Secret Agreements - The Legacy of the Middle East, Part One

The Husayn - McMahon Correspondence

While World War I raged in Europe, British forces fought the Turks in the Middle East. At this time, the Ottoman Empire extended all the way south to encompass the Hijaz – including the Muslim holy cities of Mecca (Al-Makkah Al-Mukaramah) and Medina (Al-Madinah Al-Munawirah) – and what what is now Israel (including Jerusalem), Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait and parts of Saudi Arabia.

The British entered into a series of three secret – and conflicting – agreements concerning the eventual disposition of the Ottoman Empire, assuming that they would be victorious over the Turks. The first of these agreements was between Great Britain and Sharif Husayn bin ‘Ali of Mecca, leader of the Hashemites, then the rulers of the Hijaz. The second was made between Great Britain and France (and for a short time Russia), and the third was between Great Britain and a group of influential Jewish nationalists.

British forces, with commonwealth troops from Australia and New Zealand, were making only marginal progress against the Ottomans. The bulk of British military power was concentrated on the Germans in Europe. They sought help from the local Arab population who had suffered under harsh Turkish rule for over four hundred years. In return for this help, the British promised the Arabs their independence once the Turks had been defeated and the war ended.

The Husayn – McMahon Correspondence

A series of ten letters between British High Commissioner in Egypt Sir Henry McMahon and Sharif Husayn seem to spell out an agreement between the two parties. Two of these letters are regarded as significant. Key portions are excerpted here.

Sharif Husayn to Sir Henry McMahon, July 14, 1915:

The Arab nation is asking the Government of Great Britain to acknowledge the independence of the Arab countries, bounded on the north by Mersina and Adana up to the 37th degree of latitude, to the border of Persia; on the east by the borders of Persia up to the Gulf of Basra; on the south by the Indian Ocean, with the exception of the position of Aden to remain as it is; on the west by the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea up to Mersina. Both parties will offer mutual assistance to face any foreign Power which may attack either party.

From Sir Henry McMahon to Sharif Husayn, October 24, 1915:

The Government of Great Britain statement:

The two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the limits demanded. With the above modification, and without prejudice of our existing treaties with Arab chiefs, we accept those limits.

As for those regions lying within those frontiers wherein Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interest of her ally, France, I am empowered in the name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurances and make the following reply to your letter: Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sherif of Mecca.

Great Britain will guarantee the Holy Places against all external aggression and will recognise their inviolability. When the situation admits, Great Britain will give to the Arabs her advice and will assist them to establish what may appear to be the most suitable forms of government in those various territories.

On the other hand, it is understood that the Arabs have decided to seek the advice and guidance of Great Britain only, and that such European advisers and officials as may be required for the formation of a sound form of administration will be British.

With regard to the vilayets of Bagdad and Basra, the Arabs will recognize that the established position and interests of Great Britain necessitate special administrative arrangements in order to secure these territories from foreign aggression, to promote the welfare of the local populations and to safeguard our mutual economic interests.

The Husayn – McMahon Correspondence laid the groundwork for one of the most famous special military operations of all time and the creation of a legend – Lawrence of Arabia. Lawrence, an accomplished archeologist and Arabist with years of experience in the region, was serving as an army officer on staff in Cairo. He was dispatched to work with and lead the Arab revolutionary armies under Husayn’s sons ‘Abdullah and Faysal. It was these Arab armies that preceded British forces into Damascus and Aleppo.

The Reality

The British also entered into other secret agreements, both of which conflicted with the terms agreed to in the Husayn-McMahon correspondence. Later, Britain would try to extricate herself from the commitments made to Sharif Husayn, claiming that these letters merely represented on-going negotiations and not a final agreement.

In the end, the Saudis under ‘Abd Al-’Aziz, who was also supported by the British, forced the Sharif from Mecca. The Sharif’s sons were put on thrones in kingdoms created by the British almost as consolation prizes. ‘Abdullah became King of Transjordan (now Jordan) and Faysal became King of Iraq. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan survives to this day; the Kingdom of Iraq was overthrown in 1958.

