubled son (‘Abbas) suffering from post traumatic stress disorder traveling through a region that often experiences U.S. drone strikes. 

The two are forced to make difficult decisions when two armed militants (Dhiyah and Samir) visit their camp. 

I watched this film, which is in Arabic with English subtitles. The actors playing the father and the two militants spoke with in a light Levantine dialect and accent, although at times it appeared they were trying to speak unaccented standard Arabic. The actor playing the son spoke the clearest unaccented Arabic, which is probably what they were going for.


I say this because at no time is a location mentioned, no country, city, village, or region.  Given the Levantine accent, one could almost believe that it is supposed to be Syria. That is also underscored by the fact that when Dhiyah and Samir first meet Hakim and ‘Abbas, they greet and are surprised that the father and son speak Arabic. The only place these two things would be likely is Syria, where there is a large Kurdish-speaking minority. Although there are Kurds also in Iraq, Iraqi-accented Arabic is much different than the Levantine accent heard in this film.


The subtitles in English are accurate in the interpretation, although the translations are not exact – I have no problem with interpreting the meaning, not the actual words. That’s what I did in my interpreting assignments.


The problem with the scenario as presented is the date. Assuming the film was made in 2013 or even early 2014, the United States was not using armed drones in either Syria or Iraq – other areas of the region, yes, but not Syria. The first air attacks, by both manned aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles, were on September 23, 2014, six months after this film was released. It was almost as the producers were prescient as to what was going to happen – a bit uncanny, actually.


I remember the initial airstrikes clearly. I was having dinner at Guantanamera, a Cuban restaurant in Manhattan on 8th Avenue just a few blocks from the CNN bureau in Columbus Circle. My phone rang and I was asked to get back to the studio as soon as possible as we were going live with coverage of the strikes. Since I had served as the air attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Damascus in the past, I was the first call they made. Never mind the few beers….


I digress. Without spoiling the film, the interaction between the father and son on one had and the two armed militants is intense and well-done. The son is suffering from an earlier traumatic incident and is susceptible to the not-so-subtle recruitment efforts of Dhiyah, the more charismatic of the two militants.


A comment – there is one drone strike in the film. There is no way that strike would have made it through the rigorous target validation process required for approval to strike. This is just a film, maybe with political overtones.


If I say more, it will give too much away. Watch it – it’s just 18 minutes long, but the film says a lot. Just keep in mind, the producers are probably against drone strikes. I, on the other hand, support them fully.


The Ian Ebright film is available on Amazon, and free to Prime members. Watch it here.

June 24, 2021

Defense Department Linguist Sentenced to 23 Years in Prison


Miriam Taha Thompson

In March 2020, I wrote and analysis of a U.S. Army contract linguist who was arrested for espionage. You can read that article here: Department of Defense Linguist Charged with Espionage – A Spy Story.


This week, that linguist, Miriam Taha Thompson, was sentenced to 23 years in prison for “delivering classified national defense information to aid a foreign government.” The sentence was part of a plea agreement – Thompson admitted that she knew that the Top Secret intelligence information that she was passing to a Lebanese national would be provided to Hizballah, a designated foreign terrorist organization. Given the fact that Thompson is 62 years of age, a 23-year sentence constitutes a virtual life sentence. 


I’m fine with that. She should spend the rest of her life in prison. When I wrote the article last year, we knew from Thompson’s admissions that she not only provided information that included true identities of eight human intelligence sources, she activity advised her Lebanese lover/case officer on how to collect more information on the sources.


What we did not know a year ago is that the operation in which she willingly participated was an Iranian intelligence operation focused on determining the American intelligence sources who made the assassinations of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Qods Force commander Qasem Suleimani  and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the founder of the notorious Iranian-backed and controlled Iraqi Shi’a militia Kata’ib Hezbollah. Both men were killed in an American drone strike on January 3, 2020 just outside the Baghdad International Airport.


