Israeli debate over Iran's nuclear program

Iranian President Ahmadinejad at Natanz enrichment facility

During my recent visit to Israel, Iran was one of the major topics of discussion. I spoke with political, military and intelligence officials about the threat posed by Iran's nuclear weapons program. The prevailing attitude about this threat was markedly different than my previous visit to Israel in late 2006.

At that time, in the aftermath of the war in Lebanon, Iran was the main item of discussion on virtually everyone's agenda and was described in almost biblical terms as "the existential" threat to the state of Israel. While Israelis are rightfully concerned about Iran's potential acquisition of a nuclear weapon, they appear to have gathered more information on the Iranian program and put it into a slightly different perspective. Now they view Iran's program as "an" existential threat - there are more than one, including the Palestinian issue. While Iran is still the major threat to Israel, it was not the all-consuming issue it was in 2006.

Israeli intelligence (Mossad) analysts believe that Iran will have amassed enough low-enriched uranium (LEU) that can be processed into sufficient highly-enriched uranium (HEU) for one nuclear weapon by the end of 2009. To begin processing the LEU into HEU required for a weapon, Iran will have to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Withdrawing from the NPT will erase any doubts about the true intentions of Iran's nuclear program.

What are Israel's current options? Can something be done before Iran withdraws from the NPT? Is the military option the only option that will prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon?

A coherent Israeli position is emerging. Almost all Israelis believe that the Iranians are the primary threat to the country and that deterrence is the preferred option. Failing deterrence, military action will be necessary. Successful military action against the Iranian program will be difficult, but the Israelis may believe they have no other option.

According to Likud Knesset member Yuval Shteinitz, Iran will have a nuclear weapon within two years. He favors telling the Iranians that if they do not cease their program by a certain date, military action is unavoidable. He believes this will be effective because the Iranians halted their program temporarily after the American invasion of Iraq - specifically the fall of Baghdad - since they thought they might be next.

Former National Security Council Chairman Major General (Reserve) Uzi Dayan (with author in photo) favors sanctions on Iran as the initial means of pressuring Iran to stop their uranium enrichment program. In addition to a boycott on Iranian oil and prevention of imports of refined gasoline and diesel, Dayan proposes a maritime inspection protocol of vessels bound for Iranian ports.

While that would likely be effective, the international community is too sensitive to Persian Gulf oil flows that support for such measures would be hard to gather. Quarantining ports is tantamount to an act of war. Since there is little international support for the level of sanctions required to ameliorate Iranian behavior, Dayan believes Israel must be prepared to execute a unilateral military strike on Iranian nuclear facilities.

Likud leader Benjamin "Bibi" Netanyahu (with author in photo), currently the front runner to win the prime minister position in the February 10 elections, believes that Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons is a greater threat to the world than the current economic crisis. He too favors a military option if the international community is unable or unwilling to solve the Iranian nuclear issue.

Assuming Israel has decided on the military option, their prospects are not good. How will the aircraft fly from their bases in Israel to a target located 200 miles inside Iran?

There are three possible ways to get there – either through Turkey (green), Saudi Arabia (red) or Iraq (blue), possibly a combination of all three, or even the use of Jordanian airspace as well.

In any case, the route is a one-way trip of at least 1200 miles. Even though Turkey and Israel have had a defense agreement since 1996, Israel's recent actions in Gaza have soured their relationship with Turkey and may have jeopardized this option. Use of Turkish airspace lengthens the route, but keeps the aircraft in relatively friendly airspace the longest (assuming American-controlled Iraqi airspace is friendly), but requires American support with Iraqi airspace issues for Israeli refueling tankers, or the use of U.S. Air Force tankers.

Any of these options presents a high risk of failure. See my earlier analyses of these military options:
- Iran - Israel's Air Strike Options (March 2006)
- Iran - Israel's Air Strike Options Update (June 2008)

The question is, will Israel sit by as Iran develops a nuclear weapon? My guess is no.

Israel-Palestinians: The "no solution" solution

Security barrier between Israel and West Bank at Israel's narrowest point

On my recent trip to Israel to assess the Israeli military operation in the Gaza Strip, I had the opportunity to talk to numerous Israelis and Palestinians about the situation in Gaza and the West Bank. I was hoping to hear insights on restarting the moribund peace process, particularly the Israel-Palestinian track.

