Muqtada al-Sadr - Address the Threat

Once again, radical Shi'a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr has threatened to restart his armed resistance to the presence of American forces in Iraq. For the last year, his band of thugs has observed what he calls a "truce," which has partially been responsible for lower levels of violence in the country. In reality, he had little choice but to order his loyalists to stand down or face the newly deployed combat troops that made up the American "surge." Each time the Sadrists take on the Americans, they suffer badly.

This time the threat is an attempt to stop the Iraqi government from signing an agreement with the United States that provides a legal framework for American forces to remain in Iraq beyond December 31, 2008. That agreement has been completed and will soon be submitted to the Iraqi national assembly for approval.

Al-Sadr now threatens to order his followers to attack American forces if there is any agreement that provides for the continued presence of the troops in Iraq, or allows them to retain any bases in the country. Note that al-Sadr makes these threats from the safety of Iran, where he claims to be furthering his Islamic education. Maybe he is, of maybe he is just hiding.

Muqtada al-Sadr poses a clear and immediate threat to American forces. That threat should be addressed - this radical ne'er-do-well has been a problem since he was involved in the murder of Shi'a cleric 'Abd al-Majid al-Khu'i in April 2003. Although a warrant was issued for his arrest, he has never been charged for complicity in the crime. His followers - and thus him - have American blood on their hands.

American forces should neutralize this threat. That's a polite way of sending a special forces team to kill him. I have said this before - it is long overdue.

Syrian Uranium Mythology

Earlier this month, diplomats with access to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna week revealed that samples taken from a site in northeastern Syria indicated the presence of processed uranium.

This finding lends credence to the Israeli claims that the site housed a nuclear reactor and some vindication for its attack on the facility in September 2007.

Syrian reactor site near al-Kibar

This revelation should come as no surprise - the evidence of Syrian-North Korean cooperation to build the reactor at al-Kibar is in my opinion irrefutable. Ground photography of the site shows a facility closely resembling the reactor at Yongbyon, North Korea. Photogrammetry of satellite imagery indicates that the two buildings are almost identical in size. The only exception is the clever Syrian attempts to mask the true purpose of the site. There is no obvious power source, cooling system, or air defense. While the site is easily visible from above as shown on the image above, the facility is actually placed in a wadi and not visible from the roads in the area or the Euphrates River.

This is typical for the Syrians - I was a military attaché assigned to the American Embassy in Syria and spent a lot of time trying to find these hidden facilities.

Similarities in Syrian and North Korean reactors

In what has to be a classic attempt at Syrian mythology, the explanation of how processed uranium found its way to al-Kibar. This map will be useful.

Syria has a declared nuclear program for research and the production of isotopes for medical and agricultural purposes. The program uses a small reactor located in a facility near the Damascus International Airport near Dayr al-Hajar. The facility is easily visible from the road - there are no attempts to disguise its function.

The possible explanation: Perhaps some of the uranium found in the remains of the site at al-Kibar originated at Dayr al-Hajar and was inadvertently moved to al-Kibar.

Talk about the suspension of disbelief. It is over 250 miles of bad roads from Dayr al-Hajr to al-Kibar. Trust me - I've driven it. There is no easy way to get there, and no plausible explanation as to why anyone involved in the reactor program at Dayr al-Hajar should be at al-Kibar, unless al-Kibar was in fact a nuclear facility.

I think the Syrians still have some explaining to do.

Iraq-U.S. Troop Withdrawal Agreement - A Bad Deal

The current iteration of the agreement between the governments of Iraq and the United States is a bad deal for both countries. The Iraqis are being typically xenophobic and short-sighted, and the United States is giving up too much in the rush to sign an agreement before the end of the year when the current United Nations mandate expires. Or, could it be that the United States is rushing to complete an agreement before the current administration leaves office in January?

Some Sunni and Shi'a leaders have suggested that they should wait until Barack Obama takes office before concluding an agreement, hoping to accelerate the withdrawal of American forces from the proposed three-year timetable to the 16 month pullout promised by Senator Obama during his presidential campaign. That sounds good to the Iraqis, although if there is no agreement in force on December 31, American forces technically will be required to cease operations. In theory, American forces will be sidelined until there is a legal framework in place to allow them to operate. In reality, any American officer who places his forces in jeopardy because of this political manuevering is not being true to his troops.

