MSNBC - Francona on Intelligence Sharing

MSNBC

On June 10, I was interviewed by Randy Meier on MSNBC about continuing problems with intelligence sharing. Here is a summary of that interview and a link to a video.
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Intelligence sharing better, but needs improvement MSNBC analyst Francona says changes taking place from bottom up

A newly released Justice Department report says the FBI missed at least five opportunities to uncover vital intelligence that could have helped stop the Sept. 11 attacks on New York and Washington.

The missed opportunities occurred in large parts because of bad information sharing, according to the report, particularly between the FBI and CIA, along with problems within the FBI's own counterterrorism program.

The intelligence community, including Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, have claimed that improvements have been made in this area. Those claims are true, according to MSNBC Military Analyst and Air Force Lt. Col. Rick Francona, who worked for the Department of Defense as a counter-terrorism official specifically charged with targeting al-Qaida in the late 1990s, but that that doesn't mean the problem has been solved.

"I know at the worker level, it's much more improved," Francona said Friday in an interview with MSNBC's Randy Meier. "People are exchanging the information, but the system hasn't caught up with what is really going on. "

It's at the higher levels of the bureaucracy that the information flow is still not as free as it should be, Francona said.

He noted that while working for the Defense Department in the 90s, that intelligence sharing was practically non-existent.

"I wish there had been some," Francona said. "That's the bottom line. The problem was this wall people keep talking about between the law enforcement community and the intelligence community. But the problem was deeper than that. It was within the intelligence community itself.

"The agencies weren't real good at sharing information that they had gained with the other analytical cells. Then, once you had something within the intelligence community, it was very very difficult to exchange that with the FBI," Francona said. "You could provide it to the FBI, but you never got anything back from the FBI. It was the mindset - the FBI wanted to put people in jail, the intelligence community wanted to stop operations."

Francona admitted that working in this atmosphere was very frustrating, and while improvements have been made, there is still a long way to go. "I think the problem has been recognized and people know it needs to be fixed, but the bureaucratic problems are still there," he said.

To watch the complete interview, go to:
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8171576/

© 2005 MSNBC.com

Iraq: History and the Charges Against Saddam

MSNBC

On June 8, I appeared on MSNBC Live discussing how a past chapter in US-Iraqi relations may have influenced the list of charges levied against Saddam Husayn.

Here are some excepts of the interview:

One of the charges Saddam Hussein will defend himself against in his upcoming trial is the gassing of 5,000 Kurds in the village of Halabja back in 1988. However, Hussein's use of gas against Iranian troops, which occurred within months of that incident, was not one of the 12 charges brought against the Iraqi dictator.

According to MSNBC Military analyst Air Force Lt. Col. Rick Francona, the omission of that incident from the list of charges likely has much to do with the fact that the U.S. was actively advising Hussein in his military effort against Iran.

"This is an interesting omission from that entire list we see," Francona said on MSNBC Live on Wednesday. "I think that they just don't want to raise this issue for the defense team to pick apart. They're going to want to know, 'Why was the United States supporting Saddam Hussein when now you're putting him on trial?'"
Francona, one of only two U.S. military officials present in Iraq at the time, was working in the defense attaché office in the American embassy in Baghdad. But, in an interview with MSNBC's Randy Meier, said he didn't know the gassing of the Kurds had happened until after the fact.

He did, however, learn quickly of the use of gas on Iranian troops, which combined with the news of the Halabja incident, initiated a quick response from Washington.

"The Reagan administration's response was that we were to cease operations inside Iraq immediately, and we all returned home on the next plane."

However, Francona said that once he returned to Washington, he attended a series of meetings to decide whether to abandon the effort and risk letting Iran win the war.

"The decision was taken that we would continue to help the Iraqis and we returned to Baghdad," Francona said.

Returning to Baghdad with the knowledge of what Iraqi troops had done was not easy, Francona said.

