Iran, the IAEA and Israel - convergence coming?

There is a convergence of events looming in the Middle East over the next few weeks, events which could have a profound impact on the area for years to come. These events are the upcoming International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report on Iran's nuclear weapons program, the Iranian reaction to that report, the Israeli reaction to that report, and to a lesser extent the Obama Administration reaction to that report.

According to numerous sources who claim to have seen parts of the report, the IAEA is planning to "reveal" that Iran has been working clandestinely to develop a nuclear weapons capability, citing evidence that Iran has made models of a nuclear warhead. This comes to no surprise to anyone who has been following the progress of the Iranian "peaceful nuclear energy" program for the past decade or more.

The question on the minds of most Middle East analysts is, "What took so long?" The easy answers are that there was not concrete evidence, or that former IAEA chief Muhammad al-Barada'i did not want to find that Iran had an illicit weapons program. There is probably some truth to both, but given the size of Iran's program and its unwillingness to live up to agreements it had made was enough for me. The program is much too small to develop a nuclear power generation capability, but just the right size for nuclear weapons production.

IAEA documents reportedly show that Iran is working on a nuclear warhead that can be mounted on a ballistic missile. This makes sense - Iran has a large arsenal of ballistic missiles complemented by an aggressive missile development program which draws heavily on technology imported from North Korea. It is important to note that Islamic Republic is the only country to develop a 2,000-km (1,100 nautical miles or 1,250 statute miles) missile without first having a nuclear weapons capability. Absent a nuclear warhead, Iran's medium-range missiles remain militarily ineffective, although capable of creating terror and confusion.

The United States, United Kingdom and France are urging the IAEA to report all of its information, while Russia and China are calling for the report to be postponed or totally discarded. That comes as no surprise. There has always been this split between the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. It remains to be seen if the two apologists for Iran - sorry, that should read: It remains to be seen if Iran's technology and weapons suppliers will attempt to veto the report. The intransigence of these two major business partners of Iran is the reason that there is no crippling sanctions protocol in place against the Islamic Republic.

Anyone who believes that the Iranian nuclear research and development program is not aimed at the acquisition of a nuclear weapon is either in a state of denial or has misread the Iranian regime. Those in a state of denial - and that includes part of the U.S. intelligence community - would rather not address the uncomfortable truth that a nuclear-armed Iran is not the same as other nuclear states, be it Pakistan, India or Israel. These other states, for the most part, have rational governmental structures in place to oversee their nuclear arsenals.

I am not certain you can say the same for the theocracy in Iran. While most states have acquired nuclear weapons for deterrence, no one is certain that is the rationale for the Iranians. They may or may not have the intention of actually using a nuclear weapon, but are we willing to live with that uncertainty? I guess the real question is are the Israelis, who have much more at risk, willing to live with that uncertainty?

As you would expect, the Iranians claim the IAEA report is a fabrication resulting from pressure on the agency from the United States and its allies. While there might be some truth in that, it does not change the facts that point toward a clandestine weapons program. If the report clearly accuses Iran of having a nuclear weapons program, it should pave the way for real sanctions on the country. The Iranian president recently conceded that the sanctions protocols in place are having some effect, but for anything short of a military strike to end the Iranian program, much more stringent sanctions will be required, or as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton once promised, "crippling" sanctions. We are not there by a long shot.

As long as there is the potential for Iran to develop a nuclear arms capability, Israel will remain the most concerned nation. I have spent quite a bit of time in Israel talking to a variety of Israelis, both government (military and intelligence) and civilians. They believe, and are not bashful to explain it, that a nuclear-armed Iran will constitute an "existential threat" to the Jewish state. They claim that three nuclear warheads could virtually annihilate the heart of Israel and kill a good portion of the world's Jews in one strike. There may not be enough of the country left to retaliate.