Most of what I heard was that for now at least, the two state solution is not an option. The new American envoy to the Middle East, George Mitchell, will face two sides agreeable only to a short-term ceasefire, but not agreeable to any long term solution. The major problem is that the Palestinians are divided - no one speaks for all the Palestinians. As the Israelis say, "We will send our proposals to the Palestinian side, but we need an address." An "address" that includes Hamas is unacceptable to the Israelis.

The Israelis make a good point. The Palestinians have divided into many camps, the major ones of course being Hamas and Fatah under Palestinian Authority President Abu Mazin (Mahmud 'Abbas). Hamas claims that Abu Mazin's term expired earlier this month - he claims he remains as president until new elections are held. In the ceasefire talks in Cairo earlier this month, Hamas made it clear that Abu Mazin does not speak for them.

One should not make the mistake of assuming that Hamas's influence is limited to the Gaza Strip - they are also very popular in the cities and towns of the West Bank. Many West Bank Palestinians, mostly secular in their political outlook, find themselves supporting Hamas not because they believe in the fundamentalist Islam of the group, but because they are disgusted with Fatah, the party of the late Yasir 'Arafat and current president Abu Mazin. The group is considered to be terribly corrupt. Fatah was supported by billions of dollars from the west, so 'Arafat built a casino in Ramallah.

At the same time, Hamas, supported by millions of dollars from Iran, established charities, hospitals, orphanages and schools. In the 2006 elections in which Hamas won a majority, many Christian Palestinians voted for the Islamic Hamas to voice their opposition to Fatah.

Given Hamas's refusal to recognize Israel's right to exist, their insistence that the ceasefire is not the prelude to a long-term peaceful resolution, their boast that they have already resumed importing weapons into the Gaza Strip and their claim that they have the "right to resist," it would appear that there is no reason for Israel to talk to them either directly or indirectly. A Hamas that will never agree to the existence of the state of Israel is hardly capable of being part of a permanent solution.

On the other side of the Palestinian divide is Fatah and the Palestinian Authority. The Palestinian people do not trust them, and there is no viable alternative. So it's Hamas or Fatah. Hamas and Israel cannot make peace, and the Palestinians have rejected Fatah.

So for now, the Israeli position is that there is no solution, no "peace process." There may not even be a solution in the long term. The best they can do is manage the conflict. Truces (or "lulls" in Arabic) between the Palestinians as long as possible, military action when required.

I do not envy Mr. Mitchell his task.

Yemen and the Guantanamo 245

Yemeni members of al-Qa'idah

President Obama, in an attempt to curry favor with the Europeans that adore him, followed through on a campaign promise and signed an executive order to close the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Now that the order has been issued, reality is beginning to set in - what do we do with the detainees? These are people who have committed their lives to the destruction of our way of life. Yeah, I know that sounds melodramatic, but it is the truth.

There are several realities involved with the closure of Guantanamo. First and foremost, no one wants the detainees. With the notable exception of Jack Murtha supposedly speaking for his district in Pennsylvania, various venues have already indicated their unwillingness to host these terrorists. Let's see which of the European nations are willing to be part of the solution - probably as many who are willing to send more troops to Afghanistan.

The administation has made contacts with Yemen to take its nationals - there are 245 Yemenis at Guantanamo, the largest group by far. In order for the Yemenis to be released to the government of 'Ali 'Abdullah Salih, the Obama administration demands that Yemen must first institute a terrorist rehabilitation program based on the model used in Saudi Arabia.

Yemen is not a partner to be trusted, not only in the war on terror, but for anything. It is one of the most corrupt places on the planet, and a hotbed of terrorist activity. Many terrorist groups operate virtually openly in the country. Prisoners escape, judges look the other way, and money changes hands. This is the country that the Obama administation wants to rely on to handle Guantanamo detainees?

Let's look at some history:

- October 2000: The USS Cole was attacked while on a port visit to Aden, killing 17 American sailors (see The USS Cole - A Victim of Bad Policy?

- February 2006: Twenty three Al-Qa'idah prisoners escaped from a Yemeni maximum security prison. Included in the 23 escapees were Jamal al-Badawi, mastermind 2000 attack on the USS Cole in Aden harbor, and Jabr al-Banah, an American citizen wanted in New York state for terrorist activities.

- July 2006: A Yemeni court has acquitted 19 suspected Al-Qa'idah members, some of whom had confessed to fighting American troops in Iraq.

