October 6 - Celebrating the "Victories" of the 1973 War

 

Photos: On top is the banner of the news outlet Al-Ahram touting special coverage of "The Glorious October Victory." On the lower left is a monument at the spot where Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal. On the lower right, a monument to the Egyptian soldiers lost in the war.

October 6 is Armed Forces Day in Egypt, this year celebrating the 53rd anniversary of the "victory" in the 1973 war, which is often called the Yom Kippur War, named for the Jewish holiday. Syria had celebrated October 6 as Tishreen Liberation War Day, but after the fall of the Bashar al-Asad regime and the end of the al-Asads' rule, the holiday was terminated by the new government.

Both Egypt and Syria believe they were victorious in this war, which is patently absurd. Yes, they both were initially successful on October 6 in surpring the Israelis. The Egyptians were able to cross the Suez Canal into the Israeli-occupied Sinai Peninsula and break the Israeli Bar-Lev defense line. The Syrians were able to get to the top of the Golan Heights. Israeli forces retreated a short distance on both fronts.

These "victories" were short-lived. The Israelis stopped the advances on both fronts, called up the reserves, and - thanks to a massive U.S. airlift and equipment transfers - counterattacked on both fronts.

When the fighting stopped, the Israelis had completely encircled the Egyptian Third Army in the Sinai, crossed the Suez Canal, and were on the highway to Cairo, stopping at Kilometer 101.

On the northern front, Israeli forces retook the entire Golan Heights and moved up along the road to Damascus. They stopped at the town of Sa'sa', just 28 miles from the capital, basically within artillery range.

The fighting stopped on October 24, with the United Nations Disengagement of Forces (UNDOF) agreement taking effect the next day. The UNDOF lines in Syria held until the end of the al-Asad rule, at which point Israeli forces re-entered southern Syria. Their remaning presence is an issue that is impeding a security agreement between Israel and the new Syrian government.

On the Egyptian front, Israeli forces pulled back to the Sinai. However, unlike with Syria, Egypt and Israel eventually reached a deal by which Israel agreed to a phased withdrawal in return for a peace treaty with Egypt. It was formally signed in 1979.

All that said, for Egypt and Syria to claim victory is, as I said, absurd. On both fronts, the Israelis soon regained the initiative and moved towards Damascus and Cairo, plus surrounding and rendering useless an entire Egyptian field army.

That's not victory. Egypt and Syria each won a battle, then lost the war.
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PS - See my photographs of the Suez Canal and Suez Canal Military

The Bowe Bergdahl Saga – Is It Finally Over?

 

Bowe Bergdahl’s 2017 desertion and misbehavior before the enemy conviction has been reinstated by a federal court. The court ruled – correctly in my non-lawyer opinion – that a district court judge does not have the authority to interfere in any way with the military justice system. Let’s review this case.

On the night of June 29-30, 2009, U.S. Army Private First Class Bowe Bergdahl deserted his post at Observation Post Mest in Paktika Province, Afghanistan. Bergdahl was assigned as an infantryman to the 1st Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division. He had enlisted in the Army in 2008.

Bergdahl was captured relatively soon after deserting his post. The exact date is unknown; however, the Taliban released a video of Bergdahl in captivity on July 18, 2009. This began his five years of captivity by the Haqqani network under extremely harsh conditions.

In May of 2014, in a colossal lapse of judgment, the Obama administration agreed to release five extremely dangerous and notorious senior Taliban leaders from the U.S. detention center in Guantanamo, Cuba in exchange for Bergdahl’s release.

On May 31, 2014, Bergdahl was released to a U.S. special operations team at a helicopter landing zone in Afghanistan. The “Taliban Five” were transported to  Qatar who had agreed to hold them and restrict their travel. Chalk up another failure for the Obama team – the "Taliban Five" later all became involved again in operations in Afghanistan.  

Following an investigation to confirm what virtually everyone already knew – on March 25, 2015, the Commanding General of U.S. Army Forces Command authorized charges to be brought against Bergdahl under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ):

- Article 85 — Desertion with intent to shirk important or hazardous duty

- Article 99 — Misbehavior before the enemy

The charges were referred to a military court for an Article 32 preliminary hearing.

