Aerial Refueling - Key to American Airpower (Part Two)

KC-135T of the Pennsylvania Air National Guard's 147th Air Refueling Squadron (Pittsburgh) refuels an F-15C of the 71st Fighter Squadron (Langley AFB)

Note: This should be read in conjunction with Aerial Refueling - Key to American Airpower (Part One). As with that part, Part Two will feature graphics from one of my cruise lectures.

Flying boom refueling - Probe-and-drogue refueling

In this part, we will examine the two methods of aerial refueling, the advantages and disadvantages of each, and how they affect military operations. 

Fortunately, the U.S. Air Force KC-46A Pegasus is equipped to conduct both flying boom and probe-and-drogue refueling, making it compatible with virtually every U.S. military fixed-wing aircraft requiring aerial refueling.

Flying boom refueling is favored by the Air Force. It's principal advantage is a much higher fuel transfer rate than the probe-and-drogue refueling. 

The flying boom can transfer about three to four times the rate of a typical probe-and-drogue system. While this provides little advantage when refueling fighters, whose fuel systems cannot accept fuel at the boom's maximum rate, it is invaluable for large aircraft such as bombers, transports, airborne warning and control systems (AWACS), maritime patrol aircraft, and reconnaissance aircraft, all of which may need to take on tens of thousands of pounds of fuel during a single refueling.

At one point in my career, I was assigned to an RC-135 unit. We routinely flew missions lasting up to 20 hours - and occasionally even longer - requiring rendezvous with two KC-135 tankers about halfway through each sortie. Even using the flying boom, completing the refueling sequence could take 45 minutes or more. Had we relied on probe-and-drogue refueling, those missions would have been far less practical.

In the Air Force, we often joke that flying boom refueling is "full service"- the boom operator puts the gas in your tank. Probe-and-drogue refueling is "self-service" because the receiver pilot has to fly the probe into the basket himself. It's all good-natured interservice humor.

So what are some of the planning factors that must be considered? Neither the U.S. Navy nor the U.S. Marine Corps operate boom-equipped tanker aircraft. During carrier operations, tactical aircraft are normally refueled by other aircraft within the carrier air wing, most commonly F/A-18 Super Hornets equipped with buddy refueling stores. 

The Navy is fielding the MQ-25 Stingray unmanned tanker to reduce this limitation. Every Super Hornet assigned to the tanker mission is one fewer aircraft available to carry weapons on strike or air-defense missions.

Fleet support by land-based Navy P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft and Navy E-6B Mercury airborne command post relies on aerial refueling by the Air Force - the airframes require boom refueling. The bottom photo here is a USAF KC-135 refueling a USN E-6B over my house (red dot) on the south Oregon coast on aerial refueling track AR-8A South.

Here is where it can become more complicated. The United Kingdom, one of our closest allies, operates four type of Boeing aircraft. These Royal Air Force (RAF) assets are the E-7 Wedgetail airborne early warning and control aircraft, the RC-135 Airseeker (similar to the USAF RC-135V/W Rivet Joint) signals intelligence reconnaissance platform, the P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, and the C-17 Globemaster III heavy transport.

These aircraft all require flying boom refueling. However, the RAF Voyager tanker fleet is equipped eclusively for probe-and-drogue refueling. Currently there are no plans to retrofit any of the tankers to add a boom capability, nor are there plans to acquire such tankers in the future.

As a result, the RAF must rely on allied air forces with boom-equipped tankers for refueling. While some European countries have with this capability, none have anywhere near the capability of the U.S. Air Force.

Let's look at a real world example of how aerial refueling extends the reach of American airpower, even beyond that of the U.S. Navy carriers. At times, there is nothing like five acres of American sovereign territory - and the carrier strike group that sails with it - to project power. At other times, only long-range land-based aviation can reach the target. 

This is USAF B-2 Spirit stealth bomber, one of the most advanced aircraft in the world. It is currently the only aircraft in the U.S. inventory that can carry the 30,000-pound GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator. 

