NSA - Spying on Americans?

Note: This article also appeared on MSNBC's Hardball Blog. I am one of the "Hardball War Council."

A December 16 New York Times article, "Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts" has caused an uproar around the country. Perhaps some background is in order.

The National Security Agency (NSA) is the largest agency in the U.S. intelligence community. Although nominally part of the Department of Defense, its operations are closely supervised by the Director of National Intelligence and support the entire executive branch. From its headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland, it oversees a worldwide network of intercept stations operated by "the Fort" (as it is known in the business) and the military services, using the latest technologies to access communications of all types. You name it - telephone, radio, fax, email - NSA intercepts it.

NSA's primary focus is on the collection of foreign communications in response to intelligence requirements, be they for military commanders deployed to combat zones, diplomats negotiating on behalf of the United States, etc. Generally, the communications intercepted by NSA take place outside the United States. And generally, NSA is prohibited from the intercept of communications between "U.S. persons, entities, corporations or organizations."

That is not to say that internal communications, or communications originating or terminating in the United States involving a U.S. person or entity cannot be collected by NSA. Collection of these communications, or those foreign communications involving U.S. persons (a much broader category than a U.S. citizen), entities, corporations or organizations abroad requires either a federal warrant or authorization from the Attorney General.

The governing document for this situation is United States Signals Intelligence Directive (USSID) 18. I worked in the U.S. SIGINT System for many years - this directive is taken seriously. From what I have observed, violation of USSID 18 is a career-ending event. NSA requires that its officers and military personnel assigned there to complete annual USSID 18 training.

The long-established mechanism to authorize the intercept of internal or US-entity communications is via a federal warrant issued under the provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), most often referred to as "FISA warrant." It is the FISA court that provides oversight to ensure that NSA's actions are in fact necessary and in keeping with U.S. law. USSID 18 also permits collection of these U.S. communications when authorized by the Attorney General in exceptional circumstances (emergencies, imminent danger, threat to life, etc.).

According to the New York Times article, the President issued an executive order after September 11, 2001, authorizing NSA to monitor without warrants certain international phone calls and e-mail messages to or from persons in the United States. (Note that intercept of internal U.S. communications still requires a federal warrant.) Many of the communications targeted under this executive order were discovered from exploitation of captured Al-Qa'idah and Taliban fighters and their computers and documents. According to government officials, the information collected has resulted in the disruption of terrorist operations.

Is all this against this law? I'm not a lawyer, but I doubt it. Having spent considerable time doing this for a living, I cannot contemplate NSA (or the parent Defense Department) undertaking this "special collection program" without concurrence of the NSA's General Counsel. I would be surprised if the Justice Department was not consulted as well.

Was Congress notified? According to the New York Times article, the chairmen and ranking members of the Senate and House intelligence committees were briefed by then-director of NSA Air Force Lt. Gen. Mike Hayden and then Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet. This almost certainly happened. This activity, clandestine rather than covert, would be considered a "significant intelligence activity," thus requiring Congressional notification.

My question: Was an Executive Order needed? Were the existing provisions of FISA not sufficient to authorize NSA collection of these communications? Since very few FISA requests are turned down, what special situations arose that were not covered by the FISA?

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Lt Col Rick Francona, USAF (Retired) is an MSNBC Military Analyst. He served for over 15 years in the U.S. Signals Intelligence System, including tours at the National Security Agency.

Al-Qa'idah: Newly Published Az-Zawahiri Message

Ayman Az-Zawahiri

In a September 2005 audiotape just released on an Islamist website, Al-Qa'idah's deputy leader showed good insight into American politics and an understanding of the importance of public opinion.

I would characterize this message - directed at his followers and not the West - as his version of "stay the course." He stated that although Al-Qa'idah is no military match for the Americans, but guerrilla tactics will succeed. He cited as examples of what has worked in the past and is working now, specifically:
- Afghan and Arab mujahidin against the Russians in Afghanistan
- Al-Qa'idah mujahidin in against the Russians in Chechnya
- Palestinian mujahidin against the "Jews" in "Palestine"
- Al-Qa'idah and Somali mujahidin against the Americans in Somalia
- Al-Qa'idah and Taliban mujahidin against the Americans in Afghanistan
- Al-Qa'idah mujahidin in Iraq

Az-Zawahiri claimed that continued mujahidin attacks will of course incur casualties, such is the nature of liberation movements everywhere. If they presevere, the Americans will leave due to increased domestic public opinion against the war, citing the "exit strategy." He likened the effort to Vietnam, when "they abandoned their helpers to meet their fates."