"It wasn't pleasant returning in that circumstance. We knew we were working with military people who had given the orders to use chemical weapons - not only on Iranian troops, but against their own people - so it was kind of distasteful," Francona said. "But here, we were dealing with the lesser of two evils. The foreign policy goal was to make sure the Iranians didn't win the war."

Watch the complete interview at: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8158515/

© 2005 MSNBC.com

Saudi Arabia: 'Abdullah - The Man Who Will Be King

As the news networks in the United States and the Middle East flash the news that Saudi Arabia's King Fahd has been rushed to the hospital, perhaps we should take a look at who will succeed him on the throne in Riyadh.

For the past few years, because of the king's continuing poor health, much of the day-to-day responsibility for running the affairs of the oil-rich kingdom has been in the hands of the king's half-brother and almost certain successor, Crown Prince 'Abdullah bin 'Abd Al-'Aziz. 'Abdullah, regarded almost as an outsider by many of the senior royal family, may not be as close to the United States as his predecessors, possibly causing difficulties for the United States in defending its interests in the Persian Gulf.

The Saudi ruling family is extremely secretive by nature. Many observers suspect that Fahd's health is much worse than portrayed in Saudi media. The king has been ill for several years. When he suffered a stroke in 1995, the situation was serious enough for 'Abdullah to be appointed regent for several months.

When King Fahd does die, the senior members of the Saudi royal family - the sons of the kingdom's founder 'Abd Al-'Aziz - will meet to choose his successor. Although 'Abdullah is the overwhelming favorite, there have been noises of a challenge, that being Prince Sultan bin 'Abd Al-'Aziz, the minister of defense and aviation. Like King Fahd and five other members of the senior royal family, Sultan is one of the "Sudayri Seven." King Fahd is the eldest brother of the Sudayri Seven. These are seven sons of King 'Abd Al-'Aziz from the same mother, Hasa bint Ahmad Al-Sudayri. Many have assumed powerful positions in the government, based on the full fraternal relationship. In addition to King Fahd and defense chief Sultan, 'Abd Al-Rahman is deputy minister of defense and aviation, Nayif is the minister of the interior, and Salman is the governor of Riyadh province. Turki, 'Abd Al-Rahman and Ahmad also hold positions in the government. These seven brothers - and now their sons - are the power behind the kingdom's future.

Of note is the tribal affiliation of 'Abdullah's mother. She is a member of the largest and most powerful tribe in the region - the Shammar. The Shammar are found in northern Saudi Arabia, eastern Jordan, southeastern Syria and throughout Iraq. Among his Shammar cousins, 'Abdullah counts Shaykh Ghazi Al-Yawar, one of Iraq's recently named vice presidents (and former interim president).

'Abdullah bin 'Abd Al-'Aziz and the United States

Crown Prince and First Deputy Prime Minister 'Abdullah bin 'Abd Al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud, is half-brother to the king and heir to the throne since 1982, served as regent from 1 January to 22 February 1996. 'Abdullah, 80, has been the commander of the Saudi National Guard since 1963. The Saudi Arabian National Guard is an independent military force made up of descendants of the original armed supporters of King 'Abd Al-'Aziz, and is meant to act as a counter to any possible anti-government activities by the armed forces. In times of national emergency, it is attached to the army, as they were in the Gulf War against the Iraqis in 1991.

Assuming that 'Abdullah is named to succeed King Fahd, the close relationship between Washington and Riyadh may cool a bit. Fahd is the latest in a line of pro-Western Saudi kings who have used the country's immense oil reserves - the largest in the world, over 250 billion barrels - to attempt to maintain stable oil prices. These stable oil prices, and access to the oil, is a key U.S. national interest. For this price stability, Saudi Arabia has been assured that the military power of the United States is available to protect the kingdom.

'Abdullah, however, is much less enamored of the United States than his predecessors. It is believed that 'Abdullah was behind the withdrawal of American forces from the kingdom. He may be less inclined to purchase American or western weapons, and is less likely to use Saudi Arabia's power within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to hold oil prices in check. In obvious preparation for assuming the throne, 'Abdullah has made numerous trips throughout the region as well as a visit to consult with President George Bush.