The killing of Suleimani and al-Muhandis was made possible by an excellent U.S. intelligence operation. Likewise, the Iranian-Hizballah operation to ferret out the Americans’ human sources was also effective. Unfortunately, it is spy versus spy.


According to the Department of Justice announcement, in 2017, she started communicating a Lebanese national (an unindicted co-conspirator), with whom she entered into a romantic relationship. She was aware that he had ties to Lebanese Hizballah.


In December 2019, while Thompson was assigned to a Special Operations Task Force facility in Iraq, the United States launched a series of airstrikes in Iraq targeting Kata’ib Hezbollah; that effort culminated in the drone strike that killed Soleimani and al-Muhandis.

Following Suleimani’s death in January 2020, her Lebanese case officer began asking Thompson to provide “them” with information about the human assets who had helped the United States to target Suleimani. Thompson admitted that she understood “them” to be senior Lebanese Hizballah officials. It is widely understood that providing anything to HIzballah is the same as providing it to the IRGC.


After receiving this “request for information” – this is actually her tasking – in early January 2020, Thompson began accessing dozens of files concerning human intelligence sources, including true names, personal identification data, background information and photographs of the human assets, as well as reports detailing information the assets provided to the U.S. intelligence community.


By the time she was arrested by the FBI on February 27, 2020, Thompson had provided Hizballah with the identities of at least eight clandestine human assets and a list of at least 10 U.S. targets for future strikes.


She knew what she was doing.


As I said in my earlier article, no matter how naïve Thompson tries to appear, her own words transmitted to her case officer indicate her level of involvement. She warned her case officer that at least four of these U.S. assets were operating in Lebanon, targeting the Amal organization among others, and suggested that the assets’ telephones be tapped. That’s not just providing information, that’s actively participating in an operation of a hostile intelligence service against the United States.


My question for the U.S. intelligence community writ large, and specifically the Special Operations Task Force in Irbil – why was this relatively low-level contract employee capable of gaining access to human source true identification data?


Inexcusable. Someone should be held accountable for that, but will they? Doubtful – they found the spy, so it’s congratulations all around and back to business as usual.

June 15, 2021

NSA leaker Reality Winner released from prison – now what?

That’s not a rhetorical question – I think I have a fairly good idea of what comes next for Reality Winner. She will gain fame and fortune as a darling of the left-wing media.


Winner was arrested in 2017 for the unauthorized release of a Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmentalized Information report produced by the National Security Agency about Russian attempts to interfere in U.S. elections. See my earlier views on this: Reality (is the) Winner - former NSA contractor pleads guilty.


Winner has become the new darling of the left, following in the footsteps of fellow felon Bradley/Chelsea Manning. Many of their supporters believe them to be noble whistleblowers – they’re not. Both are misguided traitors who released highly classified information to the media.


There are avenues for actual whistleblowers to report irregularities and possible illegalities – releasing top secret intelligence documents to the media is not one of those avenues. Winner was caught, and admitted her felonious activity. Her plea agreement allowed her to receive a sentence of just over five years (plus three years of supervised release) instead of the 10 years she could have received.


Winner has been released from prison after just four years and will remain in a halfway house until November, at which time she will begin the three years of supervised release. She is prohibited from public appearances and contact with the media while at the halfway house.


I hope these restrictions continue during the supervisory period as well. If not, I can guarantee you that she will become a media darling, fawned over by the left-wing media and portrayed as a heroine standing up to the government. As I said, she’s not – she’s a convicted felon who betrayed her oath to safeguard intelligence sources and methods.


Winner sought a pardon from President Trump, who declined to interfere. She did the crime, let her do her time. I am not sure how you can request a pardon for a crime you admit you committed.


Now she is seeking the same from President Biden, who just might go along with the cries from the left-wing media to grant her a pardon. I think that would send the wrong signal to the men and women of the armed forces and the intelligence community.


Watch for a book deal….

