January 9, 2009

Damascus - Nexus of Terrorism

There was an expression during the heyday of the Roman Empire that all roads lead to Rome. Today, when speaking of terrorism in the Middle East, it seems that all roads lead to Damascus. Whether it be supplies from Iran bound for Islamic militants in Lebanon, Syria and Gaza, or a venue for meetings with senior terrorist officials, it all happens in Damascus.

Only hours before the Israeli ground operation against Hamas in the Gaza Strip, the secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, Said Jalili, flew to Damascus to meet with Syrian President Bashar al-Asad. While in the city, he also met with exiled Hamas political chief Khalid Mish'al and Palestinian Islamic Jihad leader Ramadan 'Abdullah Shalah. Both live in the Syrian capital with the permission and protection of the Asad regime. Virtually all of Hamas's and Islamic Jihad's funding, weapons and training originates in Iran and is funneled via Syria.

It is not just Hamas and Islamic Jihad that draws Iranian leaders to Damascus. Last week, the speaker of the Iranian parliament, Ali Larijani, came to Damascus and met with Ahmad Jibril, leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, a group with American blood on its hands. Larijani also met with Khalid Mish'al and Ramadan Shalah. That's the second meeting in two weeks between these Hamas and Islamic Jihad leaders and senior Iranian officials.

Jibril, like Mish'al and Shalah, lives in Damascus, also with the permission and protection of Bashar al-Asad. Jibril threatened to open another front against Israel - that would be from the north, from Lebanon. That sounds like it might be a problem for the Israelis, but in reality anything that happens in southern Lebanon happens with the express knowledge and consent of another of Iran's clients - Hizballah.

Hizballah is also supplied, funded and trained by Iran, via - you guessed it - Damascus. It is unlikely that Hizballah wants to provoke a confrontation with Israel, for several reasons. Hizballah emerged as a major power broker in Labanon following the war with Israel in 2006 - there is no reason to jeapardize that, especially given the mood in Israel now. Any Israeli operation against Hazballah will be much more effective than two years ago. I suspect that the few rockets that were fired from southern Lebanon into northern Israel were not fired by Hizballah, but by Palestinians from one of the refugee camps.

Israel's operation against Hamas in the Gaza has stalled indirect talks between Damascus and Tel Aviv. If and when the talks resume, Israel will continue to make one of its key demands - that Syria stop allowing Iran to use Syrian airspace, airports, roads and border crossings with Lebanon to supply Palestinian and Lebanese militants.

The battles may be taking place in the Gaza Strip, but the fuel for the fire originates in Iran, but it comes through Damascus.

What if the UN called a ceasefire...

...and no one listened? That is exactly what happened.

by Rick Francona

The United Nations Security Council passed a resolution Thurdsay night calling for an immediate ceasefire between Hamas and Israel. Both sides ignored the resolution - Hamas fired 40 rockets into Israel on Friday, while Israeli fighter aircraft and attack helicopters concentrated on Hamas laedership and logistics targets.

Neither side has shown any willingness to stop the hostilities. Israel believes it has a mandate from its population to achieve the two major aims of this campaign: stop Hamas from firing rockets into southern Israel and prevent Hamas from acquiring even more effective arms via sumggling tunnels under the border with Egypt.

Hamas, for its part, believes - rightfully so - that it is winning the propaganda war. There are demonstrations not only in Arab and Muslim countries, but in many European countries as well. In most media outlets, Israel is portrayed as the aggressor, the military behemoth devastating an innocent civilian population that has no complicity in the attacks on Israel. The longer Hamas can survive the Israeli onslaught - and they are paying a high human price - the greater the public relations blow they are landing on Israel.

The Israeli effort to minimize civilian casualties, often referred to as "collateral damage," has caused them some military difficulties. If they were to conduct their attacks with no concern for civilians, they may well have already achieved their objectives.

It is this concern that has caused some media pundits to declare Hamas the victors, much like Hizballah was perceived to have fought the Israelis to a draw in Lebanon 2006. For example, Jackson Diehl, the deputy editorial page editor of the Washington Post, opened his recent analysis, "Israel's military campaign in the Gaza Strip is failing, but there may be a silver lining. The war against Hamas is proving -- once again -- that the Middle East's extremist movements cannot be eliminated by military means."