Israeli intelligence officials have told me that they assess that Israel has enough military power to deter any of its neighbors from attacking. They do not believe that Iran, on the other hand, despite Israel's "strategic capabilities" - that's diplo-intel-speak for nuclear weapons - Iran will not deterred. Many of them believe that if Iran develops nuclear weapons, there is a strong possibility that they will use them.

The Israelis are concerned that although most countries view Iran's quest for nuclear weapons as a world problem, many nations are hoping for an Israeli solution. Here again, an "Israeli solution" is diplo-intel-speak for an Israeli military strike, be it from the air, sea or a combination of both. While the United States and European countries declare that a nuclear-armed Iran is "unacceptable," Israel is the country that will bear the brunt of any misjudgment on the part of the mullahs in Tehran.

Is an Israeli military option on the table? Certainly, but this week's revelations that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is lobbying the Knesset for support for a military strike on Iran's nuclear facilities has a strange feel to it. If the Israelis are talking about it, they probably aren't going to do it anytime soon. It's when they are not talking about it that we might expect them to act. Does Israel have the capability to attack the Iranian facilities? It is hard to say. On paper, yes, but there are so many things that would have to come off perfectly; there is almost no room for error.

A look at the map will tell you that Israeli aircraft will be in hostile airspace almost the entire way to and from the targets. I, and others, have written about how the Israelis might do this. Who knows, the Saudis - who have no wish to see arch-rival Iran with a nuclear weapon - might just green light Israeli aircraft through their airspace. Remember the well-known Middle East adage, "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." Even Israeli President Shimon Peres, not a hawk by any stretch of the imagination, declared, "What needs to be done must be done and there is a long list of options." For a man like Peres to utter those words is chilling to me.

On the American side, President Barack Obama says Iran’s nuclear program "continues to pose a threat...." Do you think? He further threatened that Iran would suffer the "toughest possible" sanctions. That's the same rhetoric we have heard for years. One of Obama's national security advisors (where do they find these people?) added that the United States is focused on is a diplomatic strategy which ... "increases the pressure on the Iranians, through financial pressure, through economic sanctions, through diplomatic isolation."

I would be crass and ask, "Great, so how is that working so far?" I think we all know the answer to that. The next few weeks may prove critical to the future of the Middle East, and whether we like it or not, our national interests are at stake. If the IAEA rises to the task and unambiguously states that Iran is developing nuclear weapons, we need to be ready to take effective actions to preclude that from happening. More "engagement" may not be the right answer...."

حبر على ورق - Syria's agreement with the Arab League

Syrian tank in Homs

حبر على ورق (hibr 'ala waraq) is a common Arabic phrase that translates literally to "ink on paper." It is normally used to refer to and demean a worthless piece of paper, much like the agreement signed just two days ago (November 2) between the Syrian government of Bashar al-Asad and the Arab League. The agreement did not last two days - on November 3, Syrian army tanks and armored personnel carriers opened fire on protesters in the city of Homs, killing at least 20 people.

According to the the agreement, the Syrian government was to withdraw troops from urban areas, halt armed operations against civilian populations, release political prisoners, and start "dialogue" with opposition groups within two weeks. It also required the government to allow journalists, human rights groups and Arab League representatives into the country. There has been no international press coverage of the protests in Syria - or the government reaction - since they began earlier this year.

I would not put too much stock in the fact that the Syrian government, or regime, if you prefer, under the leadership (or dictatorship) of President Bashar al-Asad reached an agreement with the Arab League. In my opinion, having lived in Syria for several years and following events in the country for decades, Bashar al-Asad has no intention of adhering to any agreement that he makes. If the Syrian government agrees to anything, it is only to buy time to continue repression of any perceived threat to the continuation of the Ba'th Party regime that has ruled the country since 1963. Any agreement signed by Bashar al-Asad will be merely hibr 'ala waraq.

The protesters have laid down some markers of their own - the most important, of course, being the demand that the president step down. They have made clear that not only do the want Bashar out, they also want the end of the Ba'th Party. One need only look at the flags in the anti-regime demonstrations.

