April 18, 2012

The ICC and Sayf al-Islam al-Qadhafi - not so fast!

Sayf al-Islam al-Qadhafi before and after the Libyan revolution

A legal battle is shaping up between the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Libyan National Transitional Council over the future of Sayf al-Islam al-Qadhafi*, son of the late Libyan dictator Mu'amar al-Qadhafi. The question is not if he will be put on trial, but where. The ICC wants him extradited to its headquarters in The Hague to face charges of crimes against humanity levied in an ICC indictment of last year. Libya has insisted he should be tried by a Libyan court.

The ICC believes it has the authority to try Sayf al-Islam based on United Nations Security Council 1970, which imposed sanctions on the al-Qadhafi regime, gave the ICC jurisdiction over crimes committed in Libya, and required the Libyan government to comply with ICC demands. The two sides are working on a compromise where Sayf al-Islam will be tried in Libya with ICC supervision (the ICC charter allows for it to hold proceedings anywhere it wishes). That's probably what will happen.

That said, this could be a slippery slope for the future. Should the United Nations or the ICC be able to dictate to sovereign nations where their citizens will be tried? How would we react if either organization attempted to order the United States to extradite an American citizen for trial at The Hague? For example, if the ICC indicted an American soldier for what it believed to be a war crime, would the United States feel compelled to extradite him or her?

The ICC was established as a permanent tribunal in 2002 to prosecute individuals for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. It has limited jurisdiction - it can exercise jurisdiction only in three cases: if the accused is a national of a state party, if the alleged crime took place on the territory of a state party, or if a situation is referred by the United Nations. The last instance is in play with Libya. Libya is not a signatory to the ICC. Neither is the United States.

The ICC is supposedly has jurisdiction only when national courts are unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute the crimes. Libya has stated a willingness to try Sayf al-Islam and claims that it can do so. What then gives the ICC the authority to impose its jurisdiction on Libya? Of course, UNSCR 1970 provides the required referral, but the ICC should only prosecute when the local nation cannot.

If I had to make the call, I'd say the ICC was overreaching its authority. They should allow Libya to exercise justice in this case. Otherwise, it appears to be just another case of European arrogance.

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* The name translates as "The Sword of Islam"

Egypt - the kingmakers speak....

Campaign posters for the three remaining major candidates
Ahmad Shafiq  -  'Abd al-Muna'im Abu al-Fatuh  -  'Amru Musa

Egypt's Supreme Presidential Electoral Commission has disqualified 10 candidates from running in the presidential election scheduled for next month. According to the rules in place, there are no further appeals for these former candidates. Three of those rejected were considered front runners: the Muslim Brotherhood's Khayrat al-Shatir, Salafist leader Hazim Abu Isma'il, and former intelligence chief and vice president 'Umar Sulayman.*

Of course, there were protests against the move, especially from the Islamists, claiming that the commission is not impartial and sympathizes with the former Mubarak government. There may be some truth to this - the commission was appointed by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the true arbiters of power in Egypt after the removal of Husni Mubarak. On the other hand, if they were truly holdovers, they likely would not have disqualified General Sulayman.

More important are the candidates the commission did not disqualify - one of these men will almost certainly be the next president of arguably the most important country in the Arab world. Given the disqualifications, the new front runners are former Arab League chief 'Amru Musa (commonly rendered as Amr Moussa), former Muslim Brotherhood member and now moderate Islamist 'Abd al-Muna'im Abu al-Fatuh (commonly rendered as Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh) and former Prime Minister and commander of the Egyptian Air Force retired Air Marshal Ahmad Muhammad Shafiq (commonly rendered as Ahmed Shafik).

A few words on each candidate.

'Amru Musa (75) is well known throughout the Middle East, having served as Secretary General of the Arab League from 2001 to 2011, and as Egypt's Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1991 to 2001. Prior to that, he was the Egyptian ambassador to the United Nations, India, and Switzerland. Musa is respected in the region as well as in the West. Despite taking some unpopular positions, most Western countries, including the United States, would not object to a Musa presidency in Egypt.

'Abd al-Muna'im Abu al-Fatuh (60) is a medical doctor and described as a moderate Islamist. He is a former long-time member of the Muslim Brotherhood, but broke ties with them last year to run for president. He was imprisoned for five years for his Muslim Brotherhood association.

