The coming assault on al-Raqqah - a political minefield

Al-Raqqah, Syria (click for larger view)

According to the senior U.S. commander leading the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), an attack on the group's main stronghold in the Syrian city of al-Raqqah may start soon.

The timing, according to U.S. Army Lieutenant General Stephen Townsend, is being driven by planning and potential execution of terror attacks against Western targets emanating from the ISIS "capital" and main operations center. The general did not name a specific threat or target.

The announcement comes just weeks after the kickoff of the Iraqi offensive to recapture the city of al-Mawsil (Mosul) from ISIS, who seized the city from Iraqi forces in June 2014. That offensive will possibly take months - the lead Iraqi forces have just reached the city limits.

The original U.S.-led coalition plan - developed jointly with the Iraqi military - was to have Iraqi forces first surround Mosul, then press the attack and eradicate ISIS in Iraq. In my opinion, the Iraqis launched the attack prematurely, since there are still pockets of ISIS control outside of Mosul. For my analysis on the Iraqi plan, see my earlier article, The Iraqi operation to retake Mosul - are they ready?

The current operation against Mosul in Iraq has been expected for some time - Iraqi officials have claimed that the city will be back under Iraqi government control by the end of this year. I hope they are right, but I think they may be overly optimistic.

Likewise, it is no secret that at some point, ISIS must also be removed from its main operations center in al-Raqqah, Syria. One only need look at a situation map of the fighting in Syria to see that ISIS is being pushed back toward al-Raqqah.

The group is under pressure from U.S.-led air operations, the very effective Syrian Kurdish forces (the YPG), the U.S.-supported and advised Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF, a joint Syrian Arab and Syrian Kurd armed group), and recently the Turkish supported (air, armor and artillery) Free Syrian Army (FSA) operating northeast of Aleppo. To be fair, there is the infrequent Russian air operation against ISIS, but only in support of Syrian Army operations.

The Turkish-supported FSA operation in northern Syria, called Operation Euphrates Shield, has sealed off the remaining section of the Syrian-Turkish border from ISIS access. The rest of the Syrian-Turkish border is controlled by the YPG, much to Ankara's displeasure. The Euphrates Shield forces have been effective in pushing ISIS south and east, but the FSA fighters are still almost 100 miles from al-Raqqah.

That distance becomes important as the U.S.-led coalition begins planning on just how the fight against ISIS in Syria will be executed. This is a political minefield, not just for the coalition, but for all of the different interested parties in Syria. I find it interesting that the senior American commander is talking about the attack on al-Raqqah, yet represents a country who refuses to commit its ground troops to the fight. That, however, is a topic for another day.

As in Iraq, all parties are committed to the destruction and/or eradication of ISIS. However, in Iraq, all of the parties are more or less allied in that fight. There are differences between the United States and the Iranian-backed Shi'a militias to be sure, but they are nonetheless of common purpose.

In Syria, there are at least five anti-ISIS factions, some of which are engaged in combat operations against each other. Let's take a look at the sides in this multifaceted conflict.

* First, there is the Syrian government and its allies. The regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad is supported politically by Russia, Iran, Lebanon and Iraq. Military support is provided by the Russian armed forces, primarily through airpower, as well as ground forces from the Iranian Army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Lebanese Hizballah, Iraqi Shi'a militias, and a group of Afghan Shi'a fighters.

These allies effectively double the size of what remains of the Syrian Army. The Syrian military has been severely crippled by losses and defections to the point that without this external assistance, it would cease to be a viable force.

* Second, we have the FSA, now supported by the Turkish military. One might question Turkey's motives in its participation in Operation Euphrates Shield. Although the stated reason is to fight ISIS - and they are doing that - many believe it is to ensure that the Syrian Kurds do not create some form of autonomous region in northern Syria as they have in Iraq, or worst case, attempt to merge the Iraqi and Syrian Kurdish areas into one political entity.

Turkey's prime minister has made the claim that the Turkish Army will mount the attack on al-Raqqah, rather than allow the Syrian Kurds to do it. The problem with that: the Turks and FSA are 100 miles from al-Raqqah, while the Kurds are only 35 miles from the city.