March 21, 2021

Movie Review: Security Risk (Allied Artists, 1954)

Normally I review movies and series that are based on or about the Middle East. However, I did spend my entire career as a professional intelligence officer – about half the time as a signals intelligence officer and the other half as a clandestine human resources intelligence officer, more commonly referred to as a case officer.


One of my pet peeves is the arbitrary use of the term spy. I was not a spy – I recruited spies, foreign officers and officials who had access to their government’s secret and sensitive information to provide that information clandestinely to U.S. intelligence services. They were the spies – I was an American intelligence officer “running” or “handling” them on behalf of my country. Spies agree to betray their countries for a variety of reasons, some honorable, some not – it depends on which side of the equation you are.


Security Risk is a 1954 film by Allied Artists, directed by Harold Schuster, and written by Jo Pagano and John Rich. The film stars John Ireland, Dorothy Malone, Keith Larsen, Dolores Donlon, John Craven and Susan Cummings. It’s just 69 minutes long, so it does not require a huge investment of your time.

The write-up on several classic movie sites describes this as an American action film. I would call it an espionage drama, but in terms of the genre in 1954, it might also qualify as an action thriller. There is a lot of action packed into just 69 minutes.


The story line: (I will avoid spoiling the film for those of you who plan to watch it.)


In the early 1950’s as the Cold War between the two major post World War II powers – the United States and the Soviet Union – heated up, the Soviets were very interested in knowing what research and development was taking place in the greater Los Angeles area. At that time, southern California was the epicenter of American high-tech defense and aerospace research and development.


The film synopsis describes the scientist who is the focus of a Soviet espionage cell as a nuclear physicist. I never got that from the film – all we are really told is that he was a government researcher and was working on an undefined “formula.” The cell was tasked with acquiring the formula from the scientist.


The venue for the story is the Big Bear ski resort in San Bernardino County. The resort is 100 miles east of Los Angeles, about a three-hour drive in 1954. The scientist, Dr. Lanson (we never hear his first name), decides to take a short respite from his research by going skiing at Big Bear. Obviously, the cell tasked with acquiring his research notes and “the formula” had him under surveillance; at least three members of the cell follow him to the resort.


There is also a support asset in residence at Big Bear, which leads me to believe that the Soviets considered the area a popular area for the defense and aerospace researchers and contractors in the Los Angeles area, and likely similar facilities in Palmdale and Edwards Air Force Base.


As you would expect, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was concerned with the activities of Soviet and other hostile intelligence services – the Bureau is the primary counterintelligence agency in the United States. As such, there is an FBI agent in Big Bear to make sure these hostile intelligence services are kept at bay. You decide whether he is successful.


So as not to spoil the viewing experience for those who wish to watch the movie, I will only say that the Soviet cell at some point in the past recruited Dr. Lanson’s assistant at whatever research facility that employed him. This sets up a series of events that are interesting, and yet a bit implausible. It is the assistant who is tasked by the cell to clandestinely acquire the research papers and “the formula” from Dr. Lanson’s personal effects in the lodge suite that he shares with his assistant.


Okay, you see why I am baffled by this. If the cell has already recruited Dr. Lanson’s assistant, there should be no need to even mount this operation in Big Bear. Recruiting the assistant would have been a major intelligence coup, providing direct access to virtually all of the doctor’s research projects. Even if much of it was compartmented and not directly accessible by the assistant, the chances of accessing at the main research facility are far greater than a chance acquisition at a ski resort. Of course, without that, there would be no basis for the movie.


Continuing, when the assistant gets a chance to search the doctor’s desk, papers, and personal effects at the lodge, he pretty much ransacks the place. This is counterproductive. The goal of a clandestine intelligence operation is to acquire the information without anyone knowing that the acquisition has even occurred. Tossing an office or room only tells the security officials that something has likely been compromised.


