'Ashurah - Shi'a Holy Commemoration

The holiest day for Shi'a Muslims is celebrated on the 10th day, or 'Ashurah, of the Muslim month of Muharram. This year that equates to Saturday, February 19.

The story -

Shi’a Muslims make up almost 20 percent of the of the world’s second largest religion. The difference between the sects is as old as the religion itself and revolved around the issue of succession – who would follow Muhammad as the leader of the faithful? The Arabic word for “one who follows or succeeds,” - khalifah (Caliph) - was adopted as the title.

Many believed that the successor to Muhammad should be a family member, someone in the bloodline of the Prophet. However, Muhammad had no son, so there was no male heir to the caliphate. Muhammad did have a daughter, Fatima, who was married to Muhammad’s cousin ‘Ali bin Abu Talib. The people who favored the selection of ‘Ali as the caliph were called the Shi’at ‘Ali, the “partisans of ‘Ali,” and hence the name Shi’a.

The other school of thought, held by many prominent Muslims of the day, was that the caliph should be drawn from one of the senior and learned members of the faith, the ummah or “community.” These were the Sunnis, the traditionalists.

The Sunni position prevailed and the first three caliphs were not of Muhammad’s bloodline. Finally, a convergence occurred in 656 when ‘Ali (regarded by the Shi’a as the first Imam) was named the fourth Caliph. ‘Ali was soon murdered and his son Hasan became the second Imam. However, real political power at this time rested with the Sunni caliph in Damascus. Hasan abdicated in favor of these ‘Umayyad rulers.

Hasan’s brother Husayn assumed the Shi’a imamate, presaging what became the major divide in Islamic history. In 680, Husayn was killed in battle against superior ‘Umayyad forces in Karbala’, Iraq on the tenth day of the month of Muharram. This day is commemorated by all Shi’a as ‘Ashurah (literally, “the tenth”) as a day of mourning and perfidy on the part of the Sunnis. Many male Shi’a practice self-flagellation to honor the death of the imam.

Syria-Lebanon: New Syrian Military Intelligence Chief

On February 14, former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Al-Hariri was assassinated. Blame was immediately assigned to neighboring Syria - after all, Syria has had troops in Lebanon and has virtually ruled what many Syrians merely call "the province" since 1976.

On February 18, Syrian president Bashar Al-Asad replaced the chief of Syrian military intelligence, Hasan Khalil, with his brother in law Brigadier General Asif Shawkat. It appears that this is in response to increased political pressure on Syria, but it remains to be seen if this personnel change will be cast as addressing a "rogue" operation in Lebanon.

Removing Hasan Khalil serves other purposes as well. Hasan Khalil was regarded as fairly weak, hence his ability to remain in power. He replaced the legendary strongman Lieutenant General 'Ali Duba - probably the most feared man in Hafiz (father of Bashar) Al-Asad's Syria after the president himself.

When I was posted in Damascus as the air attache to the American embassy, my Syrian iqama (residence card) that indicated my diplomatic immunity, was signed by 'Ali Duba. Military attaches usually are accredited to the host nation director of military intelligence - in the United States, all foreign military attaches are accredited to the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Every time I was asked to show my iqama, as soon as the guard saw Duba's name, he normally turned white and almost threw the card back.

Hasan Khalil succeeded Duba after Hafiz's death since he was not regarded as a threat to Bashar. Bashar was probably afraid of Duba and didn't trust him.

Shawkat's promotion from deputy director to chief of military intelligence reflects a shift on the part of the president. Many thought that he would be a moderating influence after he succeeded his late father. However, possibly in response to increased pressure from the United States and the West, Bashar appears to be siding with Ba'th Party hardliners - two of the most prominent being Shawkat and Bashar's younger brother Mahir.

Syrian military intelligence has always had the portfolio to execute Syrian (meaning Bashar's) policy in Lebanon. It will be interesting to watch how Shawkat handles increased Lebanese popular calls for the withdrawal of Syrian troops from the country.

Syria and Iran Common Front - Nothng New

On February 15, Syria and Iran announced that they are forming a common front to face threats to the two countries. The announcement came during a meeting of the Iranian vice president and Syrian prime minister in Tehran. These periodic coordination meetings have taken place for over a decade.

While the media are spinning out of control over this announcement, there is nothing new here. Syria and Iran have had a close relationship, a "common front" since the early 1980s.