* The third faction is the Kurdish militia called the YPG - arguably the most effective fighters arrayed against ISIS. As noted, Turkey is upset over American support for the YPG. The Turks regard the Kurdish militia as an extension of the Kurdish Workers' Party (more commonly known by its Kurdish initials, PKK), which has been designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, the European Union, and NATO.

Given the proximity of YPG forces to al-Raqqah, LTG Townsend has stated that they will be involved in the military operation, with the added caveat that he wants only Arab forces to enter and retake the city itself. This is similar to the effort in Mosul, where Iraqi Arabs are supposed to be the only units to actually enter the city, with the Kurds outside to provide support. I don't think it will work in either Mosul or al-Raqqah - the Kurds represent a much-needed military capability.

* Fourth, there is the U.S.-supported SDF. These forces are a combination of Syrian Kurds and Syrian Arabs who are committed to fighting ISIS. They are funded and equipped by the United States, and have American special operations forces embedded to "advise and assist." These units have been effective in conducting operations against ISIS in eastern and northeastern Syria, with dedicated U.S.-led coalition air support. They will likely be a key part of any assault on al-Raqqah.

* Fifth, there are anti-regime Islamist groups not affiliated with the FSA or SDF. These include, among others, the former al-Qa'idah affiliated group Jabhat al-Nusrah (the Victory Front) now calling itself Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (JFS, the Levant Conquest Front).

The relationships of these factions vary between temporary tactical alliances to outright hostilities. While they are all anti-ISIS, they are not united in their efforts. As I said, Syria is a political minefield with no one entity in charge or coordinating the overall situation in the country.

The situation in Syria is confusing and chaotic - it will decrease the effectiveness of any military operation against ISIS in al-Raqqah. Although ISIS will be defeated, the political minefield that is Syria will remain.

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Erdoğan and Mosul - symptom of a larger problem?

"National Oath" map - 1920

During an address explaining why Turkey must be involved in the Iraqi military operation to retake the city of Mosul from the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan set off alarm bells by displaying a 1920 map of Turkey based on what was then called the misak-i milli ("national oath").

On the "National oath" map, the borders of Turkey include portions of what is now Greece, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Syria, Iraq, Armenia and Azerbaijan. All of this territory was part of the Ottoman Empire prior to its defeat in World War I. The map designates what the Turks believed should be the new borders of their new country.

President Erdoğan has argued for several months that Turkish troops must participate in the Iraqi military operation against ISIS in Mosul, based on Turkey's historic ties to that city, as well as the city of Kirkuk, also included in the "national oath" area. Both Mosul and Kirkuk have large Turkmen populations.

Although the Turks claim that the two cities are majority "Turkmen," thus validating their claims to the cities or at least to have a say in their future status. However, over the years, Iraq has successfully "Arabized" the cities over the years to alter the demographics -- they are now Arab cities.

To further complicate matters, the Kurds have also laid claim to Kirkuk and have tried to "Kurdize" the city by expelling Arab citizens. During the rapid ISIS advance into northern Iraq in 2014, Kurdish peshmerga took control of Kirkuk to prevent it from falling to the group. I suspect they will be extremely reluctant to relinquish their claim to the city, claiming it now as a part of the Kurdish Autonomous Region.

The term "Turkmen" itself is illustrative of the issue. After the war, most of the non-Turkish area of Ottoman Empire was divided up into the modern nations of Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine (Israel), and the borders with Greece and Bulgaria were adjusted. The British - victors in the war against the Ottomans - coined the term to differentiate the ethnic Turks in what was to become northern Iraq from the population of what was to become modern Turkey. The Turks still bristle at the imposed terminology.

Erdoğan is not only concerned with the Iraqi military campaign in Mosul - I am sure his military advisers and intelligence service have briefed him on the reality that the Iraqi forces, with U.S.-led coalition support, will eventually retake Mosul. Although the final cost in resources and human life is not yet known, the outcome is not in doubt - the Iraqis will prevail.

What Erdoğan wants is a say in what happens in northern Iraq after ISIS is expelled. In other words, the Turkish president wants to ensure that the Kurds are kept in check. He is concerned about increased Kurdish influence in Iraq based on their contributions to the Iraqi military effort against ISIS - the Kurds are undoubtedly the most effective arrow in the Iraqi quiver.