Offensive in Samarra' - A Better Plan?

On October 1, American forces (elements of the 1st Infantry Division) and at least three battalions of Iraqi forces (army and national guard) began operations in Samarra' today, and it appears that operations in Ramadi and Fallujah may be starting as well.

Samarra' is in the Sunni triangle and a center of insurgent activity, but is a holy city for Shi'a Islam. The Golden Mosque is also known as the Imam 'Ali al-Hadi and Imam Hasan Al-'Askari mosque. They are the 10th and 11th imams of Shi'a Islam and two of the "14 Infallibles."

Samarra' is also the birthplace of the twelfth imam, Imam Muhammad Al-Mahdi (and son of Hasan Al-'Askari). His shrine, not his tomb, is adjacent to the Golden Mosque. It is not his tomb, because in Twelver Shi'a, so named for the 12th imam, it is believed that he is still alive but in hiding and will return prior to the day of judgement to establish justice on earth. Twelver Shi'a are dominant in Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon - it is the main sect of Shi'a Islam.

Samarra' is also the site of a historic Sunni mosque with the famed spiral minaret - the "Malwiya" - (165 feet high), dating from the 9th century.

When the troops went into the city, this time they appeared to have done it smartly. Iraqi troops immediately seized and secured the Golden Mosque, averting any claims that the "infidels" were desecrating a holy site.

The Iraqis and US have to clear out the five major insurgent strongholds: Fallujah, Samarra', Ramadi, Sadr City and Haifa Street (Baghdad). They have to do this not only before the elections scheduled for January, but in time for the Iraqis to open voter registration sites. These are sure to be targets for the insurgents.

Israeli Assassination of Hamas Leader in Syria

The Israeli killing of 'Iz Al-Din Subhi Shaykh Khalil in Damascus is noteworthy and is not getting the attention in the media I would have given it. Israel has in the past only very infrequently conducted anti-Palestinian operations inside Syria's borders.

In October 2003, the Israelis conducted an airstrike against a Palestinian camp northwest of Damascus, called 'Ayn Sahab. When I was stationed at the American embassy in Syria, 'Ayn Sahab was thought to be a Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC, led by Ahmad Jibril) facility. We were told to avoid it as they had detained the Defense attache a few years earlier. After about twelve tense hours, the Syrians ordered his release.

The Israelis claimed that the camp was used by the PIJ, Palestinian Islamic Jihad. That attack was in response to a female suicide bomber operation at a restaurant in Haifa. Over the years, we have seen aggressive anti-Palestinian operations (assassinations) in the Occupied Territories, Lebanon and even in Jordan, but Syria has generally been off limits. Following the double suicide bombings in Beersheba a few weeks ago claimed by Hamas, the Israelis said they might retaliate against Syria for allowing Hamas to maintain offices in Damascus. This caused many of the Hamas leaders resident in Damascus to take trips to other countries, fearing another airstrike. The Israelis bobby-trapped Khalil's car outside his residence in the Musakin Al-Zahra' section of Damascus. I used to drive through this area all the time - it is on the way to the airport, and immediately adjacent to the sprawling Al-Yarmuk Palestinian refugee camp - "camp" is merely a word here - it is really now a built-up city. The ability of the Israelis to mount an operation in this rather up-scale Palestinian leadership enclave is impressive. Not only did they have the intelligence - although Khalil was not exactly hiding where he lived, they were able to either move people in or recruit someone in country to rig the car.

Not bad. That said, what will the Syrians do? Probably nothing - they would like the Palestinian issue to go away. What they really want is the Golan Heights back and the ability to influence events in Lebanon. What will Hamas do? More violence. They have threatened to retaliate against Israeli targets anywhere in the world, but they really have limited capabilities outside the territories and possibly inside Israel.