Ahmad Muhammad Shafiq (70) is a retired Air Marshal who commanded the Egyptian air force and then served as minister of civil aviation until last year. During the revolution in 2011, he was appointed as prime minister for a period of two months. He is regarded by many Egyptians as a holdover of the Mubarak government.

So, these are the three candidates that have been qualified by the SCAF-appointed council. A respected statesman, a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood and a retired military officer of the Mubarak government. It would appear to me that the ruling military officers have shaped the upcoming election quite effectively. Most Egyptians are wary of anyone associated closely with the former government, while others are wary of an avowed, albeit moderate, Islamist.

That leaves 'Amru Musa. Unless something changes - and in Egypt that is not only possible but likely - Musa will be the next president of Egypt. Given the state of the situation in the country, that's probably as good as its going to get.

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* I have transliterated the Arabic names according to the official U.S. government-mandated transliteration system, that used by the US-UK Board on Geographic Names.

April 16, 2012

UN observers in Syria - don't expect much

UN observers at the Damascus Sheraton

Six military officers that comprise the advance team of what is expected to be as many as 250 United Nations (UN) observers and ceasefire monitors arrived in Damascus and checked in to the Sheraton Hotel. They will enter into a series of meetings with the Syrians to work out how they will move around the country, what access they will have, where they will work, security arrangements for the team, etc.

Having been assigned as the air attache at the U.S. Embassy in Damascus and having worked with the Syrian Ministry of Defense foreign liaison office - the office that will likely work with the UN officers - I can safely predict that the six officers are about to learn about Syrian bureaucracy. As with most dictatorships, the regime can get things done quickly when it wants, and can drag its feet interminably when it doesn't. I am putting support to the UN in the latter category. I suspect the officers are going to spend quite a bit of time at the Sheraton. If you have to cool your heels in downtown Damascus, though, it's as good a place as any.

The Syrian regime is only allowing these officers into the country as part of an information campaign to allay criticism from the rest of the world. It hopes to prevent increased political pressure and possibly economic sanctions. Since the uprising began over a year ago, the government of President Bashar al-Asad has portrayed the opposition as "terrorists." The tech-savvy al-Asad has made effective use of the internet and social media organs like Facebook, YouTube and Twitter in an attempt to frame perceptions of the conflict in his favor. I have looked at the effort - it is quite professional.

Allowing the UN to send observers is another tactic in that strategy. Even if the UN effort grows to 250 officers, they will never be able to effectively fully observe what is going on in the country. If past performance is any indication of the effectiveness of these type of UN missions, this one is doomed to failure and will be nothing more than a propaganda tool for the Syrian regime. The officers will never have the unimpeded access they need, and everything they see will be carefully orchestrated.

The Syrians are very good at managing perceptions. For example, when President Bill Clinton visited Damascus for six hours in 1994 (when I was the attache), the Syrian government decided that the scenery on the road from the airport to the presidential palace included some eyesores, one of which was a refugee camp inhabited by Syrians who had been displaced from the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. We watched in amazement as the residents were forcibly relocated to apartment blocks, and the entire refugee camp leveled by bulldozers and replaced with a beautifully landscaped soccer field - overnight.

Previous UN observer missions in the area indicate how successful this one might be. Take UNIFIL in neighboring Lebanon, created in 1978. From the United Nations website:

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was established by the Security Council on 19 March 1978 through the adoption of resolution 425 (1978), to confirm Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon, restore international peace and security and assist the Government of Lebanon in restoring its effective authority in the area. In addition to the adjustments of the mandate after the 1982 Israeli-Lebanese war and after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon to the Blue Line in 2000, its mandate was again expanded in August 2006 following the Israeli-Hizbullah war. Its tasks included monitoring the cessation of hostilities, accompanying and supporting the Lebanese armed forces as they deployed throughout the south of Lebanon, and extending its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons.

Likewise, UNDOF was created in 1974 and is still there. From the UN website:

The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was established by the Security Council on 31 May 1974 through the adoption of resolution 350 (1974), following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the subsequent agreed disengagement of the Israeli and Syrian forces in the Golan Heights. Since then, UNDOF has remained in the area to maintain the ceasefire between Israel and Syrian Arab Republic and to supervise the implementation of the disengagement agreement.