In 1980, Iraqi forces under Saddam Husayn invaded Iran. In the ensuing eight-year war, Iran and Syria were allied politically and at times, militarily as well. On several occasions, Iranian fighter aircraft used Syrian air bases to conduct operations against Iraq. The relationship continued throughout the war. While virtually every other Arab country supported Iraq politically and economically, Syria remained firmly in the Iranian camp.

The relationship between Iran and Syria expanded in the mid-1980s to include Iranian operations in Lebanon. The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Al-Quds (Jerusalem) force began training, funding and equipping Lebanese Hizballah. IRGC operatives were also involved in the kidnapping of American officials and civilians. Two of those believed to have been kidnapped and murdered if not by the IRGC, at least with their approval, were U.S. Marine Colonel Rich Higgins and CIA's Beirut Chief of Station Bill Buckley. Iran also was involved in material and financial support to Palestinian oppostion groups, notably Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

Iranian access to Lebanon requires Syrian cooperation. That cooperation comes in the form of use of Syrian airspace, airports and roads, and passage through Syrian military checkpoints. It is not uncommon to see Iranian air force cargo aircraft delivering material to Damascus International Airport for follow-on delivery to Lebanon's Biqa' Valley.

It is not inconceivable that Iran and Syria are coordinating their support for the insurgency in Iraq. Both have emnity towards the United States, and both are wary of the emergence of a successful, representative government in Iraq.

See also my April 2003 commentary on MSNBC.com at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3070263/.

Rafiq Al-Hariri Assassination - A Syrian Hand?

It is the conventional wisdom among Middle East specialists that nothing happens in Lebanon without Syrian approval or at least Syrian acquiescence. This is likely the case in the February 14 assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Al-Hariri. The U.S. intelligence community has already stated publicly that they believe that there is a Syrian hand, although it may never be proven since Syria is good at hiding that hand. Assassination is a long-time Syrian tactic, one it has used in Lebanon for years.

Why kill Rafiq Al-Hariri? Al-Hariri was a threat to the Syrians, to the continued presence of Syrian forces in Lebanon and their domination of the country. Syria has a long history of wanting to control events in Lebanon, which they consider their own back yard.

Syria also needs Lebanon to support its dismal economy. I think the Syrians always resented the French creation of Lebanon as a primarily a Christian enclave, much like the Iraqis resent the British exclusion of the lower part of Al-Basrah province (what is now Kuwait) from the original Kingdom of Iraq. They both regard this as, if I could borrow a phrase from one of favorite (read: sarcasm) authors, "imperial hubris."

At one point, the Syrians had over 30,000 troops in Lebanon, basically its entire III Corps. They agreed to withdraw them under the Taif Accords, but never did. Of course, the troops have been "asked" to remain in Lebanon for "security" by the Lebanese government. Later on, they did pull out about half of their forces, and moved the remaining troops from the Beirut area to the Biqa' Valley (out of sight, out of mind) - getting them out of the Biqa' might be problematic. I don't think you will see the continued withdrawal of Syrian forces. They have between 14,000 and 15,000 there now, and this probably represents the minimum level they need to exert direct influence over events in the country.

The Syrians also have considerable influence over the actions of the Iranian-back group Hizballah. They also have control over the amount and form of Iranian support that reaches the group's strongholds in the Biqa' valley.

Al-Hariri, a pro-western billionaire with ties to the Saudi royal family, has been vocal in his calls for Syrian comply with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559, demanding that Syria withdraw its forces from Lebanon. Hariri, who resigned as prime minister late last year, may well have become the prime minister again after the upcoming elections. Obviously, his return to that post is not in Syria's interest.

Did Syrian military intelligence - the "usual suspects" - do this? I doubt it. Did they have Hizballah or another surrogate do it? That's where my money is.

Of note, Syria's former military intelligence chief in Lebanon, Ghazi Kan'an, is now Syrian minister of the interior. He is in the position to make the assassination of Al-Hariri happen.

interestingly, the United States has withdrawn its ambassador to Syria following a demarche to the Syrian government. The ambassador relayed Washington's "profound outrage" of the AL-Hariri assassination, despite the total lack of evidence implicating Syria in the incident.

As an aside, here is a more personalized illustration of how many Syrians view Lebanon. I had a conversation with the wife of a Syrian doctor friend.

ME: Layla, wayn al-"docteur"? (Where is the doctor?)