It was noted in the charges that several U.S. troops were injured in attempts to locate Bergdahl after his initial disappearence/desertion. Members of his unit believe that other soldiers lost their lives in these searches.

For those of us who have served in combat zones, these two articles are considered to be as bad as it gets. Desertion (Article 85) is extremely serious and potentially punishable by death if committed in time of war. We can argue over the question of whether Afghanistan was a war or not. This was one of the Obama Administration talking points as several officials and supportive media attempted to downplay Bergdahl’s desertion. At one point, Obama's National Security Advisor Susan Rice declared that Bergdahl "served the United States with honor and distinction." Nothing could be further from the truth.

However, the charge of “misbehavior before the enemy” (Article 99) is the big one. It is explicitly punishable by death or another punishment directed by a court-martial.

In September 2015, the Article 32 preliminary hearing was convened. There were attempts by some in the Obama Administration to downgrade this into a lower-level special court-martial, but in the end, the Army stuck to their guns (no pun intended) and referred the charges to the highest level, a general court-martial. Bergdahl was arraigned at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, on December 22, 2015.

In December 2016, Bergdahl asked President Obama for a pre-emptive pardon ahead of his trial. To his credit, in a rare moment of moral clarity, Obama did not do so.

On October 16, 2017, Bergdahl voluntarily pleaded guilty without a plea bargain and opted for a military judge only trial. Probably a smart move –  presenting these serious charges to a full general court-martial panel in the face of overwhelming inculpatory evidence likely would have resulted in a harsher sentence.*

On November 3, 2017, the military judge sentenced Bergdahl to a dishonorable discharge, reduction in rank to Private (E-1), and forfeiture of pay, but no prison time, despite prosecutors seeking 14 years of incarceration. I agreed with the judge's decision to not impose prison time.

After his sentencing, the military appellate system kicked in. These are serious charges, with a serious sentence – a dishonorable discharge from the armed forces carries serious consequences.

- July 16, 2019 — Army Court of Criminal Appeals (ACCA): Affirmed Bergdahl's conviction and sentence.

- August 27, 2020 — Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF): Affirmed the ACCA decision, upholding the conviction.

- February 2, 2021 — Final military appeal: CAAF denied Bergdahl's writ-appeal petition, exhausting his military appellate remedies.

On February 17, 2021, Berdahl’s lawyers filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia asking the court to review the military justice proceedings and declare that Bergdahl's conviction was unconstitutional and should be vacated.

On July 25, 2023, a U.S. District Judge in that court vacated Bergdahl's conviction on procedural grounds.

On September 1, 2026, the D.C. Circuit struck down that decision because a federal district court lacks authority to vacate a court-martial conviction. The court ordered Bergdahl's lawsuit dismissed, leaving his original military conviction in effect. His dishonorable discharge was effectively reinstated.

Eugene R. Fidell, Berdahl’s very capable and experienced attorney said the case is about “the integrity of the military justice system,” and added that “there is a grave command influence problem that has pervaded this case from the very beginning.” Fidell’s team has 45 days to weigh several options for challenging the ruling, including asking the same panel to reconsider or seeking a discretionary review by the Supreme Court.

My take: Give it up, Fidell. The guy is a confessed deserter. He pleaded guilty to that and, even worse, misbehavior before the enemy. He got what he deserved. The prosecution wanted 14 years of incarceration at the U.S. Military Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. I was among those who supported the dishoorable discharge and the non-custodial sentence. His five years at the hands of the Taliban were enough punishment, albeit self-induced. It’s over – move on.

ADDENDUM: When Bergdahl was returned to American control, I was a military analyst for CNN. As such, I was interviewed extensively about this case, and wrote several articles detailing my personal views and analysis (see links below). I stand by every word.

The Bowe Bergdahl exchange - a mixed blessing (June 1, 2014)

Military chiefs support the release of the "Taliban Five" for Sergeant Bergdahl - well, sort of.... (July 12, 2014)

The Bergdahl court-martial recommendation - has someone leaned on the Army? (October 12, 2015)

Bergdahl - the Army does the right thing (March 25, 2015)

Bergdahl - the deflective media campaign begins (March 28, 2015)

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* Personal note: Shortly after I was commissioned, I was selected to be a member of a general court-martial panel. I was ordered to present myself to the military judge (in this case, a USAF colonel). The defense counsel took one look at me, called for a pre-emptory challenge, and asked that I be excused. I was dismissed without saying a word, no explanation other than, “Thank you, Lieutenant, you are excused.”