Perhaps Mr. Diehl should stick to whatever his area of expertise might be; it certainly is not military analysis. You don't attack "movements" - you attack groups that espouse a movement, you attack targets. So, what of attacking Middle East extremist groups by military means. Has he heard of the Syrian charpter of the Muslim Brotherhood? How about al-Qai'dah in Iraq? Or the PKK in Turkey? In any case, the military operation is not over yet. Of course, the Washington Post wrote Iraq off as an Americna defeat in 2006.

The United Nations resolution failed because it offered neither side anything it wanted or needed. A ceasefire in place would give Hamas time to regroup and rearm, while Israel would still control the flow of goods and fuel into the Gaza Strip.

Bottom line: the Israeli campaign will end when Hamas agrees to stop firing rockets. At that point the United Nations can become relevant when it can provide an effective means of preventing Hamas from rearming. Until then, resolutions passed in New York without addressing the concerns of the combatants are only, as the Arabic colloquialism states, hibr 'ala waraq - ink on paper.



January 8, 2009

Turkey a good choice to lead Gaza force


by Rick Francona


As we move toward the inevitable ceasefire in Gaza, one of the key elements for the Israelis in any arrangement is the introduction of an international force to monitor and enforce the agreement. That international force will be charged with insuring that Hamas does not launch rockets into southern Israel, nor rearm itself via the porous Egyptian border.

The Egyptian-French ceasefire proposal currently being talked about does not specifically address an international force - it only calls for a ceasefire followed by talks between Israel and Hamas. That may take some time - Israel still refuses to talk directly to Hamas, which it regards as a terrorist organization, and Hamas has not yet agreed to talks with a state they have vowed to destroy.


That said, there will be a ceasefire. The question is how do we get there? Who gives in, what are the conditions, who monitors the agreement, etc. Israel will stop its operations only when it receives guarantees of a stop to Hamas rocket fire and the prevention of the resupply of Hamas. Hamas has thus far refused to allow any external observers, and claims it will only talk after Israel halts its operations. The classic Catch-22.

Ultimately, we will get to the presence of an international force, most likely under United Nations auspices. That is how wars end in the Middle East. Most of these UN observer groups, the first of which was established in 1948, are still in place today. The fact that we keep having wars says something about the efficacy of the United Nations.

There are reports that Turkey will be asked to organize the new force. The choice of Turkey is an excellent idea.

Turkey is a unique country. It is a Muslim country, but not an Islamic country. The population is overwhelmingly Muslim, but there is religious tolerance - there are Jews and Christians in small numbers throughout the country. It is a secular state, and until the establishment of a democracy in Iraq, the only truly democratic country in the Muslim world. Yes, I am aware that Egypt and Syria have elections - no one actually believes there are truly representative governments.

Turkey is also a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and is seeking membership in the European Union. It has one foot in Europe and the other in the Middle East. It's Muslim identity makes it acceptable to the Palestinians, even Hamas. The fact that it is not an Arab country makes it acceptable to the Israelis, not to mention the fact that Israel and Turkey have a longstanding military and intelligence relationship.

The Turks area signing up for a thankless task. There will be times when Hamas attempts to rearm or fire rockets into Israel. Will the Turks fire on fellow Muslims? Will they strictly enforce the anti-smuggling protocols? If previous United Nations efforts are a judge, the answer is no - they will merely report the violations to New York.

Thanks to the Turks for stepping up to the plate.

January 7, 2009

Gaza: French-Egyptian truce proposal falls short

by Rick Francona

Egyptian President Husni Mubarak and French President Sarkozy have proposed a ceasefire to end the current violence in the Gaza Strip. The proposal includes an immediate ceasefire to allow humanitarian aid into the area, followed by talks between Hamas and the Israelis to develop a permanent solution.


The two presidents are well-meaning - it is a noble effort to try to end the hostilities that have killed over 600 Palestinians during the last 12 days. It is a difficult issue. On one side, you have a group of Islamic militants committed to the destruction of Israel, who have refused to stop firing rockets at Israeli cities. On the other side is one of the world's best-trained and equipped military powers intent on eliminating the threat to its citizens. Neither appears willing to give in - it is a recipe for disaster.

France and Egypt are not the key players here - Hamas and Israel are. According to Sarkozy, Israel has "conditionally accepted" the proposal, while the Israeli media reports that Israeli leaders are "taking the proposal seriously." On the Hamas side, an official in Sarkozy's office reported that Syrian President Bashar al-Asad backs the proposal and that he will urge Hamas to stop firing rockets at Israel. Palestinian President Mahmud 'Abbas has agreed to the proposal, but there has not been a direct reponse from Hamas. Neither Asad nor 'Abbas speak for Hamas.