The fact that both groups still exist is an indication that they don't solve problems, they only acknowledge their existence. UN observer groups are big business in Syria, Israel and Lebanon.

There is a difference with UNIFIL and UNDOF as far as the Syrians are concerned. For the Syrians, it is a tool to be used against the Israelis. The newly formed observer group in Syria is actually aimed at the Syrians, so don't expect much cooperation. To the contrary, you can expect obstruction - it will be subtle, but it will be there.

The observers are there to monitor a ceasefire negotiated by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. For whatever reason, the UN is now invested in the Annan plan, a six-point plan that has almost no chance of succeeding. Anyone who has lived in Syria since the 1970 "Correctionist Movement" of Bashar's father Hafiz al-Asad knows that the government cannot share power - they must retain their positions through coercion and force. That necessitates the presence of Syrian troops in the cities where the uprising is strongest - Homs, Hamad, Idlib, Dara' and others.

Of course, these cities are where the observers will demand to go - I would do the same. Just as with the now-defunct Arab League observer mission earlier this year, they will never quite be there to see anything that shows the government to be in violation. When the observers are allowed to visit, there will be no troops visible. When the observers depart, the troops will return. This is their country - they know it better than the observers. The cities are hours apart over mediocre roads - the UN officers will spend hours in vehicles only to arrive when things have been properly staged.

I feel for the military officers on the observer team. They are likely professional officers trying to carry out an near-impossible mission, but will be frustrated at every turn. I know - I have walked in their boots.

Allowing the UN monitors into Syria is a calculated move by the al-Asad regime. They hope to be able to manipulate the officers to prevent them from seeing anything that would give the UN an excuse to levy sanctions on the Syrian government.

I hope the Syrians are not successful, but I expect they will be.

April 14, 2012

FLASH - Istanbul talks result in agreement to talk!!!

New York Times story on the historic agreement to talk

Yes, I meant the title and caption to be sarcastic. I have wondered over the last few years why Catherine Ashton still has a job. Ashton, more properly Baroness Ashton of Upholland, Her Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, is the European Union's High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Given her remarks after this latest waste of time in Istanbul, I am still wondering. It has to be her title, because it sure is not her job performance.

What am I talking about? In my two earlier articles concerning the talks between Iran the P5+1 (the permanent member nations of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany), I predicted that the talks would result in an agreement to continue talking, but nothing else. My words, "We'll just continue to talk about having talks...."

You can review the articles at:
* Diplomacy and the Iranian nuclear issue
* Diplomacy and the Iranian nuclear issue - ADDENDUM

After Secretary of State Hillary Clinton "warned" the Iranians that the international community is not interested in "talks for the sake of talk," she added that the "window for diplomacy" in the standoff over Iran's nuclear program is closing. When she said it, I was pleased, hoping that finally someone in the Obama Administration realized that the Iranians have been playing them - and rather effectively - for over three years.

Unfortunately, "talks for the sake of talks" is exactly the result of the April 13-14 talks in Istanbul. Instead of calling the Iranians out on their obvious delaying tactic, the Administration (in the person of the deputy national security advisor praised Iran's "positive attitude." Positive attitude? Mr. President, they are playing you, again, for the umpteenth time.

Back to the baroness. To hear her gushing over the talks, you would think it was a diplomatic breakthrough rivaling the 1993 Oslo Accords. Although she called the talks "constructive and useful" and said that "we want now to move to a sustained process of dialogue," the only result was an agreement to have more talks in about five weeks. Five weeks of unimpeded uranium enrichment for the Iranians - that does not sound constructive and useful to me.

The baroness's European colleagues do not seem to be as impressed as she is with the "accomplishments" of the talks. The British foreign secretary merely called the talks the first step in a process. The French seemed unimpressed as well. It seems only the baroness and the clueless American deputy national security advisor were hoodwinked by the continuous delaying tactics of the Iranians.

Of course, the Iranians, knowing that they again kicked the can down the road for another five weeks, gloated. Their negotiator, Saeed Jalili, said the talks "will lead to concrete steps towards a comprehensive negotiated solution which restores international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear program."