I asked a mentor, a USAF colonel, what happened. He asked about the case. A staff sergeant had killed his five-year old son in base housing and was being charged with murder. The local police in Denver, Colorado, wanted no part of it – let the Air Force figure it out. 

The colonel explained: "You showed up as required in full service dress ('dress blues') which requires all awards, decorations, and badges to be worn. The defense counsel, also a USAF officer, read your ribbons – he saw a prior service NCO, aircrew wings, nine Air Medals, Vietnam campaign medals – you are the last person he wants judging his NCO client. “

The Islamic Society of Monterey County and the Defense Language Institute

Al-Taqwa Mosque, Seaside, California

On a quiet sidestreet in the city of Seaside, California sits a unobtrusive building with a sign in Arabic and English identifying it as the Masjid al-Taqwa (al-Taqwa Mosque) of the Islamic Society of Monterey County.* You may ask yourself, "Why is there a mosque on the Monterey Peninsula?"

The answer to that question involves one of the peninsula's major employers and landholders - the U.S. Army Presidio of Monterey, home of the Defense Language Institute (DLI). DLI is one of the largest and most respected language schools in the country. It trains thousands of members of the U.S. armed forces in dozens of languages used in intelligence, security assistance, diplomatic and exchange positions worldwide. 

DLI has been at the Presidio since 1963 - it's predeccesor, the Army Language School began its instruction there in 1947. In 1963, the Department of Defense consolidated all military foreign language training as DLI.

The requirements for native speakers of dozens of foreign languages to become faculty members drew people from around the world, people of different ethinc and cultural backgrounds, including different religions. It should come as no surprise that many of the new faculty were Muslims - Islam is the second largest religion in the world, closely following Christianity.

I was a student at DLI several times: first at Biggs Field, Texas, for Vietnamese-Hanoi during the war in Southeast Asia, then at the Presidio for basic and intermediate Arabic, and later as an Arabic instructor. During those years, I saw  changes in the demographic makeup of the Arabic language deparment's faculty. 

In my first encounter as a student in 1973-74, most of the instructors were from Iraq and Egypt, with a smattering of Lebanese and Jordanians, and smaller numbers of Palestinians and Syrians, but very few Gulf Arabs.** An inordinate number of these intructors were Christians, much more than the demographics of the Middle East would indicate.

On my second tour as a student a few years later and during my tenure as a faculty member, I did notice a change in the makeup of the faculty. I have been back to speak to the Arabic students over the years, and I think my assessment is still accurate. What I see now is a much broader representation of the Arabic-speaking countries and a decided shift in the religions of the faculty. It appears to be mostly Muslims now.

Unfortunately, this developed into an issue during operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm - the U.S. defense of Saudi Arabia and the liberations of Kuwait, respectively. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1991, some - albeit a small minority - took umbrage at the "rallying around the flag" not just in the country, but on the Presidio as well. 

When asked about it, I had little sympathy for the position of the instructors who claimed to be offended. My comment: "This is a U.S. military facility, training American warriors to execute U.S. foreign policy. If that means military action  against your country of origin, so be it. If it offends you, find another place to work." Again, I stress that this was a small minority. 

There were similar reactions after the al-Qa'idah attacks of September 11, 2001. That tragedy was of such magnitude that even if people were offended by the U.S. response, they knew better than to raise it. I am curious, but do not know, the reaction to the Hamas attacks on Israelis on October 7, 2023.

So, what does this have to do with the Islamic Society of the Monterey Peninsula and its al-Taqwa (pronounced ah-TAQ-wa - the L is silent here***) Mosque? It means "the mosque of piety." 

No great mystery. As native speakers took positions as instructors of the many languages being taught at DLI, faculty members came from many Muslim countries, not just Arabic-speaking countries, but countries such as Indonesia (the largest Muslim population in the world), Pakistan, India, Iran, Turkey, Albania, Afghanistan, etc. 

