Mr. President, tell me again why we're in Afghanistan?

The continuing - and deadly - protests against American troops and facilities in Afghanistan in response to the destruction of Qurans that had been used to pass messages between detainees at Bagram air base again raise the still unanswered question - why are we still in Afghanistan? Instead of rushing for the exits prematurely in Iraq, perhaps President Obama and his advisors should be reassessing our continued presence in a country that as far as most analysts believe has no strategic American national interest.

Like most Americans, I understood and supported the initial military operations in Afghanistan in the wake of the al-Qa'idah attacks of September 11, 2001. Those operations came after the Taliban government of Afghanistan refused to turn over Usamah bin Ladin to the United States. U.S. forces, working with the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, soon took the capital city of Kabul and removed the Taliban from power. The troops then focused on eliminating al-Qa'idah.

Al-Qa'idah fighters ran for the relative safety of the mountains along the ill-defined and porous border with Pakistan. Many of the fighters were killed, some were captured, and some - including bin Ladin - were able to escape to Pakistan where they were sheltered by the Pushtun tribes and possibly the Pakistani intelligence service.

Follow-on military operations effectively removed al-Qa'idah from Afghanistan. As I recall, the mission of the American invasion of Afghanistan was to kill or capture as many al-Qa'idah fighters as possible and deny then a future operations base in the country. That mission was accomplished early on. Al-Qa'idah abandoned Afghanistan for Pakistan, and later moved on to Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Somalia.

If the actual enemy of the United States was/is al-Qa'idah, we should have been attacking them wherever they were/are. Instead, we - and I hold the Bush Administration accountable for this - embarked on a massive nation building effort to establish a Western-style democracy in a country that barely has any paved roads. Why? What national interest does that possibly serve? That's not a rhetorical question - I would really like an answer.

Now we have almost 100,000 American and NATO troops in Afghanistan battling the Taliban. As far as I can tell, the Taliban is not a threat to the security of the United States. True, they are attacking our troops, and thus we should be killing as many as possible. That said, I have to ask, is the Taliban really interested in anything more than having us leave? I doubt if they are going to follow us back home.

Here's my take on this.

After watching the Afghan people in the street protesting in front of the U.S. Embassy shouting "death to America," after reading that an Afghan intelligence officer killed two American troops over this issue, I believe it is time to leave these ingrates to their own fate. As with many of the people in this part of the world (and I'm going to get hate mail accusing me of being anti-Muslim...), they appear incapable of rational thought when it comes to these perceived religious slights.

I think we should announce that we've had it and we're leaving. However, on the way out, we should bring down on the remaining Taliban areas massive bombardment the likes of which they have never seen. That will serve as a warning of the fate that awaits them if they allow al-Qa'idah or any other transnational terrorist group to set up bases in the country in the future. We used to have the political will to inflict real damage on our enemies.

I would also retract the multiple apologies for the burning of the Qurans. It was not our troops who desecrated the holy books, it was the detainees at Bagram air base who used them to pass messages among themselves.

Good bye, good riddance, good luck.

Iran and Syrian issues conflate

Islamic Republic of Iran Navy frigate Alvand (71) in the Suez Canal

As the internal security situation in Syria continues to deteriorate and the nuclear standoff with Iran becomes more bellicose, there has occurred a conflation of the two crises into one overarching problem in the region. It is virtually impossible to address one of the two issues now without either addressing the other or at least considering the larger regional consequences.

Last week, that conflation took the form of a visit by two Iranian warships to the Syrian port of Tartus, coincidentally the same port used by Russian warships when they visit the Mediterranean. This is the second visit of Iranian warships to Syria in the last two years - two Iranian warships conducted an identical visit exactly one year ago in February 2011. See my article on that earlier visit, Iranian warships in the Mediterranean - deal with it. The last visits by Iranian warships prior to these recent visits were over 30 years ago.

Iran is "showing the flag" in what it considers its sphere of influence in Middle East, and demonstrating its continuing support for its closest ally - the Ba'th Party regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad. Unlike Libya's Mua'mar al-Qadhafi, who had no allies to support him against the Libyan popular uprising, al-Asad has a close ally in the Iranians, as well as enjoying differing levels of support from Russia and China.

It was both Russia and China who vetoed a United Nations Security Council resolution condemning the Syrian regime for the violence against its own citizenry. Although China's steadfast support for the dictator may be waning somewhat, Russia continues to stand by al-Asad and sternly warn against any type of intervention in Syria.

The Syrian-Iranian axis goes back decades and is rooted in the Iran-Iraq War that raged for almost eight years from September 1980 to August 1988. Virtually every Arab nation except Syria stood with their fellow Arabs in Iraq against "the Persians" - the Iranians. Animosity between the Persians and Arabs goes back thousands of years. Syria, however, chose to ally with Iran. There were several reasons that drove the leaders in Damascus and Tehran into each others' arms.

At the time of the outbreak of the war, the Syrian and Iraqi governments were both under the control of the Ba'th Party, however, the two wings of the party had taken different paths on the road to Arab Socialism and had developed an emnity that occasionally resulted in bloodshed. When Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, then-President Hafiz al-Asad (father of the current Syrian dictator) allied with the enemy of Baghdad. This is in keeping with the Middle East adage, "the enemy of my enemy is my friend."

The initial relationship expanded into an economic and military alliance. In return for access to Syrian air bases allowing Iranian fighters to operate from Iranian bases east of Iraq and recover to Iraq's west in Syria, Iran provided Syria with millions of barrels of oil that could be resold on the world market to prop up the weak Syrian economy. The two became closer as the war raged.

In 1982, Iran saw an opportunity to expand its sphere of influence into Lebanon, home of a sizable - and growing - Shi'a Muslim population. It did this by deploying members of its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to Syria and Lebanon. That organization, the IRGC Syria and Lebanon contingent (IRGC/SL) was the nucleus for the creation of the now notorious IRGC Qods Force, an elite covert/special operations unit.

The IRGC/SL group, based in a suburb of Damascus, moved into Lebanon's al-Biqa' Valley and created the Party of God, more commonly known by its Arabic name - Hizballah - to combat the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon launched to rid Israel's northern border of the threat of attack from Lebanon-based Palestinian guerrillas.