For comparison purposes, look at the current flag of Syria, first adopted when Syria and Egypt merged to create the United Arab Republic in 1958. It was used until the union was dissolved in 1961, and re-introduced by the Ba'th Party in 1980.

Pro-regime demonstrators with current Syrian flag

Below is the flag carried by many of the protesters. Note that the colors are the same, but used in different places. Red, white, black and green are common Arab and Muslim colors.

Syrian protesters with pre-union flag

This flag dates back to 1932 and is unofficially called the "flag of independence" because it was the flag in use when Syria achieved independence from the French Mandate on April 17, 1946. It was used until 1958, making it the longest used flag in Syrian history.

The protesters are not fooled by Bashar's alleged acceptance of agreements. It will be interesting to see what happens on Friday, the Muslim holy day.

Upgraded weapons in the Gaza Strip

The Palestinian group Islamic Jihad (actually, the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine) recently released a video of a multiple rocket launcher mounted on the back of a small pickup truck. The clip showed five rockets being fired from the launcher - if true, that would be the first instance of this type of launcher being used to fire rockets from the Gaza Strip into Israel. The group claims that the weapon system was brought to Gaza from Libya. The Egyptians have stopped the smuggling of some weapons from Libya destined for the Gaza Strip, but it appears that some weapons have made it through. If the Palestinians were able to move rocket launchers of this size, they may also have smuggled shoulder-launched air defense missiles - the Libyans had thousands of them and they are now unaccounted for.

The rocket launcher seen in the video fires the Grad 122mm rocket, a 1950's vintage weapon with a range of 25 miles. They have been in the Gaza Strip since least 2008 - HAMAS has fired them at Israeli cities, but previously using a makeshift ground launcher. What we see now is a ten-tube launcher which I assume to be one rack of the four that normally comprise the standard Russian-designed (but produced in many countries) 40-tube BM-21 launcher.

On October 29, Islamic Jihad fired eight of these rockets towards Ashdod, Gan Yavne, and near Beersheva. One Israeli was killed in the attacks, and significant property damage was inflicted in Ashdod. Press reports carry claims of responsibility from both Islamic Jihad and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade (the military arm of Fatah); the video carries the logo of Islamic Jihad.

The attacks on Saturday have prompted the Israelis to order all schools within 25 miles of Gaza to close pending cessation of this round of violence. Israeli schools have been dealing with Palestinian rockets attacks since the Israelis withdrew from Gaza in 2005. The city of Sderot, just a few kilometers from the Gaza Strip, has been hit almost daily since then. To cope with the attacks, the city has constructed shelters over some school buildings and and installed steel awnings over others, as seen in these photographs (I took these in Sderot in 2009).

The Israeli air force has conducted air raids in retaliation for the recent rocket attacks, killing several Islamic Jihad fighters and at least one member of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. If the rocket attacks continue and HAMAS cannot rein in Islamic Jihad and the al-Aqsa Martyr's Brigade, there is a chance that the recently-brokered deal in which Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit was released from five years of captivity in exchange for over 1000 Palestinian prisoners, will fall through. To date, less than half of the prisoners have been released.

At some point, Israel may renege on that lop-sided deal. Who would blame them?

The "Biden-ization" of Iraq?

صلاح الدين

Vice President Joe Biden just might have been ahead of his time. In 2006, then-Senator Biden was the ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. While in that position, he proposed that Iraq be divided into three separate regions along ethnic and religious lines. Specifically, he called for Kurdish, Shi'a and Sunni areas with a central government in Baghdad.

The Iraqi constitution allows for the formation of autonomous regions - the Kurds have already taken advantage of this and created the Kurdistan Region comprising the three governorates of Dahuk, Irbil and Sulaymaniyah. Of course, the Iraqi Kurds often refer to the area as South Kurdistan. I was recently in Turkey, and one of the questions I heard more than once from the Turks (they are aware of my history with the Kurds in northern Iraq) was, "If the Kurdistan Region is South Kurdistan, then where exactly is North Kurdistan?"