As events bring the inevitable change of leadership in Riyadh, it will be interesting to watch which way 'Abdullah leads Saudi Arabia.

NBC News - "CD serves as ‘cookbook’ for rogue terrorists"

Earlier this week, I was on NBC Nightly News in a Lisa Myers segment about the availablility of terrorist training materials available on CD and the internet. Here's the transcript:

CD serves as ‘cookbook’ for rogue terrorists
Experts say seized CD-ROM teaches anyone how to spread terror

By Lisa Myers & the NBC Investigative Unit

HAIFA, Israel - Israeli forces foiled a nighttime Hezbollah operation two years ago, seizing a small fishing boat in the Mediterranean. Onboard were rocket fuses, detonators and other ingredients for a terror attack.

The boat's captain is now behind bars in an Israeli prison.

"I did not know what we were carrying, I was only steering," says Mohammed Darwish.

Israeli intelligence officials say the most dangerous items found on the boat were not the explosives, but dozens of CD-ROMs that amounted to a virtual cookbook for terrorists.

Israeli officials provided NBC News with what they say is an edited copy of the Hezbollah disc. It includes detailed instructions on how to build a suicide bomb vest, which recently appeared on a militant Islamic Web site.

But experts say other, more lethal, sections of the disc have never been made public.

"I have not seen anything like this before," says Lt. Col. Rick Francona, a retired military intelligence officer and an NBC News analyst.

Francona says he's struck by the sophistication and level of detail.

NBC News will not provide most of the details, but the disc spells out how to make anti-personnel mines, anti-tank grenades and armor-piercing mines, along with the exact chemical formula to create RDX — a high-powered explosive which could increase the lethality of major attacks.

"In the past they have had to use large amounts of low explosive," says Francona. "Now they can use a small amount of high explosive. This stuff is much harder to detect."

Already, there is evidence that terrorist videos can have deadly consequences. Francona says a suicide bomb vest similar to that posted on the Internet a few months ago was detonated in the crowded mess tent in Mosul in December 2004, killing 14 American soldiers.

In March 2005, 13 more of these suicide vests were found in Baghdad.

"You no longer have to be part of a terrorist group or a dedicated part of a cell somewhere," says Francona. "You alone can formulate or fabricate these kinds of weapons and use them effectively."

Now, for aspiring terrorists around the world, the tools of the trade are just a mouse click away.

Senior investigative correspondent Lisa Myers reported this story from Haifa, Israel.

© 2005 MSNBC.com

To watch the video, go to http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7955456/

Iraq: Thoughts on the Insurgency – April 2005

In the wake of increased insurgent attacks in Iraq over the past week, one could get the impression that the insurgency is on the rise and we are in the middle of an offensive. In reality, the insurgency is probably no stronger than it was just prior to the January 30 elections.

Perhaps we should define the insurgents. As I see it, there are two main groups. These two groups have divergent strategic goals, but they are tactically allied against the coalition and the new Iraqi government. The forner regime members, mostly Ba'thists, want to restore themselves to power. The Al-Qa’idah in Iraq faction led by Abu Mus’ib Az-Zarqawi, composed of mostly foreigners, wants to install a fundamentalist Islamic state. Their common goals of forcing the coalition to leave and the destruction of the new government transcend their differences.

Many, but not all, of the recent attacks have been in the Baghdad area. The insurgents are finding it more difficult to operate at will throughout the country. The Kurdish area in the north continues to be relatively calm. The only insurgent operations in this area have been in the formerly regime-controlled cities of Mosul (Al-Mawsil) and Kirkuk, and the city of Irbil. Attacks in Mosul and Kirkuk are possible because of the presence of large Sunni Arab populations sympathetic to the regime of Saddam Husayn.