As it turned out, Israel merely traded one threat for another, the Palestinians for Hizballah. Hizballah was much more lethal, as history has shown - the 2006 war between Hizballah and Israel is a prime example. After that war, Iran and Syria completely replaced all of Hizballah weapons, this time with even more capable rocket and missile systems.

Training, funding and resupply of Hizballah was routed through Syria, mostly via the international airport in Damascus - that support continues to this day. The ability to use Hizballah as a proxy force against Israel, by either Damascus or Tehran, is an integral part of the foreign policy of both Syria and Iran and is key part of their relationship. Should the al-Asad regime fall, Iran would be hard-pressed to control or maintain Hizballah, and its influence in Lebanon would be compromised. Iran is not about to let a major component of its foreign policy disappear without a fight.

Although the Syrians and Iranians have had economic and military cooperation agreements in the past, since 2005 they have had a formal mutual defense treaty, pledging to come to each other's defense it the other is attacked. An Israeli attack on Iran will theoretically trigger a Syrian response against Israel. That response will also likely include Hizballah attacks from southern Lebanon.

The Syrian military at this time, however, is focused on maintaining order in the country and repressing a popular uprising. Would they have the capability to launch attacks on Israel as well? Would the Syrian opposition abandon their protests against the regime and temporarily unite against a common enemy? Or would they take advantage of the situation and continue to press for the overthrow of Bashar al-Asad?

On another front, if there is Western or Arab League intervention in Syria, would Iran attempt to oppose it militarily? If Arab League forces attempt to move against the Syrian regime, will Iranian forces mount attacks on those countries in support of its Syrian ally? If American forces are involved, will Iran strike American interests in the Persian Gulf?

Again, I'm pretty good at posing the questions, but don't have the answers.

It is important for anyone trying to assess available options to address either the Syrian repression of its own population and the Iranian nuclear weapons program that these are no longer isolated issues. Addressing one will also require addressing the other, or at least taking into consideration the consequences of one action on the other crisis. Specifically, attacking Iran will require consideration of the reactions of Syria and Hizballah. Likewise, intervention in Syria will have to take into consideration what Iran will do.

Let me guess - the Iranians will agree to talks, while their centrifuges spin and their allies in Damascus continue to kill their own people.

Situation in Syria continues to deteriorate - ADDENDUM TWO

Military funeral for fallen Syrian soldiers

(This adds additional information to my earlier articles, Situation in Syria continues to deteriorate and Situation in Syria continues to deteriorate - ADDENDUM.)

The news reports of the assassination of a Syrian military doctor, an army brigadier, on Saturday in the Rukn al-Din section of Damascus underscores the deteriorating situation in the country. Up until the last few weeks, most of the violence has occurred outside the capital. Saturday's killing of an army officer in Damascus threatens to bring the violence to the streets of the capital.

The daylight attack on a member of the Syrian armed forces in an upscale section of Damascus has shaken local residents. Even those who have stood steadfastly behind President Bashar al-Asad and his Ba'th Party regime are now wondering if it is time to re-assess their positions.

The news of the attack on the army doctor comes at the same time that Syrian military forces unleashed a new wave of armor and artillery assaults on the city of Homs, killing scores in the city. The Asad regime has displayed no remorse in its brutal suppression of demonstrators and protesters throughout the country. That is understandable, since Damascus has received political cover and tacit support from its two allies on the United Nations Security Council, Russia and China - both permanent members with veto power. Both have already used that veto power to stop a resolution condemning the Syrian government's actions against its own people.

The Russians have gone a step farther and contracted to provide 36 Yak-130 jet trainer/light attack aircraft to Syria. Arming a country that is using its military might against its own population - yes, that's the right move for one of our so-called "partners for peace" (a NATO program to cooperate with Russia)....

It is expected that the Arab League will ask the UN Security Council to create a peacekeeping force for operations in Syria. This is dead on arrival for three reasons. First, the Russians and Chinese will veto it; second, the United Nations has an aversion to sending peacekeeping forces into an area until there is some peace to keep; and third and most importantly, the Syrians will not accept it. It is inconceivable that the United Nations will authorize what would in reality be an invasion of Syria.

There is at least one precedent, however, for Arab League peacekeeping operations. In 1976, during the civil war in Lebanon, the Arab League created what was called the Arab Deterrent Force (قوات الردع العربية - quwat al-rada' al-'arabiyah) to try to stop the violence in that country. Although the 30,000-man force was nominally composed of troops from six Arab countries, ironically, it was the Syrians who commanded and dominated the force. I was in Lebanon when this happened - it was merely the vehicle for a Syrian intervention that lasted almost 30 years.

In a bit if good news, the Sudanese general in charge of the defunct Arab League observor mission to Syria resigned today - he had a terrible human rights record, and his observor group failed to condemn the Syrian government. Corruption in the Middle East? Say it isn't so. Additionally, the Arab League will possibly move to expel Syrian ambassadors from the capitals of member states.

Here's a bizarre twist, but symptomatic of things Middle Eastern. The leader of al-Qa'idah, Ayman al-Zawahiri endorsed the efforts of the Syrian National Council to remove the regime of Bashar al-Asad. While this should really not come as a surprise - after all, the Syrian Ba'th party is secular and anti-Islamist, it is an interesting juxtaposition of interests that places our policy in line with that of al-Qa'idah. Of course, the desired end-game would be much different. The United States would prefer to see a democracy emerge in Syria, while al-Zawahiri would like to see the creation of an Islamic republic.

The al-Qa'idah connection may go further than just political support. It is beginning to appear that the group known as al-Qa'idah in Iraq (AQI) may be directly involved in some of the recent bombings in Aleppo and earlier in Damascus. These attacks were aimed at government intelligence and security facilities, and are well within the capabilities of AQI.

The questions that remain: How long can the Syrian government resist the will of the international community and continue to oppress its own citizens? How far are Russia and China willing to go to prop up Bashar al-Asad? Is there a point when the Syrian army still loyal to the Asad regime will no longer kill their fellow Syrians and instead turn on the government? Is the West willing to intervene militarily in Syria?