Further, Erdoğan wants to head off any thoughts of a unified Kurdish entity in what is now northern Iraq and northern Syria, called Rojava by the Syria-based Kurds. After ISIS is expelled from Iraq and Syria, as they will be, the Kurds are going to want a reassessment of their status in both Iraq and Syria. Turkey wants to make sure that status is agreeable to Ankara, agreeable to Erdoğan.

That said, I believe it Erdoğan wants more than just having a say in the future of northern Iraq and northern Syria. The use of the 1920 "national oath" map at his presentation was not accidental - it was there for a reason.

Turkish demands for a role in northern Iraq, and its military actions in northern Syria are complemented by a series of Turkish air provocations against fellow NATO ally Greece. On at least two occasions, Turkish Air Force F-16's have penetrated Greek airspace, drawing reactions from the Hellenic Air Force. One incursion is possibly a navigational error in an area of meandering borders, but two distinct incursions in the same area raises the "deliberate" flag.

At the same time, Erdoğan does not assuage the apprehensions of his neighbors when he openly encourages his young population to question the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) which effectively defined Turkey's borders with its neighbors. These are the borders that define the Middle East as we know it today. As part of that treaty, Turkey relinquished claims to the remainder of the Ottoman Empire, effectively ending the border conflicts that continued for several years after World War I.

There was a subsequent agreement to the Treaty of Lausanne that dealt specifically with the city of Mosul. The Ankara Pact (1926), based on a commission report of the League of Nations, stated that Mosul should remain part of Iraq. The pact was ratified by Iraq, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

One cannot help but think of the actions of a recalcitrant Germany in the 1930's, bristling at the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. The treaty imposed what the Germans considered to be egregious conditions and sought to to subvert them clandestinely, eventually leading to the birth of a movement that led to the creation of the National Socialist (Nazi) party.

A segment of the Turkish population, encouraged by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP), are echoing a similar refrain, bristling at the terms - imposed or agreed to, depending on where you stand - of the Treaty of Lausanne and the Ankara Pact.

We should not dismiss Erdoğan's words as mere rhetoric. He has shown himself to be a capable - if distasteful - political force with a vision for Turkey's future. His attempts to convince Iraqi Prime Minister Haydar al-Abadi to include Turkish troops in the operation to recapture Mosul is a tactical maneuver to stem Kurdish nationalism. Erdoğan considers increased Kurdish influence in Iraq or greater autonomy to be a threat to Turkish national interests.

What we should be concerned about is Erdoğan's long-term, strategic vision of Turkey. Are his display of the "national oath" map, decision to provide military support to the Free Syrian Army in northern Syria, Turkish air attacks on Kurdish forces in Syria, Turkish Air Force seemingly deliberate incursions into Greek airspace, and not-so-subtle encouragement of Turkish nationalists to challenge the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne and the Ankara Pact a harbinger of things to come?

Are the Turks intent on at some point reclaiming what they consider to be Turkish territory "stolen" from them almost a century ago? I hope not, but I would not put it past Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

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Personal anecdote: When I was the Air Attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Damascus, I had virtually no contact with the Syrian military. One exception was the monthly attaché dinner at the Syrian Officers Club to welcome new attachés and bid farewell to those about to depart. Departing attachés were presented a small inlaid wooden box, a Syrian specialty. On the top of the box was a medallion with a map of Syria.

The map included a part of Turkey known as the sanjak of Alexandretta, an area ceded to Turkey by the French mandatory authorities in 1936. The Syrians have never recognized that agreement and believe the territory to be still part of Syria.

At every presentation, the two Turkish military attachés (one seen with me in the photo) would stand at attention and march from the room in protest of the inclusion of what they considered to be Turkish territory on a map of Syria.

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Syrian and Egyptian intelligence chiefs meet in Cairo - a smart play by Putin

In a surprise visit, the director of Syria's National Security Bureau, 'Ali Mamluk, traveled to Cairo to meet with his Egyptian counterpart, Director of General Intelligence Khalid Fawzi. The two met in the Egyptian capital on October 16 during a visit which lasted only a few hours.

Mamluk is a key member of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad's inner circle, and is under European Union sanctions for his alleged actions against Syrian citizens during the protests that led to the civil war.