Az-Zawahiri is politically astute. He understands that war is waged not only on the battlefield, but in the media and public opinion. He is using all the facets, believing that if they tough it out, eventually the Americans will tire of it and go home. It was Ho Chi Minh who said, "We kill one of you, you kill ten of us. Soon you will tire of it."

Pre-9/11 Warning to Saudis - Some Perspective

Usamah Bin Ladin

On December 9, the National Security Archive released a Department of State cable under the headline and text:

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National Security Archive Releases Pre-9/11 Warning To Saudis That Osama Bin Laden Might Target Civilian Airliners

Washington, D.C., December 9, 2005 - More than three years before the 9/11 attack on the United States, U.S. officials warned Saudi Arabia that Osama bin Laden "might take the course of least resistance and turn to a civilian [aircraft] target," according to a declassified cable released by the National Security Archive today. The warning was made by the U.S. regional security officer and a civil aviation official in Riyadh based on a public threat bin Laden made against "military passenger aircraft" and his statement that "we do not differentiate between those dressed in military uniforms and civilians."

The State Department cable was not mentioned in the report of the 9/11 Commission, which investigated how U.S. intelligence failed to detect planning for the terrorist attacks, using civilian airliners, on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. It was obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by Archive analyst Barbara Elias.
----------------

Let's put this into perspective and get away from the 9/11 hype.

First and foremost, this has nothing to do with the attacks by Al-Qa'idah terrorists on the United States in September, 2001. This press release refers to a June 1998 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh to the State Department, recounting a meeting between embassy officers and a senior Saudi official. Although the name of the Saudi official has been redacted from the document, we can infer that since the meeting took place at King Khalid International Airport (KKIA) that it was an airport security official. (Note: In Saudi Arabia, civil aviation is subordinate to the Ministry of Defense and Aviation).


King Khalid International Airport, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

The meeting was held to relay to the Saudi government American concerns over a potential threat posed by Usamah Bin Ladin to civil aviation in the kingdom. The cable cited a Bin Ladin television interview a week before the Riyadh meeting in which he stated that his organization was targeting a "military passenger aircraft in the next few weeks." It is important to note that the cable states that there was no specific information indicating a threat to civil aviation.

At that time, I was chief of the Defense HUMINT Service counterterrorism intelligence branch. One (if not the) primary focuses of the branch was Usamah Bin Ladin and the threat to deployed U.S. forces. The branch was started to support increased attention to force protection in the wake of the attacks on the U.S. Military Training Mission in Riyadh in 1995 (six dead) and a U.S. Air Force housing area - Khobar Towers - near Dhahran in 1996 (19 dead).


Crater after attack on USAF housing - Al-Khubar, Saudi Arabia

Our assessment of the threat at the time was that Bin Ladin might try to use a shoulder-launched surface to air missile, such as an SA-7 or possibly even the much more capable U.S.-made Stinger left over from the Afghanistan war, to down an American military cargo aircraft flying into or out of Royal Saudi Air Force bases. Since the attacks of 1995 and 1996, the United States military had consolidated most of its activities to Prince Sultan Air Base, a remote facility allowing much greater security.

Given the increased security awareness, some analysts felt that Bin Ladin might be frustrated with his inability to attack an American military aircraft and instead fire on a civilian airliner, most likely at KKIA, just north of Riyadh. Bin Ladin had said earlier that he did not distinguish between military and civilians. Personally, I thought the possibility of Bin Ladin attacking a civilian airliner at KKIA was remote, as there were no American flag carriers operating there on a scheduled basis, and at that time Bin Ladin was not attacking Saudi targets.

This has nothing to do with 9/11. That's why it was not mentioned in the 9/11 Commission Report.

Hardball: American withdrawal and the insurgency

From MSNBC's Hardball with Chris Matthews
See http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5445086

American withdrawal and the insurgency

Lt. Colonel Rick Francona
MSNBC Military Analyst

As the debate over the war in Iraq continues to heat up, several Congressmen, Senators and even former military officers are calling for an American troop withdrawal, claiming that the presence of U.S. forces in the country that fuels the insurgency; withdraw the troops and the insurgency will end or significantly decrease. After all, without foreign forces in the country, there is no need for an insurgency.