At that time, there were no existing Muslim houses of worship in the area. A group of Muslim faculty members began meeting in their homes, finally forming the organization now known as the Islamic Society of Monterey County. To the point that it's not always about Arabic-speaking people, one of the founders of the society was an Indonesian, brought in to start the Indonesian and Malay department at the language school. The society began in 1965 and became a nonprofit religious corporation in 1969.

Following the attacks of 9/11, I also noticed an increase in what I would call the "Islamic leanings" of some of the faculty, many of whom I considered close friends - I still do, but the relationship has certainly changed. It is no longer possible to discuss Middle East events with some of them who become almost enraged when speaking about U.S. foreign policy. It's better left alone. I am often tempted to repeat the comments I made after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (see above). 

So, in a way, the creation of the Defense Language Insititute at the Presidio of Monterey logically resulted in the creation of the Islamic Society of the Monterey County. It remains a key source of membership in the congregation. 

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* There is another mosque in Monterey County - the Salinas Masjid of the Islamic Community of Salinas. The two groups are not affiliated, but often conduct programs, events, and celebrations with each other.

** I am speaking anectdotally here, based on my observations.

*** In Arabic, half of the letters are "solar" and half are "lunar" - solar letters drop the L in the definite article "al-" and double the next (solar) letter.

Syria Reasserts Sovereignty Over Russian Bases

 

Russian Air Force Su-25 attack jets at Humaymim

On August 9, the Syrian Foreign Ministry announced that Damascus and Moscow have signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) addressing the future of Russia's two military facilities in Syria: the naval facility at Tartus and the air base at Humaymim (colocated with Latakia International Airport). 

The MOU comes after negotiations between the Russians and the new government of Syria following the removal of the Bashar al-Asad regime in December 2024.

 

Tartus has been used by Russian Navy ships for over 50 years. In 1971, Syria and the Soviet Union had signed an agreement to establish a Soviet naval logistics and support facility at the port. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the base remained open for use by the Russian Navy. 

In 2015, the Bashar al-Asad government requested Russian military assistance to help in the fight against anti-government groups and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The logisitics facility at Tartus then developed into a semi-permanent Russian naval presence. At the same time, the Russian Air Force deployed combat and support aircraft to Humaymim air base and established a logistics air bridge between Russia and the Syrian base.

In 2017, Russia secured renewable 49-year leases for both the naval facility at Tartus and the air base at Humaymim. These facilities became Russian exclusion areas. 

The Russians made extensive improvements to the air base to handle the expanded air force presence - runways extended, new taxiways and parking aprons, aircraft maintenance hangars, administrative buildings, and barracks built, as well as delployment of a state-of-the-art air defense and electronic warfare systems.

After the fall of the al-Asad government in December 2024, Russia withdrew its ships from the port at Tartus. It was not until the spring of 2026 that Russian Navy ships returned for a short time. While they continue to have access, there is not a restored permanent presence.

Today's agreement replaces the 49-year leases on both the naval facility and the air base. The key points of the MOU:

• The Syrian Ministry of Defense will gradually take over the administration of the air base at Humaymim and the commercial pier at the port of Tartus.
  
  
• The transfer will be completed and the new arrangements will take effect in three months.
  
  
• The Syria Civil Aviation Authority will take over the Latakia International Airport and begin its rehabilitation.
  
  
• The military facilities at Humaymim and Tartus will be transformed into joint Russian-Syrian training and qualification centers.

Russia's loss of the Syrian bases has forced them to seek alternative bases for its presence in the Mediterranean. Although they can still use Humaymim air base as a staging area for their operations in the Middle East and Africa, Libya is now being used more and more - Russia has access to as many as six air bases in the country. 

As Syria attempts to reconstitute its armed forces, it is increasingly turning to Turkey for assistance and training. What remains to be seen is where the Ahmad al-Shara' government will seek to acquire new weapons, including aircraft and air defenses. While it would be preferable to wean the Syrians off Russian equipment, I am not sure Western governments will be willing to supply Damascus with sophisticated weaponry.