That aircraft-and-weapon combination was employed during the June 2025 American strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities. Seven of these bombers flew over 36 hours to and from the targets in Iran. 

The operation required refueling support from 32 tanker aircraft operating from multiple locations. Without aerial refueling, a mission of that distance and duration would simply not have been possible. 

While the fighters and bombers may get the headlines, much of what they accomplish relies on the tankers. Aerial refueling is not simply a support function, it is what makes American global airpower possible. 

Aerial Refueling - Key to American Airpower (Part One)

 

USAF KC-46A Pegasus refueling an A-10 Warthog *

Last week, the United States asked the Israeli government to increase the number of U.S. Air Force aerial refueling aircraft temporarily based at Ben Gurion International Airport. At the time of the request, there were about 60 tankers at Ben Gurion. The presence of this number of USAF aircraft has reduced the capacity of the airport by about 70 percent. 

Increasing the number of tankers to almost 100 aircraft would severly limit civilian air traffic into and out of Israel's primary and largest airport. Israel has agreed to the increased number of tankers, but they will be based at Israeli air bases instead.

Why does the USAF need so many tankers? Aerial refueling is a major mission for the USAF, and an important mission for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. The U.S. Army has only a few refuelable helicopters, mostly belonging the the 160th Special Operations Air Regiment - these are almost always refueled by the USAF Special Operations Command's MC-130 aircraft.

Why is aerial refueling important? I am going to use some graphics from one of my cruise ship presentations about the 2025 and 2026 Israeli and U.S. air operations against Iran. 

Given the distances between air bases and targets, aerial refueling plays a major role. For example, the distance between air bases in Israel and targets in Iran can be 1000 miles or more. 

Most Israeli aircraft cannot fly that distance unrefueled. Unfortunately, Israel has only six aging B707 refueling aircraft. They have ordered the KC-46A Pegasus, but they have not been delivered. 

Israeli Air Force refueling F-15I Ra'am aircraft

Because of that shortage, the USAF provided KC-46A tanker support to Israeli aircraft on their way to and from Iran during Operation Rising Lion.

USAF KC-46A refueling Israeli Air Force F-35

Given the lack of an adequate number of tanker aircraft, there are other solutions to extend the range of fighter aircraft. The Israelis make extensive use of conformal fuel tanks (CFT) and external drop tanks. CFT are attached to the aircraft and are aerodynamically designed to cause less drag than coventional drop tanks, which are carried under the fuselage and/or wings. 

Here are an F-15I and F-16I with CFT. Please note that these aircraft are also carrying drop tanks.

This picture below highlights the problem of not having sufficient aerial refueling capability.

F-16I Sufa ready to go to Iranian targets

Again, this F-16I is outfitted with CFT as well as three external drop tanks. It is only carrying two air-to-ground munitions, in this case SPICE 1000-pound precision-guided munitions, plus wingtip-mounted AIM-120 air-to-air missiles in the off-chance that the virtually destroyed Iranian air force attempted to engage.

That's a long way to go to drop just two weapons. Most of the aircraft capability is tied up in carrying enough fuel to make the round-trip sortie.

This illustrates the fuel-munitions tradeoff. For those not familiar with air operations, a quick review. The limiting factor for air operations planners is the gross takeoff weight of an aircraft. Start with an aircraft with no fuel or munitions. For example, an empty F-15I weighs about 32,700 pounds, with a gross takeoff weight about 81,000 pounds. That leaves almost 50,000 pounds of payload. 

This is where the USAF excels in the use of aerial refueling. When possible, aircraft are loaded with a maximum munitions load and a minumum fuel load. Immediately after takeoff, the aircraft meets a tanker prepositioned near the base, where it takes on as full a fuel load as possible. Now, it is a fully armed and fully fueled aircraft.  

That's why we put so many of our resources into aerial refueling. It is a force multiplier. Fun fact: 75 percent of world's aerial refueling aircraft belong to the U.S. Air Force.

We do this better than anyone in the world.