Of course, this begs the question – why was Dr. Lanson in possession of these highly classified papers while ostensibly on vacation? Isn’t the purpose of a vacation to vacate your mind from the job? Merely having the materials with him and working on them in a non-secure facility violates virtually every security protocol there is.


The assistant is successful in discovering the research papers, including “the formula.” As any good intelligence asset, he properly photographed all of the materials. He is discovered while photographing the documents, a fight ensues, and the assistant is able to make his escape.


Read this-> When the assistant leaves the lodge, he leaves behind the documents out (he should have replaced them) and get this, leaves his camera there. In other words, he left the very items he was sent to acquire. Sort of like the current joke, “You had one job….”


The very first thing you learn at the Intelligence Operations Course, Tradecraft 101, or just plain old “spy school” is GET THE INTELLIGENCE. That’s why we do this.


Bottom line: It’s an entertaining story, especially if you have any background in intelligence operations.


Watch it for free at the Russian classic film site Odnoklassniki:  https://ok.ru/video/1735416220340



March 6, 2021

“Yeah, thank you, Charlie Wilson” – the law of unintended consequences


In a recently aired episode of the CBS television series Seal Team, there was a quick phrase that probably went unnoticed by most of the viewing audience. Even if they heard it, they probably are not aware of the meaning.


In Season 3, Episode 19, Bravo Team is operating in a village in Afghanistan. Overwatch for the operation is being provided by a Predator drone. As shown in this screen capture, a surface-to-air missile is launched at and hits the drone.

The loss of the drone caused a loss of communications with the operational headquarters, and a loss of situational awareness. As the team realizes what has just happened, one of the SEALs remarks, “Thank you, Charlie Wilson.”

For those viewers who were not aware of the level of U.S. involvement in opposing the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980’s, the remark may not mean anything. To those of us who were involved in the American effort to support the Afghan resistance fighters – the self-proclaimed mujahidin (holy warriors) – it was a reminder of the concept of unintended consequences.


From 1987 until Saddam Husayn invaded Kuwait in 1990 and I was deployed to Saudi Arabia, I was assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency at the Pentagon as the Assistant Defense Intelligence Officer for the Middle East and South Asia.


When I was not in Baghdad working the operation assisting Iraqi forces, my office was peripherally involved in the Defense Department's slice of the CIA program supporting the Afghan mujahidin - "holy warriors" opposing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. That Defense Department support included the delivery of the FIM-92 Stinger shoulder-fired air defense missile.


At some point in America's support - I think it was 1986 - Texas Congressman Charlie Wilson insisted that the "muj" needed an air defense weapon to combat the heavily armed Soviet MI-24 assault helicopter gunship, the Hind. He insisted that they be provided the U.S.-made state-of-the-art Stinger.

Afghan mujahidin with Stinger missile

Charlie Wilson was a charming Southern gentleman. When I visited his office the first time, the launcher that fired the first Stinger in Afghanistan was hanging on the wall – he was extremely proud of that. He liked to talk about the Confederacy, in fact, much of the art in his office portrays battles of the Civil War. When my boss remarked about a depiction of Pickett's July 3, 1863 unsuccessful charge at Gettysburg, he quietly nodded his head and remarked, "If Pickett had been successful, we'd be having this conversation in Richmond...."


Back to the Stinger. There was absolutely no interest at the Pentagon in supplying the world's most lethal shoulder-fired air defense system to a bunch of tribesmen in Afghanistan – for several reasons. First, we believed they could have achieved the same effect with lesser-capability Soviet weapons, such as the readily-available (and not traceable to the United States) SA-7.


Second, and more importantly, no one wanted the Stinger in the hands of potential bad guys. Since we had to provide all of the weapons and equipment via the Pakistani intelligence service – the notoriously unreliable ISID – we were concerned that money talks and the Stinger would find itself where we did not want it to go.