According to the Egypt's ambassador to United Nations, representatives of Israel, the Palestinian Authority and Hamas have agreed to meet separately with Egyptian officials in Cairo. The Egyptian foreign minister was not so confident in this characterization, stating merely that Hamas had been invited to the talks. He also seemed to be downplaying expectations of the talks, now hoping for a "limited ceasefire" to allow humanitarian aid into Gaza - a far cry from the permanent ceasefore and Israeli withdrawal hinted at earlier in the week.

There are several elements missing in the French-Egyptian proposal - all show stoppers. The most immediate is a provision in the plan that will prevent Hamas from firing rockets into Israel and prevents the group from rearming via the Egyptian border. The proposal, as I understand it, merely calls for a ceasefire, followed by talks between Hamas and Israel, not for the introduction of an international force to prevent arms smuggling and Hamas rocket attacks. "Talks" to Hamas normally means a breather during which it will try to regroup and rearm. In addition, Israel has stated that it will not negotiate with Hamas, which it considers a terrorist organization.

The Cairo meetings may be the first steps in the ceasefire process, but I do not see the Israelis agreeing to stop their attacks unless there is a provision for a monitoring and enforcement mechanism, most likely an international force. Until Hamas agrees to that protocol, Israel will continue its actions in Gaza.


January 6, 2009

An international force for Gaza?

International efforts to arrange a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip are taking place at a variety of venues, including the United Nations in New York. One of the provisions in almost every version of a proposed ceasefire agreement between Hamas and Israel is the presence of an international force of some kind deployed to the area to monitor and/or enforce any arrangement.

The composition and mission of that force will be key in getting both the Israelis and Hamas to agree to a ceasefire. Israel has stated that an international force is a requirement, and that it must be charged with preventing Hamas rocket attacks on southern Israel, as well as preventing Hamas from smuggling weapons via the tunnel-ridden Egyptian border.

Hamas has not yet agreed to the presence of an international force in the Gaza Strip. It is hoped that Egypt might be able to convince the group that acceptance of such a force may be the only way to end the relentless attacks on the Palestinian territory. At some point, international pressure for a ceasefire will be so great that refusal to accept the presence of an international force will turn public opinion against Hamas. Continued refusal for such a presence will rob Hamas of its perceived moral high ground. Egypt would also have to agree to the presence of the international force since the tunnels are partly in Egyptian territory.

What will constitute an acceptable international force? Will it be a civilian observer force, or a military force with a mandate to enforce ceasefire provisions?

Unfortunately, any international force will likely have to be authorized by the United Nations. The United Nations has an abysmal record of conducting successful or effective observation operations in the Middle East. Look at the multiple "temporary" observer organizations already in existence in the Middle East - they have been there since the first war between the Arabs and the new state of Israel in 1948.

There already are hundreds of military observers in Israel, Lebanon, Syria and Egypt - and they have yet to stop a war. The observer groups require large amounts of money and resources to sustain, and as far as I can tell, their only actual function is to perpetuate a rather comfortable existence.

Israel must insist that any new UN force be mandated with not only observing Hamas trying to rearm itself and attempting to fire rockets at Israel, but that the force actually take preventive action. Merely reporting violations of the ceasefire agreement to New York is worthless - ask the Israelis on the Lebanese border.


January 5, 2009

Palestinian President 'Abbas Calls for Ceasefire

Mahmud 'Abbas (Photo-AFP/Omar Al-Rashidi)In an interesting turn of events, Palestinian President Mahmud 'Abbas will travel to New York to press the United Nations Security Council to adopt a resolution calling for an immediate end to Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip and a permanent ceasefire between Hamas and Israel. That ceasefire will include an international observer force to monitor the border between Israel and the Gaza Strip.

'Abbas's proposed ceasefire raises a whole host of issues, not the least of which is his standing among the people of Gaza and Hamas, the democratically elected leadership of the Palestinian people. 'Abbas was elected to the presidency of the Palestinian Authority in 2005; his current term ends on January 8, 2009. Hamas has said they will not recognize his authority after that date.