- February 2008: Jabr al-Banah waltzed into a courtroom in Sana', Yemen, made a brief appearance and departed. This is outrageous - al-Banah is an American citizen wanted by American authorities for terrorist activities - he is one of the so-called "Lackawanna Six."

- May 2008: Usamah Bin Ladin orders his followers in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to leave and head for Yemen. Bin Ladin assessed - correctly - that the climate in Yemen is much more conducive venue to base his terrorist operatives.

Back to rehabilitation. Forget it. You cannot rehabilitate these people, you cannot negotiate with these people, you cannot trust these people. When we exhibit what we believe is noble behavior - rehabilitation and release - they regard it as weakness, not strength. Oh, by the way, the Saudi program was a failure.

The only successful way to deal with these people is to hunt them down and kill them. If you think they have valuable intelligence information, hunt them down, waterboard them, then kill them.

You don't send them to Yemen.

Hamas violates and proposes a ceasfire

Gaza border
(my photo - click for larger image)

An Israeli soldier was killed and three others wounded in a roadside bomb attack along the Gaza border. This comes just a week after Hamas announced a ceasefire, a ceasefire that followed Israel's unilateral ceasefire and withdrawal of its troops from the Gaza Strip. Israeli forces responded and killed one Palestinian. These violations are to be expected from a group that has vowed to destroy the state of Israel.

At almost the same time, Hamas representatives were proposing a 18-month truce with Israel, the very state they hope to eliminate. Although Egyptian intelligence mediators are pushing for a truce of longer duration, perhaps three years, Hamas representatives will probably not agree.

Why not agree to a long term truce? Simple - the representatives believe the group can sufficiently regroup and rearm in the shorter period of time and allow it to continue "the resistance." Note that "resistance" is Hamas's middle name: The term Hamas is an acronym of the Arabic words for Islamic Resistance Movement (حركة المقاومة الاسلامية - harakat al-muqawamat al-islamiyah).

The Israelis are unlikely to agree to a formal ceasefire unless they receive guarantees that the smuggling of weapons into the Gaza Strip - mostly via tunnels under the Egyptian border - will be stopped. They have severely restricted the importation of goods via the Israeli border crossings and are not likely to open them in the absence of similar guarantees.

Hamas leaders have demanded that Israel open the crossings. Of course they want the crossings open - even more chances to bring in arms and dual-use commodities that can be used for "resistance" activities. One Hamas members openly boasted that smuggling of weapons resumed on the first day of the Israeli-declared ceasefire. Usamah Hamdan, the Hamas representative in Lebanon, stated, "It is our right to have weapons, and we shall continue to enter arms into Gaza and the West Bank." He further said that anyone who thinks it is possible to prevent arms from entering Gaza is "delusional."

Hamdan is correct. The border with Egypt is riddled with tunnels. Despite the relentless pounding of the tunnels by Israeli aircraft, many are already back in operation. Tunnels are easy to dig in the Gaza soil, and there is a lot of money to be made. On the Egyptian side, efforts to eliminate smuggling will not be effective. Egyptian border guards are poorly paid and extremely corrupt. Hamas has money to bribe the Egyptians, and Iran has weapons to provide. Stopping it will require a major effort on the part of Egypt or a combination of Egypt and the international community.

I don't see it happening. Hamas will rearm, just as Hizballah did after the fighting in 2006. There will be a short uneasy truce with occasional violations like the one we saw today, and in a year or two, we'll be revisiting the war in Gaza once again.

The problem has not been solved, only deferred.

Sderot - Israel's "Rocket City"

From my recent visit to Sderot - The small city of Sderot, Israel sits just under three miles from the border with the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip. This places the city within the range of the homemade al-Qassam rocket, manufactured in the machine and welding shops in Gaza City, and launched from the strip of land south of Bayt Hanun and closest to Sderot.


Since Israel dismantled its settlements in the Gaza Strip and withdrew its military forces in 2005, over 8000 al-Qassam rockets have been fired at Sderot. There have been 13 deaths attributed to the rockets. The photo shows three al-Qassam rockets being fired at Sderot, seen from Mitzneh hill in Sderot.


Israel and Hamas had a temporary ceasefire (in Arabic, a hudnah, or "lull") in effect for six months - that ended in December. Immediately after the truce expired, Hamas began firing dozens of al-Qassam rockets into Sderot every day. Life reverted to the pre-truce days of running for safe rooms and public shelters. The precast shelter above sits next to a parking lot and school.