Afghanistan - Define the U.S. National Interest

As we approach the election in Afghanistan, it is instructive to remember some history. Afghanistan is a tribal society traditionally ruled by local warlords, each with his own militia. The British attempted to expand their empire into this region in the 19th century - they never really were able to subdue the Afghans. The edge of the empire never really extended past the Khyber Pass on the present border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The Soviets attempted to quell the country between 1979 and 1989. Although they were able to impose a government, politics of the Cold War prevailed and American support for the mujahidin led to the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the country. Once again the country returned to its traditional tribal/warloard structure.

The Taliban takeover of the country was an anomaly. Created by the Pakistani Interservice Intelligence Directorate (ISID) from Afghan refugees in Pakistan initially to protect Pakistani commercial convoys through Afghanistan, they became popular in Afghanistan as a counterbalance to the perceived corruption of the warlords. Eventually, the Taliban grew and were able to seize power. The Taliban's support of Usamah bin Ladin and his Al-Qa'idah organization - originally a group of Arabs who had fought alongside the Afghan mujahidin against the Soviets (sometimes referred to as the "Afghan Arabs") - eventually led to its demise. Afghanistan had become the main training and staging area for Al-Qa'idah operations, including the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States.

Faced with American demands to hand over Usamah bin Ladin, the Taliban refused. The subsequent American and Northern Alliance (a group of anti-Taliban Afghans - many say merely displaced warlord militias) removed the Taliban and destroyed much of Al-Qa'idah's leadership in the country

My position on Afghanistan: Go in (done), remove the Taliban from power (done), destroy Al-Qa'idah (in progress), warn whoever picked up the pieces that we won't tolerate resurgence of Al-Qa'idah, and get out.

Anyone who reads the British experience in the 19th century and the Soviet experience in the 1980s should conclude, as I have, that it is truly the no-win capital of the world. I mean, anyplace whose national sport is fighting over a calf or goat carcass. Here is a passage on buzkashi:

Traditionally, a calf is beheaded, the legs are cut off at the knee and its entrails are removed. The carcass of the calf is then soaked in cold water for 24 hours before the game so that it may be tough enough to withstand the tugging that takes place. When there is no calf available, a goat is used instead. Winners are awarded prizes of turbans, cash or rifles. According to unwritten rules of the game, nobody can tie the carcass to his saddle or hit his opponent on the hand to snatch the calf. Likewise, tripping an opponent by using the rope is forbidden. Buzkashi continues until a team is announced the winner.

Back to the point:

If there is no Al-Qa'idah in Afghanistan - even if there is the Taliban but no Al-Qa'idah - please define the U.S. national interest in involvement there. I can't.

It's not "a" mosque – it's "the" mosque

Imam 'Ali Mosque, An-Najaf, Iraq

The Imam ‘Ali mosque in An-Najaf, Iraq, is the holiest site in Shi’a Islam. It is named for the man whose tomb it houses – ‘Ali bin Abu Talib.

Why is ‘Ali significant?

‘Ali gained prominence following the death of the Prophet Muhammad, who left no male heirs, throwing the adherents to the new faith into disarray. Who would follow Muhammad as the leader of the faithful? The Arabic word for “one who follows or succeeds,” - khalifah (Caliph) - was adopted as the title.

Many believed that the successor to Muhammad should be a family member, someone in the bloodline of the Prophet. The people who favored the selection of ‘Ali as the caliph were called the Shi’at ‘Ali, the “partisans of ‘Ali,” and hence the name Shi’a.

The other school of thought, held by many prominent Muslims of the day, was that the caliph should be drawn from one of the senior and learned members of the faith, the ummah or “community.” These were the Sunnis, the traditionalists. The Sunni position prevailed and the first three caliphs were not of Muhammad’s bloodline.

The Shi’a declared ‘Ali as their first imam, in what would become known as the Twelver* school of Shi’a Islam. It was not until the deaths of the first three Sunni caliphs that ‘Ali was named to be the fourth caliph in 656. However, hopes for reconciliation between the Sunni and Shi’a were short-lived.