In a surprising development this week, the provincial council of the governorate of Salah al-Din voted to form an autonomous region as well. The majority of the population of Salah al-Din - just over 900,000 people - is Sunni Arab, but there are also Kurds and Shi'a Arabs living in the governorate as well.

Interestingly, the Sunnis were originally against the provision in the constitution allowing for autonomous regions. They were concerned that the Kurds would form an autonomous region in the oil-rich north (as they did) and the Shi'a would do the same in the oil-rich south. Thus far, the Shi'a have not made any moves to form such a region, but they really don't need to - they easily dominate the government based on their numbers. The Sunnis feared that the Kurds and Shi'a would have sole access to the country's primary resource - oil - and freeze them out of the wealth.

What is driving the Sunnis in Salah al-Din to form an autonomous region?

The most recent aggravation between the Sunnis - most of whom live in the areas of central Iraq to the north, east and west of Baghdad - and the Shi'a dominated government is a massive arrest campaign targeting members of the outlawed Ba'th Party, the party of former dictator Saddam Husayn. The Salah al-Din governorate includes the city and environs of Tikrit, the area that was home to Saddam Husayn. The Sunnis believe that autonomous region status will shield them from the Iraqi security services.

In addition to the security crackdown in the governorate, the Sunnis believe that the central government in Baghdad is not allocating national resources fairly to the Sunni areas. They complain that the only city in Salah al-Din that is treated fairly is Sammara' because that city is the home of the shrines of the tenth and eleventh imams of the Shi'a sect. It was this shrine that was bombed by the late al-Qa'idah in Iraq (AQI) leader Abu Musa'ib al-Zarqawi, an event that triggered a civil war between the Sunnis and Shi'a. That bloody conflict lasted until the 'Anbar Awakening in which the local Sunni tribes turned on the mostly foreign fighters of AQI.

If the leaders of Salah al-Din think that forming an autonomous region is going to stymie the Iraqi security services from hunting down remnants of the Ba'th Party and Saddam loyalists, they are mistaken. The Shi'a suffered terribly under Saddam and the Ba'th and will not be deterred from hunting down anyone still wanting to be a Ba'thi.

Will Iraq go the way of the Biden plan? I doubt it. The Kurds have been autonomous for decades and have proven to be such a problem for central governments in Baghdad that it works better to allow them to be autonomous as long as they do not abuse it - as they have tried on more than one occasion. The Shi'a will probably not try to unite the southern provinces into a "Shi'a-stan" since their political alliance with the Kurds gives them the dominant political role in the country as well as key positions in the ministries and government organizations.

On the other hand, I am surprised that the Sunnis have not attempted to unite the Sunni heartland, but it probably would do no good even if they did. That said, who knows - maybe Biden will be right. The only - and major - difference is that the Iraqis will do this themselves rather than have the Americans do it for them.

The Shalit release deal - setting up the next seizure

Gilad Shalit /  גלעד שליט 

After more than five years as a prisoner of HAMAS, Israeli soldier Gild Shalit has been exchanged for over 1,000 HAMAS militants. I am all for pressuring HAMAS to release the young Israeli, or possibly an exchange of reasonable proportions, but 1,000 Palestinian prisoners, many serving life sentences and most with Israeli blood on their hands, for one Israeli captive?

It sets a very bad precedent - the reunion of Gilad Shalit and his family feels good, makes a great media story, and certainly will be used to Benyamin "Bibi" Netanyahu's political advantage, but this will come back to haunt the Israelis. How long will it be before HAMAS, Islamic Jihad or some other Palestinian faction attempts to capture another Israeli soldier and force the Israelis to release more of the remaining 4,300 Palestinians incarcerated in Israeli prisons? How long will it be before the released Palestinian prisoners themselves are again plotting violence against Israel? I would venture to say that HAMAS's recruiting efforts have been made much easier by this besting of Israel in the diplomatic arena.