In my usual insightful way, I have adroitly discovered the questions. Unfortunately, I do not have the answers.

I watch these events with great sadness - I lived in Damascus for several years when I was assigned as the air attache to the American embassy there. I have friends on both sides of the struggle, and I wish them all well.

Afghanistan - hasn't the Administration learned anything?

Taliban fighter smiling because he now knows how long to wait for victory

I was tempted to title this article "Obama runs for the exits in Afghanistan," but thought better of it. Not that it isn't true - it is - but I too believe that we are wasting valuable resources, including the blood of our troops, in a war that now has nothing to do with our national interests.

However, it is the way which this Administration is going about the withdrawal that bothers me. It appears that there is absolutely no military sense being applied to the issue. It is hard for me to believe that the generals at the Defense Department are not objecting to this dangerous practice of telegraphing every move to the enemy. Yes, I used the word "enemy" despite Vice President Biden's assertions to the contrary. If a group of fanatical Islamist jihadists are shooting at our troops, they're the enemy.

Biden's words: "Look, the Taliban per se is not our enemy. That's critical. There is not a single statement that the president has ever made in any of our policy assertions that the Taliban is our enemy, because it threatens U.S. interests. If, in fact, the Taliban is able to collapse the existing government, which is cooperating with us in keeping the bad guys from being able to do damage to us, then that becomes a problem for us."

Mr. Vice President, if the Taliban is not our enemy, why are we expending huge amounts of resources and maintaining almost 100,000 troops in Afghanistan trying to kill as many of this non-enemy as we can? If the Taliban is not the enemy, just what are they? If, as you and the President claim, this jihadist group is not a threat to U.S. interests, why are we even in Afghanistan? There may be, just maybe, some reason to the vice president's idiotic statements.

Considering his many years as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he shows an astounding lack of understanding of the region. If I thought he was capable of formulating the foreign policy concepts involved here - it has to be a coincidence - I'd say Biden was setting the stage for the Obama Administration's rush for the exit from Afghanistan. There are a number of things happening that pretty much foretell the obvious:

First, there were rumors - later confirmed by the Defense Department and the State Department - that the United States is setting up back-channel talks with representatives of the Taliban at a location outside of Afghanistan. The venue turns out to be Qatar, a country known for walking the line between American ally and seeming co-conspirator with countries and causes at odds with our national interests. When the fact that talks were on the agenda became public knowledge, it came as a surprise to the U.S.-recognized (although to call it democratically elected would be a stretch) government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai. If the Administration is going to strike a deal with the Taliban and exclude the Karzai government from the process, the chances that the current "democracy" in Afghanistan will survive are low.

As we heard about the talks in Qatar, there were rumors - again later confirmed by the Defense Department and the State Department - that the United States was considering the release of five top Taliban officials currently in American custody at Guantanamo as a "confidence-building" gesture to the Taliban. Building confidence in what - the Administration's naiveté and gullibility? When have the Taliban lived up to any agreement?

Not to worry - spokesmen for the Administration declared that any release of Guantanamo detainees would be in compliance with the recent defense authorization act that requires that the Administration certify that any detainees released would no longer pose a threat to the United States. It is hard to imagine how these five can be declared to not be a threat. The government's record on recidivism in regard to previously released Guantanamo detainees is abysmal.

Regardless of the logic against it, the government is making preparations to move the five to an undisclosed country in the Gulf region - you can assume it will be Qatar. It's the first step in their release, blatantly disregarding Congressional mandates, clear threats to national security, and basic common sense. I thought this Administration had already defined new limits of American naiveté, but this goes beyond even that.

Here's a thought that may not have crossed Mr. Biden's mind. There is an American soldier who has been held by the Haqqani network of the Taliban for almost three years. Is the fate of U.S. Army Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl part of the "confidence building" measures between the United States and the Taliban? If not, why not? Surely we are going to demand something from the Taliban other then oft-made and never-kept commitments? If you are going to be foolish enough to enter into talks with the Taliban, shouldn't you at least get something out before you hand Afghanistan over to the Taliban?

Then we come to Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta's description of our strategy in Afghanistan, a description that includes a schedule of when we are going to cease combat operations, the number of troops we plan to withdraw and when we remove all of our troops from Afghanistan. This is exactly the same thing committed to by the Bush Administration in Iraq and foolishly executed by the Obama Administration. Is there no adult leadership left at the Pentagon?

Panetta said that American and other international forces in Afghanistan plan to end their combat operations in the country next year, transitioning to a "training, advise and assist" role with Afghan forces until the end of 2014. Curious that both the announcement and timeline coincide with the upcoming presidential election, allowing President Obama to campaign on ending yet another war. If I was him, I would be careful trying to tout his premature withdrawal from Iraq as a success story - every day there is an increase in the violence in the country. Could politics be driving Panetta's announcement?

The bottom line here is that what the President, Vice President, Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense are doing is to cause the very thing they claim "becomes a problem for us." Biden's words again: "If, in fact, the Taliban is able to collapse the existing government, which is cooperating with us in keeping the bad guys from being able to do damage to us, then that becomes a problem for us." This current course of action will lead to exactly that - the Taliban will take over Afghanistan in 2014 as soon as the last American troops leave.

Have we learned nothing from Iraq?

Situation in Syria continues to deteriorate - ADDENDUM

خالد مشعل‎ - Khalid Mish'al

(This adds additional information to my earlier article, Situation in Syria continues to deteriorate.)

The situation in Syria has gotten so bad that the leader of the Palestinian group HAMAS is looking for a new place from which to operate. Khalid Mish'al, the leader of HAMAS, believes that Damascus no longer secure enough for the group's headquarters. HAMAS is designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the U.S. State Department.

There are concerns other than security that are driving Misha'l out of Syria. HAMAS is an Islamic organization whose goals include the elimination of Israel and the establishment of an Islamic Palestinian state in its place. As such, it is supported by the Muslim Brotherhood, the primary member of the Syrian National Council, the group heading the opposition to the secular Ba'th Party regime of President Bashar al-Asad. It is unseemly that HAMAS would be headquartered in the capital city of the state HAMAS's Islamist allies are attempting to overthrow.