A power struggle for the caliphate ensued between ‘Ali, who had set up his office in Kufah (near An-Najaf, Iraq) and the Damascus-based ‘Umayyad dynasty. Although there was some fighting between supporters of the two factions, ‘Ali was assassinated in Kufah in 661. The shrine in An-Najaf was constructed to house his tomb.

The Shi’a named ‘Ali’s son Hasan to be next caliph (or the second imam), however, Hasan chose to abdicate his position in favor of the ‘Umayyads, the very people responsible for his father’s murder.

Hasan’s brother Husayn assumed the Shi’a imamate, becoming the third imam. This action sparked a civil war that created the major divide in Islamic history. In 680, Husayn was killed in battle against superior ‘Umayyad forces in Karbala’, Iraq on the tenth day of the month of Muharram. This day is commemorated by all Shi’a as ‘Ashura (literally, “the tenth”) as a day of mourning and perfidy on the part of the Sunnis. Husayn’s body is buried in the shrine at Karbala’, also a holy site for the Shi’a.

It’s not "a mosque" – it’s "the mosque."

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* These Shi’a believe that there were 12 imams. The Twelfth Imam is also known as the "hidden imam" who did not die, but entered a period of occultation. The imam, also called the mahdi, will return at the end of time.

Sudan/Darfur: Clearing Up Some Misconceptions

The situation in the Darfur region of Sudan has attracted worldwide attention. Due to misreporting or under-reporting, most people have been left with the impression that the crisis in the Darfur is a case of Arab Muslims versus black Christians and animists. While there is a north-south civil war, it is primarily between Arab Muslims backed by the Khartoum government (under Lieutenant General 'Umar Hasan Ahmad Al-Bashir, who came to power in a coup in 1989) versus black Christians and animists, that civil war is a separate issue from the crisis in Darfur.

Darfur, literally two Arabic words, dar and fur meaning "home/house of the Fur," comprises three provinces in western Sudan - Shamal (North) Darfur, Gharb (West) Darfur, and Janub (South) Darfur. The inhabitants of the area are predominantly Muslims who are of black African ethnicity rather than Arab. The major groups are the Fur, the Zaghawah and the Masalit. There are also some Arab tribes in the area, the Bani Halbah and Al-Mahiriyah, with internal conflicts as well.

The primary Arab tribal group in the Darfur is the Baqqarah, derived from the Arabic word for cattle. The Baqqarah are nomadic herdsmen constantly seeking new pastured for their cattle. This search has placed them at odds with the agrarian Fur, Zaghawah and Masalit. The economic struggle between the two escalated into armed conflict, resulting in the creation of the Janjawid militia on the Arab/Baqqarah side, and two groups on the non-Arab side, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M). The fact that the two groups have taken up arms to back up there demands for equal treatment from the Arab government in Khartoum has allowed the Bashir government to label them as rebels and use the Sudanese army and air force to support Janjawid attacks. The Janjawid have primarily focused their attacks on the civilian populations of the Fur, Zaghawah and Masalit rather than on the armed groups.

The attacks on civilians have resulted in a massive refugee problem, with almost one million seeking assistance in neighboring countries and creating a humanitarian crisis.
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For more information, see the Human Rights Watch report on Darfur at http://hrw.org/reports/2004/sudan0504/.

An-Najaf: Another Lost Opportunity in the Making?

The current fighting between the forces loyal to Iraqi Shi'a presumptive cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr and the United States (which includes some nominal Iraqi participation) offers real opportunity to right much of the wrong-headed policy of the past. If current thinking of how to handle the situation in An-Najaf - and the Shi'a areas of Iraq that have seen sympathetic uprisings (Al-Kut, Al-'Amarah, Al-Basrah, Diwaniyah, An-Nasiriyah and Baghdad/Al-Sadr City) - anyway resembles the "solution" a few months ago in Al-Fallujah, the overall situation in Iraq will continue on its downward spiral to civil war.