Of note, the visit also coincided with a joint Russian-Egyptian military exercise involving paratroopers from both countries.

The author and General al-Sisi (2013)

The Russians have been seeking increased influence in Egypt since the removal of the Muslim Brotherhood affiliated government of Muhammad al-Mursi in 2013 by the current president of Egypt, former chief of the Egyptian armed forces General 'Abd al-Fatah al-Sisi.

Both Syria and Egypt are involved in military operations against the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) - Egypt in the Sinai Peninsula, and Syria in the north and eastern part of that country. The common enemy was the ostensible, and plausible, reason for the two senior officials to meet.

Egypt is nominally involved in the U.S.-led coalition against ISIS, although it has limited its military actions to its own territory and a small operation in Libya. After ISIS killed 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians in February 2015, the Egyptian Air Force conducted airstrikes on ISIS targets in Darnah, killing 64 members of the group.

Syrian official media reported that the two intelligence officers "agreed on coordinating stances politically between Syria and Egypt, and boosting coordination for combating terrorism hitting both countries." That is diplo-speak for Syria's claim that Cairo supports the government of Bashar al-Asad.

Mamluk and Fawzi were probably the two best interlocutors for this meeting. Both have enough stature to represent their respective countries/regimes, with an understanding of realpolitik to be able to discuss issues with candor despite awkward situations.

The Syrians chose to publicize the meeting of the two officers in a bid to portray Egyptian President al-Sisi as a supporter of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad. The topic was raised at the meeting - the Syrians want all the support they can muster for the continuation of the al-Asad regime in any future Russian-backed political settlement of the civil war in Syria.

The Egyptian media opted to not report the meeting. I suspect that originally the meeting was supposed to be kept in confidence. Mamluk traveled to and from the meeting in a Syrian Air Force TU-134 jet painted in SyrianAir (the flag carrier airline of Syria) colors*.

Egypt is in a tough position, and is trying to walk a fine line between Russia and Saudi Arabia. The Egyptian president has received a lot of backing and support from Saudi Arabia, but earlier this month, Egypt was one of only four countries who voted for a Russian-sponsored United Nations Security Council resolution on Syria.** This vote came after Russia had vetoed a Saudi-supported French resolution aimed at halting the Russian and Syrian bombing of Aleppo. Saudi Arabia retaliated by halting the shipment of subsidized oil products to Egypt.

Egypt has recently strengthened its relationship with the Russian Federation. Much of that was due to the Obama Administration's decision to halt planned deliveries of additional AH-64 Apache helicopter gunships and spare parts following the removal of Mursi.

Vladimir Putin, sensing an opening, dispatched his Minister of Defense to Cairo and offered the Egyptians a lucrative arms package. The Egyptians, in need of weapons to continue fighting Islamists on the Libyan border and in the Sinai Peninsula, accepted. For the first time in decades, thanks to the American short-sighted knee-jerk reaction, Russia has regained a foothold in its former client state.

'Ali Mamluk's visit to Cairo undoubtedly was approved - and possibly instigated - by the Russians. Putin's main objective in Syria is the survival of the regime of Bashar al-Asad, preferably through a diplomatic/political solution, but by force of (Russian) arms if required. Egypt is a key player in the region - its public support for the al-Asad government plays right into Putin's plans.

Well played, Mr. Putin, well played.

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* I have flown on this same aircraft (YK-AYB) in 1994 as the guest of then Minister of Foreign Affairs Faruq Shara' and Ambassador to the U.S. Walid Mu'alim (now the foreign minister).

** Arabic linguist humor: After the Security Council voted down the Russian draft, the United Kingdom ambassador scolded his Russian counterpart, "This text...it's a sham, just as Russia’s hollow commitment to a political process in Syria is a sham." Al-Sham (pronounced A-SHAM) is the Arabic word for Damascus, Syria or the Levant, depending on context. See also, What's in a name? - the Syrian-Iranian car company.

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The Iraqi operation to retake Mosul - are they ready?

Iraqi Army troops moving towards Mosul

The "liberation" (as the Iraqis are calling it) of Mosul from the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has been anticipated for some time. Iraqi politicians, including Prime Minister Haydar al-'Abadi, have promised to return the city to Baghdad's control by the end of the year. I have said in the past that although they may be able to start the operation before the end of the year, I am not sure they will be able to complete the operation by then.