All new homes in Israel are required to have air-tight reinforced shelters. Many existing structures, especially in areas with Hamas rocket range are being refitted with safe rooms.


Once the launch of an al-Qassam is detected, a warning is issued over loudspeakers thoughout the town of 20,000 people. There are multiple sensors used to detect rocket launches, like the network of blimps (photo). The warning is the two Hebrew words, "tzevah adom" - meaning "color red." The warning system and shelters have saved lives.



Schools have been protected by external steel roofs and awnings to prevent the ball bearings and nails packed as shrapnel in the rockets from penetrating classrooms.


The last al-Qassam fired in this round struck Sderot a few hours after the unilateral Israeli ceasefire went into effect on January 18. Note the date on the rocket in the photo. It was fired to make a statement, a gesture.


The al-Qassams that have hit Sderot are on display at the city police station.


There is a new sense of patriotism and pride in Sderot as the rockets have stopped and the people believe that the Israeli armed forces have dealt a blow to Hamas. Hopefully it will last for some time.

The Gaza Campaign - Part Two

Israeli troops enter the Gaza Strip

(see also The Gaza Campaign - Part One)

The ground campaign

Israeli troops began moving to the Gaza border as soon as the air campaign started. To make sure enough troops were going to be available to the military commanders, at least 10,000 reservists were called up for duty. Israel committed about 175,000 troops to the mission in Gaza.

The primary units for the operation were detached from other commands in the country and assigned to the southern command for Operation Cast Lead. The 1st "Golani" Infantry Brigade was detached from Northern Command, and the 35th Paratroop Brigade was detached from Central Command. The 84th "Givati" Infantry Brigade is an integral part of the Southern Command. The 36th Armor Division came from Northern Command.

The order was given to move into Gaza on January 3, 2009. The initial thrust was made by the 36th Armor Division to cut the Gaza Strip into two sections, effectively separating Gaza City and its neighboring refugee camps in the north from Rafah and the Egyptian border area in the south. This isolated the rocket launch areas in the northeast corner of the Strip from the resupply tunnels in the south.

According to officers from the 36th, they met little resistance in their move from the Israeli border near Nahal Oz to the Mediterranean Sea. Although they had been warned that Hamas had received the Konkurs (NATO designator AT-5 Spandrel) antitank guided missile, they did not encounter any on their operations.

As the 36th was bisecting the Gaza Strip, the three infantry brigades moved towards Gaza City. The initial moves were into the rocket launch areas in the northeast part of the Strip. Despite the presence of Israeli infantry from January 3 until January 18, Hamas was still able to fire rockets at Israeli cities.

The three brigades approached Gaza City from three sides: the Paratroop Brigade from the north, the Golani Brigade from the east and the Givati Brigade from the south. Hamas generally faded back as the Israelis approached, not wanting a direct fight with the better-equipped and trained Israelis. The Israelis moved slowly but deliberately, using combat engineers to clear numerous obstacles and improvised explosive devices. Hamas resistance intensified as the Israelis approached more built-up areas.

Ten Israeli soldiers were killed in the ground campaign, and about 500 were wounded. Israeli military intelligence claimed that Israeli troops had killed 600 Hamas members whom they could identify by name. They suspect that many more of the dead were members of Hamas as well. They also believe that they were able to destroy over half of Hamas's rocket inventory. Of course, the tunnels that were closed by Israeli Air Force bombs during the campaign were back in operation just two days after the ceasefire.

The Israeli Ceasefire

Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert announced a unilateral ceasefire was to go into effect at 2:00am on January 18, 2009. Hamas did not call a ceasefire until January 20, but this was just bravado - they had taken a horrendous beating at the hands of the IDF and were glad for the respite.

There had been a vigorous debate over the modality of the ceasefire. (See my earlier The Israeli debate over what to do now in Gaza.) In the end, the position espoused by Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni was adopted. Livni felt that a unilateral ceasefire and withdrawal on Israel's terms was the best route since an agreement would limit only Israel - Hamas will not live up to its commitments in any case.

Restoration of Deterrence

Israeli forces in Gaza did more than kill several hundred Hamas members - it restored deterrence as a cornerstone of Israeli policy in the region. That sense of deterrence was lost in 2006 when the Israeli political leadership failed to allow the IDF to win a decisive military and political victory over Hizballah. Certainly the IDF prevailed on the battlefield, but the impression was created of a country that lacked political will to use its power.