Muqtada Al-Sadr, first, has very tenuous credentials as a cleric. The clerical levels in Shi'a Islam are hojjat-al-islam, then ayatollah, and then grand ayatollah (there are only five grand ayatollahs; Al-Saystani [Al-Sistani] is one of them). Also, there is the term Al-Sayyid, which Muqtada claims, with some legitimacy. The term refers to a direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, and entitles them to wear the black turban. That said, he has a following. That following is comprises his Mahdi Army, which I liken to a gang of thugs, but also to genuine religious followers that revere the family name.

The campaign to either destroy or discredit Al-Sadr goes back months. The initial confrontation occurred in Sadr City (renamed for his father; it was formerly Saddam City) when US forces attempted to serve an arrest warrant on Al-Sadr. That led to a stand-off in Baghdad, then later in Kufah, and then to An-Najaf. As in Al-Fallujah, the US engaged in a confrontation-negotiation-confrontation-stalemate sequence. It appears we are entering that same thing again in An-Najaf.

It won't work. Despite the uprisings in other cities, Al-Sadr has to be dealt with; actually, he has to be eliminated as both a political and military force. Anything else hands yet another perceived victory to the insurgents.

Pakistan and Musharraf: America's Ironic Allies

General Pervez Musharraf must lead a charmed life. He has survived at least five attempts on his life in the last two years. The last attempts were quite sophisticated; I believe they are not the work of some mere gang from Karachi. More likely, they are from Al-Qa'idah itself, the Taliban, or some heretofore undiscovered rogue element inside the Interservices Intelligence Directorate (ISID), the Pakistani intelligence service. Note that the ISID is not a civilian organization, but military. The ISID created the Taliban, were the funnel for all US aid to the Afghan Mujahidin, and had a pretty close relationship with Al-Qa'idah in the 1980s and 1990s.

The level of training required to mount the last attempt on Musharraf was far above that of self-learners; it smacked of state-level training. As I recall, there were multiple explosive devices timed to detonate sequentially across a bridge span. The only people with that ability are people trained by the ISID or the ISID itself. Note also that the CIA trained only Afghan mujahidin. The Arabs who came to fight in Afghanistan, what we called the "Afghan Arabs," were either trained by the ISID or by the cadre of CIA-trained mujahidin.

Why would anyone in (or formerly in) the ISID be involved in a assassination plot against Musharraf? Remember, up until September 11, Pakistan was not particularly friendly to the United States. Our facilities there had been attacked and American diplomats had been killed. Ever since the imposition of sanctions under the Pressler Amendment (required a nation to be certified as nuclear weapons free to buy US equipment) on Pakistan because of their nuclear weapons program and failure to deliver their paid-for F-16s in 1988-1989, relations had been strained. The F-16 issue really angered the Pakistanis, because for all the concern over the Pakistani ballistic missile program, the F-16 was the initial delivery system for nuclear weapons, and remains part of the strategic nuclear force along with the missile systems.

Many ISID and military officers resent Musharraf's friendliness to the West. Many of these officers are devout Muslims. Fundamentalist Islam is strong here. Pakistan is home to some of the most virulent madrasa's in the world, preaching hatred and intolerance. Graduates can be found in the Pakistan Army and its ISID. I met the then-head of the ISID in 1989. Not someone I would want interrogating me, but to the point, he did not appreciate Western secularism at all. Remember, despite cooperation with the United States in the war against Al-Qa'idah, Pakistan is officially the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

I am not sure what the catalyst for change was, but after September 11, Pervez Musharraf decided to overtly support the United States in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). There was some contact prior to that, but of a much lower level and very low-profile. One analyst told me that Musharraf is supporting us against Al-Qa'idah and the Taliban because they tried to kill him. I think it is the other way around - the sophisticated assassination attempts were mounted post OEF. I am only speculating here, but I would bet you even money, maybe even give you some odds, that Pervez has made some arrangement for resettlement in the United States or Great Britain should he be deposed. For my part, I have no problem with it.