Who are the real winners of this political move? Certainly HAMAS, whose flagging stature and slide into irrelevance has been reversed. The perception that the radical Islamist group has been able to humble the "invincible" Israelis into making such an uneven trade for a young corporal (although he was promoted numerous times in captivity) has revitalized HAMAS arguably into the primary political power in the Palestinian territories. If an election was held today, not only would they sweep the Gaza Strip as they in the elections of 2006, they would almost certainly win in the relatively more moderate West Bank as well.

I understand the emotional bond between the Israeli population and their troops. Israel is a small country with large enemies, forcing virtually all of its Jewish citizens (Arab citizens are exempted) to serve a period of active military duty and remain in the reserves for decades. Military service in Israel is one of the common experiences with which all Israelis identify. Over the 64 years of Israel's existence, almost every family has suffered losses in the various wars and conflicts. With a small population and large military establishment, every soldier is regarded as part of the family. It is not surprising that the Israeli government negotiated with HAMAS for Shalit's release, but what is astounding is the number of prisoners with Israeli blood on their hands the government agreed to release.

I am not in the camp of some of fellow Middle East analysts who believe that this deal might presage improved relations between Israel and the Palestinians, believing that if the two sides could compromise on this issue, perhaps there are other things that could be negotiated. First of all, releasing 1,027 Palestinians, including not just a few murderers, in exchange for one Israeli soldier is not a compromise, it is a capitulation. The Palestinians know, or at least believe, that they now have the upper hand in dealing with the Israelis - all they need are more hostages, be they soldiers (the best capital) or even settlers in the West Bank.

Why would HAMAS - and they are now the key player on the Palestinian side - agree to any deals with the Israelis. All this exchange has done has vindicated the HAMAS hard-line position. Why change a winning strategy? If I was an Israeli soldier anywhere near the border with Gaza or the West Bank, I'd be watching my back. If I was a settler on the West Bank, I'd be careful what Palestinians I allow close to my village. HAMAS will try this again.

Death of Saudi Crown Prince highlights succession issue

Sultan bin 'Abd al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud * /  سلطان بن عبدالعزيز آل سعود‎

His Royal Highness Crown Prince Sultan bin 'Abd al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud died Saturday at the age of 80 while in New York City for medical treatment. The prince had been in ill-health for a number of years and was suspected of suffering from Alzheimer's disease.

The crown prince was well-known to many Americans (including me) from his service as the Minister of Defense and Aviation during Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm in 1990 and 1991. The prince was a gentleman, a friend of the United States and a pleasure to work with - he would have made a fine king, and I mourn his passing. Of note, he was also the father of Prince (Lieutenant General) Khalid bin Sultan bin 'Abd al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud, commander of Saudi and Arab forces during the war (who was not always a pleasure to work with).

King 'Abdullah, the crown prince's older brother, was at the airport in Riyadh to receive the body. The king, now 87, was seen in a wheelchair and a surgical mask, underscoring the health issues that plague the surviving sons of the founder of the kingdom, King 'Abd al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud.

When the kingdom was founded in 1932, King 'Abd al-'Aziz established the succession to be from his sons, from brother to brother, not from father to son. Normally the oldest surviving son was the first choice, but not always. When kings have died, the surviving sons of King 'Abd al-'Aziz have gathered and selected the new king by consensus.

This system has been in place since the death of King 'Abd al-'Aziz in 1953. With 37 sons, there did not seem to be any urgency to provide for further succession. However, the youngest of the founder's sons (Muqran bin 'Abd al-'Aziz) is now 66 years old. At some point, the family will need to come to terms with selecting a monarch from the next generation - that may cause divisions in the family. There are already rivalries among the various groups based on their different mothers. Given the close relationship between the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, it is in America's national interest that there continue to be smooth transitions of power in Riyadh.

To address this issue, in 2006 King 'Abdullah created the Allegiance Council, comprised of 35 princes charged with determining, in consultation with the king, who will become the new crown prince. It is widely rumored that Nayif bin 'Abd al-'Aziz, who has been the extremely powerful Minister of the Interior since 1975, will be the next crown prince. Nayif is also one of the powerful "Sudayri Seven," a set of full brothers who include the former King Fahd and the late crown prince.