It also appears that HAMAS and Misha'l have found new protectors/sponsors - the Turkish government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) is an Islamic party and a primary sponsor of the Syrian National Council.

On Erdoğan's watch, Turkish groups have attempted to run the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip, with fatal consequences (see my earlier article, The MV Mavi Marmara in the Golden Horn). Turkey has chilled its relations with Israel over these incidents. The country is also moving closer to Iran, an avowed foe of Israel, and coincidentally a major financial and material supporter of HAMAS.

In his attempt to find a new home for HAMAS's headquarters, Misha'l has also visited Jordan. The mechanics of the visit are interesting. Misha'l was listed as a member of the delegation of the Crown Prince of Qatar so as not to offend the United States, a close ally of Jordan. HAMAS has not has an official presence in Jordan since it was expelled a decade ago. Although Misha'l may request a renewed presence for the group in Jordan from King 'Abdullah II, senior Jordanian officials have stated it will not happen. The relationship with Washington is far more important that any benefit that would accrue from having HAMAS in the kingdom.

Misha'l's willingness to leave Damascus for elsewhere is telling. The situation in Syria shows no signs of improving, and Syrian President Bashar al-Asad shows no willingness to step down. It will get worse before it gets better.

____________________
* HAMAS is an acronym for the Arabic words حركة المقاومة الاسلامية, harakat al-muqawamah al-islamiyah the Islamic Resistance Movement.

Situation in Syria continues to deteriorate

Meeting of the Arab League Ministerial Committee on the Situation in Syria

The situation in Syria shows no signs of improving, despite the efforts of the Arab League to mediate a solution. Of course, it would be helpful if the Syrian regime of President Bashar al-Asad was interested some sort of compromise. Asad is operating under the belief that he will be able to survive this crisis and remain in power - he may be right. The Arab League, as well as many other nations including neighboring Turkey, have called for Asad to step down.

Violence continues in various parts of the country, including clashes between the Syrian armed forces and groups of soldiers who have defected from the military and formed the so-called Free Syria Army (FSA). The violence has claimed the lives of both government troops, members of the FSA, civilian protesters and innocent bystanders as well. Just this week, the secretary general of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and a Christian priest have been killed, although by whom is not clear. Of course, there are conflicting accusations - the government did it, the protesters did it....

I will give credit to the Arab League for at least trying to address the situation in Syria. Their intentions were noble, if the execution was a bit flawed. Sending a Sudanese general with the cloud of human rights violations over his head to lead an Arab League observer team to Syria was probably not the best idea. The observer team was ill-equipped to deal with the practiced deceit of the Syrian regime. Syrian forces merely withdrew temporarily where the observers were present, only to return as soon as they were gone. This is reminiscent of Iraqi actions when there were United Nations Special Commission observers in Iraq in the 1990s.

Not to be taken in by the Syrian regime, the Arab League did release a scathing critique of the Bashar al-Asad government and proposed a plan whereby the president would step down and transfer power to Vice President Faruq al-Shara'. I almost laughed when I read this - Shara' is hardly the leader to guide Syria out of this morass. Shara' is a Sunni from the Dara' area of southern Syria and made his way up the Party ranks via Syrian Arab Airlines (now Syrianair). He rose through the ranks by being a threat to no one. He's a pleasant man for sure, but hardly of the gravitas required for this job.

US Embassy - Abu Rumanah, Damascus
My office was behind the wall to the right of the white van

As the situation deteriorates, and it is, despite protestations from Asad supporters, the United States is contemplating closing the embassy in Damascus, citing danger to life and property of American diplomats and staff.

The threat to the embassy is real. The chancery is not one of the new fortress-style embassies such as the one in neighboring Jordan. The Damascus embassy is housed in two large, old houses that have been joined and modified, but not the standards that would prevent a successful attack. In fact, the embassy has been attacked several times over the last few years. I was posted to this embassy for over two years - make no mistake about this, when there is an attack or demonstration against the American embassy in Damascus, the Syrian government has either organized or approved it.

Having served at the embassy and living in Damascus, I understand the security issue. There are consequences of not having a diplomatic presence in Syria. It is not so much about the diplomacy, but the ability to have American eyes and ears on the ground in an area of concern. Okay, that might also mean an intelligence capability that is critical to our understanding of the situation. If you look at the areas in which we have had military confrontations, it is in those countries in which we have not had Americans - diplomats and military attaches - there to observe and report.

The situation has gotten so bad the many Arab League members have withdrawn from the mission in Syria, faulting the Asad regime for not halting the attacks on its citizens. Instead, the League has appealed to the United Nations Security Council to intervene. The Secretary General of the Arab League will also ask the UN to support its plan by which Asad steps down and a transition unity government is established. The Syrians, true to form, rejected the Arab League's "meddling in Syrian internal affairs."

What will happen in the United Nations? Is there the possibility of a Libyan-style military intervention in Syria? It's not likely - Russia, a permanent member of the Security Council with veto power, is a staunch supporter and apologist for the Syrians. The United States, also a permanent member, is not anxious to involve itself in yet another military operation in the region, despite its new-found strategy of "leading from behind." Syria is not Libya - it has a much a more capable air defense system and air force, and the population is spread out over much of the country rather than being concentrated in a narrow strip along the Mediterranean coast.

The regional powers, including Turkey, are not likely to intervene. The most likely course of action may be some weak UN resolutions condemning the violence, but meaningful sanctions are highly improbable given Russian support for Damascus. In essence, the Syrian regime will continue to oppress its own population in hopes that they can stop the protests. The government does not show any signs of compromise with the protesters.

I do not assess the Syrians as capable of overthrowing the Asad regime at this time. Perhaps if there are continuing large-scale defections from the Syrian military to the opposition, there may be a chance of a change of government. I don't see that happening anytime soon.

Without assistance from outside Syria, be it from Turkey, the United States, or the European Union, there is little chance that the government will fall.

There is a major concern that argues against any American support for the opposition. The primary Syrian opposition organization is the Syrian National Council, which is little more than a front for the Muslim Brotherhood.