Note: Part Two will discuss types of refueling and issues for some of our allies. (Click here to go to Part 2.)
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* Yes, I know the official name of the A-10 is the Thunderbolt II. In over 27 years of service in the USAF, I can probably count on one hand the number of times anyone in the field called it anything but the Warthog, usually with admiration and respect. It is a fearsome weapon system.

It's "Houthis" with a TH

The Houthis in Yemen - their logo and spokesman

Public Service Announcement for journalists, reporters, anchors, news readers, media analysts, and anyone else who has reason to comment on the Iranian proxy group in Yemen, the "Supporters of God" (أنصار الله) the movement's official name, often rendered as Ansar Allah.
 
They are more commonly called "the Houthis" (الحوثيون). The name "Houthi" comes from the family's surname, not from a religious or tribal title.
 
The movement is named after the al-Houthi (الحوثي) family, particularly its founder, Husayn Badr al-Din al-Huthi (حسين بدر الدين الحوثي)., who launched the movement in the 1990s in Yemen's northern Sa'da Governorate.
 
It is pronounced: "the WHO-thees". I add this to correct the mispronunciation by those who want to sound like they know what they are talking about, changing the Arabic letter ث (thāʾ) — (th as in think) -- to a T, resulting in WHO-tees.
 
Unlike many other languages that do not have the TH sound, Arabic has three different distinct letters that employ that linguistic dental fricative sound.
 
All of those who insist on converting the TH to a T only highlight their lack of understanding of the language and the region.

The Strait of Hormuz: Iran's View of the MOU

 

Let's talk about the "Strait of Hormuz."

In an interview aired yesterday on Al Jazeera TV, the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf spoke of his interpretation of Iran's future role as it concerns the Strait of Hormuz.

The takeaways:

 

• We will not permit the United States to interfere in the Strait of Hormuz.

• We have agreed with the Sultanate of Oman on the navigation mechanism in [the Strait of] Hormuz based on the fifth article of the memorandum of understanding.

• We are proceeding with the implementation of the [Strait of] Hormuz navigation mechanism and will consult with the countries bordering [our] territorial waters.

It is clear from Ghalibaf's statements that he views the Strait of Hormuz as the territorial waters of Iran, and if pressed, jointly owned by Iran and the Sultanate of Oman. In his view, it is anything but how the world sees the Strait - an international waterway with free access to all. He is on record claiming that control of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz is Iran's right, and that Iran will not relinquish control under any circumstances.

Ghalibaf is not alone in this belief. Iran's deputy foreign minister unilaterally informed Omani officials that Iran alone will determine the transit routes in the Strait, and prohibit the use of other routes. Again, this is the Iranians ignoring the fact that the Strait of Hormuz is a declared international waterway according to the 1994 United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS). The Strait is neither Iranian nor Omani territorial waters.

It gets even better. On May 18, Iran announced the creation of the Strait of Hormuz Administration. Iran unilaterally declared that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) will exercise control over the area shown in yellow on the map.

 

The lines run from the western edge of Qeshm island in Iran to Umm al-Quwayn in the UAE, and from Jabal Mubarak, Iran to Fujayrah, UAE. The area includes not only the international waterway, but also Omani territorial waters.

This attempt flies in the face of a variety of international agreements that prohibit either Iran or Oman from restricting passage through the strait or charging a toll.

Why are the Iranians taking these what I would call unwarranted actions? 

The answer is the imprecise wording of the last sentence in the fifth article of the memorandum of understanding between the Iran and the United States. It reads:

"The Islamic Republic of Iran will conduct dialogue with the Sultanate of Oman to define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz, in discussions with other Persian Gulf littoral states, in line with applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz."

Ghalibaf's comments suggest that Tehran interprets this sentence to mean that Iran and Oman will jointly administer and manage the Strait, rather than merely establish navigational procedures to ensure the safe passage of commercial shipping. The map and declaration that the IRGC will exercise control over a huge swath of the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman - including the entire Strait of Hormuz - far exceeds the provisions of this statement.