'Abbas may hold the title of President, but in reality, he exercises power only in the West Bank since his Fatah party was forcibly ousted from the Gaza Strip by Hamas militants in June 2007. That move in effect created two Palestinian states: a quasi-Islamic fundamentalist state in Gaza run by Hamas, and a secular state run by Fatah in the West Bank. Given that split and the animosity of Hamas towards 'Abbas and Fatah, why is 'Abbas pushing for a cease-fire that allows Hamas to continue its rule in the Gaza Strip?

Perhaps 'Abbas realizes that unless Israeli troops completely annihilate Hamas - which is extremely unlikely - the Islamic group will emerge with much more domestic political capital than before the Israel military operation began. Conversely, Fatah has almost no chance of regaining a foothold in Gaza. If 'Abbas wants to retain any influence in the Palestinian leadership, he must have a political victory that benefits Hamas. Arranging a ceasefire that stops the killing in Gaza might do the trick.

Some background is in order. Hamas, considered a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union, was able to win the parliamentary elections in January 2006 not because people were enamored with Hamas, but because a majority of people were no longer willing to tolerate the corruption of the Fatah-dominated government.

Under Hamas, however, things continued to deteriorate. Unemployment soared as the United States, Canada and the European Union stopped providing funds to the Palestine National Authority. Israel clamped down on the Gaza Strip, causing shortages and economic hardships. Hamas was able to claim that all the area's economic problems were caused by the Americans, Europeans and Israelis, deflecting scrutiny from their inability to govern and efforts to introduce more Islamic jurisprudence into the legal system.

'Abbas has his work cut out for him. He has to carefully craft a ceasefire resolution that is acceptable to the Security Council, a difficult task. Any condemnation of Israel in the resolution will surely be vetoed by the United States. If he is successful in New York, he will then have to sell it to Hamas who is on record as opposing any arrangement forced on them that includes international monitors.

'Abbas's proposed resolution just might be the answer, and will likely be acceptable to the Israelis. The question is - will it be acceptable to Hamas?



January 4, 2009

Israeli troops focus on the "launch basket"

Uriel Sinai/Getty ImagesIsraeli forces in Gaza have thus far employed classic military strategy. Their initial thrusts into the densely populated Gaza Strip sought to isolate the northern city of Gaza and the sprawling Jabaliyah refugee camp from the rest of the territory. It is from the areas north, east and south of Gaza and Jabaliyah that Hamas fires rockets into southern Israel. Using these locations allows Hamas to maximize its reach into Israel.

Hamas no longer has to rely on the short-range homemade and grossly inaccurate Qassam rockets. The Qassam could only reach Sderot, the Israeli city closest to the border with Gaza. With its Iranian-supplied "Grad" rockets, Hamas can now strike as far north as the major Israeli port city of Ashdod, and as far east to Beersheba in the Negev desert. To hit these cities, Hamas must fire its rockets from the northeast corner of the Gaza Strip. That area is known in military parlance as the "launch basket" - noted in red on the map below.


This launch basket - about 10 square miles of territory - was a priority target for the air campaign, and is a primary target for the Israeli ground forces entering Gaza. Israeli troops must clear and control the launch basket if they are to stop Hamas from firing rockets at Israeli cities. Almost one million Israelis live within rocket range of the launch basket.

As of Sunday, Hamas was still able to fire rockets at Israel, despite Israel's claim that its forces control the northeastern section of the Gaza Strip. It's a big area and firing a small rocket that only requires a car battery can be hard to spot and stop. That said, this is the area that the Israeli forces must secure.

Urban warfare against a committed and dug-in enemy who has had ample time to prepare defenses and obstacles is very difficult and can cost high casualties. The Israelis do not, or should not, have any desire to reoccupy the entire Gaza Strip. For now, they need to isolate Gaza city and the Jabaliyah refugee camp to prevent resupply and reinforcement from the southern Gaza Strip, but more importantly, they must clear and control the launch basket.

The Israeli population is behind this operation. The Israeli political leadership needs to allow the Israeli military to do whatever it takes to prevent Hamas from firing rockets at Israel. Securing the launch basket in northeast Gaza is a good start.

January 3, 2009

Hamas - The Iranian Connection

Jalili with Asad (AFP/SANA)

Over the years, the Syrians made no effort to hide their support of this transshipment system, the key component of which is the Damascus International Airport. From the airport it is a short drive (30 minutes) to the Lebanese border and the Biqa’ Valley. For years, Iranian Air Force 747 cargo aircraft routinely delivered arms and supplies to Hizballah and the Palestinian groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad at the airport – and still do. They did not try to hide it on the military side of the airport – this was done on the civilian side in plain view. I was the air attaché at the American embassy in Damascus – often while at the airport, I observed this activity.