Pakistan has gone after Al-Qa'idah (and the remnants of the Taliban) with a vengeance.* While initially, Musharraf only allowed the United States use of its airspace and some low-key basing, eventually the Pakistanis mounted some serious military operations in the Waziristan tribal area along the Afghan border. In deference to the analysts I mentioned earlier, this in fact did come after some assassinations attempts on Musharraf. In retaliation, Al-Qa'idah operatives in June 2004, tried to kill a Pakistan Army corps commander responsible for the Waziristan operation. The investigation into the attack has led to the biggest intelligence gains against Al-Qa'idah to date. One arrest lead to another, including a nephew of September 11 mastermind Khalid Shaykh Muhammad. That led to the arrest of who I consider the biggest catch - computer expert Muhammad Na'im Nur Khan. Khan himself was a find, after all, he functioned as the "communications center" for senior Al-Qa'idah leadership. More important than the man, however, were the computers and data discs detailing Al-Qa'idah planning. As a result of this treasure trove of intelligence, operatives were arrested in Great Britain and Dubai, and terror threat alerts were issued in the United States.

This is surprising when one considers the makeup of Pakistan. Like countries in other areas, what is now Pakistan was created by the British out of the Punjab, Kashmir and Baluchistan (we will forego the West Pakistan and East Pakistan/Bangladesh split). English is the unifying language; it and Urdu (Urdu is spoken by less than 10 percent of the population) are the official languages. As an aside - since the casing notes found on Khan's computer were in non-native English, I believe the reconnaissance was likely done by Pakistanis.

Ironically, Pakistan may be the best ally we have in the fight against Al-Qa'idah. That future of that alliance is likely directly dependent on the survival of Pervez Musharraf.

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* The only divergence from this policy of going after the terrorists is Pakistani support for Azad Kashmir, guerrilla operations (some call it terrorism) by the Taliban and Al-Qa'idah against India in the region of the Siachen Glacier. I still haven't figured out how this still happens.

National Intelligence Director - Addendum

I am concerned that in the "rush to reorganize," the new DNI will focus too much on the Beltway's highest priorities and forget about the myriad other consumers. That perceived lack of focus is what has prompted the Defense Department, the armed services and other executive departments to keep their own intelligence agencies or staffs. It will very tempting to satisfy only national requirements - after all, the person will be a Presidential appointee with Senate advice and consent, just as the DCI is now. However, the new DNI cannot neglect to provide intelligence support to such mundane things as Air Force systems development - what the threats coming down the road are, etc. Those diverse requirements are the reasons we have such a decentralized community now - DOD was (is?) not about to rely on an independent agency to satisfy its requirements. It will certainly be a challenge. I will be curious to see how NSA fares in all this.

I am not sure I would revamp the entire community all at once. I would separate the DCI from the director, CIA and see how that goes. Make CIA act like an equal agency, not the dominant organization. As far as budget authority, that is all overblown. The monies are fenced almost to the line item when they come out of the Congressional committees, so I don't see much change happening there - nor should there be.

What the President proposed today is unsatisfactory. The DNI, or NID, will have no direct control over anything. He/she will "coordinate" on budgets, and funnel the President's requests for information to the proper agency for action. As far as I can tell, CIA will still have all the operational approval and authority, and will still control the NIE process. I suspect that Rumsfeld is behind this - no one wants to give up their own intelligence empire.

The irony: Rumsfeld would be better off if the DNI had real authority. His DOD intelligence agencies would be equal to or greater than the boys and girls in McLean.

The existent dominant position and power of the CIA is the problem, not a real DNI.

Iraq: "Arabization" Fallout

Today, Human Rights Watch criticized the US-led coalition for not resolving the problems of the Saddam-era "Arabization" program (ta'rib / T"RIB).

There are numerous comments one could make about this, so I'll take the cheap shot first - there is no US-led coalition anymore....