In the predominantly Shi’a south, there has been a marked drop in insurgent attacks. The Shi’a believe that their best interests are in supporting the nascent government (which they dominate). There are ongoing attempts by the insurgents, both the former regime elements as well as the Az-Zarqawi faction, to create a rift, to spark a civil war between the Sunni Arabs and the Shi’a. Thus far, repeated attacks on Shi’a mosques and funerals have not provoked the intended Shi’a response.

Why have the Shi’a not responded to the provocation? The Shi’a are a much more coherent and cohesive group than the Sunnis. As an oppressed majority, they have coalesced throught the years into a cohesive community led by their clergy. The senior Shi’s clerics, most notably the Grand Ayatollah ‘Ali Al-Sistani, exercise great moral authority. They have told the Shi’a not to respond to the Sunni provocations. Thus far, they have not.

Since the selection of the president, Kurd Jalal Talabani, we have been waiting for the prime minister designate, Ibrahim al-Ja’afari, to form a new government. The insurgents want to let the population, primarily the Sunnis, that they will continue to target anyone in, cooperating with, or contemplating becoming part of the government.

The nature of the attacks has changed as well. The insurgents continue to use the improvised explosive device and car bombs. All other tactics have for the most part been rendered ineffective by adaptive American tactics. When the insurgents have tried massed force on force attacks against American forces, such as at Abu Ghurayb earlier this month, it failed and resulted in significant insurgent casualties.

In the end, however, it is not American or coalition forces that will defeat the insurgency. On MSNBC last night, Chris Matthews in an interview with New York Times columnist Tom Friedman asked if we would leave Iraqi forces with “an insurgency we couldn’t handle.” I think there has been a realization all along that it will have to be the Iraqi forces that will defeat the insurgency. That will happen only when the Iraqi people, particularly the Sunnis in the so-called “Sunni triangle,” cease being “fence-sitters” and commit to the new government and begin cooperating. Once that happens and the increased intelligence flow that began after the elections increases, the insurgency will face defeat.

When the Iraqi forces gain the upper hand, they will be dealing with both factions of the insurgency. Although some fo the Iraqis in the insurgency may choose to become part of the new system, most of them and virtually any of the Al-Qa’idah faction that stay will have to be hunted down and killed.

Iraq: Murder along the Rivers

Iraq

Over 70 Iraqi bodies were discovered yesterday in two separate locations, one on the Tigris River and one on the Euphrates River.

At least 50 bodies were pulled from the Tigris yesterday morning southeast of Baghdad and down river from the town of Mada'in (15 miles southeast of Baghdad), the location where Shi'a residents last week claimed that as many as 100 of their fellow Shi'a were taken hostage by Sunni insurgents. When Iraqi and American forces searched the area, they found no evidence of hostages, nor was there any concrete information on the number of hostages. Some Sunnis in town claim the hostage situation was a hoax to incite violence.

Iraqi President Jalal Talabani is speculating that the bodies are those of the Mada'in hostages from last week. If that is the case, these will be Shi'a remains, killed at the hands of Sunni insurgents. The Shi'a have already said they will not be baited into a response. The Shi'a clerics exercise great moral authority and discipline - so far.

Along the Euphrates, there were also 19 Iraqis National Guardsmen killed in Hadithah, 130 miles northwest of Baghdad. This is in the so-called Sunni triangle. There are indications that many of the residents are getting sick of the Iraqi on Iraqi violence, especially after the Sunni Clerics Association cleared the way for young men to join the National Guard.

Although the dead were initially identified as guardsmen, they were subsequently indentified as fisherman who may have stumbled on to an insurgent camp.

Iraqi Insurgents Watch Al-Jazeera

Following up my earlier post today about Al-Jazeera, recent urgent news from the station reveals an interesting fact of the insurgency in Iraq.

Arabic:
مقتل اللواء عدنان ثابت أحد قادة عملية المدائن في هجوم استهدف منزله بجنوب بغداد

Translation:
Major General ‘Adnan Thabit, one of the commanders of the Mada’in operation, was killed in an attack targeting his house in south Baghdad.