This could be a long, difficult, and bloody battle. ISIS has controlled Mosul since they overran the city in June 2014. They have had well over two years to prepare for what they know is their last major stand in Iraq.

Based on what we have seen in other cities held by ISIS and retaken by Iraqi forces, ISIS has developed a series of tunnels to allow the group to move men and weapons to where they are needed, as well as placed minefields, improvised explosive devices (IED) and other obstacles, mapped out ambush sites, and prepare scores of vehicle-borne IED's with suicide drivers willing to confront attacking Iraqi forces. They will likely force civilians to be human shields as they have in other battles. ISIS has claimed that its fighters will fight to the death to defend the city. I believe them - ISIS fighters rarely surrender.

If and when ISIS is defeated in Mosul, it will only be a matter of time before it is completely eradicated or ejected from Iraq. I believe that given the forces arrayed against ISIS, and the resources dedicated to this operation, the Iraqis will ultimately be successful in retaking Mosul. The question is how much will it cost, in terms of time, resources, city infrastructure, and most importantly, human life.

Map by Thomas van Linge (@arabthomness)

I hope they are not starting this operation on a political timetable - this is a major operation for the Iraqis. There is still a large pocket of ISIS fighters in Hawija (southwest of Kirkuk). This presence poses a threat to Iraqi supply lines as well as creating the potential for ISIS guerrilla attacks against Kurdish and Sunni areas at a time when the Iraqis need to be focused squarely on the Mosul operation. If it was me "advising and assisting" the Iraqis, I would tell them to eliminate that pocket before launching the operation into Mosul.

I would also advise that they more completely isolate Mosul, specifically interrupting the ISIS main line of communication (LOC) from the city to the west towards the ISIS controlled area of Syria and to the ISIS capital of al-Raqqah. According to several Iraqi commanders who have spoken on this, cutting that supply line will fall to the Shi'a and Yazidi militias, probably centered on Tal 'Afar.​ This is even more important than eliminating the Hawija pocket.

One senior Iraqi Army officer indicated that they may leave an escape route for the ISIS fighter to flee to Syria, referring to the western LOC. Allowing ISIS any route out is a bad idea - in all of the recent fights between Iraqi forces and ISIS, ISIS has effectively exploited weaknesses in Iraqi attempts to cordon the group. Now is not the time to give ISIS any opportunity to regroup after the fall of Mosul.

According to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff U.S. Marine Corps General Joe Dunford, the Iraqi forces are ready for the operation in Mosul. All that is necessary is a political decision on the part of Prime Minister al-'Abadi, which could come at any moment. I hope the general is right, but why did President Obama order another 1,100 U.S. troops to Iraq, remarking yet again that the Americans are not "ground forces," but there to provide only "training and assistance, logistical support."

Here is an example of the United States not providing ground forces. This is Comanche Battery, 1-320 Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, currently deployed to a fire base south of Mosul.

Iraqi forces will include the Army, Air Force, Special Police and Counter-terrorism units, along with the Kurdish peshmerga and the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU). The PMU include Shi'a militias, as well as some Sunni, Christian, and Yazidi militias. Although Iraqi Air Force and Iraqi Army Aviation aircraft will participate, the bulk of air support will be provided by the US-led coalition (mostly U.S. Air Force).

The Iraqis must put an "Iraqi face" on this effort, that it is all Iraqis working together to liberate Mosul regardless of ethnicity or religious group. This will be critical after the city is cleared of ISIS.

As the Iraqis continue to push ISIS back into Syria (as well as out of the remaining areas under its control in the western Euphrates Valley), the real challenge will be reconstituting Iraq as a coherent nation. That means working with the Sunnis and Kurds to determine the future of the north - what areas now controlled by the Kurds might be included in the Kurdish autonomous region. For example, Kirkuk was taken from ISIS by the Kurds - I see no indication they are willing to give it up. It has always been the Kurds' contention that Kirkuk is a Kurdish city - Baghdad does not agree.

The Iraqis must remove ISIS from Iraq - retaking Mosul is the key. Can the army that lost Mosul to ISIS in 2014 take it back from ISIS in 2016? They have to.

