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A U.S. helicopter flies over Kabul (Rahmat
Gul - AP) |
Thanks to the Biden Administration’s disastrous handling of
the withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan,
the world is about to witness another botched evacuation reminiscent of the
fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975. Those of us
who served in Vietnam
will never forget the disturbing images of Huey helicopters evacuating people
from the rooftop of the American embassy.
It appears that history is about to repeat itself.
President Biden announced, probably against the advice of
his senior military leadership, that the United States would withdraw all of
its forces by the end of August. I can’t say that I blame Biden for not listening
to the same generals who created the absolute disaster that Afghanistan has
become.
Let’s review how we got here. Soon after the al-Qa’idah
attacks on the United States
on September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush delivered an ultimatum to the
Taliban to surrender ‘Usamah bin Ladin to the United States. The Taliban refused,
triggering the U.S. invasion
of the country and the removal of the Taliban, to be replaced by the Northern Alliance. The American military began operations
to eliminate al-Qa’idah, including bin Ladin.
By early December, the U.S.
and its allies (including Northern Alliance, British, and German forces) had
forced the remnants of al-Qa’idah to seek shelter from the relentless air
attacks in the Tora Bora cave complex near the border with Pakistan. An
Afghan militia leader claimed that he had negotiated the surrender of al-Qa’idah,
including bin Ladin, and they were working out the “modalities of bin Ladin’s
surrender.”
I remember shaking my head in disbelief. Rather than
committing U.S.
forces to the capture or killing of bin Ladin, we agreed to “outsource” it to
an unreliable Afghan warlord. I said to anyone who would listen that there is
no way this group of Afghans was going to turn over a fellow Muslim, a fellow
warrior, to the United States. It was just not going to happen. President Bush
refused to commit U.S.
forces to an attack, believing Pakistani lies that they would apprehend bin
Ladin if he tried to enter Pakistan.
We all know what happened – this “working out the modalities”
was merely a ploy to buy time to allow tribal forces on both sides of the
border to spirit bin Ladin into Pakistan,
where he remained until U.S.
forces tracked him down in Abbottabad,
Pakistan on May
2, 2011. The Pakistanis had no idea where he was for almost ten years? I find
that hard to believe.
After the end of the Battle of Tora Bora, I maintain that the
United States had achieved
its major objective of the invasion of Afghanistan – to remove al-Qa’idah
from the country. The survivors of the organization who accompanied bin Ladin
into Pakistan dispersed to
other areas to continue the fight – Iraq,
Syria, Yemen, the Maghreb.
So why did the United States
feel compelled to remain in Afghanistan,
a country that has been known as “the graveyard of empires?” You would think
that knowledgeable people in the American intelligence, military, and
diplomatic communities would have recognized the folly of committing a large
military force to Afghanistan
except to oversee the orderly withdrawal of U.S. troops.
For reasons that I cannot fathom, some bright light,
probably at the State Department, came up with the idea that we should try to
introduce Western-style democracy into this tribal society. This phenomena –
starting out to do one thing (removing al-Qai’dah) and morphing into another (nation
building) – is called “mission creep.” We Americans excel at it.
The obvious, but faulty, analogy that some will point out is
the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe after
World War II. There is nothing remotely similar to reintroducing democratic
institutions in Europe and creating democracy from nothing in Afghanistan.
Of course, the first step in any of these efforts is to
establish security – that usually means more troops. The American military
presence continued to grow to combat the threat still posed by the resurgent
Taliban. In my view, at that time, the Taliban did not represent a threat to
the United States.
Al-Qa’idah did, and was dealt with.
Did I want the Taliban to resume control of Afghanistan? No.
Did I think that the continued presence of American and allied troops would
prevent it? No. I thought the presence of foreign troops would only be able to
postpone the Taliban’s return to power, but in the end not prevent it. Why didn’t
our supposedly bright military leaders tell the President(s) that? If you can’t
win a war, don’t fight it.
As we have seen time and time again, a smaller, committed force
can outlast a superpower and defeat the incompetent indigenous forces supposedly
trained and equipped by their sponsors. The Afghan army was never a capable
fighting force, despite the huge expenditure of American and allied resources
and massive training efforts.
Why not? Because their hearts were not in it. Most of the
troops willing to join the Afghan military or security forces were doing it for
a paycheck, not a burning desire to keep democracy alive in Afghanistan.
On the other hand, the Taliban fighters are true believers. They
will fight to the death to achieve their objective – the reintroduction of an
Islamic state in Afghanistan.
They also enjoy enough popular support to continue to fight on despite the
efforts of the United States
and its allies.
It is only the presence of foreign forces that prevent the
Taliban from retaking the entire country. With the irresponsible manner of the Biden
withdrawal, it is only a matter of time – I give it days – before the Taliban
regain control.
In a press conference on July 8th, Biden claimed
that a Taliban victory was not inevitable, citing the fact that the Afghan military
of 300,000 was among the best equipped in the world, and capable of defeating
the 75,000 Taliban fighters. Just two days ago, the Pentagon spokesman claimed
that Kabul was
not in imminent danger. Clearly, neither one of them has a grasp on the reality
of the situation.
My bottom line: We should have left Afghanistan after ‘Usamah bin Ladin was allowed to
“escape” to Pakistan
in an act of perfidy in 2001, or at the latest in early 2002, and prevented the
loss of thousands of lives and trillions of dollars.