LAYLA: Huwa 'ambi-"shopping" fi l-mhafazih. (He's shopping in the province.)

ME: Ayni mhafazih? Huwa mu fi Sham? (Which province? He's not in Damascus?)

LAYLA: La la, huwa fi l-mhafizih, Bayrut y'ani. (He's in the province, Beirut, I mean.)

Lebanon, the province.

Iraq: Elections, the Sunnis and the Insurgency

Iraqis went to the polls on Sunday, January 30. By most measures, it was a success, despite the death of several dozen people. Initial estimates of participation range around 60 percent. This marks the country's first free elections in almost five decades. Note the term "free." There have been referenda in Iraq before, even under Saddam Husayn, although these have always been sham exercises.

It will take a week to 10 days to tally the votes, but the conventional wisdom is that the United Iraqi Coalition (ballot choice 169) will emerge as the winner. This is the platform supported by Grand Ayatollah 'Ali Al-Sistani and headed by the leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) 'Abd Al-'Aziz Al-Hakim. Although there was some concern on the part of the United States about the emergence of an Islamic government along the lines of the neighboring Islamic Republic of Iran, both Sistani and Hakim have made it clear that they have no intention of creating an Islamic state, and are committed to allow all religious groups in the country the freedom to worship as they please. The new government will almost certainly be Islamic in character and based on Islamic values, but it will not implement Islamic law. Of course, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has stated on more than one occasion that the United States would not tolerate the establishment of another Islamic Republic like Iran in the Persian Gulf. As long as there are nearly 150,000 American troops in the ground in Iraq, his statements do carry some weight.

What's next?

After the votes are counted, the winning coalitions/parties/slates will be told how many of the 275 national assembly seats they will receive. Once seated, the assembly will then elect a president, two vice presidents, then select a prime minister who will form a government. This is somewhat similar to the electoral system in Israel, except Israel now directly elects its prime minster. One of the key duties of this new government will be to provide for the drafting of a Constitution and the preparations for permanent elections in December 2005.

Will the government be considered legitimate?

I don't think there is any question of legitimacy in the eyes of the Shi'a and Kurds. Both groups enjoyed large turnouts for the election. The Sunni turnout was understandably lower - either because of the boycott called for by many Sunni clerics, or because of intimidation by the insurgents (most notably the Al-Qa'idah in Iraq group under Abu Musa'ib Az-Zarqawi). However, given the overall turnout, most of the Sunnis will likely accept the government as legitimate. On the other side, the Shi'a and Kurds will almost certainly include Sunni groups. They realize that any attempt to exclude or marginalize the Sunnis will result in continued or increased animosity between the Sunnis and majority Shi'a. For their part, the Sunnis will likely respond favorably to offers of participation in the new government, in other words, having it both ways. It reminds of me of California deputy governor Cruz Bustamante's "No on the recall, yes to Bustamante" position....

What does this mean for the insurgency?

At this point, it is difficult to estimate the effect the election results will have on the insurgency. There are two major factions of what we commonly call the Iraqi insurgency. These are the Az-Zarqawi group composed of mostly foreigners and possibly some Iraqi fundamentalist Islamists (or jihadis) on one hand, and disaffected former regime members (sometimes called the Ba'this) on the other. While there is a very slight chance that the former regime members might be convinced to quit the insurgency and become part of the new Iraq, I think it safe to assume that any effort to reach out to the Al-Qa'idah faction would certainly fail. The insurgents must be hunted down and either killed or captured. The key to this is actionable intelligence. That intelligence can only be supplied by the population of the areas in which the insurgents operate - primarily the Sunni triangle. When the Iraqi people are ready to commit themselves to the new government - and only then, will the insurgency be defeated.

What does this mean for American forces in Iraq?

In the near term, troop levels will likely remain at current levels or decrease slightly as the two battalions of the US Army's 82nd Airborne Division's "ready brigade" return to standby duty at Fort Bragg. These battalions were sent to augment American troops providing election security. Once additional Iraqi units are trained, or the level of violence decreases (for example, if the Sunnis commit to the new government), the process of withdrawing the coalition forces from Iraq can begin.

The US government has stated that it will honor any Iraqi government request to remove American forces from the country. The chances of that request at this time is almost nil. Anyone in power in Iraq realizes that until Iraq's security forces are more capable, American troops remain the final guarantor of Iraqi security.