In the end, the Iranians and Omanis will have to allow free passage - the legal term is "right of transit" - through the Strait with no tolls or fees. If Iran attempts to enforce a contrary interpretation, it would almost certainly invite a direct challenge from the United States and possibly other maritime powers.

"Is My Daughter an American Citizen?"

 

American and Saudi Passports

Let's talk about "birthright citizenship.”

The recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling affirming absolute birthright citizenship has generated considerable discussion on both sides of the issue. I have my own views, but it is not germane to this discussion of birthright citizenship.

It is January 17, 1991. Operation Desert Shield – the defense of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia – has transformed into Operation Desert Storm, the campaign to liberate the State of Kuwait. Throughout the night, hundreds of coalition aircraft pound targets in Baghdad and other key locations in Iraq.  

Before dawn the next morning, the Iraqis responded with al-Husayn ballistic missile attacks on Riyadh, Dhahran, and Israel. The war was on.

The atmosphere in Saudi Arabia had changed dramatically over the previous five months.

Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. Four days later, President George H.W. Bush ordered American forces to Saudi Arabia. The lead elements—the "division-ready" brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division and the U.S. Air Force's 1st Tactical Fighter Wing—arrived on August 7.

In those months leading up to the war, we American troops spent a lot of time working alongside Saudi officers. When not interpreting for General Schwarzkopf, I worked in the in the Coalition Coordination, Communications, and Integration Center (C3IC). I had become close to several of the Saudi officers—they were intrigued with any American or Westerner who had learned their language.

Watching the change in their demeanor from our arrival in August to the attack on Iraq was fascinating. Many of the officers I came to know had grown up in relative privilege and had never imagined that their country might face a direct military threat. As tensions mounted and the coalition buildup accelerated, some quietly began looking for a safety net—a way out should the worst happen.

One afternoon, a Royal Saudi Air Defense Force brigadier with whom I had become friends, approached me and asked if we could speak in private.

Once alone in his office, he asked whether it was true that people born in the United States were automatically American citizens. I told him that I believed that to be true in most cases.

He explained that years earlier as a young officer, he had attended the U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery School at Fort Bliss, Texas. While there, his wife had given birth to their daughter at the post’s hospital. He wanted to know if his daughter was, in fact, a U.S. citizen.

Not being an immigration lawyer, I contacted a friend in the Consular Section of U.S. Embassy in Riyadh explained the situation. Her first question surprised me – did he have diplomatic status?

I hadn't even considered that. I asked the brigadier whether he had been assigned to the Saudi Embassy or had any form of diplomatic accreditation while he was in the United States. He had not. He had simply been a military student attending training at an Army post in Texas.

My friend at the Embassy clarified for me. If he had enjoyed diplomatic immunity, neither he nor his wife would have been “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States, a key requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. As a foreign military officer attending school in the United States, he and his wife were fully subject to American civil and criminal law. Their daughter therefore acquired U.S. citizenship at birth.

Although she had been eligible since birth, her parents had never applied for documentation, not thinking that it would ever be needed.

Within a month, I had arranged for her U.S. passport, and presented it to her father along with an American flag. His smile said everything - he invited me to his office for “tea.” If you've ever served in Saudi Arabia, you know exactly what that means. 

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Note: Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under his interpretation, the daughter may not have acquired U.S. citizenship at birth since her father was posted in the United States on a temporary basis. I get it, but it felt good to be able to do this for the brigadier and his daughter.

Abdul Carter - What's in a name?

 

Abdul Carter and Jason Dart

Let's talk about "Abdul Carter." 

There was a bit of controversy over New York Giants quarterback Jason Dart. Carter criticized Dart for introducing President Trump at a rally - not that it is any of Carter's business.

I was struck by the name Abdul Carter. I have been dealing with this for decades, mostly among young men who claim to have converted to Islam. 

During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, there was a team of Saudi imams (we called them the God Squad) who would roam the joint commannd center and target Americans for conversion, including me, with offers of money, trips, gifts. They assumed that because I could speak Arabic, I would be a potential convert. I didn't take the time to explain that we in the intelligence services normally learn the languages of our potential foes....