That impression is gone. The Hamas leadership has already stated that based on Israel's action in 2006, they assumed there would be some retaliation for the rocket attacks, most likely some airstrikes, but nothing on the order of the three-week campaign.

Israel has been criticized in some media for a "disproportionate response." Most journalists do not understand the definition of disproportionate response. The term refers not to the level of violence nor is meant to be a measure of how many lives were lost on each side. If a Palestinian kills an Israeli, is Israel supposed to kill only one Palestinian in response? Of course not. Disproportionate response is the use of greater force than required to achieve an objective. For example, destroying an entire apartment complex to kill a sniper in the roof is disproportionate.

I believe that it will be some time before Hamas again challenges the Israelis, but it will at some point. How long that is depends on deterrence and Israel's ability to focus international efforts on preventing Hamas from re-arming via the tunnels from Egypt.

The "Gaza problem" has not been solved, just deferred. For the residents of Sderot who endured thousands of rocket attacks since Israel left the Gaza Strip in 2005, that may be enough.

The Gaza Campaign - Part One

Air attack on Rafah

From mid-day on December 17, 2008 to the early hours of January 18, 2009, the Israel Defense Forces conducted Operation Cast Lead, a punishing air and ground action against Hamas in the Gaza Strip. During the operation, approximately 1300 Palestinians died, as well as 13 Israelis (10 were IDF personnel). More than 5000 Palestinians and 500 Israelis were wounded.

As with most IDF operations, Cast Lead was well-planned, well-executed and based on excellent intelligence. It consisted of distinct phases: a week-long air campaign, an initial ground incursion followed by penetration of urban areas of Gaza City.

The following information was provided to me by Israeli defense sources during visits to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Gaza.

The air campaign

Airstrike areas in red

The week long first phase of the operation was a stand-alone air campaign. Although the air defense environment was assessed as good, the pilots were ordered to make liberal use of infrared missile countermeasures - that means dropping a lot of flares.

The Israeli Air Force had developed a list of 600 preplanned targets, the so-called "target bank." This bank consisted of five types of targets:

- rocket manufacturing facilities
- rocket/weapons storage facilities
- rocket launch positions
- leadership targets (homes and offices)
- tunnels on the Egyptian border

The first wave of attacks were timed to put about 70 fighter aircraft on target simultaneously at exactly 11:30am on Saturday, December 27. The initial sorties struck 120 targets. The remaining targets of the target bank were hit over the next week.

The Israelis were very aware of the negative public opinion that would be mounted against them once pictures of bomb damage hit the airwaves all over the world. For the most part, they calculated that into the equation. They did try to minimize civilian casualties - phoning warnings to residents of buildings on the target list, employing only precision guided munitions and using an Israeli-developed small bomb. The small bomb, precision guided as well, carried only a 25-pound warhead. It was meant to kill the target and limit damage to surrounding residences.

One objective of the air campaign was to decrease the number of rockets fired at cities in southern Israel. This objective was technically met - the numbers did decrease day by day, from more than 100 to less than 20. That said, despite relentless pounding by one of the world's best air forces, Hamas was still able to fire both al-Qassam and Grad rockets throughout the three week operation. Targets included the cities of Sderot, Ashkelon, Kiryat Gat, Ashdod and Beersheba.

After one week, the Israeli military leadership determined that the operation's overall objectives had not yet been met and that it was time to authorize the IDF to launch the ground campaign.

Israeli air operations continued throughout the campaign. After the target bank was exhausted, pilots were directed to targets of opportunity by intelligence and surveillance system operators.

The coverage of Gaza's skies was completely dominated by the Israeli Air Force. When I visited Gaza the day after the ceasefire was declared by Israel, there were numerous F-15 fighter jet sorties visible, as well as the nonstop buzz of unmanned aerial surveillance vehicles.

(to be continued)

Reconstructing Gaza - the battle for hearts and minds

Damaged buildings in Gaza (click for larger view)
my photo - January 19

The combat may be over in Gaza, but the war goes on. Now the battles are over the reconstruction projects that will repair the estimated $2 billion worth of damage to the infrastructure. As funds from wealthy Arab states - Saudi Arabia has pledged $1 billion and the other Gulf Arabs another $1 billion - become available, there is a coming struggle over who will administer the funds inside the Gaza Strip. The organization that controls the distribution of the money will garner important political clout and in essence emerge as the real winner of the war.