That said, several of the negotiators noted a change in the Iranian attitude, describing it as "almost positive and more constructive." I would assess that the Iranians sense that time is indeed running out, not so much afraid of Barack Obama's and Hillary Clinton's threats as the potential for Israeli military action against their nuclear facilities. Jalili claimed that "for the Iranian people the language of threat and pressure doesn't work."

Actually, that is exactly what works. However, the West has in the past not been willing to apply the right pressure to bring about a change in Iranian behavior. They are starting to now with sanctions on Iranian banks, making it hard for the country to sell its oil. This pressure needs to be increased.

It remains to be seen just how the Obama Administration will react to the failure of the talks. The President is concerned that as the election approaches, he will be seen as having failed to stop the Iranian nuclear program. He should be. Thus far, the Iranians have outplayed him at every move.

What do we have to show for the efforts thus far? Talks that reached an agreement to have more talks.


April 10, 2012

Obama, Peres and Pollard - any "flexibility?"

U.S. President Barack Obama and Israeli President Shimon Peres

As many of my readers are aware, I have serious problems with many of the Middle East policies of the Obama Administration. I believe that for the most part, this White House does not have a grasp of the nuances that shape events in the region and that this naivete does not portend well for the future. Like it or not, we must remain the major player in events in the region, if for no other reason than to guarantee the unimpeded flow of oil from the Persian Gulf.

That said, when President Barack Obama does the right thing, I believe it incumbent on me to say so. If one criticizes, then one must likewise compliment. On Tuesday (April 10), the Administration did the right thing. It did the right thing in the face of no small amount of political pressure. Numerous Jewish groups in the United States as well as Jewish members of Congress have lobbied for the release/pardon of convicted spy Jonathan Pollard.

Pollard, a former U.S. Navy civilian intelligence analyst, has served over 26 years of a life sentence for espionage against the United States on behalf of Israel. Due to legal technicalities in force at the time of his sentencing, he is scheduled to be released in November of 2015.

Israeli requests for Pollard's release are nothing new. I have detailed these efforts in a recent article: Israeli leaders depart without spy Pollard - good! I am conflicted by the Israelis' continuous requests to excuse Pollard's treason. The intelligence officer in me respects the Israelis' desire to stand by a recruited spy who worked for them, while the American military officer in me would have supported the death penalty against a traitor whose perfidy may have led to the deaths of people who we, American intelligence, had recruited to work for us. It is a haunting duality.

The latest request, coming from a man of the stature of Shimon Peres, has real gravitas. The highly respected Israeli leader is no doubt acting on the orders of his government and political party. In response, a White House official - not the President himself - stated that the administration's position on Pollard "has not changed."

Shimon Peres is scheduled to be in Washington in June of this year to be awarded America's highest civilian award, the Presidential Medal of Freedom. There is an effort ongoing in Israel to convince Peres not to accept the award unless Pollard is freed. Eighty members of the Knesset have signed a petition urging Peres to refuse the award. Do the Israelis really want to insult the only real ally they have?

This is very troubling. Shimon Peres is an honorable man who has served his country in a continuous series of military, political and diplomatic positions that mirror the creation and development of the Jewish state. To have this icon of Israeli history grovel for the release of a traitor, no matter the cause, should be embarrassing for the people of Israel. A paragon of honor asking for the release of a spy - not exactly the legacy he would want. It is hard to believe the government of Israel wants one of its most respected citizens to compromise his standards to be associated with the ilk that is Jonathan Pollard.

There is another angle to this case. As we have all seen on video clips, President Obama told Russian President Dmitry Medvedev when discussing America's European-based missile defense system, that he will have more "flexibility" after the upcoming election.

This begs the question - on what other matters will the President believe he has more flexibility?

Regardless of the outcome of the election, after it is over, the President will either be in a lame-duck status until January 19, 2013 or until January 19, 2017. After November 6, 2012, the President may feel he has the political freedom - or as he calls it, "flexibility" - to acquiesce to demands such as the release of Jonathan Pollard.

I hope the President adheres to the principled position of previous Administrations and resists calls for "flexibility" over any release for the traitor Jonathan Pollard.

April 4, 2012

Diplomacy and the Iranian nuclear issue - ADDENDUM

Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi (Esam Omran/Reuters)

A few days ago, I published an article, Diplomacy and the Iranian nuclear issue. In it, I accused the Iranians of playing a delaying game to buy time for their nuclear weapons program. I mentioned that the last round of talks ended when the two sides could not agree on a subject for the talks. The Iranians refused to agree that the talks were to be about their uranium enrichment program - the only reason for holding the talks.