الله أكبر - "Allahu Akbar" - a Pronunciation Guide to the Takbir

Allahu Akbar

The takbir - the Arabic phrase Allahu akbar ("God is greatest" or "God is greater") - is one of the best-known expressions in Islam. It has been used for nearly fourteen centuries in daily prayer, religious observance, and, historically, as a battlefield cry by Muslim armies. In recent decades it has also become associated in the public mind with Islamist terrorism because it is frequently shouted during attacks.

The phrase is frequently mispronounced in English-language media. Even experienced speakers occasionally omit the final 'u' in Allahu,  pronouncing it as Allah akbar instead of the grammatically correct Allahu akbar.

The takbir appears on the national flags of two countries* - Iraq and Iran. 

On the Iraqi flag (left), the takbir is the green script in the white stripe. The takbir was added to Iraq's flag in January 1991 just days before the beginning of the Gulf War, when Saddam Hussein sought to portray the conflict as a jihad against the U.S.-led coalition.
 

On the Iranian flag (right), the takbir in white stylized script appears 22 times in the green and white stripes. 

My guide to pronouncing the takbir: a-LAH-hu AK-bar.

International Phonetics: ʔaɫ.ɫaː.hu ʔak.ba

Listen to a native speaker. 

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* 

Saudi Arabia's flag does not contain the takbir. Instead, it bears the shahadah: "There is no god but God, and Muhammad is His messenger."

Aerial Refueling - Key to American Airpower (Part Two)

KC-135T of the Pennsylvania Air National Guard's 147th Air Refueling Squadron (Pittsburgh) refuels an F-15C of the 71st Fighter Squadron (Langley AFB)

Note: This should be read in conjunction with Aerial Refueling - Key to American Airpower (Part One). As with that part, Part Two will feature graphics from one of my cruise lectures.

Flying boom refueling - Probe-and-drogue refueling

In this part, we will examine the two methods of aerial refueling, the advantages and disadvantages of each, and how they affect military operations. 

Fortunately, the U.S. Air Force KC-46A Pegasus is equipped to conduct both flying boom and probe-and-drogue refueling, making it compatible with virtually every U.S. military fixed-wing aircraft requiring aerial refueling.

Flying boom refueling is favored by the Air Force. It's principal advantage is a much higher fuel transfer rate than the probe-and-drogue refueling. 

The flying boom can transfer about three to four times the rate of a typical probe-and-drogue system. While this provides little advantage when refueling fighters, whose fuel systems cannot accept fuel at the boom's maximum rate, it is invaluable for large aircraft such as bombers, transports, airborne warning and control systems (AWACS), maritime patrol aircraft, and reconnaissance aircraft, all of which may need to take on tens of thousands of pounds of fuel during a single refueling.

At one point in my career, I was assigned to an RC-135 unit. We routinely flew missions lasting up to 20 hours - and occasionally even longer - requiring rendezvous with two KC-135 tankers about halfway through each sortie. Even using the flying boom, completing the refueling sequence could take 45 minutes or more. Had we relied on probe-and-drogue refueling, those missions would have been far less practical.

In the Air Force, we often joke that flying boom refueling is "full service"- the boom operator puts the gas in your tank. Probe-and-drogue refueling is "self-service" because the receiver pilot has to fly the probe into the basket himself. It's all good-natured interservice humor.

So what are some of the planning factors that must be considered? Neither the U.S. Navy nor the U.S. Marine Corps operate boom-equipped tanker aircraft. During carrier operations, tactical aircraft are normally refueled by other aircraft within the carrier air wing, most commonly F/A-18 Super Hornets equipped with buddy refueling stores. 

The Navy is fielding the MQ-25 Stingray unmanned tanker to reduce this limitation. Every Super Hornet assigned to the tanker mission is one fewer aircraft available to carry weapons on strike or air-defense missions.

Fleet support by land-based Navy P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft and Navy E-6B Mercury airborne command post relies on aerial refueling by the Air Force - the airframes require boom refueling. The bottom photo here is a USAF KC-135 refueling a USN E-6B over my house (red dot) on the south Oregon coast on aerial refueling track AR-8A South.