Hours before the start of the Israeli ground incursion into the Gaza Strip, the secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, Said Jalili, flew to Damascus to meet with Syrian President Bashar al-Asad. Jalili also met with exiled Hamas political chief Khalid Mish'al and Palestinian Islamic Jihad leader Ramadan 'Abdullah Shalah - both are based in the Syrian capital.

This trip by one of Iran's senior national security officials comes as no surprise. Both al-Asad and Jalili are extremely concerned about events in Gaza since their countries are the principal supporters of Hamas and Islamic Jihad - the two fundamentalist Islamic groups responsible for the rocket attacks that sparked the current Israeli military operation. Almost all of Hamas's and Islamic Jihad's funding, weapons and training originates in Iran and is funneled via Syria into the Gaza Strip.

Case in point. Over the last few weeks, Hamas launcher teams have fired rockets 40 kilometers (24 miles) into southern Israel, striking targets as far as Ashdod and Beersheba. These rockets are Katyusha "Grad" rockets, which the Palestinians must receive from outside Gaza. These are a far cry from the inaccurate homemade al-Qassam rockets that only travel about five miles and have been fired daily at the Israeli border town of Sderot.

Where does Hamas get the weapons, money and training support it needs to mount these attacks? Simple - Iran. Some history is in order here. In 1982, elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) were dispatched to Lebanon to provide support to Hizballah (actually they helped created the organization). The IRGC contingent provided the necessary ingredients for successful insurgent/guerrilla operations – money, weapons and training. Their operations soon expanded south to the various Palestinian groups – including the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC), several factions of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and of course, HAMAS. By 1992, Iran was the primary sponsor of these groups.

How do money, weapons and training get from Iran to the Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip? There are several routes, but the hub of the transshipment system is Syria, a close ally of Iran going back decades – Syria was the only Arab state to back (and provide support to) Iran during the eight-year Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988). Syria and Iran recently renewed their formal defense cooperation agreement. The weapons end up being smuggled into Gaza via Egypt.


As they say, follow the money. That trail leads from the Rafah, Jabaliyah and Khan Yunis refugee camps (more like Islamic training centers) back to Tehran. Scratch the surface of the Arab fundamentalist groups Hizballah in Lebanon as well as Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza, and you hear Persian....


Conditions for a ceasefire in Gaza


Now that Israeli forces have entered the Gaza Strip as the second phase of Operation Cast Lead proceeds, the world is demanding the United Nations arrange a ceasefire. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon expressed "disappointment" at the Israeli invasion - I don't recall such concern when hundreds of Qassam rockets were landing in Sderot, nor when Hamas upped the ante a few weeks ago by launching longer range Katyusha rockets at the cities of Ashkelon, Ashdod and Beersheba.

Arab nations called on the UN to demand an immediate halt to Israeli military activities, while the French urged both sides return to the political track. In a bit of absurd theater, Hamas government spokesman Tahir Nunu stated, "Anyone who thinks that the change in the Palestinian arena can be achieved through jet fighters' bombs and tanks and without dialogue is mistaken."

The question of whether or not bombs and tanks can change the situation remains to be seen. Nunu's remark about "without dialogue" is classic. Hamas does not recognize Israel's right to exist and has committed itself to the destruction of the Jewish state. Now he wants "dialogue" with the very same people he has vowed to destroy. The analyst in me believes that the bombs and tanks are indeed having an effect. If Hamas had the upper hand after eight days of Israeli air attacks, they would not utter the word "dialogue."

For the sake of argument, let's assume that Hamas is serious about a dialogue with Israel. Israel has stated that it will not accept Hamas's word that it will not resume rocket and mortar attacks on southern Israel - any ceasefire must be accompanied with the deployment of international observers. Normally that means a United Nations observer force. If I were the Israelis, I would demand a totally independent group, not the same feckless and ineffective UN groups now deployed in Lebanon, Syria and Egypt.

In reaction to the Israeli requirement for international observers, Nunu said that Hamas "would not allow Israel or the international community to impose any arrangement." Of course, that is exactly what his brother Arabs are demanding, that the United Nations impose an arrangement. What Nunu really means - Hamas wants the UN and international community to impose a ceasefire and withdrawal on Israel with no demands of Hamas and no deployment of observers that would limit their ability to continue launching rockets against Israel.