That might make sense if we were dealing with a united Iraqi nationalist or resistance movement. The reality on the ground on Iraq is quite different -- the insurgency in Iraq is not a monolithic or even unified group. Many are trying to draw parallels between Iraq and Vietnam, but the two situations are markedly different. In Vietnam, you had the Viet Cong backed by the North Vietnamese army. They were allied and united in the same cause -- their goal was the same. They had a common vision for the country after the exit of the Americans. This is not the case in Iraq.

The insurgency in Iraq comprises disparate elements, each with its own goals and tactics. These elements may have a temporary alliance with each other -- the Middle Eastern adage "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" comes to mind - but in the end, their goals are incompatible. Do they all want the Americans/coalition forces to leave? Absolutely. Once they are gone, will the elements of the insurgency then together work out the future of Iraq? Doubtful. If they are successful and cause the Americans to leave, then they will have to deal with each other's opposing positions. However, their joint immediate goal is to cause an American withdrawal.

The calls for American withdrawal vary from just leaving, to a timetable, to redeployment of the forces to neighboring countries, or a combination thereof. In any case, the result will be the same - handing a victory to the insurgents. All of these options involve ceding territory to the enemy. That will be regarded not only as a victory for the insurgency, but an affirmation of their belief that Americans will not continue in the face of continuing casualties. That perception will last a long time and may impact future U.S. operations in the region and around the world.

After the withdrawal, the real power struggle in Iraq will begin. The two major elements of the insurgency are the former regime elements and the foreign fighters of Al-Qa'idah Ar-Rafidayn, the Al-Qa'idah affiliated group led by Abu Mus'ab Az-Zarqawi. Both want the Americans (and coalition) out of Iraq, but for different reasons. The former regime elements, the Sunnis who were driven from power by the American-led invasion of 2003, want to reassert their control over the country, to regain what they believe their rightful position. Withdrawal of American troops will not lessen their attacks. They will refocus their efforts on the new Iraqi government, a government they regard as illegitimate and composed of Shi'a and Kurds that mean to keep them from exercising the power they once did. The level of violence will likely increase with the removal of American forces, not decrease.

The Az-Zarqawi group, however, is not interested in the reinstatement of the secular, socialist Ba'th regime. They have been vocal in their calls for the establishment of a fundamentalist Islamic state, a caliphate somewhat akin to the former Taliban state in Afghanistan. Should American forces withdraw, the Az-Zarqawi group will increase their attacks on the new Iraqi government, and likely continue their attacks on the Shi'a as well. Az-Zarqawi has stated he will attack American forces elsewhere in the region. Moving them to Kuwait, as suggested by at least one retired general, is not a solution. Hunting down and killing the insurgents is.

It is the presence of American forces that prevents the insurgency from turning into an outright civil war. The departure of those forces will trigger a bloodbath.

Iraq: Insurgent Mortar Tactics

Over the last two years, the insurgents in Iraq, the insurgents - be they Iraqis or part of the Az-Zarqawi-led Al-Qa'idah in Iraq - have learned that they cannot attack American forces directly. Every time they do, they suffer unacceptable losses.

To continue their attacks on the Americans, the insurgents have adopted tactics that allow them to strike without sacrificing themselves. These tactics are in addition to the suicide bombers and the use of their most effective weapon, the improvised explosive device (IED).

One such tactic is the use of a mortar with an improvised delay trigger. Here's how it works.

The insurgents determine as best they can the appropriate firing position of the tube and the suitable charge for the round. The tube is buried or otherwise supported to stand alone. An ice cube is placed in the tube, followed by the round. The mortar team departs the area. After the ice cube melts, the round falls into the tube and is launched at the target.

Why not fire the mortar by hand and run away? They tried that. However, the American military possesses accurate "firefinder" radars, the AN/TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-37 which can immediately locate enemy fire. The radar back-plots the firing location to friendly artillery and mortar positions to allow for counterbattery fire. Use of this tactic defeats the counterbattery fire.

Another common mortar tactic is to mount the mortar in the back of a pickup truck. The team fires the mortar while slowly moving, which is very inaccurate, or from a fixed position, departing immediately after firing. While counterbattery fire might be effective in this instance, the insurgents normally fire from built up areas - concern for civilian casualties prevents an artillery response.

Although the insurgents can use these tactics to fire mortars, the most effective weapon in the insurgent arsenal is the IED.

Iraqi Demands for American Troops to Depart?

Arab League Seal and National Flags

In the final communique issued at the end of the recent Arab League meeting in Cairo, Iraqi leaders called for a timetable for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Iraq. They noted that these forces are present in Iraq under the terms of a United Nations mandate, which was recently extended for another year.