Here is where it can become more complicated. The United Kingdom, one of our closest allies, operates four type of Boeing aircraft. These Royal Air Force (RAF) assets are the E-7 Wedgetail airborne early warning and control aircraft, the RC-135 Airseeker (similar to the USAF RC-135V/W Rivet Joint) signals intelligence reconnaissance platform, the P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, and the C-17 Globemaster III heavy transport.

These aircraft all require flying boom refueling. However, the RAF Voyager tanker fleet is equipped eclusively for probe-and-drogue refueling. Currently there are no plans to retrofit any of the tankers to add a boom capability, nor are there plans to acquire such tankers in the future.

As a result, the RAF must rely on allied air forces with boom-equipped tankers for refueling. While some European countries have with this capability, none have anywhere near the capability of the U.S. Air Force.

Let's look at a real world example of how aerial refueling extends the reach of American airpower, even beyond that of the U.S. Navy carriers. At times, there is nothing like five acres of American sovereign territory - and the carrier strike group that sails with it - to project power. At other times, only long-range land-based aviation can reach the target. 

This is USAF B-2 Spirit stealth bomber, one of the most advanced aircraft in the world. It is currently the only aircraft in the U.S. inventory that can carry the 30,000-pound GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator. 

That aircraft-and-weapon combination was employed during the June 2025 American strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities. Seven of these bombers flew over 36 hours to and from the targets in Iran. 

The operation required refueling support from 32 tanker aircraft operating from multiple locations. Without aerial refueling, a mission of that distance and duration would simply not have been possible. 

While the fighters and bombers may get the headlines, much of what they accomplish relies on the tankers. Aerial refueling is not simply a support function, it is what makes American global airpower possible. 

Aerial Refueling - Key to American Airpower (Part One)

 

USAF KC-46A Pegasus refueling an A-10 Warthog *

Last week, the United States asked the Israeli government to increase the number of U.S. Air Force aerial refueling aircraft temporarily based at Ben Gurion International Airport. At the time of the request, there were about 60 tankers at Ben Gurion. The presence of this number of USAF aircraft has reduced the capacity of the airport by about 70 percent. 

Increasing the number of tankers to almost 100 aircraft would severly limit civilian air traffic into and out of Israel's primary and largest airport. Israel has agreed to the increased number of tankers, but they will be based at Israeli air bases instead.

Why does the USAF need so many tankers? Aerial refueling is a major mission for the USAF, and an important mission for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. The U.S. Army has only a few refuelable helicopters, mostly belonging the the 160th Special Operations Air Regiment - these are almost always refueled by the USAF Special Operations Command's MC-130 aircraft.

Why is aerial refueling important? I am going to use some graphics from one of my cruise ship presentations about the 2025 and 2026 Israeli and U.S. air operations against Iran. 

Given the distances between air bases and targets, aerial refueling plays a major role. For example, the distance between air bases in Israel and targets in Iran can be 1000 miles or more. 

Most Israeli aircraft cannot fly that distance unrefueled. Unfortunately, Israel has only six aging B707 refueling aircraft. They have ordered the KC-46A Pegasus, but they have not been delivered. 

Israeli Air Force refueling F-15I Ra'am aircraft

Because of that shortage, the USAF provided KC-46A tanker support to Israeli aircraft on their way to and from Iran during Operation Rising Lion.

USAF KC-46A refueling Israeli Air Force F-35

Given the lack of an adequate number of tanker aircraft, there are other solutions to extend the range of fighter aircraft. The Israelis make extensive use of conformal fuel tanks (CFT) and external drop tanks. CFT are attached to the aircraft and are aerodynamically designed to cause less drag than coventional drop tanks, which are carried under the fuselage and/or wings. 

Here are an F-15I and F-16I with CFT. Please note that these aircraft are also carrying drop tanks.

This picture below highlights the problem of not having sufficient aerial refueling capability.

F-16I Sufa ready to go to Iranian targets

Again, this F-16I is outfitted with CFT as well as three external drop tanks. It is only carrying two air-to-ground munitions, in this case SPICE 1000-pound precision-guided munitions, plus wingtip-mounted AIM-120 air-to-air missiles in the off-chance that the virtually destroyed Iranian air force attempted to engage.

That's a long way to go to drop just two weapons. Most of the aircraft capability is tied up in carrying enough fuel to make the round-trip sortie.