Thus far, Israel has not let international pressure distract them from their operations, nor should they. There is no way Israel is going to win the public relations battle in the Middle East or Europe, so why even try?

Urban warfare in Gaza is going to be difficult and bloody. Hamas learned valuable lessons from Hizballah's defense of southern Lebanon in 2006. No doubt it has created a series of obstacles, roadside bombs, and improvised explosive devices. Israel has calculated this into the decision to move into the Gaza Strip. This plan has been in the works for some time.

I sense a determination on the part of the Israelis that was missing in 2006. They have mobilized tens of thousands of reservists in case Hizballah wants to join the fight and launch rockets into northern Israel from southern Lebanon, or Fatah wants to attempt to challenge the Israelis from the West Bank. I doubt either will make that mistake.

The military option is not a solution, but it might remove one of the obstacles to peace - Hamas. Look for a ceasefire only when Israel believes that objective has been accomplished.


January 2, 2009

An Israeli ground incursion into Gaza?

AP Photo - click for larger imageIsrael continues to build up its ground forces on the borders of the Gaza Strip in preparation for a probable ground incursion into the Gaza Strip.

The Israeli Air Force has effectively exhausted its preplanned campaign targets list, and is now striking targets of opportunity as they are identified by manned and unmanned surveillance aircraft. Israel likely has all the forces in place now for a ground operation in Gaza.

One of two things will happen in the coming days. Either Hamas will offer a ceasefire that includes a commitment to cease rocket launches into southern Israel and a statement that recognizes Israel's right to exist, or the Israeli leadership will order the Israeli army to move into Gaza. That order, at the minimum, will be to eliminate Hamas's ability to fire rockets into Israel, or may go so far as to attempt to destroy Hamas.

UN Map - click for larger imageUnited Nations map of Gaza (click for larger image)

Barring Hamas's decision to come to terms with the Israelis - and I do not see that happening - the Israeli military will enter Gaza in force. As I have said before, the Israelis will not repeat the mistakes of 2006 when they did not use overwhelming force against Hizballah in Lebanon. That ill-fated decision by Ehud Olmert has resulted in a much stronger Hizballah. When Israeli troops enter Gaza, it will be with with tanks and infantry backed by artillery and aviation. Hamas is not Hizballah - they may be as committed, but not as proficient.

Israel has been cited by some misguided critics for use of what they label "disproportionate force" in Gaza. These critics do not understand military conflict. They would have you believe that if Hamas kills an Israeli, then the Israelis should kill one Hamas militant. That's not use of force, that's merely vengeance. If Hamas is systematically killing Israelis, the Israelis should use any force required to eliminate Hamas's capability to kill more Israelis. In military conflict, there is no such thing as disproportionate response. You use what you think you need to prevail and accomplish the objective.

Just as Hamas is not Hizballah, Gaza is not southern Lebanon. The narrow Gaza Strip can easily be segmented by Israeli armored thrusts, possibly into as many as three sectors. Israeli forces could initially isolate the northeastern part of the Strip, in effect cutting off the city of Gaza and the sprawling Jabaliyah refugee camp. Israeli troops can move from Israel to the Mediterranean, a distance of less than five miles, and cut off this area. The area north, east and south of Jabaliyah are the "launch basket" for the Hamas rockets that have been used against Sderot, Ashkelon, Ashdod and Beersheba.

The goal of the initial thrust will be to isolate the Gaza-Jabaliyah pocket from resupply and reinforcements from other area of the Strip. All of the weapons that enter Gaza do so via the porous border with Egypt into the Rafah area, and Islamic militant fighters are easily recruited amid the squalor of the Khan Yunis refugee camp. Separating the fighter pool and weapons supply route from the launch area should begin decreasing the number of rockets being fired into Israel.

After the initial thrust, the Israelis should concentrate on two areas: clearing the "launch basket" around Jabaliyah and sealing the border with Egypt. Clearing the launch basket is obvious: closing the border with Egypt prevents the escape of Hamas leaders and the introduction of additional weapons into the Gaza Strip.

This will not be easy. Hamas is a committed foe. Gaza is a densely populated urban area that will require difficult house-to-house urban warfare. The Israelis have probably determined that they have no choice - the time has come to address the issue of Hamas. It will not be long now.