This is typical for the Iranians, and a tactic that has served them well for years. It is only recently that Europe and the United States have begun getting serious about effective sanctions, and those are still months away.

Now, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi has raised objections to the venue for the talks. They have been scheduled to be in Istanbul for quite some time, but less than ten days before the meetings, the Iranians now have an issue with convening the talks in Turkey.

It is understandable that the Iranians are upset with the Turks. Turkey is supporting the opposition in Syria, Iran's closest - and some would say, only - ally. Iran has formally requested Baghdad host the negotiations. Iraq, under the leadership of pro-Iranian Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, is drawing closer and closer to Tehran in its political, economic and even military relations. Not surprisingly, the Iraqi foreign minister (my friend Hoshyar Zebari) supports the Iranian proposal.

Now there will be a negotiation of where to negotiate. It reminds me of the Paris talks about Vietnam in the late 1960s - the parties spend an inordinate amount of time arguing over the shape of the table.

The talks will probably be held in Baghdad, but it remains to be seen what is actually on the agenda. Perhaps at last the Iranians will actually discuss their nuclear program, but I'm not betting on it. They will assert their right to enrich uranium (not in question), deny the existence of a weapons program (there is) and end the talks when the representatives of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany, the so-called "P5+1," demand further information on the program.

Meanwhile, the centrifuges continue to spin.


April 1, 2012

Diplomacy and the Iranian nuclear issue

Former Iranian negotiator Hossein Mousavian

As the United States considers imposing tougher sanctions on Iran over its refusal to adhere to a series of United Nations resolutions about its uranium enrichment program, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has warned the Iranians that time for a diplomatic solution is fast running out. This is the most succinct warning delivered by the secretary in a long time, and is long overdue.

Another round of talks between Iran and the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany, the so-called "P5+1," is scheduled for mid-April in Istanbul. Most Middle East observers, this one included, believe this is just another stalling tactic on the part of the Iranians, much as they have done for the past several years.

The last round of talks ended when the two sides could not agree on a subject for the talks. It's bad enough when negotiations fail due to disagreement over the subject being discussed, but when supposed professional diplomats cannot reach an agreement on what subject to discuss, it borders on absurdity.

Mrs. Clinton's words: "We're going in with one intention: to resolve the international community's concerns about Iran's nuclear program. Our policy is one of prevention, not containment. We are determined to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. We enter into these talks with a sober perspective about Iran's intentions. It is incumbent upon Iran to demonstrate by its actions that it is a willing partner and to participate in these negotiations with an effort to obtain concrete results."

I predict that at the April talks, the Iranians will argue that their enrichment program is not up for discussion, effectively wasting everyone's time except theirs. While they agree to talks and try to give the impression that they truly want a diplomatic solution, the centrifuges keep spinning and they pile up more uranium. The Iranians don't want a diplomatic solution, in fact, they don't want any solution. Wanting a solution would indicate that they believe there is an actual problem. They do not believe their quest for a nuclear weapon is a problem. Their repeated agreements to enter into talks is merely an attempt to delay long enough until they achieve their objective. Am I the only one that gets that?

Now let's look at recent remarks on the subject made by former Iranian nuclear negotiator Hossein Musavian, who is now a visiting scholar at Princeton University. His proposed solution to the Iranian nuclear issue: "As soon as the P5+1 recognize Iran's right to enrich uranium, there will be an opportunity to break the nine-year deadlock over the nuclear program."

With a brilliant observation like that, it's hard to believe this guy has a job at a university the caliber of Princeton. Okay, Hossein, let's take this slowly. First, Iran does have the right to enrich uranium. However, it does not have the right to build a nuclear weapon, as long as it remains a signatory of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The treaty allows for member states to develop nuclear energy programs as long as they can demonstrate that their nuclear programs are not being used for the development of nuclear weapons. That is what the United Nations is asking of the Iranians - demonstrate that its program is not for the development of nuclear weapons. When Iran does that, the deadlock - and sanctions - are over. The ball is in Iran's court.