We were proven right in October 1987 when the U.S. Navy seized the Iran Ajr while it was laying mines in the Persian Gulf. Found on the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) vessel was a battery of a Stinger launcher. The serial number of the battery was traceable to the CIA Afghan Task Group – it had been sent to Pakistan destined for the muj.


I am not sure where it was diverted, but I am betting on the ISID. We in the HUMINT (human intelligence) business used to joke that you had to recruit an "x" (the nationality of your choice), but you could buy a Pakistani – in south Asia, money talks. To make matters worse, during the operation, another Iranian boat fired two Stingers at a U.S. Navy A-6. We concluded that weapons we had sent to support anti-Soviet fighters in Afghanistan were being used against us in the Persian Gulf.


This is euphemistically called "unintended consequences."


When Congressman Wilson was in Pakistan on an official visit in 1987, he wanted to use the U.S. Defense Attaché's C-12 aircraft to fly somewhere. Fine, but Wilson wanted to take his girlfriend along. The Defense Attaché, a USAF colonel, said, "Sir, you mean your assistant." Wilson – looking for a fight – insisted that the colonel was going to take his girlfriend along. The colonel refused; it caused us (well, me) hours of grief trying to save the airplane once Wilson got back to Washington.


All in all, am I a fan of Charlie Wilson's? Let's see – a former Navy intelligence officer, a drunken womanizer, but someone who got things done. His heart was in the right place, but allowing the Stinger to end up in the hands of the IRGC, the Taliban, and who knows who else, is the epitome of unintended consequences. 

February 16, 2021

Biden's Iran Policy - Obama Failure 2.0?

Obviously satire, but let’s take a look at what is driving it. It’s simple – President Biden’s ill-advised and ill-timed policies on Iran, basically rolling back all of the gains of the Trump Administration to contain Iran, are dangerous. It’s almost like we are watching the implementation of Obama 2.0. That Iran policy was disastrous then, and it will be disastrous now.


Since taking office on January 20, Biden has signaled to both the Iranians and our allies alike that he will be attempting to engage the Iranians, despite the consistent Iranian repudiation of Obama’s efforts to do the same during his eight years in office. In the past few days, Secretary of State Tony Blinken, a former Obama official, has stated, “The path to diplomacy is open right now” with Iran.


Let’s follow that thought – just who will be advising Biden on his Iran foreign policy decisions? Three key advisors have roots in the Obama Administration – we know how its Iran policy turned out. Remember the optic of pallets of cash being flown to Iran just as American hostages were released. Although Obama insisted there was no linkage between the cash deliveries and hostage releases, Iranian officials have stated unequivocally that there was.


Blinken previously served in the Obama Administration as Deputy National Security Advisor from 2013 to 2015 and Deputy Secretary of State from 2015 to 2017. Before that, from 2009 to 2013, he was the National Security Advisor to Vice President Biden. His focus was, among other things, Iran’s nuclear program.


Then we have National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan. Sullivan worked in the Obama Administration as Director of Policy Planning at the Department of State, and as Deputy Chief of Staff to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, then as National Security Advisor to Vice President Biden from 2013 to 2014. He was also a senior advisor for the Iran nuclear negotiations.


Rounding out the Iran team is Special Representative for Iran Robert Malley. Malley’s claim to fame (or infamy) is being the lead negotiator (or capitulator) of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, the so-called Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). In the Obama Administration, Malley was designated the National Security Council “point man” for the Middle East, as well as the special advisor on the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, ISIS – the so-called “JV team,” according to Obama. Given the state of American foreign policy in the region when Obama left office, this is not a sterling résumé.


Biden has tasked Malley to bring both the United States and Iran into compliance with the JCPOA. I’m not sure that is technically possible, since the United States is no longer a party to the JCPOA. I take that as an indication where the Biden Administration is heading – a new round of concessions and capitulations to the mullahs in Tehran.


It could be worse. If John Kerry had not been named as the jet-setting Special Envoy on Climate Change, he would likely be advising Biden on Iran. Thank God for small mercies.