The problem with a timetable is that it creates a race against the clock. From the US/coalition perspective, we then have to kill most of the them faster than the timetable expires. From the insurgents' perspective, they merely have to survive in sufficient numbers until the forces depart.

Some media outlets have reported that the Iraqis "demanded" a timetable. Let's take a look at what was really said. If you read the Arabic text, the Iraqi leaders used the word "natlabu," which can be properly translated as either "we request" or "we demand." I prefer to use "request" because more often than not the connotation is less strident than "demand." It's a subtlety missed by some translators.

What was also in the communique was the statement that "resistance is the right of all nations." What does that mean? To me, it means that Iraqi nationals involved in the insurgency fighting US/coalition forces can eventually be granted some sort of amnesty, while the "terrorists" (Iraqi or foreign) cannot. Who determines who is who? We'll see.

Although many in the United States will find the prospect of pardoning any of the insurgents abhorrent, there will have to be some form of national reconciliation if the country is to stand up as a coherent political entity.

Both of these statements - the request for a timetable and "resistance is a right" - are likely attempts by the Shi'as and Kurds to bring the Sunnis back into the fold. Will it work? Maybe, but probably not anytime soon. It has taken ten years for Bosnia Herzogovina to agree to a federal structure and to try to write a constitution, and foreign forces are still there.

MSNBC Hardball - CIA and Torture

MSNBC

November 15 - I appeared on MSNBC's Hardball with Chris Matthews to discuss recent allegations of torture by the CIA. Here is the transcript:

=====================

Torture tactics spur debate
Does aggressive interrogation of an alleged terrorist cross the line?

Sen. John McCain says he wants to ban cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment of detainees. Though Vice President Cheney has been lobbying for language that will not limit the president's power in prisoner treatment.

Is there a right and wrong way to treat an alleged terrorist?

Rick Francona, a retired Air Force Lieutenant colonel and MSNBC analyst, and Dana Priest, a reporter for The Washington Post, play Hardball on the issue. Priest recently broke the story on the CIA so-called black sites.

CHRIS MATTHEWS, HARDBALL HOST: Let me start with Colonel Francona here. It seems to me there's four levels of hell if you get captured by the United States. There's how you're treated by the military, how you might be treated by the CIA, how you might be treated if you end up in one of these black sites in Eastern Europe and what happens to you if you have to go one of these rendition sites like Egypt. Am I right, Colonel Francona? There are four levels of hell here for treatment.

LT. COL. RICK FRANCONA, U.S. AIR FORCE (RET.): You're exactly right, Chris, and that's in about the right order. Of course, the military operates under a strict series of standards that were set up by the Department of Defense. Basically they're adhering to the Army Field Manual on interrogation. And that's pretty cut and dry.

Then you get into this kind of murky world of what happens if you fall into the hands of the Central Intelligence Agency? If you're held in one of the Central Intelligence Agency's facilities, there's a lot of oversight and restriction on that. But as we've seen reported, and I think Dana had some information on this, was when you get into the black sites that are in other countries, then you get outside of U.S. supervision, outside of real oversight.

The CIA is in charge but they're offshore and they're, you know, out of sight, out of mind and then the worst is, of course, what we call these extraordinary rendition, is when you are handed over to our foreign service and you're at the mercy of that service.

MATTHEWS: OK, Dana, your review of the four levels of hell yourself. What do you know about them?

DANA PRIEST, THE WASHINGTON POST: The one that I'm most familiar with although it's very vague, is the CIA site, the black sites. You know, they are not operating without guidelines. In fact, their guidelines are approved by the Justice Department and the White House and the CIA General Counsel's Office. But we don't know much about them, contrary to the military interrogation techniques that we have got lists and lists of and we see what's being debated in Congress.

The CIA has refused to turn over anything about those. We know, however, there have been some techniques used. Water boarding is the most familiar where a detainee is made to believe they're going to drown.

MATTHEWS: Are they? Are they going to drown? I mean, I'm wondering if that isn't just the real thing.

PRIEST: No. I mean, the whole point of having somebody in that site is not to kill them. It's to interrogate them so that you can get information out of them.

MATTHEWS: Well, how often do they get out of hand and how often do they actually drown somebody? Like every tenth time? Enough times to make you think they might be doing it?

PRIEST: No. I think we would hear. We know about seven or eight investigations involving CIA people linked to deaths of detainees. We have not heard of any in the black sites yet and I we would.