That said, if American troops cease operations, it just may demonstrate to the Iraqi leadership just how fragile their current relative calm is. Iraqi military and security forces have come a long way in the past few years, and may be able to handle much of the direct on-scene operational duties required to maintain some semblance of calm, but they are not in a position to provide the requisite logistics, transportation, medical, intelligence, etc. - all those combat support functions that are not yet fully operational in the fledgling Iraqi units.

The Iraqi politicians are acting as if they are in the driver's seat. Lest they forget who gave them this opportunity to practice democracy, we should at all times remind them that it was American forces - U.S. soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen - that fought and died ro remove Saddam Husayn and the Ba'thi regime. There are almost 4,200 American families that gave their most precious commodity - their sons and daughters - to give them this this chance. We should demand a say in what goes on for the immediate future.

The Middle East is a dangerous, yet critical, part of the world, and it will remain so as long as we Americans are dependent on fossil fuels as a cornerstone of our energy resources. In the absence of any semblance of leadership or even mere cooperation from our European "allies," the United States needs to stand firm and demand an agreement that meets our security needs, rather than accept what is not in our national interest. The presence of 152,000 American troops should count for something.

So what do the Iraqis want, and what can we not live with? Let's take a look at some of the points that this administration has caved on.

Let's eliminate the jurisdiction issue. The language of the agreement in all iterations is similar to agreements we have made all over the world - hardly a show stopper. More to the point, however - the initial draft provided for an American troop withdrawal from Iraq by the end of 2011, open to negotiation at that time. If press reports are correct, the latest draft removes language authorizing Iraq to ask U.S. forces to remain in any capacity beyond the end of 2011 - the new text is, "United States forces shall withdraw from all Iraqi territory no later than December 31, 2011."

Unacceptable. No one can predict the situation in Iraq in 2011, let alone the situation in Iran at that time. We did not sacrifice over 4,000 Americans to establish an Iranian surrogate. Both Iraq and the United States need the flexibility to determine American force presence at that time based on the situation. We should demand no less.

The Bush Administration should rethink these concessions, and the incoming Obama Administration should reject them.

Obama's Election - Mixed Reviews in the Region

The election of Barack Obama as the next president of the United States has sparked some interesting reactions in the Middle East - mostly predictable, but with some surprises.

The leaders of Iran and Syria - both state sponsors of terrorism - sent congratulatory messages to the president-elect, assuming that he will be more amenable to direct discussions with their regimes. Iranian leaders are especially encouraged by Obama's repeated campaign promise to meet with them without preconditions.

In a earlier interview with the New York Times, Obama made clear that “changes in [Iranian] behavior” would be rewarded with economic benefits and security guarantees. “We are willing to talk about certain assurances in the context of them showing some good faith,” he said in the interview at his campaign headquarters here. “I think it is important for us to send a signal that we are not hell-bent on regime change, just for the sake of regime change, but expect changes in behavior. And there are both carrots and there are sticks available to them for those changes in behavior.”

With these words on the record, Obama's victory was welcomed in Tehran, as well as Damascus - no surprise since Syria has become nothing more than a client state of Iran. Iranian President Ahmadinejad would prefer to deal with someone who has committed to talk to him without the Iranian leader making any concessions whatsoever. I suspect that Ahmadinejad's national security advisors have provided him with an analysis that the new American president will be somewhat naive and easier to manipulate that either the Bush administration or John McCain. To Ahmadinejad, an Obama win presents him with the opportunity to reset the nuclear enrichment issue - no doubt he will want to start at square one and thus gain more time for his scientists to move closer to their likely goal of producing fissile material - the precursor to a nuclear weapon.

Syria likewise is happy with an Obama victory. Despite his rhetoric at selected American Jewish gatherings, Obama appears much more disposed to the Palestinian and Arab positions in the Middle East peace process than either George Bush or John McCain. Syrian President Bashar al-Asad hopes that a softer line from Washington will allow him to drive a harder bargain in his dealings with the Israelis. He may even believe he will able to regain the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights without having to close the Syrian gate for Iranian support of Hizballah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Virtually all Iranian support for these terrorist groups is funneled through Syria's airspace and border crossings into Lebanon.