It all comes down to oil....

A recent article in the Christian Science Monitor highlighted a key concern for the United States in the coming years - the ballooning Chinese demand for oil. Oil, the primary American national interest in the Middle East, and our reliance on it, will continue to dominate our foreign policy untiil we adopt a coherent energy policy.

This is one of the key challenges facing not only us, but the entire industrialized world in the coming years. While oil production and delivery are peaking and will eventually level, demand is going to increase exponentially as not only China and India develop, but the emerging nations of South America and Southeast Asia. I agree, though, that China and India with their huge populations will be the major players. Wait until every Chinese family has one or two cars.

"Oil is a fungible commodity..." is a common theme in my Middle East presentations. Although we only import about 15 percent of our oil from the region, the fact that oil is a fungible commodity makes that number irrelevant. All that matters is how much is available on the market on any given day. If there is a disruption in the flow of Middle East/Persian Gulf oil, those countries that are the main consumers of that oil will then be vying with us to buy oil from our traditional sources - Venezuela, Mexico, Norway, Nigeria, etc.

It was Jimmy Carter who first stated that we would use military force to guarantee that Persian Gulf oil flows. Until the United States creates and implements a coherent energy policy, we will have American forces deployed to protect that oil supply (mainly Saudi Arabia) and the sea lanes of communications (currently the Persian Gulf/Arabian Sea SLOCs). It doesn't matter so much what the policy is, let's just have one! If the policy is to import and use foreign oil, fine, let's say so and accept the fact that we will have to commit our military resources to making sure that flow continues. If it is to drill in our own environmentally sensitive areas, fine, let's say so and get on with it. If it's to rethink nuclear power generation, fine, let's say so and seek some better technology. But let's not continue on our rudderless journey into greater reliance on imported oil.
Falling off my soapbox now.

Disbanding the Iraqi Army - A Mistake

In a January 12, 2005 opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal, Paul "Jerry" Bremer, former administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority, defended his decision to disband the Iraqi army shortly after the fall of Saddam Husayn in 2003. Although I agree with his decision that disbanded the Ba'th Party and the civilian internal security organizations, disbanding the Iraqi armed forces was a mistake.

Bremer's defense of his decision includes the usual litany of how the army was used as an instrument of Saddam's tyranny and repression of his own people. No doubt, the army was involved in the regime's atrocities, but not everyone in the army. He claims that the army "disbanded itself." Many of the soldiers, including the noncommissioned officers and officers, fled in the face of the advancing American forces, refusing to fight for the regime. Many of these units had been contacted by U.S. intelligence prior to the war and had agreed to not fight. There was an expectation in these units that they would make up the army of a post-Saddam Iraq.

There were many senior officers in the Iraqi army that needed to be dismissed, some even deserved to be prosecuted for war crimes. That does not translate into the need to disband the entire institution of the Iraqi army. Having to recreate an entire military structure from scratch has led to the abysmal security situation we find in Iraq today. He states that the creation of a "well-equipped, professional army cannot be done overnight." Absolutely correct, which is why completely eliminating the existing infrastructure was ill advised.

Bremer's assertion that "more than three quarters of the enlisted men in the New Army and virtually all he officers and NCOs served in the old army" is a bit misleading. The actual numbers of former soldiers in the new army are not significant, it is the lack of coherent, cohesive units capable of conducting effective operations.

The effects of disbanding the armed forces were immediate and widespread. Rather than having an existing security force of native Iraqis patrolling the streets, the disbanding created a power vacuum that led to chaos and widespread looting and violent crime. It also instantly created massive unemployment, putting over 300,000 armed men out of work. In fact, the newly unemployed soldiers may have taken part in the looting and violence. Many have probably found their way into the insurgency.

The bulk of Iraqi security duties now falls on the shoulders of American and coalition troops. They are resented by the Iraqis, who consider them an occupation force, regardless of whether or not there is a sovereign Iraqi government. It didn't have to be that way.

Iraq: Scowcraft Speaks Out

Lt Gen Brent Scowcroft, USAF (Ret)

In a recent Washington Post article, former national security advisor Brent Scowcraft spoke out against American policy in Iraq. Although he served as an advisor to the former President Bush, he has been critical of the current president's actions in Iraq.