You see, Hossein, the problem the Iranians have is that they cannot demonstrate that their program is not being used for the development of nuclear weapons. Why not? Simple, because the Iranians are developing a nuclear weapons capability. There is no other explanation for their program. It is much too small for a nuclear energy program, and the necessary infrastructure to support such a huge program has not been seriously considered since the days of the Shah. If Iran were to use every one of its nuclear facilities to generate electricity, it would produce less energy than what Iran's oil wells flare off as waste.

Nuclear weapons analysts at the Los Alamos National Labs - the professionals at this sort of thing - have looked at the size of Iran's program and concluded it is exactly the right size for a nuclear weapons program. In reality, it can be nothing else.

The Iranians know it, the Israelis know it and with a few notable exceptions in the U.S. intelligence community, we know it. The real question for our diplomats is why are we going through this kabuki dance? The Iranians are not going to give up their nuclear weapons program because of a "diplomatic breakthrough" in Istanbul later this month.

Diplomacy has failed and will continue to fail. Tougher sanctions will certainly hurt the Iranian people, but will they be effective in slowing the nuclear program? Hard to say. The only sanction that has any chance of working it to prohibit Iran from exporting oil. Do we have the political will to do it? Doubtful. We'll just continue to talk about having talks, probably right up to the point where Israel believes the rest of the world is not committed to solving the crisis and takes action on its own.

The Israelis have heard both Secretary Clinton and President Obama say the words that we will not permit Iran to develop a nuclear weapon, but so far, it's all talk. I guess that's called diplomacy.


March 30, 2012

Syria agrees to ceasefire - don't hold your breath


According to pronouncements from the United Nations and Syrian media, Syrian President Bashar al-Asad has agreed to a ceasefire between his armed forces and the opposition, supposedly paving the way for some form of negotiations between the two sides. This alleged ceasefire is part of a deal arranged by none other than former United Nations Secretary General and now chief envoy Kofi Annan, whose past accomplishments at this sort of thing are pretty much nonexistent.

The agreement between Annan and al-Asad, announced on March 27 by Annan, includes six points supposedly endorsed by the Syrian president. Annan claims that the agreement includes an "immediate" ceasefire, access for humanitarian organizations to the areas affected by the violence, negotiations that will lead to a multiparty democracy, release of political prisoners and access to Syria by foreign media.

Does this sound familiar? It should. In November, the Syrian regime reached an agreement with the Arab League by which it would withdraw its armed forces from the cities and start political reforms. Al-Asad's acquiescence to the Arab League was in reaction to a threat by the organization to suspend Syria from its ranks. It was basically ignored by the regime; artillery attacks on the restless cities of Homs, Hamah and Idlib continued as al-Asad announced his acceptance of the plan.

In February of this year, the government continued to attempt to deflect world condemnation of the regime's violent repression of its citizens - it staged a sham* referendum asking the Syrian people if they wanted a new constitution. As with most elections and referendums in Syria, it passed overwhelmingly. The new constitution sounds good, but it appears that the regime is paying about as much attention to the new one as it did to the old one.

Al-Asad learned well from both his father and his Iranian allies. From his father he learned to rule Syria with an iron fist. In 1982, Hafiz al-Asad deployed the much-feared sarayat al-difa' (The Defense Companies), a regime protection unit of the Syrian army under command of his brother Rifa't, to put down an eerily similar Muslim Brotherhood uprising in Hamah, the scene of much of the violence over the last year.

Rifa't's ruthless destruction of a good portion of the city center and the killing of as many as 25,000 citizens is regarded as "The Hamah Rules" - how the al-Asad's handle dissension. (See Syria: The invasion of Hamah for more.) We are seeing those rules being applied today. The Syrian army's regime protection units - in particular the Republican Guard and the 4th Armor Division - are repeating the events of 1982 across the country, having killed over 9000 citizens thus far.

From the Iranians, he learned how to deal with the feckless West. Agree to talks, and do nothing. Just as the Iranians have delayed any effective sanctions (although this may be changing) by agreeing to talk, then refusing to talk, then agreeing to talk, etc., Bashar al-Asad agreed with the Arab League last year and with Kofi Annan now to buy time and space. He has no intention of opening up Syria to a multi-party democracy, releasing political prisoners, allowing foreign media into the country, or stopping the repression of any dissent.