Many of these converts take on what they think are Muslim names. I am not sure if Carter is a convert or was born into a Muslim family. In any case, I would recommend that they learn either a smattering of the Arabic language, or the concept of the 99 attributes of Allah.

Abdul cannot stand alone as a name. 

It is actually the word 'Abd (meaning "servant of") and the Arabic definite article al- (meaning "the"). It is followed by one of the attributes of Allah. 

So when I am introduced to a new convert, and he says his name is "Abdul" - I ask him "'Abd al- WHAT?" Virtually every time, I get a blank stare. This is when I cease to take them seriously. Although I am not a Muslim, I generally know more about it than they do. 

So, in deference to either Carter or his parents, I will acknowledge that his middle name is Jabbar (meaning "the compellor" or "the almighty") - the same as the basketball legend Karim Abdul Jabbar. As with both, the correct transliteration of the Arabic ( عبد الجبار ) would be 'Abd al-Jabbar. It is not a first and middle name, or a middle name and last name - it is one name. 

In the Middle East, if you introduce yourself as Abdul, you will get a puzzled look meaning 'Abd al- WHAT?

The Medjool Date - No Longer "Unknown"

 

Shields Date Garden - Indio, California

Time for some Arabic language trivia.

 

Most of you are probably familiar with the Medjool date. They’re one of the most popular date varieties in the world.

 

The name Medjool comes from the Arabic word majhul (مجهول) meaning "unknown" or "unidentified." It was applied to this variety of date because its place of origin was unknown and the dates do not grow in the same manner as other dates.

 

With the advent of DNA testing, scientists have been able to determine that the "unknown" date variety originated in a specific grove in the Tafilalt region in eastern Morocco.

 

Today, California’s Coachella Valley produces more Medjool dates than almost any other region in the world.

 

Since it is no longer an unknown date, should it not be renamed the ma'ruf (معروف) or "known" date? Or call it the Tafilalt variety?

Yes, I am being facetious....

 

"Palestinian Exhaustion" – Thoughts on Hamas and the Trump Plan

In a whirlwind of activity in the Middle East that has resulted in the success of the Trump plan for what appears to be a permanent ceasefire in the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza, one has to wonder about the thought process on the Hamas side that led to the agreement.

The question most of those of us who specialize in the Middle East are asking is, “Why would Hamas agree to give up what is their ace-in-the-hole during the entire two year confrontation, the Israeli hostages*?”

 The hostages were all that was preventing the Israelis from going what we Christians would call “Old Testament” on Hamas. If they had not had these “detainees,” I believe that the Israel Defense Forces would have laid waste to the entire Gaza Strip.

For those not familiar with the geography, the Gaza Strip is about 25 miles long and seven miles wide, home to about 2.3 million people. We do not have good number on how many of them support Hamas, but at one point, 70 percent of Gazans supported the attacks of October 7, 2023.

That has since declined as the IDF has turned the area into the rubble that resembles Dresden in 1945, but the remaining level of support for the group that is responsible for creating one the greatest humanitarian crises in modern times is astounding.

Let’s go back to the agreement between Hamas and Israel. I understand the pressure applied on Israel by President Donald Trump and other world leaders. What I remain curious about is the pressure applied on Hamas – and it was there – from Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey. I believe that it was the pressure from Turkey that may have carried the day.

It is no secret that Turkish President is an avowed Islamist, a behind-the-scenes supporter of both Hamas and the Islamic State – after all, how did all those ISIS fighters get into Syria and Iraq? I have spent a lot of time on both sides of the border between Turkey and Syria. It is a serious border, especially on the Turkish side, complete with fencing, lighting, guard towers, and minefields. ISIS fighters crossing from Turkey into Syria had to have assistance – either bribery, government collusion, or both.

