Russian Deployment of North Korean Artillery in Ukraine

 

170mm Koksan self-propelled howitzer in Iraq

A recent article in Military Watch magazine reported on Russia's use of North Korean-made heavy artillery in Ukraine. The article was based on comments made by the commander of the Ukrainian Defense Intelligence Directorate.

“Unfortunately, this gun is demonstrating itself quite well in battle. It’s firing from quite a long range, and it’s quite good in terms of accuracy. We have data that the Russian Federation was provided 120 pieces. But I think that supply will continue because these guns are demonstrating themselves quite well. This is unfortunate for us because this is artillery for long-range firing.” 

Why I am writing about a North Korean artillery piece being used by Russian forces in Ukraine? This is, after all, Middle East Perspectives by Rick Francona. Read on.

I am very familiar with the Koksan gun. In fact, I believe I am one of the few Americans who have ever had the opportunity to get in, on, and under the weapon. I took the above photograph in 1988 at an Iraqi Army artillery depot south of Baghdad. At the time, I was serving as a liaison officer to the Iraqi Directorate of Military Intelligence at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. It was the eighth year of the Iran-Iraq War; we had developed a relationship with the Iraqis to prevent a recurrence of Iraq's mistaken attack on the USS Stark in the Persian Gulf in 1987 in which 37 sailors were killed.

I wrote about this experience in my book, Ally to Adversary - An Eyewitness Account of Iraq's Fall from Grace. From the book:

PROJECT MORNING STAR

Our cooperative relationship with the Iraqis allowed us unprecedented access to the Iraqi military. For example, the Iraqis had captured a large artillery piece from the Iranians during the liberation of Al-Faw. They could not identify its origin and were perplexed by the unusual 170-mm bore. Artillery pieces worldwide are generally manufactured in standard bore sizes, normally 122-mm, 130-mm, 152-mm, 155- mm, 175-mm, and 203-mm. We knew they had captured this gun: Army Colonel Gary Nelson—our newly assigned defense attaché in Baghdad and an artillery officer by training—had seen it while it was on display at a victory celebration in Baghdad. We knew what it was, and we wanted it.

The Iranians had acquired this self-propelled howitzer in 1987. At that time, it was the longest-range artillery piece made anywhere in the world, capable of firing a rocket-assisted projectile to a range of almost sixty kilometers. It had been used by the Iranians to conduct harassment fire from the Al-Faw Peninsula into Kuwait’s northeastern oil fields. The Iranians were applying military pressure on the Kuwaitis in a variety of ways, as punishment for supporting Iraq in the war and for alleged violations of oil export and pricing policies of OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries). This artillery fire was complemented by Chinese-made “Silkworm” cruise missile attacks on Kuwait’s oil ports and by naval attacks on Kuwaiti shipping in the Gulf. 

The attacks were the catalyst for the March 1987 decision to register Kuwaiti oil tankers under the American flag (a procedure called “reflagging”) to offer some protection for oil shipping in the region. The U.S. Navy could not legally protect foreign shipping, but a merchant ship flying the U.S. flag was entitled to armed escort through the Persian Gulf war zone.

The high level of U.S. interest in the gun had little to do with the situation in the Persian Gulf and rested instead on the fact that the weapon had been designed half a world away to fire on the capital city of a close U.S. ally, South Korea. What the Iraqis had captured on the Al-Faw Peninsula, though they did not realize it, was a weapon designed and built by North Korea to fire on Seoul from the North Korean side of the Demilitarized Zone. The U.S. military refers to it as a Koksan gun.

While inspecting the gun (the project was called Morning Star), we discovered more evidence of Iraq’s use of nerve gas. As I rooted around the cramped driver’s station of the gun system looking for anything of intelligence value—maps, notes, logs, manuals, firing tables, communications charts, and so forth—I found several used atropine injectors. These auto-injectors had been manufactured in Iran and were similar to those I had found earlier on a battlefield on Al-Faw. I showed one of the injectors (and pocketed another) to both Majid and the brigadier general commanding the artillery depot, explaining that these used injectors indicated to me that a nerve agent had been used at Al-Faw. 

I was careful not to accuse the Iraqis, but the implication was clear. The brigadier general replied that Iraqi artillery doctrine calls for use of obscurant smoke in the preparatory artillery barrages. His “analysis” was that the Iranians mistook the smoke rounds for nerve gas and, therefore, self-administered atropine. 

Not wanting a confrontation while standing in the middle of an Iraqi military installation, I did not mention to the Iraqi officers that we had also discovered decontamination fluid in many places on the weapon, most noticeably trapped in the headlights. It would make no sense for the Iraqis to decontaminate the vehicle if they had only fired smoke rounds at the Iranians.

In the end, the Iraqis decided not to allow us to move the gun back to the United States, so I arranged for a small team of artillery experts and engineers to fly to Iraq and do a field exploitation of the piece. I remember that working on the gun in the blazing sun in the Iraqi desert was, and still is, the hottest I have every been. My insides felt like I was being roasted.

Just as the Ukrainian intelligence chief noted, the gun was well-engineered and manufactured. It was an intelligence boon - these guns pose a threat to U.S. forces in South Korea.