Surprisingly, many senior officials of the Iraqi government are pleased that Obama won the election. The Shi'a leaders, including Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, are sympathetic (to put it mildly) with Iran and agree that their long term interests are best served with a quick and complete American troop withdrawal from Iraq - as Obama has committed to do. Other leaders are not as happy. The Sunnis believe that a quick withdrawal of American forces leaves them vulnerable to a resurgence of sectarian violence, and do not trust the Shi'a leaders close relationship with Iran. The Kurds are not so pleased with the Obama victory - they have stated that if American forces are not permitted to remain past a date certain specified in a status of forces agreement, they will offer bases in the Kurdish autonomous area. Of course, Prime Minister al-Maliki has just proposed to further limit what the autonomous regions can do, specifically aimed at just such an offer.

As far as the other Arab states, they are wary of the rise in Iranian power, Iran's apparent disregard for concerns of the international community over its nuclear program and what they believe is a new American willingness to give concessions to the regime in Tehran. If they believe a President Obama allows Iran to continue its uranium enrichment efforts unchecked, they too will find it necessary to develop their own similar capabilities. The failure of American foreign policy on this issue could ignite an arms race in the region, particularly the Persian Gulf. If Iran acquires a nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and possibly Turkey will be hard pressed not to follow suit.

The need to contain Iran will be Obama's first national security challenge. A precipitous withdrawal of American forces from Iraq, failure to provide strong leadership on the nuclear issue and the perception that we will no longer stand firm with out Gulf Arab allies may just be that test future vice president Joe Biden meant in his recent warning.

Memo to President Admadihejad: "Nuclear weapons are militarily useless"

Dear Mahmoud,

Your nuclear weapons program turns out to be unnecessary!

That's right - I attended a seminar yesterday at the ultra-liberal James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. The new deputy director of the institute, Dr Patricia Lewis, is on record that "nuclear weapons are militarily useless."

There you have it. Now you can dismantle all the centrifuges, heavy water plants and atomic vapor laser isotope separation equipment at Natanz, Arak and Lashkar Abad.

Wait - I forgot. All those facilities are for peaceful purposes. Disregard.

Okay, I am being facetious here. That said, Dr Lewis's remarks merit some comment. Of course, you'd expect some hair-splitting statement from someone whose background is solely with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and the Verification Research and Training Centre in London. Look at their success record, in say, North Korea, Pakistan, India or more currently, Iran.

According to Dr Lewis, the United Nations would like to persuade Iran to refrain from stepping over the nuclear weapons threshold, and encourage countries to rely on their own conventional military forces for security.

Here's the real answer. Nuclear weapons in the hands of responsible nations provide deterrence. Call it what you will, but the former Soviet Union was deterred by America's nuclear arsenal, and was able to deter attacks on itseff. It is this Cold War model that drove India and Pakistan to acquire nuclear weapons, and it seems to have worked. During the last decade and a half when tensions flared in South Asia, the nuclear option caused saner heads to prevail. Without that balance, we would have seen at least two major confrontations between India's and Pakistan's considerable conventional forces.

Unfortunately, it is this same model that now drives irresponsible governments in the Middle East to acquire such weaponry - and I speak here specifically of Iran and Syria. They believe that a nuclear weapons capability will deter Israeli attacks and gives them more leverage in Middle East diplomacy.

Why do I call the goverments of Syria and Iran irresponsible? They are both state sponsors of terrorism - who can say if in a major miscalculation that either one or the other would provide a nuclear weapon to Hizballah, Hamas or Islamic Jihad. At that point, the weapons become instantly useful.

In fairness to Dr Lewis, I suspect that she is trying to draw a distinction between nuclear weapons as a military tool and a political tool. It makes no difference - they are one and the same. Having the weapons gives your diplomacy credibility. Without the weapons, other countries are apt not to pay too much attention.

Syria - Car bomb attack near Shi'a shrine

On September 27, a car bomb killed 17 people in a suburb of Damascus, Syria. The location of the attack is symbolic - the shrine of Sitt Zaynab, a site visited by thousands of Shi'a Muslims each month, including many Iranians on government-sponsored tours. Because the site is revered by the Shi'a, the perpetrators were almost certainly Sunni fundamentalists.

Sitt Zaynab, literally Lady Zaynab, refers to Zaynab bint 'Ali, the daughter of 'Ali and Fatimah (daughter of the prophet Muhammad) making her the granddaughter of the prophet, daughter of the first Shi'a imam and brother of Hasan and Husayn, the second and third imams. She is buried in the shrine that bears her name. It is one of the most beautiful buildings in Syria.