Thus, the quandary for the Obama Administration is - do you help remove the oppressive Ba'th regime of Bashar al-Asad and probably usher in an Islamic fundamentalist government? There is precedent: Libya, and to some extent Egypt.

Civil war in Iraq - not improbable, maybe likely

Iraqi Shi'a militiamen march on Israeli and American flags

Every day the news from Iraq reflects increasing sectarian violence - it has been virtually the same since the premature, arbitrary and precipitous withdrawal of American troops from the country. My views on that betrayal of trust is well known - see my latest on that outrage: Betrayals - Obama and the withdrawal from Iraq.

It comes as no surprise that in the absence of thousands of American forces in the country, local groups who have been constrained in the past have begun to assert themselves in their quest for power. The Shi'a-dominated groups - this includes the forces loyal to Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, the Iranian-backed party and militia of radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, and other parties wanting a piece of the political pie in Iraq - also are seeking revenge for years of being treated as third-class citizens at the hands of the Sunni-dominated Ba'th regime of Saddam Husayn.

Sunni groups, including al-Qa'idah in Iraq (AQI) who simply waited for the Americans to leave on schedule, have re-asserted themselves in their rejection of the Shi'a-dominated government.

It's a pretty simple analysis - the Shi'a want to marginalize any Sunni influence in the government as that government leans toward Iran; the Sunnis want to regain some of the political power they once enjoyed. The Kurds are probably the only winners in this situation, enjoying the relative safety and security of the Kurdish Autonomous Region in northern Iraq.

The Kurds are concerned, however, that al-Maliki's moves to consolidate his power as soon as American forces left have put the country at risk of a civil war. The Americans were hardly out the door when al-Maliki sought the arrest of Sunni Vice President Tariq Hashimi in what most analysts believe to be are trumped up charges as part of a power play to seize even more control of the government.

As al-Maliki tries to marginalize the Sunni-supported coalition Iraqiya party headed by former prime minister Iyad 'Alawi (himself a Shi'a), pushback from AQI and Sunni political leaders has lead to a spike in violence targeted against Shi'a areas and religious functions. The attacks are reminiscent of the 2006 attacks against Shi'a shrines that led to an outright religious civil war in the country. Iraqiya ministers boycotted the parliament in protest; the Shi'a-dominated body reacted by suspending the boycotting ministers, leading to a greater political crisis. If this tit for tat does not stop, the violence will devolve into a full-blown civil war.

The violence is disheartening to anyone who has served or has family who served in Iraq. It cheapens the sacrifice and commitment of our young men and women - who believe in what they did - to allow the Iraqis to develop a successful post-Saddam Iraq. The new reports are saddening.

Since the withdrawal of American forces - what I describe as Obama's mad dash for the exit - at least 200 people have been killed in the sectarian violence as the Sunni groups attempt to goad the Shi'a into another civil war. The Sunnis have assessed, correctly in my view, that Iraqi forces are unwilling or unable to stop the violence without American troops to back them up.

The image at the beginning of the article is illustrative of how badly two American administrations have handled our involvement in Iraq. The mere fact that Muqtada al-Sadr is still alive is a statement of failure by the Bush Administration - al-Sadr should have been killed in 2003 when we had the opportunity. The fact that the militias are now free to spew their anti-American hatred is an indictment of the Obama Administration and its failure to capitalize on the success of the surge and Anbar Awakening that broke the back of AQI and other Sunni insurgent groups.

Without American troops, it appears that a civil war is not only improbable but likely. Should it happen, there is almost nothing the United States can do about it. Thanks to President Obama's failure to secure an American presence in the country after December 31, 2011, the only way American forces can assist the Iraqi security and military organizations in keeping the peace is via an invitation from the Iraqi government.

Given the fact that the Shi'a-dominated government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki stands to gain from the disorder, there is liitle chance of that invitation happening.

We are now faced with a situation in which a country whose freedom was purchased with the effort and blood of American forces is devolving into civil war, and the Obama Administration has squandered any opportunity to influence events.

The Obama Administration and Iran - an infusion of spine?

CJCS General Dempsey, President Obama and Secretary of Defense Panetta

Has there been a sudden infusion of spine at the White House? If you believe the words of Dennis Ross, one of President Obama's key advisors on Iran, it has been there all along - I'm not so sure. Ross served on the National Security Council as the Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for the Central Region (Middle East, Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, Pakistan and South Asia).

I first met Ambassador Ross in the early/mid-1990s while I was posted as the Air Attache to the U.S. Embassy in Damascus, Syria. He was a frequent visitor to Damascus as then-Secretary of State Warren Christopher attempted to restart the Syria-Israel track of the Middle East Peace Process. I found him to be extremely knowledgeable on the region, although his bias towards Israel was easily discernible. The Palestinians did not regard him as an honest broker, likely because of this perceived bias.

According to Ambassador Ross, the President has "made it very clear" that he regards a nuclear-armed Iran as so great a threat to international security that "the Iranians should never think that there's a reluctance to use force...." He argues that those who believe the President would rather contain a nuclear-armed Iran than use military force to prevent the Islamic Republic from acquiring nuclear weapon are wrong. The ambassador claims that the Administration considers Iran with nuclear weapons a greater threat than the fallout from American military action against Iran's nuclear facilities.

That is refreshing to hear, but I am not thoroughly convinced that this has been the President's position for any length of time.

It has taken almost three years for anyone in the Administration to actually say that the United States will not permit Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. That's because it has been the policy of the Obama White House to "engage" the Iranians in hopes that rational diplomatic discourse would deter the Iranians from continuing on their program to enrich uranium and develop a nuclear weapon. There is also no doubt that the goal of the Iranian program is the development of a nuclear weapon.

That engagement policy, in conjunction with ineffective economic sanctions, has failed miserably. It had about the same chance of success as the request to return the reconnaissance drone. While the President is of the belief that he was taking the high road and showing strength in trying to reach out to the Iranians, the Iranians, being Middle Easterners, regarded it as a sign of weakness. Combined with his sprint for the exits in Iraq and Afghanistan, the leadership in Tehran viewed his policy as one of capitulation.