As you might imagine, both Hamas and the Palestinian Authority (PA) want to be the manager of the funds and overseer of the projects. Israel would prefer that the PA be in charge - they have a good working relationship with Mahmud 'Abbas (Abu Mazin) - whereas they refuse to even talk to Hamas, considered by Israel, the United States and the European Union, as a terrorist organization.

Israel does have a say in the reconstruction. Israel controls the crossings into Gaza except for the eight miles of the Gaza-Egypt border, the "Philadelphia Corridor." Most, if not all, of the aid will have to come through Israel - even if the Egyptian border crossings were opened, they cannot handle the volume of traffic that will be required to import the amount of building materials needed to reconstruct the Gaza Strip. Israeli officials have stated they want to make sure that Gaza is rebuilt, not Hamas's capabilities.

Another Israeli concern is aid from Iran, which of course will be handled on the ground controlled by Hamas. Hamas has already started to pay out Iranian-supplied compensation to Palestinians whose homes were destroyed in the Israeli attacks over the last three weeks. This is yet another lesson learned from Hizballah. Immediately after the passage of a United Nations resolution ending the conflict between Israel and Hizballah in 2006, Hizballah teams in southern Lebanon began handing out Iranian-supplied money to people whose homes were damaged or destroyed. Hizballah then went on to re-arm and consolidate its political power, eventually emerging as the major power broker in the country.

Hamas hopes to replicate Hizballah's success - turn a military defeat into a political victory. One way to do that is to control several billion dollars of aid. Administering aid also provides excellent cover for the covert acquisition of weapons to replace Hamas's depleted or destroyed stocks. Without gaining the position of aid administrators, the organization would appear to be just the defeated party in a war with Israel. If they are not involved in the solution, they will be blamed for all the damage and destruction.

For the Palestinian Authority, administering the reconstruction aid may be its last chance for relevance in the Gaza Strip. Since its violent expulsion from the Strip at the hands of Hamas in 2007, the PA has virtually no presence or influence in Gaza, or as many Israeli officials refer to it, "Hamastan." If the PA can be seen as the rescuers of Gaza, it has a chance to regain some of its former political power. It will be difficult - the PA is notoriously corrupt.

The coming fight between Hamas and the PA may rival their bloody fight in 2007 and the stakes are just as high.

Ceasefire in Gaza?

from Tel Aviv

Israel annoucned a unilateral ceasefire effective at 2:00 am local time on Sunday for its forces in Gaza. Not long after that, there was at least one exchange of fire on the ground, a rocket attack on southern Israel and an Israeli response.

It would appear that Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni prevailed at the late night cabinet meeting. She has for the last week or so proposed a unilateral ceasefire that did not require a Hamas agreement. Her rationale was that agreements only limit Israel since Hamas cannot be trusted to abide my any agreement.

Hamas announced that they were not bound by the Israeli ceasefire declaration and repeated its earlier demands that Israeli troops withdraw from the Gaza Strip. For the time being, Israeli troops are remaining in their positions.

If the ceasefire does not hold - and the betting here in Israel is that it will not - what is the next move for the Israelis? Do they restart the offensive and push deeper into Gaza, including into the densely populated cities of Gaza and Rafah, as well as the Jabaliyah and Khan Yunis refugee camps? This has been Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's position - if Hamas does not abide by a ceasefire, the Israel Defense Force should be given free reign to hunt down the remaining members of Hamas and destroy the organization. Of course, this flies in the face of Olmert's claim when he announced the ceasefire that all of the objectives of the military operation have been met.

Now the Israelis are in place in Gaza, not yet in an occupation mode, but it has the danger of turning into one unless they resolve the answers to a series of questions. No one in Israel, especially the IDF, wants a re-occupation of the Gaza Strip. Will Hamas be smart and sit tight until the Israelis feel confident that the ceasefire will hold and thus start the withdrawal of their forces? Will the Israelis begin to demobilize the reservists called up for duty in the operation? What happens if Hamas waits until then and resumes rocket attacks on southern Israel?

All good questions, and not many answers. Welcome to Gaza.

Off to Sderot

Welcome to Sderot sign with rocket count

Just a note to let you know that I will be in Israel for the next week, including Sderot and the Gaza border area. I hope to make a few posts from there, but full articles might have to wait until my return. Rick