Since the site is a Shi'a holy place, the attack is an embarrassment for the Syrian government of Bashar al-Asad. Syria prides itself on its lack of violence - the internal security apparatus is large and effective. Despite this, there have been a number of incidents that call in to question the stability of the regime.

I was the air attaché at the American embassy in Damascus in the early to mid 1990s. At that time, the only violence was the occasional gunfight between remnants of the Sunni fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood (ikhwan al-muslimin) and Syrian security forces. When these events happened, I tried to get to the scene to see what was happening. In almost every instance, the fundamentalists would never surrender - the Syrians normally had to burn the building in which they had holed up.

There is serious bad blood between Sunni fundamentalists and the Asad regimes. In 1982, the fundamentalists had virtually taken over a section of downtown Hama, a city in north-central Syria. Hafiz al-Asad (Bashar's father) dispatched his brother Rif'at and special units of the Syrian army. The army fired artillery into the old city, leveling most of it and killing as many as 40,000 people. The Muslim Brotherhood was effectively destroyed as a major threat, but elements remain.

In September 2006, four men were killed in an attempted car-bombing attack on the American Embassy in the Abu Rumanah section of Damascus. The four were members of a pro-al-Qa'idah group.

In February of this year, Hizballah military commander 'Imad Mughniyah was killed in the normally peaceful residential Kafr Susah section of Damascus, virtually under the eyes of the Syrian internal security service. I believe it was the Israelis.

In August, Syrian brigadier Muhammad Sulayman was murdered in Tartus. Sulayman was allegedly involved in the supply of weapons to Hizballah. Again, there is suspicion that Israeli agents were responsible, but I believe it was likely an internal powerplay in the security forces. Sulayman did not rise to the level that would make him a target for the Israelis to mount an operation in Tartus.

The recent bombing at Sitt Zaynab underscores the internal problems in Syria despite the pervasive security services and domestic intelligence activities. While these problems appear to be worsening, Asad's intelligence officers are busy trying to ignite a civil war in Lebanon, probably to justify another Syrian military intervention.

Perhaps young Bashar should try to solve the problems in his own country before creating them in another.

New Pakistan policy risky – but necessary

This article appeared on MSNBC.com

Pushing Pakistan might work but could cause the government to fall

American forces have expanded the war in Afghanistan to include cross border operations into neighboring Pakistan. This represents an escalation of the risks the United States is prepared to take in its war against the remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

Since July, American forces have increased in number and size the raids into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of North and South Waziristan, areas used by the Taliban and al-Qaeda as safe havens once thought immune from attack. Most of these raids consisted of Hellfire missile strikes launched from Predator and Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles operated by both the U.S. Air Force and the CIA; at least one raid included a ground incursion by U.S. special operations forces and CIA operatives.

At the same time, the United States is gradually increasing the number of troops in Afghanistan and urging its NATO allies to do the same. This “quiet surge” as described by the Bush Administration is in response to increased Taliban attacks on U.S. and NATO units in Afghanistan over the last six months.

With the situation improving in Iraq, American forces can – and should - now concentrate on the original battleground in the offensive against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. However, as long as there is a safe haven for these groups’ fighters across the border in neighboring Pakistan, stepped up operations limited to the sovereign territory of Afghanistan can only do so much. The solution must include denying the Taliban the ability to use Pakistan as an operations, logistics and training base.

Denying the Taliban use of Pakistani territory should be the responsibility of the Pakistan government. To be fair, Pakistan has at times deployed troops into the lawless frontier regions. Each time they have been met with stiff resistance and suffered surprisingly significant casualties. The Pakistan armed forces are very professional – they well understand the level of force required to get the job done; they just seem unwilling to do it.

One must also consider the internal dynamics of Pakistan when either calling for newly elected President Asif Ali Zardari to take action or taking unilateral action across the border. There is a fair amount of sympathy in the population in general and the armed forces in particular for the Taliban and al-Qaeda – the Taliban was created by Pakistan’s intelligence service, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate.

The ISI was also the primary funnel for American and Saudi money and weapons to the Afghan mujahidin and the Arab volunteers who later formed al-Qaeda, in the fight against the Soviet occupation in the 1980’s. Those bonds run deep. American demands that Zardari commit large numbers of troops to fight the Taliban, al-Qaeda and their Pushtun hosts in the border areas may cause a crisis in popular support for the new government. After all, there is little support in Pakistan for the United States and its war against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. A failed government in Islamabad would serve only the extremist agenda.