It was not until late last year that a senior Administration official - Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta - said the words many of us have been waiting to hear: "The United States does not want Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. That's a red line for us and that's a red line, obviously, for the Israelis. If we have to do it we will deal with it. ... If they proceed and we get intelligence that they are proceeding with developing a nuclear weapon then we will take whatever steps necessary to stop it. There are no options off the table. ... A nuclear weapon in Iran is unacceptable."

The Secretary reiterated his remarks just last week, saying, "They [the Iranians] need to know that if they take that step, they're going to get stopped." The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army General Martin Dempsey followed Panetta's remarks with the acknowledgement that the Pentagon has been planning and positioning assets to be ready to take military action if ordered to do so. This should come as no surprise - this is what military planners do.

Finally, some spine from Obama Administration officials. It seems to be having the desired effect - the Iranians are finally taking notice. They appear to have come to the realization that they are dealing with a superpower.

Combined with real sanctions, those "crippling" sanctions that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has promised since 2009, these statements by senior American officials have Iran concerned. The Administration seems to have found Iran's Achilles heel - sanctions on Iran's central bank. Despite that, after the legislation imposing the sanctions passed overwhelmingly in the U.S. Congress, the President signed it only reluctantly. As Ambassador Ross said, "The latest measures are the first really affecting the core of their [Iran's] revenue, which is their sale of oil." The Administration, with the prodding of the Congress, finally gets it.

Immediately afterwards, an Iranian official threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz. (See my earlier article, Iranian Navy versus the U.S. Fifth Fleet? I can imagine the reaction in Tehran when he said that - "You said what? Do you know what the American fleet will do to us if we try that?"

So what is behind the Administration's newly discovered backbone?

I would like to tell you that it was the realization that what we were doing was not working and it was time to adjust our policy to something that might. I would like to tell you that the new Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, retired Army General David Petraeus, and new Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta were able to convince the President that his policies were not working, and in fact were allowing Iran to proceed almost unhindered down the road to a nuclear weapon.

Unfortunately, I think it has more to do with the upcoming Presidential election than the realization of a failed policy. The President needs something successful and popular to run on. Appearing to be strong on the Iran issue will help, as will the by-product of that stance: perception of the President's support for Israel, whether he really favors that or not.

Whatever the reason, the American Administration is finally enacting the crippling sanctions we have been waiting for, and a senior official - the one who runs the armed forces - has made the declaration that we will not allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon.

Spine - it's about time.

The resurrection of the caliphate?

Libyan rebel military commander 'Abd al-Hakim Balhaj,
an associate of the late al-Qa'idah leader Usamah bin Ladin

As their forefathers did over 1,300 years ago, the forces of militant Islam have swept across North Africa. Ridding the world of dictators and corrupt regimes is a good thing, but there are always unintended consequences.

In the case of those initial countries who have liberated themselves in what is known in the West as "the Arab spring" - Tunisia, Egypt and Libya - it appears that the replacement governments are going to be Islamic. They are going to be not only Islamic, but likely militant Islamist. Some of the leaders of the emerging governments seek a return to the caliphate of old.

The term caliphate derives from the Arabic khilāfah (خلافة, succession). The caliphate is primarily a Sunni Muslim construct and is the existential difference between the Sunnis and the Shi'a Muslims. The two sects evolved because of their differences over the issue of succession when Muhammad died in 632 – who would follow Muhammad as the leader of the faithful?

Many believed that the successor to Muhammad should be a family member, someone in the bloodline of the prophet. However, Muhammad had no son, so there was no male heir to assume the caliphate. Muhammad did have a daughter, Fatimah, who was married to Muhammad's cousin 'Ali bin Abu Talib. The people who favored the selection of 'Ali as the caliph were called the Shi'at 'Ali, the "partisans of 'Ali," hence the name Shi'a.

The other school of thought, held by many prominent Muslims of the day, was that the caliph should be drawn from one of the senior and learned members of the faith, the ummah or "community." These were the Sunnis, the traditionalists.

The Sunni position prevailed and the first three caliphs (Abu Bakr, 'Umar and 'Uthman) were not of Muhammad's bloodline. Finally, a convergence occurred in 656 when 'Ali (regarded by the Shi'a as the first imam) was named the fourth caliph. 'Ali was soon murdered and his son Hasan became the second Imam.

Real political power at this time rested with the Sunni caliph in Damascus. Hasan abdicated in favor of these 'Umayyad rulers. Following 'Ali, the succession took on the form of dynasties - the Umayyad, followed by the 'Abassid, the Fatimid and finally the Ottomans. The caliphate was abolished with the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1924.

In the aftermath of World War One and the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, the Middle East was carved up by Western powers. Regions in which Arab tribes lived were divided up. Lines were drawn on maps by people that did not live in the area. Countries that never before existed were created - Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan were established.

The Gaza Strip, West Bank and the area that is now Israel were administered by the United Kingdom under a United Nations mandate. In 1947, the United Nations voted to allow the partition of the Palestinian mandate into an Arab and Jewish state - this led to the creation of the State of Israel in 1948.

The creation of Israel was a watershed event in the Middle East. Many Arabs, especially the Palestinians, viewed this an attempt to assuage guilt for the actions of the Nazis, a misplaced attempt to create a homeland for the Jews at the expense of the local Arab population. I will not explore the merits of those beliefs - it is the perceptions that are important since they are the basis for Arab reaction.

Fast forward to the Yom Kippur war of 1973. When it was apparent that Israel was in danger of suffering a defeat at the hands of the Egyptian and Syrian armed forces, the United States military executed Operation Nickel Grass, the airlift/delivery of fighter aircraft, armor, artillery, munitions and other supplies to the the Jewish state. The operation turned the tide and the Israeli army soon moved to within 60 miles of Cairo on the Egyptian front, and to within less that 20 miles (well within artillery range) of Damascus on the Syrian front.

The American resupply of Israel led to a confrontation between the superpowers - the United States and the Soviet Union. Both countries put their armed forces on alert for possible intervention in the Middle East. On October 24, I remember going on alert for immediate deployment to counter Soviet moves in the region - it was the first time in 11 years, the first time since the Cuban missile crisis, that American forces went on worldwide alert.