General Scowcraft is highly regarded, but I do not think he is assessing the situation correctly. As cited in the Post article:

"The Iraqi elections, rather than turning out to be a promising turning point, have the great potential for deepening the conflict," Scowcroft said. He said he expects increased divisions between Shiite and Sunni Muslims after the Jan. 30 elections….

The Sunnis believe that they are about to loose their long hold on the reins of power in Iraq. Actually, they have already lost it. The establishment of any form of representative government - call it democracy or whatever - validates and codifies that loss. They are acting to prevent that. Chaos, failure to hold elections, civil war - all these are good news for them. It is for this reason that I believe that anyone who thinks the elections will lessen the violence may be mistaken. In this, General Scowcroft is correct. The insurgents, be they Iraqi Sunnis and/or Ba'this, and especially the Al-Qa'idah affliated Az-Zarqawi group, will continue the fight. The solution to the insurgency is not elections, it is to hunt the insurgents/terrorists down and kill them.

That said, those who against the new government are already supporting the insurgency - I don't see an elected government, Shi'a-dominated or not, swelling the ranks of the insurgents.

Scowcroft predicted "an incipient civil war" would grip Iraq and said the best hope for pulling the country from chaos would be to turn the U.S. operation over to NATO or the United Nations -- which, he said, would not be so hostilely viewed by Iraqis.

NATO will not much more palatable to the Iraqis than the United Nations or us. In any case, NATO has already said they aren't interested. Of the three, I think NATO would be the least objectionable, but the United Nations would really inflame the Iraqis. As we know, the Iraqis are the most xenophobic people in the region, and they suffered under the United Nations sanctions.

Scowcroft also said the continued U.S. presence in Iraq is inflaming the Middle East, hurting the U.S. war on terrorism.

He may be right on this one, but he offers no realistic solution. After publication of the article, it was suggested that the general was hoping to convince the Europeans to be part of the effort, positing the possibility of a U.S. withdrawal and all that would entail. Maybe.

Others were quoted in the Post article. Most state the obvious problems, but only one offers a solution. Here is an example of stating the obvious with no realistic solution:

Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Jimmy Carter's national security adviser: "I do not think we can stay in Iraq in the fashion we're in now," Brzezinski said. "If it cannot be changed drastically, it should be terminated."

Does he really think that is an option? Then there will not be an "incipient civil war" as Scowcroft warns - there will be a full-blown meltdown, one which will be disastrous.

The best excerpt, as I see it, is from Tony Cordesman. At least he implies a solution (with which I agree):

". . . Our success more and more depends on, not on our skill at war, but whether the Iraqis as political leaders can lead and govern, whether Iraqi security and military forces can take up the burden of the counterinsurgency battle and whether Iraqis can form a state. If they fail politically or fail to govern or fail to provide adequate military or security forces, nothing we do military or politically or with our allies is going to matter."

I don't think the question is "can" the Iraqis lead and govern, it is "how" they will lead and govern. I believe that leading Shi'a cleric Ayatollah Al-Sistani has already figured this out and is waiting for the results of the election, which, unless we are all mistaken, will usher in a Shi'a-dominated government. The question is, how will that new government, probably led by Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) chief 'Abd Al-'Aziz Al-Hakim, will do to restore security. The security problem is localized in the Sunni area of the country, as well as parts of Baghdad. If the Shi'a-dominated government is viewed by the Kurds and Sunnis as theocratic, then it will look like a civil war.

It may not be important what it looks like as long as the Kurds and Shi'a cooperate and focus on the Sunni insurgents, and allow the rest of the Sunnis to go about their lives. I wouldn't hold my breath for this to happen, but it is probably the only way the insurgency will end. The average Iraqis, be they Sunni, Shi'a, Kurd, Chaldean, Assyrian, Turkoman, etc, have to commit to the new government - that means accepting it as legitimate and cooperating against the insurgency.

I would have to say that we won't know until the Iraqis have a real opportunity to participate in their government. What stops them? In the Kurdish north, nothing. They have had basically a functioning democracy for well over a decade. In the Arab portions of the country, several reasons, the most obvious of which is the security situation. However, it goes further than that. The Shi'a, and even the Sunnis to some extent, are heavily influenced by their religious leadership. It is almost akin to clan or tribal loyalty. I think they will vote how their local mosque tells them to. How do we get beyond that? I don't know that we ever will unless there is a return to a secular society, such as the Ba'this, and that was maintained only by force of arms.