Analysis:
The general had appeared in an interview on Al-Jazeera shortly after the operation, in which he briefed the reporter on the operation. Hours later, he was killed in an insurgent attack on his house.

Conclusions:
The insurgents are watching Al-Jazeera.
The insurgents are capable of finding specific individuals and mounting an operation against them on short notice.

Al-Jazeera Bureau Office in Iran Closed

Al-Jazeera, the 24-hour Arabic language news network was virtually unknown in the West prior to the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom (American operations against Al-Qa'idah and the Talaban in Afghanistan) – it has become a household world to millions of people watching coverage of events in the Middle East. To some Americans, the name means anti-American slanted news coverage beamed to an under-informed Arabic-speaking audience. To that Arabic-speaking audience, it has emerged as their principal source of news with over 35 million viewers. While there are other Arabic-language satellite channels, none has the reach - or clout - of Al-Jazeera.

On April 18, Tehran ordered that the network cease operations in Iran, blaming the channel for inciting anti-government violence in the Arabic-speaking Iranian province of Khuzestan in which several people were killed.

Al-Jazeera

Al-Jazeera is based in Doha, Qatar, and is owned by the Emir of Qatar. The word al-jazeera, or more properly al-jazirah, means “the island,” but is also translated in this context as “the peninsula.” For years the only available continuous television news service available in the region was CNN, an English language service. For Arabic speakers, there was no comparable option. Although there are Arabic-language news services available by satellite in the region, none offer 24-hour continuous coverage.

The U.S. government is concerned that Al-Jazeera’s reporting may be inaccurately reflecting American foreign policy. Washington is not pleased with what appears to be Al-Jazeera’s willingness to provide Al-Qa'idah's Usamah Bin Ladin, his agent in Iraq Abu Musa'ib Az-Zarqawi or Iraqi insurgent groups with a propaganda organ. Despite misgiving over AL-Jazeera's motives, the Pentagon allowed the network to particpate in the embedded reported program during the war in Iraq.

Senior U.S. government officials have appeared on the station to attempt to better represent the American position. When then-national security adviser Condoleezza Rice was interviewed on Al-Jazeera, the station repeatedly aired statements taken out of context as “teasers” advertising the interview. For example, Dr. Rice discussed a wide range of topics, including American demands that Palestinians halt violence against Israel, concerns about Saddam Husayn, the background for American military actions in Afghanistan and the war on terrorism. Only the demands that Palestinians stop attacks on Israel and remarks about Saddam Husayn were aired in these teasers. No mention was made of her reiteration of the American administration’ support for the creation of a Palestinian state.

In Iraq, military commanders remark that when something bad happens, Al-Jazeera seems to be first on the scene. While not accusing the network of anything illegal, some believe the network may have been tipped off. More than one of its reporters has been detained or arrested. The network constantly reminds the world of Spain's arrest of its journalist Taysir Al-Luni for assisting Al-Qa'idah.

Al-Jazeera is a useful source for American news organizations - MSNBC monitors its broadcasts daily. It can also be a source for the Iraqi insurgents. Shortly after appearing on Al-Jazeera, the commander of the anti-insurgency operation in Mada'in was killed near his home.

If you can read Arabic, visit Al-Jazeera's web site. Do not confuse the English language version - they do not read the same. The Arabic is much more strident and anti-American in tone.

Iraq - Abu Ghurayb Attack

Last week, I was on NBC Nightly News in a Lisa Myers segment about the insurgent attack on the Abu Ghurayb prison. Here's the transcript:

Zarqawi posts Abu Ghraib attack video on web
NBC terror analyst says video shows new level of sophistication
By Lisa Myers & the NBC Investigative Unit - April 7, 2005

The video, titled "Storming the Prison of Abu Ghraib," shows scenes of the battle from afar, as well as insurgents preparing a surprise attack.

One insurgent calculates how to hit the target, while others load up an improvised rocket launcher. The group claims to have fired 39 rockets.