At 11:41pm, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered all U.S. armed forces to assume DEFCON (Defense Condition) III which meant putting nuclear-armed units on the "highest state of peacetime alert." The next step, DEFCON II would ready the nuclear triad - strategic bombers, and land and submarine-based nuclear missiles - for imminent launch. The Pentagon alerted the 82nd Airborne Division and ordered the movement of aircraft carriers toward the Eastern Mediterranean. It was a scary time - trust me. Things were happening very quickly as young men from the armed forces of two nuclear-armed powers began to square off over events in a far-off corner of the world.

Cooler heads prevailed and both nations stepped back from the brink. Yet another United Nations resolution was adopted and life returned to the new normal. However, the incident indicated that events in the Middle East were not solely under the control of the people that live there, including the Arabs. When the Arabs and Jews/Israelis came to blows, it was the West and East blocs that actually called the shots (no pun intended).

Over the years following the Yom Kippur war, there were other smaller American/Western military interventions in the region, such as the Marine operation at Beirut airport, American deployments in support of Egypt and the Sudan, U.S. operations against Libya, and American support for Iraq against Iran, all in the in the 1980's. However, it was the 1990's that brought about the greatest confrontation between the West and the descendants of the Muslim caliphate.

In August 1990, Iraqi forces invaded the neighboring State of Kuwait, overpowering the capital city in less than five hours. In two days, there were substantial Iraqi forces on the northern border of Saudi Arabia. Any threat to the oilfields of Saudi Arabia were, and are, a red line for the United States. In what was another watershed event for the region and particularly its Muslim residents, the Saudi royal family asked the United States to deploy armed forces to defend the Kingdom from a potential Iraqi invasion. In the end, over half a million American troops deployed to defend Saudi Arabia and eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

It was the deployment of American troops to Saudi Arabia that germinated the seed of hatred among many Islamists. Saudi Arabia is home to the two holiest sites in Islam, the Ka'aba/Grand Mosque in Mecca and the Mosque of the Prophet in Medina. Note that the official title of the Saudi king is actually "Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques." This responsibility forms the social contract between the monarchy and the people of Saudi Arabia.

The introduction of American forces into what many Islamists consider holy ground caused a backlash among several groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood (al-ikhwan al-muslimin), and an organization of Arabs who had fought against the Soviets in Afghanstan, al-Qa'idah, led by a Saudi, Usamah bin Ladin. In 1996, bin Ladin issued a fatwa, an Islamic legal pronouncement, entitled "Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places."

We are all aware of al-Qa'idah's operations between 1996 and 2001. Following the American invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, al-Qa'idah moved its operations to Pakistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Somalia. While their primary tactical goal was to kill Americans, the strategic goal always was the fall of current and corrupt Arab governments and the establishment of an Islamic state, or the forerunner to a caliphate.

In a bizarre and somewhat unexpected coincidence of events, the so-called "Arab Spring" brought new hope to the Islamists. It began in Tunisia and quickly spread to other venues, including Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Syria and Libya. North Africa is well on its way to becoming an Islamist bloc. Elections in Tunisia, Egyptand Morocco saw victories by Islamist parties. The new governments of Tunisia and Egypt will be dominated by these parties. Libya will likely follow after elections in April.

In the Kingdom of Morocco, an Islamic party gained a plurality in the hastily called elections and King Muhammad VI named its leader as prime minister. In Algeria, elections this spring will likely result in increased Islamist participation in the government - the campaigns are already underway. If you are an Islamist, you have to consider things to be looking good for your cause in North Africa.

Looking elsewhere in the region, Islamists are also likely pleased with events in Yemen. President 'Ali 'Abdullah Salih is about to renege on a deal that would grant him immunity in exchange for stepping down and leaving the country. This is a temporary reprieve for Salih; he is on his way out. After he eventually departs, there will be a power vacuum - look for al-Qa'idah in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to consolidate its power and lead the country toward an Islamic state.

In Iraq, the fortunes of al-Qa'idah in Iraq (AQI) appeared to be on the decline until the scheduled - and some would say, premature - withdrawal of American forces from Iraq. No sooner were the Americans gone than a wave of sectarian violence re-ignited. While the Obama Administration bandies about claims of "success" in Iraq, the country is on the verge of another round of Sunni-Shi'a bloodshed.

As many Middle East analysts (including this one) predicted, AQI merely waited out the Americans to stick to an announced withdrawal timetable. This is what happens when you have a President with no military experience who refuses to listen to his military advisors. (See my earlier thoughts on that: Betrayals - Obama and the withdrawal from Iraq.)

In Turkey, the longstanding absolute separation of church and state is coming under attack. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) under Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is an Islamist party and is slowly attempting to replace secular democracy with Islamic law. Note that the terms "Justice and Development" are common to Islamist parties throughout the region.

There is some push back in the region as the Islamists seek to take power. In Syria, the opposition group calling itself the Syrian National Council is dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood. There is fear among some segments of the Syrian population that an Islamic government will seize power if the regime of Bashar al-Asad is overthrown. In an unlikely alliance against an Islamist takeover, the government has garnered support from secular Sunni groups, Christian residents and the Druze of the al-Suwayda' area. However, Islamists can still be hopeful that the government will fall, ushering in their successful takeover in Syria. It could go either way.

Looking to other locations as well, such as Somalia, Sudan, Nigeria and Mali, may give Islamists hope that their star (and crescent) is on the rise. Is there a chance we could see a new caliphate in the Middle East?

Let's hope not.

Iranian Navy versus the U.S. Fifth Fleet?

Sea lanes in the Strait of Hormuz

Iran has threatened to close the Straits of Hormuz if the West carries out its plans to impose more stringent sanctions on Iran, specifically on its central bank. While the western nations stopped short of the threat of an outright embargo on Iranian oil exports, tough sanctions on the central bank will have almost the same effect. If Iran cannot process payments for its oil, it can't export it.