Let's be clear. We are not going to see, nor should we push for, a Jeffersonian democracy to emerge. There will be some form of representative government - let them figure out what they want, what works for them. The bottom line remains that we have to eliminate the insurgency. Actually, THEY have to eliminate the insurgency.

Iraq: Elections and Violence

Elections in Iraq are set for January 30, 2005. It appears that date is virtually set in stone. As that date approaches, the level of violence has increased. If you follow the media, you could get the impression that the country is awash in violence. That is not the case - the violence is limited primarily to the area defined in the press as the "Sunni triangle," the area between Baghdad, Mosul and western Anbar province. This are includes the trouble spots of Fallujah, Ramadi, Samarra' and Ba'qubah.

Some media pundits have posited the theory that the violence is tied to the elections and that successful elections will result in a lower level of violence. I agree that the violence is tied to the elections, however, I do not believe that the magic date of January 30 had any influence on the level of violence. The perpetrators of the violence fall into two categories: Iraqis from the former regime or sympathizers, and a group of fundamentalist Muslims, some Iraqi and some foreign, under the leadership of Al-Qa'idah affiliate Abu Musa'ib Az-Zarqawi.

Neither of these groups want the elections to occur. They have increased the level of violence, primarily in the Sunni triangle, but also including attacks in the Shi'a holy city of An-Najaf. These attacks are aimed at intimidating the Sunnis from voting, and in the case of the attack in An-Najaf, to spark sectarian divisions among the diverse groups that make up Iraq to prevent a new government from being effective.

Regardless of the outcome of the elections in January - and by all accounts it appears that they will take place on schedule - the violence will not decrease. The targets of the violence may shift to those newly elected representatives, but the reasons for the insurgents to attack will remain. They do not want the establishment of a representative government in the country. For the secular Ba'this, it formalizes and institutionalizes their fall from power that began with the American invasion in March 2003. For the Al-Qa'idah sympathizers, it creates a secular state that flies in the face of their dream of a fundamentalist Sunni Islamic state.

The elections will exacerbate the violence, not lessen it. The only thing that will lessen the violence is the eradication of those perpetrating it. Appeals for inclusion of offers of amnesty are a waste of time. The insurgents have to be hunted down and killed.

Saudi Arabia – The Next Target for Al-Qa’idah?

Al-Qa’idah leader Usamah Bin Ladin released another audiotape that appeared on an Islamic fundamentalist website on December 16. Much of the threats on the tape were leveled at the Saudi royal family, as well as Americans in the kingdom and oil facilities.

Saudi Arabia does not need threats from Usamah Bin Ladin – it has plenty of problems already. There are several external organizations calling for the overthrow of the royal family and the institution of a representative government. Although the United States is calling for more representative governments in the region – such as in Afghanistan and Iraq – they back the Saudi rulers.

The situation is almost reminiscent of Iran in the mid-1970’s. Many of the same factors that resulted in the fall of Shah Reza Pahlavi in 1979 exist or are developing in Saudi Arabia today. If you look at the Saudi population – the Saudis, not the vast numbers of foreigners working in the kingdom – you find a host of well educated (many in the finest American and European universities) young men with limited job opportunities. The wealth of the country rests with and is controlled by the royal family.

These same youth, having been exposed to Western democracies, see that they have no input to their political system. Educated, underemployed and with no political voice, they are ripe for recruitment by organizations that call for change. Many turn to their religion for a solution. This is ready made for a fundamentalist charismatic leader to arise. Enter Usamah Bin Ladin.

If the Saudi royal family does not address these pressures, they likely will find increased internal opposition that might lead to their overthrow. In the last year, since the attack on a housing compound in Riyadh, they have begun to track down Al-Qa’idah affiliated terrorists. This represents a change in Saudi attitude – they were willing to turn a blind eye as long as there were no attacks in the kingdom. Closely linked to this crackdown is an effort to change the traditional madrasah system in which young boys are indoctrinated into a fanatical, intolerant brand of Islam. The U.S. State Department had a program where American educators were working with Saudi Ministry of Education to review the curriculum. Although the Saudi government (read: royal family) buys into it, the people don't. The program was made public and the American administrators identities published on the internet on an Al-Qa'idah website - they had to be withdrawn for their own safety.

What effect will the threats from Bin Ladin have on the Saudis? It might cause them to work closer with the United States against the Al-Qa’idah organization.