It is interesting – and telling – that the Pakistani government which accepts up to $100 million every month from the United States to reimburse the Pakistani military for its efforts against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, is willing to order its troops to fire on American forces. It is willing to try to prevent American forces from entering Pakistan, yet seems to be unwilling to prevent Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters from crossing the border seemingly at will.

The war cannot be won unless the flow of men and materiel in and out of Pakistan is stopped – it’s that simple. What is not simple is how to stop it. Pakistan does not want American forces to conduct cross border raids from Afghanistan into its territory, but will not stop the Taliban from doing essentially doing the same thing in reverse.

There is little choice here. American forces must strike the Taliban and al-Qaeda wherever they are – at times that will be in Pakistan. The trick will be to do it in such a way that we don’t cause the fall of the new government.

See my earlier pieces I did for MSNBC.com on this subject:

• Pakistan’s safe haven may need surge operation - July 18, 2007
• Uncertainty rises after Musharraf’s departure - August 21, 2008

Hizballah's Nasrallah says what we knew all along...

On September 4, Hizballah leader Hasan Nasrallah stated what any observer of Middle East politics has known all along: Hizballah has no intention of disarming and disbanding its militia, although it has committed to do so numerous times.

This should come as no surprise.  Hizballah has rarely, if ever, adhered to any pact or agreement it has made.  This includes the Ta'if Accords of 1989, United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1559 of 2004, and UNSCR 1701 adopted at the end of the 2006 war between Israel and Hizballah.

All of the accords that Hizballah has agreed to include a requirement that Hizballah disarm and disband its militia, the al-muqawamat al-islamiyah (Islamic Resistance).  The accompanying requirement is that "foreign forces" - read: Israel - would leave the country as well.  Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000, ending an 18 year occupation - the United Nations declared Israel to be in compliance with the Tai'f accords.  UNSCR 1559 demanded that Hizballah live up to its end of the deal.

Hizballah refused, claiming that Israeli forces were still occupying part of Lebanon - specifically the Shaba' Farms (mazari' al-shaba').  This is an excuse created with Syrian complicity.  (See my earlier The Shaba' Farms - Hizballah's Fig Leaf.)  

The Shaba' Farms sit adjacent to the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.  Both areas have been occupied since Israel seized them in the Six Day War of 1967.  Old Syrian army maps and United Nations maps both show the area to be part of Syria, not Lebanon.  When it became apparent that Israel was going to withdraw from Lebanon and remove any reason that Hizballah should maintain its militia, Syria claimed that the Shaba' Farms were actually part of Lebanon, not Syria.  A myth was born.

Israeli occupation of any part of Lebanon, in the eyes of Hizballah, justifies the continued existence of Hizballah's militia.  What changed on Friday was Hizballah's need for the myth.  Nasrallah said that regardless of whether Israel withdrew from the Shaba' Farms and another disputed border area (the village of al-Ghajar), it would not disarm.

One has to ask if Nasrallah will justify this complete disregard for Hizballah's commitment by claiming the Shi'a dispensation of taqiyah - lying to protect the faith.

In any case, Nasrallah's words expose Hizballah for what it is - a lying bunch of thugs who are more interested in power than peace.

Former Iraqi general to speak out against Iran

The national security advisor to Iraqi President Jalal Talabani resigned his position so he can legally speak out about what he perceives as a threat to his country from Iran, specifically from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Qods Force.

Jalal Talabani with the author in Irbil, Iraq - 1996

Wafiq al-Samarra'i is uniqely qualified to make these kinds of assessments - he is a retired general and professional military intelligence officer. I first met Wafiq in early 1988 when President Ronald Reagan decided that an Iranian victory in the Iran-Iraq war was unacceptable and that the United States would support Iraq.

President Reagan's Secretary of Defense, Frank Carlucci, directed the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to begin providing intelligence assistance to Iraq. I was sent to Baghdad to serve as the DIA liaison officer to the Iraqi Directorate General of Miltary Intelligence (DGMI), the istikhbarat. At that time, the director of the Istikhbarat was Major General Sabr 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Duri. Al-Duri is currently on death row for his complicity in the chemical attacks on the Kurds at Halabjah in 1988. This happened while I was in Baghdad working with the Istikhbarat.

The deputy director of the Istikhbarat at the time was Brigadier Wafiq al-Samarra'i. Wafiq became my primary point of contact in Baghdad - he and I worked intelligence support to Iraqi forces fighting against Iran. With American intelligence support, they were able to halt the Iranian onslaughts and mount a series of offensives that ended the war in August 1988.