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Houthi attack on USS Mason - an Iranian challenge? - ADDENDUM

Two days ago (October 10), I wrote an article on a missile attack by the Yemeni Houthis on the USS Mason operating in the Red Sea in international waters. I have included that article in its entirety below.

Today, that same destroyer was targeted again from Houthi territory in Yemen. The warship fired defensive missiles in response. The ship was not hit or damaged.

This is what happens when the United States does not respond immediately and decisively to attacks on American ships in international waters. If we fail to respond again to this provocation, we can expect them to continue, not only here but in other places as well.

If it appears obvious that this Administration will not act to defend its own ships and sailors, other groups - for example, the Iranian IRGC, primary sponsors and supporters of the Houthis - will feel emboldened to also challenge American ships.

Let me try this with smaller words:

Memo for the President - At least four lethal missiles have been fired at a U.S. Navy destroyer operating in the Red Sea on your orders. This is a challenge not only to the United States, but to the right of any vessel to operate in international waters.

If you do not take immediate and decisive action, this will continue and escalate. If that happens, one of these missiles may hit an American ship, causing casualties and possibly the loss of ship itself.

Take action now, before this gets out of control.

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OCTOBER 10, 2017

Houthi attack on USS Mason - an Iranian challenge?

USS Mason (DDG-87)

The headline from the Red Sea is pretty straight forward - two missiles were fired at a U.S. Navy destroyer while the warship was sailing in international waters off the coast off Yemen. The missiles were fired from a coastal area of the country under the control of the Houthis, a Shi'a rebel group sponsored by Iran.

Fortunately, the missiles did not hit their intended target. According to the Navy, the ship did not sustain any damage nor were any of the crew injured, although the missile impacted close enough to the vessel to trigger on board countermeasures.

The vessel targeted in the attack was the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Mason (DDG-87), traveling in company with another Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, the USS Nitze (DDG-94), and Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) USS Ponce (AFSB(I)-15).

The three ships were ordered to the Red Sea near the strategic Bab al-Mandab strait in the wake of a Houthi missile attack on the United Arab Emirates logistic vessel HSV Swift on October 1 in this same area.

The Swift was not so lucky - it was struck by a missile and caught fire. The vessel was formerly under charter to the U.S. Navy, but was sold to the UAE National Marine Dredging Company and was operating under charter to transport humanitarian aid to Yemen and evacuate wounded civilians from the country.

United Arab Emirate High Speed Logistics Vessel (HSV) Swift after missile strike

The missiles used in both attacks are believed to be either a Chinese-built C-802 anti-ship missiles (NATO: CSS-N-8 Saccade) or an Iranian reverse-engineered copy called the Noor. While not technologically advanced, the missiles' simple design is easy to maintain, easy to operate, and can be very effective.

As I said, what happened is fairly straight forward, but why would the Houthis open fire on a U.S. Navy warship?

This is an obvious challenge to any member of the Saudi-led coalition currently conducting airstrikes on Houthi targets in Yemen. The Houthis have warned these nations to avoid Yemeni waters. The United States is a member of the coalition, providing intelligence, logistics and aerial refueling.

The Houthis may not have been aware of the nationality of the warship, although it would be patently irresponsible to launch a missile at a ship ostensibly in international waters without positive identification.

It may go further - this may be an indirect challenge to the U.S. Navy by the Iranians, the primary supporters of the Houthis. The Iranian advisers working with the Houthis are members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), which views the American Fifth Fleet as its primary adversary in the region.

Over the past few months, there have been numerous provocations in the Persian Gulf by IRGC crews in armed fast boats harassing U.S. Navy warships. Coincidentally, at least one of these incidents involved the USS Nitze and the USS Mason.

The attack also occurred the day after Saudi aircraft bombed a funeral in Sana, killing more than 100. The Houthis may have been seeking retaliation for what they believe was a deliberate attack. The IRGC issued a statement that the rebel group would avenge the bombing, calling it "a U.S., Saudi, Israeli joint conspiracy."

The question now - how does the United States react to what many believe constitutes an act of war?