As is the case with many countries in the Arab and Muslim worlds, Turkey has been a political and diplomatic supporter of Hamas. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has defined Hamas as liberation movement.  Even after the October 7, 2023 massacre, he was quoted as saying, “Hamas is not a terrorist organization, it is a group of mujahidin (holy warriors) defending their lands.”

Why was Turkey at the talks?

My take on this is that most of the Arab and Muslim world, and now likely including Turkey, is suffering from “Palestinian Exhaustion.” In other words, they are tired of the Palestinians in general, and Hamas in particular. Even countries that had previously supported the Palestinians — some even condoning the violence of October 7 — have watched for two years as Israel destroyed virtually the entire infrastructure of the Gaza Strip, with no indication that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu intended to stop before Hamas was completely eradicated.

I suspect that the leadership of Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey informed what is left of the leadership of Hamas that it was time to stop the fighting. At last count, according to the Palestinian Ministry of Health, the death toll in Gaza is over 67,000 with almost 170,000 injured, and as many as 11,000 missing (believed to be under the rubble). Hamas has lost most of its senior leadership inside and outside of the Gaza Strip, civilian casualties continue to mount, and there was no possible path to any sort of meaningful victory.

The Trump plan, among other things, calls for the immediate return of the 48 hostages (only 20 of whom are thought to be alive), phased withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Strip, and the disarming of Hamas. Hamas is still refusing to disarm.

I am surprised that Hamas has agreed to release the remaining hostages in the first phase. While the Israelis have begun the initial phase of their withdrawal, they are still in Gaza with overwhelming military force. Once the hostages are released, Hamas’s leverage is gone. It was their sole bargaining chip. Hamas will now have to rely on whatever security guarantees were made by the negotiating parties in Sharm al-Shaykh.

Hamas realistically had no choice. Support for Hamas in the Arab and Muslim world was declining, the Israelis were relentlessly pursuing Hamas members in the last bastion of Gaza City, and even the hard-core could see that it was only a matter of time before they would be all killed or captured.

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* When the international press referred to the Israelis taken on October 7 as “hostages” – the Arabic word is (رهائن – raha’in), most of the Arabic media was offended. They refer to those taken as “detainees” (محتجزين – muhtajazin), which must be some lesser category. When I was the interpreter for the U.S.-Iraqi talks at the end of Desert Storm, this was the agreed-upon word for Kuwaiti prisoners. The Iraqis had referred to them as “guests”( ضيوف – dhiyuf) until I officially objected.

Syrian President Abolishes October 6 Holiday

Memorial on east bank of Suez Canal where Egyptian troops crossed on October 6, 1973

In a rather surpring move, Syrian President Ahmad al-Shara' announced the abolishment of the October 6 holiday. Officially, it was called “Tishrin Liberation Day” (Arabic: عيد حرب تشرين التحريرية), which commemorated an initially successful Syrian military operation aimed a retaking the Golan Heights from the Israelis. Israel had captured the Heights in the Six-Day War of 1967, and has not only occupied the area, but has formally annexed it to the State of Israel.*

The October 6, 1973 operation was part of joint Egyptian-Syrian coordinated attacks on Israeli-occupied territory in the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. Egypt also celebrates the perceived "victory" on October 6 as Armed Forces Day. The Egyptian army was able to cross the Suez Canal and break through the Israeli defenses, although with heavy casualties.

The Syrian decree drew sharp criticism throughout the Arab world, particularly Egypt. While both Syria and Egypt view their performance in the two-week conflict as a victory, it was a stalemate at best, a defeat at worst. The rest of the Arab world goes along with the mischaracterization as it provides some relief from the humiliation that usually follows their military clashes with the Israel Defense Forces.

I have always been amazed that both Egypt and Syria regard their military operations in the Yom Kippur War as a victory. Let's take a quick look at what started as successful assaults, but soon withered in the face of Israeli counterattacks. It took a few days for the Israelis to stop the advances and activate enough of their reserve forces to mount counteroffensives on two fronts.