Bashar al-Asad will not give up power. If Kofi Annan thinks he will, he is either naive or delusional. All Mr. Annan has done is provided the Syrian president with a way to stave off sterner action against Syria by the West. Do not look for the Syrian army to return to garrison anytime soon.


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* I love using the word "sham" when talking about Syria. It is a play on words - الشام (ash sham) is the Arabic word for Damascus (and formerly for the area that is now Syria). It is also the name of a car jointly produced by a Syrian-Iranian consortium. See my earlier article on the car, What's in a name? - the Syrian-Iranian car company.

March 20, 2012

Libyan militia desecrates WWII cemetery in Benghazi


The recent desecration of a World War II cemetery in Benghazi, Libya by what appears to be members of an Islamist militia underscores the difficulty in reconciling East and West in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. It also serves as a warning to other Arab countries what can happen when you remove the sitting government, be it good or bad.

The video is pretty self explanatory. I have listened to it a few times - my Libyan dialect is not as good as my Syrian/Lebanese, but I'll share with you some interesting excerpts.

Mostly they are just egging each other on, yelling things like "Break them, they're Crusaders* and dogs," "God is great," and "Let's start with that cross (the cenotaph)" interspersed with profanity.

At about time code 1:00, one militiaman dislodges a headstone inscribed with the Magen David, the Shield of David (often called the Star of David), indicating the grave of a fallen soldier who was a Jew. The speaker remarks that this is "the grave of a Crusader." Everyone else appears to be focused on the large cross and knocking it down. Then the speaker realizes the grave is marked with the Shield of David and says, "Look at the flag on the front of it, this one was one of the Israeli battalion, it's Hebrew." Note that Israel was not yet a country when this soldier was killed.

The militiamen then turn their attention to the large cross. The speaker tells the man on the ladder to break off the sides of the cross. Others shout break it, God is great, etc. with more profanity. At some point, they appear to give up on knocking down the cross, one remarking that "it isn't breaking."

The video has made its way to other Arab countries. I received an email from a friend in Syria, a supporter of the regime of Bashar al-Asad. He is a physician who believes in secular government and although not a fan of the ruling Ba'th Party, believes it is better to maintain the current government than risk a takeover by the Islamist al-ikhwan al-muslimin (the Muslim Brotherhood).

The text of his email:

That is what we don't have in Syria; that is what they are trying to do to my country. But I think that we Syrians have more open minds than to let something like that happen here. What we are seeing in Damascus now are people from Afghanistan, Libya, Lebanon and Africa - it's not normal. We don't want what happened there (Benghazi) to happen in our country and I think the people will fight to keep our beautiful Damascus - Muslim, Christian and Syrian Jews.

As as aside, there is a large British Commonwealth cemetery in Damascus with graves of 1077 soldiers from both world wars. The Commonwealth Countries hold a somber ceremony at the cemetery on Remembrance Day (November 11). I have attended these as a representative of the U.S. Air Force - quite moving.

The Libyan government (or what passes for it) has pledged to find and punish those responsible for this outrage, and to restore the cemetery to its original condition. I hope they mean it, since it was the airmen of the United Kingdom and at least one of the Commonwealth countries - Canada - and their NATO allies that liberated them from the regime of Mu'amar al-Qadhafi. Otherwise, they will appear to be a nation of ingrates.

We'll see.

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* The actual word is صليبي - salibi, or "of the cross." It is commonly used as a derogatory term for Western troops, which they regard as Christian.

March 19, 2012

Semantics, politics and Iran's nuclear weapons program


In the aftermath of the rhetoric delivered by U.S. President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the recent American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) convention and during Netanyahu's visit to Washington, the American and Israeli intelligence agencies are "semanticizing" and politicizing their assessments of Iran's nuclear program so that their two governments appear to be on the same page. It will be interesting to see if the new pronouncements force Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to adjust her previous remarks that are not exactly in line with these positions.

I just love it when government spokespersons attempt to tell you one thing when they mean something else. According to an American intelligence official, there is little disagreement between the Israeli Mossad and the U.S. intelligence community. You would not have known that had you been paying attention to the exchanges of words between Israeli and American military leaders during the recent spate of the Americans' visits to Israel.