The Administration must react decisively. Not doing so will only embolden the Houthis to continue to fire on American warships in the Red Sea, and embolden the Iranians to continue their escalating provocations in the Persian Gulf.

The Iranians have already assessed this Administration as unwilling to challenge Tehran. Failing to act will only validate that assessment.

The reaction needs to be stronger than a diplomatic protest from Secretary of State John Kerry - he is already regarded as weak by the Iranians.

This reaction needs to come via the Department of Defense.

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Houthi attack on USS Mason - an Iranian challenge?

USS Mason (DDG-87)

The headline from the Red Sea is pretty straight forward - two missiles were fired at a U.S. Navy destroyer while the warship was sailing in international waters off the coast off Yemen. The missiles were fired from a coastal area of the country under the control of the Houthis, a Shi'a rebel group sponsored by Iran.

Fortunately, the missiles did not hit their intended target. According to the Navy, the ship did not sustain any damage nor were any of the crew injured, although the missile impacted close enough to the vessel to trigger on board countermeasures.

The vessel targeted in the attack was the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Mason (DDG-87), traveling in company with another Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, the USS Nitze (DDG-94), and Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) USS Ponce (AFSB(I)-15).

The three ships were ordered to the Red Sea near the strategic Bab al-Mandab strait in the wake of a Houthi missile attack on the United Arab Emirates logistic vessel HSV Swift on October 1 in this same area.

The Swift was not so lucky - it was struck by a missile and caught fire. The vessel was formerly under charter to the U.S. Navy, but was sold to the UAE National Marine Dredging Company and was operating under charter to transport humanitarian aid to Yemen and evacuate wounded civilians from the country.

United Arab Emirate High Speed Logistics Vessel (HSV) Swift after missile strike

The missiles used in both attacks are believed to be either a Chinese-built C-802 anti-ship missiles (NATO: CSS-N-8 Saccade) or an Iranian reverse-engineered copy called the Noor. While not technologically advanced, the missiles' simple design is easy to maintain, easy to operate, and can be very effective.

As I said, what happened is fairly straight forward, but why would the Houthis open fire on a U.S. Navy warship?

This is an obvious challenge to any member of the Saudi-led coalition currently conducting airstrikes on Houthi targets in Yemen. The Houthis have warned these nations to avoid Yemeni waters. The United States is a member of the coalition, providing intelligence, logistics and aerial refueling.

The Houthis may not have been aware of the nationality of the warship, although it would be patently irresponsible to launch a missile at a ship ostensibly in international waters without positive identification.

It may go further - this may be an indirect challenge to the U.S. Navy by the Iranians, the primary supporters of the Houthis. The Iranian advisers working with the Houthis are members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), which views the American Fifth Fleet as its primary adversary in the region.

Over the past few months, there have been numerous provocations in the Persian Gulf by IRGC crews in armed fast boats harassing U.S. Navy warships. Coincidentally, at least one of these incidents involved the USS Nitze and the USS Mason.

The attack also occurred the day after Saudi aircraft bombed a funeral in Sana, killing more than 100. The Houthis may have been seeking retaliation for what they believe was a deliberate attack. The IRGC issued a statement that the rebel group would avenge the bombing, calling it "a U.S., Saudi, Israeli joint conspiracy."

The question now - how does the United States react to what many believe constitutes an act of war?

The Administration must react decisively. Not doing so will only embolden the Houthis to continue to fire on American warships in the Red Sea, and embolden the Iranians to continue their escalating provocations in the Persian Gulf.

The Iranians have already assessed this Administration as unwilling to challenge Tehran. Failing to act will only validate that assessment.

The reaction needs to be stronger than a diplomatic protest from Secretary of State John Kerry - he is already regarded as weak by the Iranians.

This reaction needs to come via the Department of Defense.

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Aleppo - the impotence of American diplomacy

The images of the ferocious Russian and Syrian air and missile attacks on Aleppo are heart-breaking - media reports show horrific results. Since the complete collapse of Secretary of State John Kerry's latest attempt to engineer another "cessation of hostilities" between the Syrian coalition and the anti-regime rebels, the fighting has intensified to unprecedented levels.

Little, if any, humanitarian aid - the heart-string issue that originally drove the recent ceasefire attempt - has arrived for people in besieged Syrian cities, including hundreds of thousands in Aleppo. The United Nations will not deliver aid without security assurances from the Bashar al-Asad government, and that is not forthcoming.