This illustrates the fuel-munitions tradeoff. For those not familiar with air operations, a quick review. The limiting factor for air operations planners is the gross takeoff weight of an aircraft. Start with an aircraft with no fuel or munitions. For example, an empty F-15I weighs about 32,700 pounds, with a gross takeoff weight about 81,000 pounds. That leaves almost 50,000 pounds of payload. 

This is where the USAF excels in the use of aerial refueling. When possible, aircraft are loaded with a maximum munitions load and a minumum fuel load. Immediately after takeoff, the aircraft meets a tanker prepositioned near the base, where it takes on as full a fuel load as possible. Now, it is a fully armed and fully fueled aircraft.  

That's why we put so many of our resources into aerial refueling. It is a force multiplier. Fun fact: 75 percent of world's aerial refueling aircraft belong to the U.S. Air Force.

We do this better than anyone in the world.

Note: Part Two will discuss types of refueling and issues for some of our allies. (Click here to go to Part 2.)
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* Yes, I know the official name of the A-10 is the Thunderbolt II. In over 27 years of service in the USAF, I can probably count on one hand the number of times anyone in the field called it anything but the Warthog, usually with admiration and respect. It is a fearsome weapon system.

It's "Houthis" with a TH

The Houthis in Yemen - their logo and spokesman

Public Service Announcement for journalists, reporters, anchors, news readers, media analysts, and anyone else who has reason to comment on the Iranian proxy group in Yemen, the "Supporters of God" (أنصار الله) the movement's official name, often rendered as Ansar Allah.
 
They are more commonly called "the Houthis" (الحوثيون). The name "Houthi" comes from the family's surname, not from a religious or tribal title.
 
The movement is named after the al-Houthi (الحوثي) family, particularly its founder, Husayn Badr al-Din al-Huthi (حسين بدر الدين الحوثي)., who launched the movement in the 1990s in Yemen's northern Sa'da Governorate.
 
It is pronounced: "the WHO-thees". I add this to correct the mispronunciation by those who want to sound like they know what they are talking about, changing the Arabic letter ث (thāʾ) — (th as in think) -- to a T, resulting in WHO-tees.
 
Unlike many other languages that do not have the TH sound, Arabic has three different distinct letters that employ that linguistic dental fricative sound.
 
All of those who insist on converting the TH to a T only highlight their lack of understanding of the language and the region.

The Strait of Hormuz: Iran's View of the MOU

 

Let's talk about the "Strait of Hormuz."

In an interview aired yesterday on Al Jazeera TV, the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf spoke of his interpretation of Iran's future role as it concerns the Strait of Hormuz.

The takeaways:

 

• We will not permit the United States to interfere in the Strait of Hormuz.

• We have agreed with the Sultanate of Oman on the navigation mechanism in [the Strait of] Hormuz based on the fifth article of the memorandum of understanding.

• We are proceeding with the implementation of the [Strait of] Hormuz navigation mechanism and will consult with the countries bordering [our] territorial waters.

It is clear from Ghalibaf's statements that he views the Strait of Hormuz as the territorial waters of Iran, and if pressed, jointly owned by Iran and the Sultanate of Oman. In his view, it is anything but how the world sees the Strait - an international waterway with free access to all. He is on record claiming that control of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz is Iran's right, and that Iran will not relinquish control under any circumstances.

Ghalibaf is not alone in this belief. Iran's deputy foreign minister unilaterally informed Omani officials that Iran alone will determine the transit routes in the Strait, and prohibit the use of other routes. Again, this is the Iranians ignoring the fact that the Strait of Hormuz is a declared international waterway according to the 1994 United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS). The Strait is neither Iranian nor Omani territorial waters.

It gets even better. On May 18, Iran announced the creation of the Strait of Hormuz Administration. Iran unilaterally declared that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) will exercise control over the area shown in yellow on the map.

 

The lines run from the western edge of Qeshm island in Iran to Umm al-Quwayn in the UAE, and from Jabal Mubarak, Iran to Fujayrah, UAE. The area includes not only the international waterway, but also Omani territorial waters.

This attempt flies in the face of a variety of international agreements that prohibit either Iran or Oman from restricting passage through the strait or charging a toll.