First, Egypt. Yes, the Egyptians crossed the Suez Canal and broke through the Israeli defenses, a series of fixed fotifications along the canal known as the Bar-Lev Line. They used water cannons to breach the high sand berms, and built pontoon bridges to move enough troops to overwhelm the sparesly manned fortifications. 

The success of that part of the operation has become a teaching point in many military schools - static defenses can be overcome by determined troops using innovative tactics. So, yes, initial success. 

Israeli forces pulled back and regrouped. As reinforcements and reserves arrived, the Israelis counterattacked. They eventually encircled the entire Egyptian Third Army in the Sinai and cut them off from resupply and reinforcement, effectively taking them off the battlefield without having to defeat them militarily. 

Other Israeli forces crossed the canal and proceeded down the main highway towards Cairo, eventually reaching a position known as Kilometer 101, just over 60 miles from the capital city, where they were located when the ceasefire took effect. 

Egyptian victory? Hardly. Yet, it is celebrated like they just won World War II.

Now Syria. Yes, Syria was able to seize portions of the Golan Heights from Israeli forces, only to be forced back as the Israelis regrouped and launched a counteroffensive, advancing on the main road from al-Qunaytirah toward Damascus.** 

By the time a ceasefire had been arranged, Israeli troops were as far along the road as the town of Sa'sa', roughly 18 miles from the city. That placed the Syrian capital within artillery range of Israeli gunners.

Syrian victory? Hardly. I will say this for the Syrians. There never seems to be the level of celebration there as compared to the massive celebrations in Egypt. It's hard to claim victory when the opposing army can fire artillery into the capital city.

Shara' may be making a gesture to Israel. There have been a series of talks between Syria and Israel possibly leading to a security arrangement between the two countries. Tension with Israel is something the Syrian president doesn't need. He has his hands full with not only the Druze in the south, but also the Kurds in the northeast, and al-Asad loyalists in the northwest. Then there are the parliamentary elections - you get it.

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* In 1981, Israel announced "application of Israeli law and administration," replacing the military administration of the area. Although the word "annexation" has never been used, it is in effect what it is. Only the United States recognizes Israeli sovereignty, done so by President Trump in 2019.

** This is the same "road to Damascus" traveled by the apostle Paul (then Saul) cited in the Bible. During my assignment as the Air Attache at the embassy in Damascus, I traveled this road regularly "observing and reporting." There is a Russian Orthodox chapel at what is believed to be the spot of his conversion. And there's a huge Syrian military facility there as well....

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Today’s Trivia – “From the River to the Sea”

 

“From the River to the Sea” - You’ve heard it at all of the anti-Israel, pro-Palestinian, or Hamas-support demonstrations. It is the oft-repeated mantra that most of those who are shouting it likely have no idea what it means. The modern mantra includes the additional phrase “Palestine will be free.”

In Arabic, the words rhyme: it is pronounced “min al-BAHar ilah an-NAHar” – in Arabic, the definite article AL before the letter N changes to AN.*

For those not exactly sure what it means, it’s quite simple. The river is the Jordan River, and the sea is the Mediterranean Sea. While the meaning is quite simple, the implication is not.

A look at a map that shows the area between the Jordan and the Mediterranean reveals that what the Palestinians believe is their country would include what is now the State of Israel, the West Bank of the Jordan River, and the Gaza Strip. 

That is basically the complete territory of the British-administered Palestinian Mandate. The map to the left shows the United Nations partition plan of the Mandate proposed in 1947.

Use of the chant “from the river to the sea” is a call for the elimination of the state of Israel. It also is a refutation of the so-called “two-state solution” called for by the United Nations, European Union, Palestinian Authority, some Arab countries, and even some Israeli political parties. As you would expect, both Hamas and most Israelis are against the plan. 

Ask virtually any of the protesters to explain it – most of them can’t.

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* In Arabic grammar and pronunciation, the concepts of solar letters and lunar letters are essential for correctly pronouncing the definite article (“al‑”). Do a ChatGPT search on “Arabic solar and lunar letters” for a complete explanation. It’s a complicated language.

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