Nayif is 78, so still may be able to serve for years as king following the death of his older brother 'Abdullah. Assume that he becomes king in 2013 and serves for 10 years. That means that Muqran, the youngest of the first generation would be 78 at that time, and could possibly serve for ten years or so. Then the real issue surfaces. Who in the second generation becomes the king?

As long as the United States imports most of its oil ( a situation that unfortunately I do not see changing anytime soon), it is essential that there be a friendly monarch on the throne in Riyadh. That means smooth successions from the brothers and later to the next generation.

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* Please note the difference in the transliterations of the Arabic al- and Al. In the name 'Abd al-'Aziz, al- is the Arabic definite article "the." The word Al in Al  Sa'ud, Al is the word for "house of" or "family."

Iraq - Obama spins another policy failure into a success?

(Note: This should be read in conjunction with my July 30 article - click here or on image to open in new tab).

October 21 - President Barack Obama announced today that after speaking with Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki that the United States and Iraq were in "full agreement" on the complete withdrawal of American troops from Iraq by the end of the year. I am surprised that the announcement was not accompanied by a warning to DC area residents to remain in their homes or be swept up by the vortex caused by the incredible spinning coming from the White House.

Today's claim goes beyond the normal spinning we have come to expect from this Administration. Today's spin was replete with references to the deaths of al-Qa'idah leader 'Usamah bin Ladin and Libyan dictator Mu'amar al-Qadhafi and the continued - and ill-advised - scheduled draw down of American troops in Afghanistan. We should expect that, after all, the death of bin Ladin and al-Qadhafi are successes, albeit a bit more nuanced than the President would have you believe (see my earlier article, Mu'amar al-Qadhafi dead in Libya - what took so long?). However, to spin this obvious foreign policy failure into a success is a stretch for even this White House - the claim that Iraq and the United States are now in "full agreement" is disingenuous and misleading. That's a polite way to say that it's a lie.

The President continued, "The last American soldier (sic) will cross the border out of Iraq with their heads held high, proud of their success and knowing that the American people stand united in our support for our troops." On this, he is correct - the American troops (I am including the marines, airmen and sailors in addition to that soldier he mentions) should hold their heads high. They did their part, they were successful. However, this Administration has not been. The "full agreement" the President cites is actually an admission of failure.

Over the past six months, the Administration has been in almost crisis mode trying to secure an agreement whereby some American troops could remain in Iraq past the December 31, 2011 deadline established in the Status of Forces Agreement of 2008. This Administration has had almost three years to make an arrangement with the Iraqis - as provided for in the SOFA. Now we have today's admission that the effort has failed. American commanders wanted to keep between 15,000 and 25,000 troops in Iraq as trainers of the not-ready-for-prime-time Iraqi forces and as a contingency force. This failure will put at risk many of the gains achieved by almost nine years of the expenditure of American blood and treasure.

Given Iran's constant meddling in Iraqi politics and its lethal operations against American troops in both Iraq and Afghanistan, combined with the fact this region is critical to American national interests, it is important that we have a presence in the region. Thanks to this failure, there will be almost no American troops on the ground in the Middle East. That may come back to haunt us the next time a crisis - and there will be one - erupts in the region.

Mr. Obama, you may think that this ends our involvement in Iraq and frees you up to focus on your domestic agenda - national security has never been your strong suit - but I venture to say we will be dealing with the fallout from this failure for years to come.

You have committed one of the worst sins of a President - you have broken faith with the troops.

Mu'amar al-Qadhafi dead in Libya - what took so long?

Screen capture from the Al-Jazeera web site announcing
the killing of al-Qadhafi and the end of his regime

October 20, 2011 - According to Libyan officials former "Brother Leader" Mu'amar al-Qadhafi has been killed and photos of his bloody corpse broadcast on various news media around the world. This, of course, is welcome news. Not only does it end a 42-year reign of terror in Libya, it presents an opportunity for the Libyan people to at long last determine their own future.