Why are the Iranians taking these what I would call unwarranted actions? 

The answer is the imprecise wording of the last sentence in the fifth article of the memorandum of understanding between the Iran and the United States. It reads:

"The Islamic Republic of Iran will conduct dialogue with the Sultanate of Oman to define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz, in discussions with other Persian Gulf littoral states, in line with applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz."

Ghalibaf's comments suggest that Tehran interprets this sentence to mean that Iran and Oman will jointly administer and manage the Strait, rather than merely establish navigational procedures to ensure the safe passage of commercial shipping. The map and declaration that the IRGC will exercise control over a huge swath of the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman - including the entire Strait of Hormuz - far exceeds the provisions of this statement.

In the end, the Iranians and Omanis will have to allow free passage - the legal term is "right of transit" - through the Strait with no tolls or fees. If Iran attempts to enforce a contrary interpretation, it would almost certainly invite a direct challenge from the United States and possibly other maritime powers.

"Is My Daughter an American Citizen?"

 

American and Saudi Passports

Let's talk about "birthright citizenship.”

The recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling affirming absolute birthright citizenship has generated considerable discussion on both sides of the issue. I have my own views, but it is not germane to this discussion of birthright citizenship.

It is January 17, 1991. Operation Desert Shield – the defense of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia – has transformed into Operation Desert Storm, the campaign to liberate the State of Kuwait. Throughout the night, hundreds of coalition aircraft pound targets in Baghdad and other key locations in Iraq.  

Before dawn the next morning, the Iraqis responded with al-Husayn ballistic missile attacks on Riyadh, Dhahran, and Israel. The war was on.

The atmosphere in Saudi Arabia had changed dramatically over the previous five months.

Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. Four days later, President George H.W. Bush ordered American forces to Saudi Arabia. The lead elements—the "division-ready" brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division and the U.S. Air Force's 1st Tactical Fighter Wing—arrived on August 7.

In those months leading up to the war, we American troops spent a lot of time working alongside Saudi officers. When not interpreting for General Schwarzkopf, I worked in the in the Coalition Coordination, Communications, and Integration Center (C3IC). I had become close to several of the Saudi officers—they were intrigued with any American or Westerner who had learned their language.

Watching the change in their demeanor from our arrival in August to the attack on Iraq was fascinating. Many of the officers I came to know had grown up in relative privilege and had never imagined that their country might face a direct military threat. As tensions mounted and the coalition buildup accelerated, some quietly began looking for a safety net—a way out should the worst happen.

One afternoon, a Royal Saudi Air Defense Force brigadier with whom I had become friends, approached me and asked if we could speak in private.

Once alone in his office, he asked whether it was true that people born in the United States were automatically American citizens. I told him that I believed that to be true in most cases.

He explained that years earlier as a young officer, he had attended the U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery School at Fort Bliss, Texas. While there, his wife had given birth to their daughter at the post’s hospital. He wanted to know if his daughter was, in fact, a U.S. citizen.

Not being an immigration lawyer, I contacted a friend in the Consular Section of U.S. Embassy in Riyadh explained the situation. Her first question surprised me – did he have diplomatic status?

I hadn't even considered that. I asked the brigadier whether he had been assigned to the Saudi Embassy or had any form of diplomatic accreditation while he was in the United States. He had not. He had simply been a military student attending training at an Army post in Texas.

My friend at the Embassy clarified for me. If he had enjoyed diplomatic immunity, neither he nor his wife would have been “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States, a key requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. As a foreign military officer attending school in the United States, he and his wife were fully subject to American civil and criminal law. Their daughter therefore acquired U.S. citizenship at birth.

Although she had been eligible since birth, her parents had never applied for documentation, not thinking that it would ever be needed.

Within a month, I had arranged for her U.S. passport, and presented it to her father along with an American flag. His smile said everything - he invited me to his office for “tea.” If you've ever served in Saudi Arabia, you know exactly what that means. 

_____

Note: Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under his interpretation, the daughter may not have acquired U.S. citizenship at birth since her father was posted in the United States on a temporary basis. I get it, but it felt good to be able to do this for the brigadier and his daughter.