MATTHEWS: How would we hear? If somebody is over in Poland or somewhere, somewhere else in Eastern Europe at some old gulag site, would we actually get a report of someone who died over there?

PRIEST: Well, we, the people, would not. The public. I mean, the only way that we've known anything about the sites is through press reporting. Because the members of Congress who know about this, there are perhaps four, they're sworn to secrecy. They violate a law if they tell you about it, and that's catch-22 for them.

MATTHEWS: Well, here is what Senator Hagel said. I don't know if this is catch-22 or not. Here's what he had to say. We're going to watch the reports of these secret CIA jails, the story you broke.

Sen. Chuck Hagel (R), Nebraska said, "The recent media reports of a worldwide American system of secret black hole jails run by the Central Intelligence Agency and developed explicitly to circumvent our obligations under the Geneva Convention soils further everything America represents. It further erodes the world's confidence in America's word and our purpose."

OK. Colonel Francona, what do you make of that? You're a military man. What is your personal sense of what's right and wrong in the area of treating prisoners?

FRANCONA: I don't have the problem with the CIA running a series of overseas detention facilities and interrogation sites. I'm more concerned about what goes on in them and how it's overseen from headquarters. If there are guidelines that are adhered to and those guidelines are within the framework of the law, I don't have a problem with that.

MATTHEWS: Why would you take somebody over to Poland if you weren't going to treat them differently than you would in Georgia?

FRANCONA: Because you could do things in Poland that you can't do in Georgia because you are out of sight.

MATTHEWS: That's my point. Dana, is that your assessment? There's a reason why these are black sites? Because they want to do things in the dark?

PRIEST: Well, yes. And the only reason they took them overseas is because they didn't want U.S. courts and U.S. law to apply.

The only reason that they're secret where they are is because they would be breaking the laws of democracies, where these black sites are located. Because they have laws like we do, that gives detainees certain rights.

MATTHEWS: I don't want to be a complete goo goo here, a good government type, Colonel Francona, but what about the United Nations declaration of human rights, which outlaws this kind of torture of any kind, really?

FRANCONA: Well, here we're going to get into semantics. What constitutes torture? What constitutes, you know, aggressive interrogation?

MATTHEWS: How about it hurts real bad? Let's keep it simple. It hurts real bad, that's torture.

FRANCONA: That's torture.

MATTHEWS: It hurts real bad.

FRANCONA: Threatening with a loaded weapon, threatening to kill their family, I don't regard that as beyond the pale. When you start breaking things, forcing joints, that's beyond the pale, that we shouldn't be doing.

MATTHEWS: Dana?

PRIEST: The bottom line is, we don't know. Senator Hagel is on the intelligence committee. He doesn't know about these black sites and that's because they won't brief members who are even supposed to be doing oversight to give them any comfort about what might be going on there.

To watch the video, go to http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10057085/.

© 2005 MSNBC Interactive

MSNBC - Analysts agree Iraqi vote could be key to future

MSNBC.com

Analysts agree Iraqi vote could be key to future Coughlin and Francona say approval, high turnout could quell insurgency

Although it is not yet official, after this weekend's voting, it appears Iraq has adopted a new constitution.

For millions of Iraqis, it is a cause for celebration -- a victory for the political process and defeat of the insurgents. But for Sunnis, who came out in huge numbers -- many to vote against the document -- it is a stark reminder of where they stand during the post-Saddam era.

On Monday, MSNBC Analysts Con Coughlin and Rick Francona joined anchor Randy Meier to discuss the impact of the expected approval of the constitution and what may be next for the country.

Coughlin, an editor at the London Daily Telegraph and author of 'Saddam, His Rise and Fall,' told Meier that after this weekend's constitutional approval a successful election at the end of the year could spell doom for the insurgency.

"I think the next key thing really -- and it's not that far away -- is the elections in December. If the Iraqis elect a government based on the new constitution that has an international recognition and legitimacy, then there's actually no point in having an insurgency. Basically, it is people fighting their own government," Coughlin said.

"I think already, we're seeing some Sunni's drafting away from the ideological resistance and any change in how Iraq is governed," he added. "I think we will see that drift increase the longer this process continues."

Francona, a retired Air Force colonel and former officer with the Defense Intelligence Agency, noted that although the Sunnis did not support the constitution, their participation was very important, and encouraging for the fledgling democracy's future.

"I think that by all of the Sunni's that did turn out, it legitimizes the process and underscores that the Iraqis are interested in developing some sort of legitimate government on their own," he said.