This culminates a revolution that began on February 15 of this year - eight months of fierce fighting between al-Qadhafi loyalists hoping to hold onto power and a variety of armed groups seeking the end of the regime that has been in power since September of 1969. These rebel groups have been supported by NATO air power since March 19. The five-week delay by NATO, which includes the United States, to take action almost doomed the rebellion from the start and cost many more Libyan lives than was necessary.

Later today, no doubt President Obama will make another speech in which he will claim victory and vindication for his policy on Libya, specifically his ludicrous "leading from behind" military strategy. The delays in taking actions in February and the limited American involvement, leaving the bulk of the air operation to our NATO allies, prolonged what should have been a very short, weeks-long engagement rather than an eight-month bloodbath that has not only killed thousands of Libyans but decimated the infrastructure of the country.

We should be happy that the regime of Mu'amar al-Qadhafi is gone, and we should salute our forces and those of our NATO allies who played a critical role in that process. We should also, however, demand an analysis of how many lives could have been saved had we exercised better political leadership and employed much more capable American air power with more appropriate weapons systems for this type of fighting. This particular episode of timid operations execution turned out well albeit delayed; next time we may not be so fortunate.

This entire affair should have been over in weeks with much less loss of life. Remember that when Caesar comes forth for his accolades.

Proposed U.S. arms sale to Bahrain - the wrong weapons

The State Department announced that it will take into consideration an upcoming report on how Bahrain handled recent protests in the Gulf kingdom before approving the proposed sale of $53 million of American-made weapons. The State Department announcement is in response to Democratic senators who voiced concern that United States was in effect arming a nation who may have abused its citizens' human rights. They cite the Egyptian example that we might be perceived as arming a repressive government, a perception that in the future might harm our relations with the Bahraini people.

I have problems with the arms sale package, but not because of the concern over the ruling family in the Kingdom of Bahrain. My issue is with the makeup of the arms package itself - we're selling them the wrong weapons for their needs. I understand that a $53 million sale would be nice for contractors AM General and Raytheon, but isn't someone advising the Bahrainis on what they need?

Let's take a look at the relationship between the United States and Bahrain. Bahrain has been a staunch ally of the United States for years, in fact, the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet is headquartered in the island kingdom. The Bahraini royal family, the Al Khalifah, is Sunni in a 70 percent Shi'a country. Because of the Shi'a's natural affinity for the Iranians, Iran has been a constant thorn in the side of the Al Khalifah. The United States supports Bahrain's efforts to minimize Iranian influence on the island. Despite that, the Iranians have fomented unrest in the Shi'a community. The Iranians have gone so far as to claim that Bahrain is actually part of Iran.

Given the fact that the kingdom is ruled by a Sunni minority, it is doubtful that in a future change of government the Shi'a majority will ever gravitate towards the United States, so I think we should not consider how our support of the al Khalifah is viewed by the Shi'a. When push comes to shove, they will align with their Shi'a allies in Tehran.

The proposed $53 million arms package consists of 44 up-armored Humvees, 48 TOW anti-tank missile launchers, almost 300 TOW missiles (in various configurations), and associated night sighting devices. 

Approval of the sale requires the Defense Security Cooperation Agency to certify that it will contribute to the foreign policy and national security of the United States, specifically in this case, "by helping to improve the security of a major non-NATO ally that has been, and continues to be, an important force for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East. The proposed sale will improve Bahrain’s capability to meet current and future armored threats. Bahrain will use the enhanced capability as a deterrent to regional threats and to strengthen its homeland defense."

This is where I have a problem. Armored Humvees and TOW missiles constitute an anti-armor capability, defending against tanks and armored personnel carriers. From the certification: "The proposed sale will improve Bahrain’s capability to meet current and future armored threats." Hey, DOD, just where is that armored threat?