Israeli leaders talked about the imminent threat from Tehran while the Americans spouted their "time and space" view - that we still have time for sanctions to work before the Iranians can assemble a nuclear weapon. Sanctions may have hurt the average Iranian citizen, but they have not slowed the nuclear program at all. It was this difference of opinion on the Iranian nuclear weapons program that caused Israel to advocate quick action against Iran while the United States pressured the Israelis to delay any military strikes.

The U.S. intelligence officials exact words were, "[Mossad] does not disagree with the U.S. on the weapons program...there is not a lot of dispute between the U.S. and Israeli intelligence communities on the facts." How is that for a ringing endorsement? "Does not disagree" and "not a lot of dispute" - having worked in the intelligence community for almost three decades, that sounds to me like there are significant differences between the Israeli and American positions. Use of the double negative (twice) is a giveaway.

It also sounds to me that the Israelis, for whatever reason, have decided to alter their public stance on the Iranian nuclear weapons program. I suspect the reason is pressure from the Obama Administration. I'd like to know what was promised to the Israelis to change their position - increased aid, weapons - like bigger bunker-buster bombs - intelligence, etc.? I'd also like to know if the Israelis are simply mouthing what they think their American sponsors want to hear, or do they really believe this fantasy?

Both nations now state that there is not enough proof to determine whether Iran is building a nuclear bomb. Secretary Clinton remarked shortly before the Netanyahu visit that Tehran has not decided to produce weapons. Again, having done this for a long time, there is no way one would make that remark if it were based on actual intelligence. Information that specific would have to have been derived from an extremely sensitive intelligence source - one would hope Secretary Clinton knows this and would not compromise sources. After all, that is how you get your agents killed. The fact that she is talking about it means it is an assessment, a guess or just wishful thinking. Remember, it was her intelligence bureau (albeit during the Bush Administration) that authored the now-discredited 2003 National Intelligence Assessment that Iran was not working on nuclear weapons. State Department analysts are notorious for being apologists for the Iranians.

Secretary Clinton has made some other, slightly different remarks that she may have to walk back. If what I suspect is true - that the Obama Administration has pressured Israel into accepting its dubious version of reality - her recent declaration that the United States is committed to prevent Iran from not only developing a nuclear weapon but also developing the capability to develop a nuclear weapon may not stand. I hope she means exactly what she said and we don't hear a State Department spokesperson later tell us "what the Secretary really meant" is something different.

In the past, the American intelligence community sought to distinguish between having the capability to develop nuclear weapons and actually building nuclear weapons. The former was deemed to be acceptable, while the latter was not. Mrs. Clinton's statements indicate that there is no longer such a distinction between the two according to the Obama Administration - both are unacceptable. Yet it appears the United States is pressuring Israel to make that exact distinction. So which is it, Mrs. Clinton? What is the American position?

It would appear, as I have stated before (see Netanyahu and Obama at AIPAC - a leader and a reader), I believe the overarching consideration for the American position - actually the Obama Administration position - is based on how it affects this November's presidential election.

Could the current - and convenient - American intelligence assessment that Iran is developing the capability to produce a nuclear weapon but has not actually made the decision to build a nuclear weapon be based on politics rather than on reality? When Secretary Clinton made the claim that the United States regarded the development of a nuclear weapons capability as the same as actually developing a nuclear weapon, she was reflecting reality. The Israelis have said as much - they regard the "haven't made the decision" argument as "semantic and secondary." For what it is worth, I agree with Mrs. Clinton's claim and the Israeli view.

Israeli intelligence analysts believe that once the decision is made, it may be as long as two years before Iran has a deliverable warhead for its ballistic missiles. Their concern is that Iran is moving its research, development and production facilities into hardened bunkers. At some point, Israel may not be able to launch an effective military operation against Iran's nuclear facilities.

My cynical assessment is that the Obama Administration wants to prevent an Israeli military strike on Iran in general, but to prevent it at all costs before the November election. A regional conflict and resultant soaring oil prices will not be helpful for the President's re-election campaign. Until then, the United States will work closely with Israel and pressure the Israeli leadership to wait. It remains to be seen what American policy will be after the election - that, of course, depends on who wins.

It is sad when semantics and politics intrude into intelligence and the effective conduct of foreign policy. If you think it hasn't, you're not paying attention.