After the end of the war, Wafiq and I parted company as our countries drew apart. Saddam adopted a militazation policy and a belligerence towards American ally Kuwait that we could not abide. By the time Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1991, Wafiq had been promoted to the position of director of the DGMI. My friend had now become my enemy.

In response to Iraq's invasion, occupation and annexation of Kuwait, American forces poured in to the Arabian deserts to defend Saudi Arabia and ultimately liberate Kuwait. While Wafiq served as Saddam Husayn's military intelligence chief, I served as the advisor on Iraq and personal Arabic interpreter to American forces commander, General Norman Schwarzkopf.

When the war ended in March 1991, Wafiq conitnued in his position but was becoming more and more disillusioned with what Saddam was doing to Iraq. In December 1994, he defected to the West via the Kurdish controlled area in northern Iraq. Since I was one of the very few American officers that knew him and had worked with him, I was chosen to be on the team handling his debriefing and resettlement. Eventually, we had him working in the Iraqi opposition with Dr 'Iyad Alawi and the Iraqi National Accord (the wifaq), mostly in Jordan.

After the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, Wafiq returned home to his native Samarra' where he was instrumental in the defeat of the Sunni insurgency and al-Qai'dah in Iraq. He was selected to be the national security advisor to the Iraqi president in 2005.

The fact that Iran is a threat to Iraq is obvious. The general will attempt to ensure that the Shi'a-dominated government in Baghdad remains committed to resisting Iranian attempts to become the major power broker in the country. (See my articles, Muqtada al-Sadr biding his time in Iran and Muqtada al-Sadr in Iran - Who is behind it?)

Wafiq al-Samarra'i has the credentials and gravitas to make the case to the Iraqi government and the Iraqi people. I wish him success.

Muqtada al-Sadr in Iran - Who is behind it?

In my last post (Muqtada al-Sadr biding his time in Iran), I wrote about Muqtada al-Sadr and his decision to disband his jaysh al-mahdi (Army of the Mahdi) militia and transform it into a social welfare service organization, move to Iran and pursue a course of study to burnish his Islamic credentials, in hopes that he will gain the requisite stature to eventually become the major political power broker in Iraq.

Not a bad plan when you think of it. The big unanswered question: who came up with it? Muqtada al-Sadr is demonstrably not that smart. He has consistently led his followers into a series of disastrous military blunders, most recently suffering devastating losses in battles with American and Iraqi troops in Baghdad, al-Basrah and al-'Amarah. Yet, on his own he decides to completely change course, "get religion" and commit to a four to five year program of study?

Here is one possible explanation.

In the human intelligence business, we normally try to recruit assets with access to specific information that cannot be obtained through normal means - in other words, find a spy to steal the information. The usual targets for recruitment are diplomats, military personnel, government officials and employees - people who have routine access to sensitive or classified information. We recruit them to give that information to us, for whatever reason - ideological views, an appeal to their patriotism, revenge, greed, whatever works.

A more difficult operation is to recruit what is called an "agent of influence." This person does not necessarily have access to specific information of value, but they themselves are believed to be a future leader of a particular country, military organization, political party, etc. These agents of influence are difficult to find and more difficult to recruit since they are generally truly committed to the county or group we are trying to penetrate. However, finding and recruiting an agent of influence has huge potential. Having a well-placed asset that we can control inside a government or organization provides unique abilities to shape events to our liking.

Consider this scenario: An Iranian intelligence officer, whether from the Ministry of Intelligence and Securitry (MOIS), or the intelligence arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), or a Qods force officer working with the Mahdi Army, approaches Muqtada al-Sadr.

The approach would have been along the lines of, "Here's your opportunity to get what you have alwasy wanted - to be the most powerful man in Iraq. To do that, you are going to have to have solid religious credentials, you need to be a marja' al-taqlid (source of emulation), at the very least an ayatollah. We - you friends and brothers in Iran - can make this happen. We'll get you into the presitigious religious academy in Qom, we'll make sure you get the credentials you need. We'll help you create a social services organization based on the Mahdi Army - remember, we have done similar things with Hizballah in Lebanon. When you return to Iraq, we'll continue to help. All we ask is that you continue to be our ally and friend."

Sounds pretty plausible, doesn't it? I wonder.