Former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said of Biden, “He has been wrong on nearly every major foreign policy and national security issue over the past four decades.” With these three – Blinken, Sullivan, and Malley – advising Biden on Iran, I don’t expect that record to improve.


In addition to this Obama-rerun cast of advisors, let’s look at some of the actions of the new administration in “containing” Iran.


Some of the first actions Biden has taken in the region was to freeze the sale of F-35 stealth fighter jets to the United Arab Emirates. Access to this advanced aircraft was a sweetener on the UAE-Israel track of the Abrahamic Accords. Of course, the Biden Administration may not care if that historic agreement falls through – it does not appear that Biden is that friendly to Jerusalem. 

After almost a month in office, Biden has yet to call Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu – you’d think that a call to America’s closest ally in the region would have already happened, but the Democrats have generally never been fond of Israel, especially when it is led by the Likud party.


Biden has also frozen impending sales of advanced munitions to Saudi Arabia, a measure of disapproval of Saudi (and UAE) military operations against the Huthi-led revolt in Yemen.


In an even more incredulous, and in my opinion, utterly moronic, move, Biden has removed the Huthi movement – a Shi’a militant group supported, trained, and armed by Iran – from the State Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.


It is ironic – right out of the gate, Biden has protected a terrorist group supported by the world’s leading state supporter of terrorism, and taken punitive measures against the two countries leading the fight in support of the Yemeni government which the United States recognizes.


Here’s what to watch in the near future. On February 15, a group believed to be associated with Iranian-supported Iraqi Shi’a militias claimed responsibility for an attack on a U.S. coalition facility in Irbil, the capital of the Kurdish Autonomous Region in northern Iraq. The attack killed a foreign worker and wounded several U.S. contractors, as well as wounding an American servicemember.


What will Biden do in response? If he does nothing, he will be perceived as weak. If that is the case, he will have failed the test – get ready for increased Iranian-sponsored militia attacks on US and allied coalition facilities and personnel.


With the Obama Administration holdovers, the team that brought us the dangerous and disastrous JCPOA, we have some insight as to where Biden’s policy toward Iran is likely headed.


It is not a good place.



January 12, 2021

Turkey may have halted plans to turn former Istanbul church into a mosque

According to a Turkish news outlet (read article here), the Turkish government may be reconsidering the August 2020 decision by self-styled new sultan President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to reconvert the Church of the Holy Savior museum to a mosque. (Read my initial thoughts on that decision - "Sultan" Erdogan converts another museum to a mosque.)


The church/museum in the Chora (Kariye) section of Istanbul is considered one of the most beautiful examples of a Byzantine church. In the 16th century, the church was converted into a mosque by the city’s new Ottoman rulers, and it became a secularized museum in 1948. The interior of the building is covered with fine mosaics and frescoes. It is listed as one of the top 30 “must-see museums” in the world. 

The original church was built in the early 5th century to the south of the Golden Horn, and stood outside of the 4th century walls of Constantine the Great; it became incorporated within the city's defenses later that century.

The frescoes and mosaics, plastered over by the Ottomans, are being restored. They are stunning, almost overwhelming. I have seen mosaics in other early Christian Churches throughout the Middle East, but nothing like these.

In August 2020, the government ordered the re-conversion of the museum into a mosque. The move came shortly after a similar decision to re-convert Istanbul’s Hagia Sophia into a mosque from a museum, despite outcries from the international community. That conversion took place and the building is now known as the Ayasofya-i Kebîr Câmi-i Şerifi (Hagia Sophia Holy Grand Mosque).

President Erdoğan was scheduled to inaugurate the newly converted mosque last October, but the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), Turkey’s top religious authority, cancelled the event the day before to allow for continued restoration work. 

The church/museum remains closed as the work continues, giving hope that it will remain a museum. Others maintain that the delay is merely a result of the Turks exercising great care when covering the Christian art. 

Let’s hope for the former and not the latter.