"As for the document itself, there is still a lot of Sunni resistance to the provisions in there. If you look at the way the vote went in some provinces -- in the Anbar province 97 percent against -- there are a lot of problems with the document, but most of the Sunnis realize now that they have to be a part of the political process," he added.

Francona noted that although many Iraqis admitted that they didn't fully understand the document and were voting after getting direction from their Imams and tribal leaders, the vote was an encouraging start.

"This country has a long history of not making decisions -- being told what to do. It was created in the aftermath of World War I and really enjoyed no freedom at all. So the concept of people making their own decision and voting that way is very new to them," he said.

To watch the entire interview with Rick Francona, go to:
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9729269/

© 2005 MSNBC Interactive

Al-Qa'idah: Letter from Ayman Az-Zawahiri

A letter from Ayman Az-Zawahiri, second only to Usamah Bin Ladin in the Al-Qa'idah hierarchy, was intercepted by coalition forces in July. The letter is dated July 9, 2005.

There has been some question as the authenticity of the letter, but for argument's sake, let's assume it is real.

This is not rhetoric - this is a letter from a senior Al-Qa'idah official to the head of the Al-Qa'idah affiliate in Iraq, that being Abu Mus'ib Az-Zarqawi's Al-Qa'idah in Mesopotamia. In addition to the text of the message, there are also some interesting items that can be gleaned from a careful reading of the letter.

Here is what I got from my reading:

- Az-Zawahiri cannot travel easily.

- Az-Zawahiri does not have ready continuous access to electronic media, including Al-Jazeera satellite television. He cannot tell what of his recordings was broadcast, nor does he have a good sense of what is happening in Iraq.

- It is difficult for Al-Qa'idah to send couriered communications.

- The arrest of Abu Faraj Al-Libi (Al-Qa'idah's chief of operations, usually regarded as the number three position in the organization) had a severe impact on the organization's finances, to the point that Az-Zawahiri asked Az-Zarqawi to send him $100,000. The arrest did not, however, result in the arrest of any of the Arab members of Al-Qa'idah. He seems to value the Arab members more than other nationalities.

- Pakistan's operations in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area are problematic for the organization.

- Al-Qa'idah continues with the ultimate goal of establishing a caliphate governed by the Shari' (strict Islamic law) with its center in what is now Syria or Egypt. Israel would have to be removed.

- The plan for Iraq:
1. Expel the Americans
2. Establish Islamic governance
3. Move the struggle to the surrounding countries
4. Move against Israel

- Popular support is essential for success - unlike what happened to the Taliban who did not attempt to widen their support base. Political action is equally important as military operations.

- "The Americans will exit soon." Az-Zawahiri has studied the American experience in Vietnam and believes that if they presevere, the American will just leave.

- Az-Zawahiri makes no distinction between the Iraqi Shi'a and the Iranians. He uses the terms interchangeably. Although he despises them and considers them to be apostates, he realizes that they cannot kill all of Iraq's millions of Shi'a. According to Az-Zawahiri, many Muslims do not understand the rationale for Az-Zarqawi's attacks on the Shi'a, and the attacks on Shi'a mosques are alienating Muslims around the world. Additionally, the attacks on the Shi'a divert resources from attacks in the primary adversary - the Americans.

- The Iranians are holding at least 100 Al-Qa'idah members, some of them senior leaders.

- Recorded beheadings and slaughter are counterproductive and hurt the cause in the media. Az-Zawahiri believes that half of the battle is being fought in the media, and broadcasts of the killings is not helpful. He says that they will have to wind the battle for hearts and minds in the media because they will never be able to do it on the battlefield.

- Az-Zawahiri's favorite wife, a son and a daughter were killed in an American air strike.

Read the entire text of the letter in either English or Arabic at:
http://www.odni.gov/release_letter_101105.html

Syria: Ghazi Kan'an Commits Suicide?

The Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), the mouthpiece of the Bashar Al-Asad regime, announced today that Syrian Minister of the Interior, Ghazi Kan'an, had committed suicide in his office in Damascus. Kan'an was more known for his previous position, that of military intelligence chief for Lebanon during Syria's occupation of that country.

There may be a connection to the suicide and the soon-to-be-released United Report on the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Al-Hariri.

I do not normally forward another analyst's views, but Pat Lang's take on this is superb. I worked for Pat for many years - he knows of what he speaks.

Read Pat Lang's The End of Gazi.