The Obama Administration has been reluctant to sanction Iran's central bank, sometimes called Bank Markazi (Persian for "central bank"), claiming that it could cause a dramatic increase in the price of oil and disrupt the global economy. Possibly, but it appears that given the response from Tehran, it is the type of sanction that might actually force Iran to comply with international demands to halt its uranium enrichment program. It is widely accepted that the program is nothing more than a precursor to the development of a nuclear weapon, despite Iran's claims that it is merely building a nuclear energy capability.

The previous four United Nations sanctions protocols have not had the desired effect. Iran's immediate reaction and threats to halt the flow of one-sixth of the world's oil (a third of the oil that moves on the water) indicates how effective sanctions on Bank Markazi might be. President Obama has said recently that despite his misgivings, he will sign a sanctions bill.

If the President is serious about preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, this is a good first serious step - and a welcome one. I credit Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta for what appears to be an infusion of spine in dealing with the Iranians.

Panetta's words are pretty clear: "The United States does not want Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. That's a red line for us and that's a red line, obviously, for the Israelis. If we have to do it we will deal with it. ... If they proceed and we get intelligence that they are proceeding with developing a nuclear weapon then we will take whatever steps necessary to stop it. There are no options off the table. ... A nuclear weapon in Iran is unacceptable."

Iran also responded with military demonstration in the Persian Gulf in the guise of an exercise named Velayet-90. The exercise, currently underway, is being conducted in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, the bodies of water on either side of the Strait of Hormuz.  The timing and venue are not a coincidence. It is meant to send a message to the West that Iran can close the world's major oil choke point if it wishes. Habibollah Sayyari, commander of the Iranian navy (and I use the term loosely), claimed that closing the strait "will be easier than drinking a glass of water."

That's the message Iranian leaders hope to send - that they can close the strait at will. They are saying it, and maybe even a few of them believe it, but there are some serious issues they may want to consider.

Although the sea lanes through the Strait of Hormuz transit the territorial waters of both Iran and Oman, the strait falls under the legal protocol of "transit passage" as codified by the United Nations and is thus open to ships of all nations. Basically, it is an international waterway.

The free flow of oil from the Persian Gulf is a vital U.S. national interest - this is not an area for missteps. It has been our stated policy for decades to guarantee that flow, using military force if necessary. In the past, the United States has gone so far as to re-flag Kuwaiti tankers to allow the U.S. Navy to escort the ships through the Strait during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s.

In response to the latest Iranian threat, a spokesperson for the U.S. Fifth Fleet made this statement: "Anyone who threatens to disrupt freedom of navigation in an international strait is clearly outside the community of nations; any disruption will not be tolerated." That's a polite way of saying to the Iranians, "If the Iranian Navy tries to close the Strait of Hormuz, the United States Navy will reopen it."

U.S. Navy Carrier Strike Group

The Iranian navy would be no match for the firepower of the U.S. Fifth Fleet. The Fifth Fleet, the maritime component of the U.S. Central Command, commands ships on rotation from the Pacific (Seventh) Fleet or the Atlantic (Second Fleet). The fleet normally consists of a carrier strike group, an expeditionary strike group, and a variety of support assets. That translates to about 20 surface combatants and submarines, with 15,000 personnel (including a U.S. Marine expeditionary unit) and almost 100 combat aircraft. If the Iranians are serious about this, the Navy has another 10 carrier strike groups and 11 expeditionary strike groups from which to draw augmentation.

The Fifth Fleet will not operate alone. Since Iran's threatened action also impacts the Gulf Arab nations, they will likely allow basing of U.S. Air Force combat aircraft at their many excellent air bases. While the participation of our Arab allies is uncertain, they will open their facilities to maintain the flow of oil.

Iranian challenges to the U.S. Navy in the Persian Gulf are not new. In 1988, the last year of the eight-year long Iran-Iraq War, there was a series of escalating events between the Iranians and Americans. When the U.S. agreed to escort Kuwaiti tankers in the Gulf, IRGC sailors laid mines in the shipping lanes, one of which damaged a U.S. Navy frigate.

In retaliation, the Navy destroyed an Iranian oil platform used for surveillance of U.S. operations. That caused the Iranian navy to attempt a surface engagement with the U.S. flotilla. In the battle that followed, two Iranian surface combatants and half a dozen speedboats were sunk and many other units and facilities damaged. The action was a stinging defeat for the Iranians.

If the Iranians are serious about provoking an armed confrontation with the United States, they must know what will happen to them. They have had a front row seat for decades of American combat operations in the Gulf, starting with our support of our Arab allies in the 1980s, the defense of Saudi Arabia and liberation of Kuwait in 1990 and 1991 (Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm), the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 (Operation Enduring Freedom), and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Operation Iraqi Freedom).

If there is a confrontation, it will not be a localized maritime confrontation in the Strait of Hormuz. American aircraft and cruise missiles (air, sea and submarine launched) will strike targets all over the country to neutralize the air defense system, establish air dominance over the country, and disrupt the regime's command and control systems. Air and naval assets will begin the elimination of the Iranian navy inventory. The Iranian navy possesses Chinese surface to surface missiles that are both ship and land launched - these are of concern, but in the end, they will be destroyed.

The Defense Intelligence Agency and the Office of Naval Intelligence have been collecting intelligence for three decades to support this exact operation - it is the key concern of the Fifth Fleet. This was always a threat posed by the Islamic Republic. The U.S. Navy has been planning, training and preparing for this for a long time - after all, this is why we have a navy. I am sure the plans are being updated as I write this.

There is a final consideration. If the Iranians mean to do this - and I don't think Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is that insane - they may just precipitate the very action they are trying to avert. Whether they carry out the threat or not will be Khamenei's decision. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad may have some input, but something with ramifications this extensive will be made by the Supreme Leader himself.

Iran's threats to close the Strait of Hormuz are in direct response to the U.S./Western threat of sanctions that will seriously hurt Tehran's nuclear weapons development program. If they are willing to trigger an armed confrontation with the United States, what is to stop the United States from attacking the nuclear facilities as well?

A confrontation between the United States and Iran has been brewing since the Islamic Revolution of 1978-1979. If we are once again going to send young Americans into harm's way, this time in Iran, we should break all of Ahmadinejad's toys.