Former military intelligence officer Rick Francona, now an NBC News analyst, says the video reveals a level of military competence.

"The zeroing in of the weapons and the launching of the rockets, and hitting what they aimed at, shows a certain skill level that we may not have accredited to the Zarqawi group," says Francona.

The flames in the distance appear to be rockets hitting their targets. A few seconds later, U.S. soldiers respond with gunfire. One large blast may be a suicide or roadside bomb.

"This is a particularly audacious attack because it appears that they were in no rush when they were setting up these weapons," says Francona. "They were taking their time. They were being very deliberate in their actions, and it was obviously broad daylight."

Zarqawi claims to have had spies inside and outside the prison. An Internet posting in December warned that Abu Ghraib was a target, because of abuses there.

On the Web site, Zarqawi dedicates the attack to Omar Yousef Jumah, a cleric from Jordan who left his family to fight in Iraq and was killed in a previous unsuccessful attack on Abu Ghraib.

The Pentagon would not comment on the video. Military analysts predict there will be more large scale attacks, as Zarqawi tries to prove his group is relevant and still to be feared.

© 2005 MSNBC.com

To watch the segment, go to http://msnbc.msn.com/id/7419507/

My Baghdad

I spent a good part of late 1987 and 1988 in Baghdad. Although I was there for a few hours in 1991 to pick up the POWs, but haven't been back since. My other "visits" to Iraq were limited to operations in the Kurdish north and other undisclosed locations. So, my memories of Baghdad were of a different city than what is there now.

Although Iran and Iraq had been at war for over seven years by the time I arrived in Baghdad, the city really had not been touched. There were the occasional air raids and then in 1987/1988 the SCUD attacks, there was little devastation. There were also few signs of a country at war. Saddam made sure that life appeared to be normal in the city - it wasn't, but it looked that way. No seriously injured soldiers were allowed to be out and about. The major military casualty centers were far outside the city. The only indications of losses were the coffins being delivered by taxicabs with racks on top for that purpose, and the black death banners proclaiming the martyrdom of young men.

Baghdad was considered one the most beautiful cities in the region. The mosques were much prettier and ornate than those in drab Saudi Arabia or poorer Syria, for example. Say what you will about the Ba'th party and Saddam Husayn, they made the city a showplace. There were escalators up to pedestrian bridges over busy streets, the streets were modern and well-paved, the highways rivaled the autobahns, the trains ran on time (sounds like 1935 Germany...), the public monuments and parks were beautiful and well-kept.

There was real nightlife - clubs, restaurants, people out walking along the Tigris, the masquf (a special way of cooking Tigris river carp - I wouldn't recommend it) cafes in full swing, etc. It was safe to walk the streets. After the Iraqis unveiled the Husayn missile and began hitting Tehran at a rate of four outgoing for each incoming Iranian SCUD, the mood changed. After our program starting having some effect and the Iraqis recaptured the Al-Faw peninsula, the mood really improved and there was an anticipation of victory. Perhaps that is too positive. They had lost so many men that it might be more accurate to say there was an anticipation of the end of the war.

Also, consider that I was an official guest of the Iraqi government, specifically the guest of the Director of Military Intelligence. He had a bit more power (life and death) than his counterparts in the United States. I was treated extremely well, taken anywhere I wanted, and of course they wanted to show me the best side of the city.

Mostly I was impressed with the Iraqis and the Baghdadis, themselves. They aren't the same as the Saudis, Syrians, even the Jordanians. There is something about them that is different - they seem to have drive, pride, confidence. The name Baghdad derives from the Arabic "to swagger, throw your weight around, to act like a Baghdadi." (Remember the song, "Walk like an Egyptian?")

The sanctions caused a lot of decline in the infrastructure. Those who have returned recently describe the damage from the shock and awe campaign, the collapsed infrastructure, power shortages, blast walls everywhere, not to mention the danger.

I prefer to remember my Baghdad as it was. Whoever said, "You can't go back" was right.