Russian and Syrian warplanes have launched an astounding number of airstrikes on anti-regime opposition groups, and almost none against positions of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Moscow's stated reason for deploying force to Syria. No surprise there.

What is a surprise is the ferocity of the Russian air and missile campaign against the hundreds of thousands of civilians trapped in the opposition-controlled areas of Aleppo, as well as opposition controlled cities all over the country. The Russians have also introduced new weapons to complement the terror-inducing barrel bombs dropped by Syrian Air Force helicopters.

The Russians had previously used conventional high-explosive bombs, thermobaric (fuel-air explosive) bombs, and some cluster munitions. However, in the last few weeks, they have added phosphorous incendiary bombs, napalm, and huge "bunker buster" bombs called "shaking" bombs by the residents of Aleppo in reference to the earthquake sensations the bombs produce when they penetrate deeply into buildings before they detonate. They have also deployed rocket launchers firing thermobaric and incendiary weapons into Aleppo. It is reminiscent of Russian attacks on Grozny, Chechnya in 1999-2000.

The Russians and Syrians have gone after the anti-regime rebels with a vengeance, almost as if it is in retaliation for the failure of the ceasefire. The choice of targets in Aleppo is also disturbing - hospitals, blood banks, other medical facilities, civil defense centers, and virtually any infrastructure that might support the rebels in any way. Medical supplies are dwindling fast as doctors attempt to treat the large and increasing number of civilian casualties inflicted by the more lethal ordnance being used.

Why the savage attacks on Aleppo?

The Russian goal in Syria is not the defeat of ISIS, although that would be an additional benefit. Their primary interest in Syria is the survival of the Syrian government and its president, Bashar al-Asad. To guarantee that outcome, the Russians need to destroy or defeat the anti-regime rebels, some supported by the United States, others supported by Turkey, Saudi Arabia or Qatar. Taking Aleppo is a key part of that effort.

The Syrian Army and their supporters are massing for an eventual ground assault to do just that - the ferocious air and missile campaign is the first phase of that operation. Forces from the Syrian Army, the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' Qods Force, Iranian Army, Lebanese Hizballah, Iraq's Badr Corps Shi'a militia, and Afghan Shi'a militiamen, all backed by Russian artillery and air support, will prove to be too much for the opposition forces in and around the city.

Aleppo will fall - it is only a matter of time. The city will come back under regime control - it will be used as a base to launch more attacks on other remaining opposition cities, probably starting with Idlib province, the province that sits between regime-controlled territory in Hamah and the newly-captured city of Aleppo.

If the Russians continue the current pace of air and missile operations and the Shi'a coalition supporting Bashar al-Asad is willing to continue to press the attack on the ground, it is likely that the opposition will be defeated in western Syria. The only viable opposition enclave will be the Kurdish-controlled area in the northwest and northeast areas of the country, and a small Turkish-backed FSA presence between the Kurdish enclaves.

At that point, the Russians will have been successful in achieving their primary goal - the survival of the Ba'ath regime of Bashar al-Asad. Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov will have outplayed President Barack Obama and Secretary John Kerry again.

The United States will have to reassess its goals in Syria, which since 2011 have included the removal of Bashar al-Asad. The United States may have to settle for solely focusing on its primary objective - the eradication of ISIS and the former al-Qa'idah affiliate Jabhat Fatah al-Sham.

As for the removal of Bashar al-Asad, I think it safe to say that window of opportunity is rapidly closing if it has not closed already. Even John Kerry, in leaked conversations reported in the New York Times, has said as much. A reading of Kerry's comments indicates he would accept a referendum on the continued governance of the al-Asad regime, in stark contrast to the hard-line American foreign policy of five years ago when President Obama said unequivocally that Bashar al-Asad had to go.

Virtually nothing Secretary Kerry has proposed in Syria has worked - the Russians are now firmly in the driver's seat. The world, especially our allies in the region who feel this Administration has cozied up to the Iranians at their expense, is witnessing the abject failure American foreign policy in Syria. They worry that, when needed, the United States will not be there for them.

If I was them, I would be concerned as well.

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