I agree wholeheartedly that the Arabization project was ethnic cleansing. It was targeted against the Kurds, as well as the Assyrians and Turkomans. Saddam, true B'athi that he was, had no use for ethnic divisions in Iraq. He truly believed that Iraq should be Iraqi - not Arab and Kurd, not Muslim and Christian, not Sunni and Shi'a, not Assyrian and Arab, etc. In an attempt to rid the country of its largest (and most troublesome) ethnic group, Saddam began the Arabization program with them. In the 1970s, entire Kurdish villages in the north were exchanged with entire Arab (mostly Shi'a - coincidence?) villages in the south. So, you take Arabs used to living in the arid southern deserts or marshes and forcibly move them to the Colorado-like climate of the north. Conversely, you take Kurds from their traditional mountain villages and move them to the south.

Many Kurds (as well as Assyrians and Turkomans) were forced to move from the cities of Mosul (Al-Mawsil) and Kirkuk, while Arabs were moved into their homes. After the fall of Saddam, the Arabs were not anxious to return to the volatile south. On the other hand, the Kurds could not return fast enough. You know the problem - Kurdish family shows up and wants its family home back. Arab family, through no fault of its own, is living there, has lived there for maybe 30 years, and does not want to leave. There is no real legal system in place, and most of these Arab and Kurdish families fall into that gray zone between a Saddam-ruled Iraq and now.

This is a tricky problem for the new government. As early as 1995-1996 while running around northern Iraq, I saw many abandoned villages and asked why no one lived in these serviceable buildings. The answer was usually a derisive snort and the guttural spitting, "ta'rib." No Kurd would live there. I replied that these were usable buildings, decent facilities, but it fell on deaf ears. Hatred often supercedes reason.

Human Rights Watch (and I usually have no problems with them - they liked my book; see http://www.francona.com/hrw.html), has blamed the now-defunct coalition for not addressing this problem.

They wrote:

"If these property disputes are not addressed as a matter of urgency, rising tensions between returning Kurds and Arab settlers could soon explode into open violence," said Sarah Leah Whitson, executive director of Human Rights Watch's Middle East and North Africa division.

Okay, we all know where I stand when it comes to the Kurds, but I do not want to over-romanticize them. Many of the villages in the Kurdish area could use some cleaning, some paint, some hygiene, etc. That said, while they may have their problems among themselves - the PUK and KDP divide, for example - they are cohesive when dealing with the Arabs (except for that 1996 KDP-Iraqi lash-up against the PUK). If the Arabs trying to move back into Mosul and Kirkuk want to get violent, I will give you fair odds on who comes out on top. I have rarely seen quiet courage like that of the Kurds; no complaints, just commitment to their cause, which over the years has usually been a losing one. No bragging, no excuses, no apologies - they have a fatalistic dignity that you cannot help respect. On more than one occasion, I have had a Kurd peshmerga move in front of me to try to shield me from hostile fire. I am not alone - all of us who served with the Kurds feel this way about them. (Getting on soapbox now: They are the third largest ethnic group in the Middle East; they are the largest ethnic group in the world without a homeland. I doubt they will ever have a homeland; geopolitical realities are against them. Falling off soapbox now.)

The Assyrians - Christians composed of both Syriacs, Chaldeans and Nestorians - have their own hurdles to face. They have come under attack, including this week's coordinated five bombings in Baghdad and Mosul, by the Az-Zarqawi faction of Al-Qa'idah. When I was in northern Iraq, we would often visit the nearby Assyrian (Christian) village of Shaqlawah - they had a church and decent wine. The elders there were always concerned that a post-Saddam Iraqi government would be anti-Christian. Having spent time in the mixed societies of Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, I tended to dismiss their concerns - I may have been a bit naive. I am surprised at the level of Islamic sentiment that is manifesting itself in Iraq. During all of my time in Saddam-controlled Iraq and the Kurdish area, I never felt any Islamic sentiment. Bars and nightclubs were in full swing - the Iraqis have a reputation for being hard-drinking party-goers. Perhaps this is a backlash; time will tell.

The resettlement issue is a real problem, created by years of Saddam Husayn's attempts to eliminate Kurdish influence and attempts at autonomy. It is a problem that needs addressed - I just am not sure we are the best adjudicators here.