Bahrain is an island in the Persian Gulf. It's nearest neighbors are Saudi Arabia, less than 20 miles to the west, and Qatar, a little over 20 miles to the east. Bahrain is connected to Saudi Arabia by a causeway. Iran, which might pose the greatest threat to the kingdom, is over 100 miles away across the Persian Gulf.

I am having trouble picturing an armored vehicle threat to Bahrain. Perhaps the Saudis - a close ally of Bahrain, by the way - might run an armored column down the causeway? First, they would not do that. Bahrain has fairly liberal rules when it comes to Islam - Manama has bars and nightclubs. The causeway is usually packed on Wednesday (last day of the Saudi workweek) afternoons with Saudis heading for what passes for "sin city" in the region.

Which brings me to the next point. In the far-fetch likelihood of an attempted incursion via the causeway, it could easily be stopped with air power. It is hard to imagine any real land threat to Bahrain. Is someone postulating that the Iranians would attempt an amphibious assault across the Persian Gulf? Here again, the answer is air and sea power.

As with many of these small Gulf nations, Bahrain's best "bang for the buck" (excuse the obvious pun) lies in acquiring a capable air force and navy. A potent air force and navy can blunt almost any threat to Bahrain, or at least buy enough time for more capable allied forces such as the United States and Saudi Arabia to enter the fray.

Humvees and TOW missiles? I would ask if anyone at the Pentagon has actually thought this through, but the answer is obvious in their certification: "The proposed sale will improve Bahrain’s capability to meet current and future armored threats."

In case I am being too subtle, that's a no.

The MV Mavi Marmara in the Golden Horn

I was in Istanbul, Turkey earlier this month and happened on the MV Mavi Marmara at a dock in the Golden Horn (my pictures).

The ship was docked at an out-of-the way location not far from some Turkish government facilities. The current status of the vessel is unclear.

To me, the Mavi Marmara is a bit of recent Middle East history.

The Mavi Marmara, which translates from the Turkish as Blue Marmara (Sea) was built in Turkey in 1994. It was operated as a passenger ferry in the Istanbul area until 2010, when it was purchased for $800,000 by IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation, an Islamic Turkish charity organization active in more than 100 countries. IHH is derived from the first three words of its full name in Turkish: İnsan Hak ve Hürriyetleri ve İnsani Yardım Vakfı, or The Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief.

IHH purchased the vessel specifically to lead an international effort to challenge the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip. Since no shipowners would allow their vessels to take part in such a dangerous operation, IHH purchased a vessel using public donations. This is interesting - the IHH has special consultative status with the United Nations, but the United Nations has upheld the legality of the Israeli naval blockade of Gaza.

If IHH was looking for a confrontation, unfortunately, the Israelis obliged them. In May 2010, the Mavi Marmara participated in a convoy of ships manned by activists from 37 different countries. After the activists refused Israeli Navy demands that they divert to the Israeli port of Ashdod or be boarded, the Israelis began forcibly boarding the Mavi Marmara early in the morning of May 31.

In the violent clash that followed, nine activists on the vessel were killed and several dozen others injured. There are mixed reports as to whether or not the ship was carrying humanitarian aid.

The Mavi Marmara was released in July 2010; after being towed to a Turkish port and repaired, it returned to Istanbul in December.

According to what information I can find, including several Turkish sources, the vessel is still registered in the Comoros Islands.  That may be, but the Turkish flag has been reapplied to the side of the ship, and the vessel was flying the Turkish flag from the stern when I saw it in the Golden Horn. During the confrontation with the Israelis in 2010, the ship did not have the Turkish flag painted on the side, although there were huge Turkish cloth flags adorning the vessel. It also flew the Cormoros flag on the stern.

Most of the Turks I spoke with about this incident believe that the IHH activists were looking for a fight. They aslo expressed surprise that the Israelis took the bait and, in their view, overreacted. I tend to agree with that assessment, but then, it's always easy to second guess these things after the fact.