Middle East Perspectives by Rick Francona

Situation in Syria continues to deteriorate

2012-01-26T20:15:00.000-08:00

Meeting of the Arab League Ministerial Committee on the Situation in Syria

The situation in Syria shows no signs of improving, despite the efforts of the Arab League to mediate a solution. Of course, it would be helpful if the Syrian regime of President Bashar al-Asad was interested some sort of compromise. Asad is operating under the belief that he will be able to survive this crisis and remain in power - he may be right. The Arab League, as well as many other nations including neighboring Turkey, have called for Asad to step down.

Violence continues in various parts of the country, including clashes between the Syrian armed forces and groups of soldiers who have defected from the military and formed the so-called Free Syria Army (FSA). The violence has claimed the lives of both government troops, members of the FSA, civilian protesters and innocent bystanders as well. Just this week, the secretary general of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and a Christian priest have been killed, although by whom is not clear. Of course, there are conflicting accusations - the government did it, the protesters did it....

I will give credit to the Arab League for at least trying to address the situation in Syria. Their intentions were noble, if the execution was a bit flawed. Sending a Sudanese general with the cloud of human rights violations over his head to lead an Arab League observer team to Syria was probably not the best idea. The observer team was ill-equipped to deal with the practiced deceit of the Syrian regime. Syrian forces merely withdrew temporarily where the observers were present, only to return as soon as they were gone. This is reminiscent of Iraqi actions when there were United Nations Special Commission observers in Iraq in the 1990s.

Not to be taken in by the Syrian regime, the Arab League did release a scathing critique of the Bashar al-Asad government and proposed a plan whereby the president would step down and transfer power to Vice President Faruq al-Shara'. I almost laughed when I read this - Shara' is hardly the leader to guide Syria out of this morass. Shara' is a Sunni from the Dara' area of southern Syria and made his way up the Party ranks via Syrian Arab Airlines (now Syrianair). He rose through the ranks by being a threat to no one. He's a pleasant man for sure, but hardly of the gravitas required for this job.

US Embassy - Abu Rumanah, Damascus
My office was behind the wall to the right of the white van

As the situation deteriorates, and it is, despite protestations from Asad supporters, the United States is contemplating closing the embassy in Damascus, citing danger to life and property of American diplomats and staff.

The threat to the embassy is real. The chancery is not one of the new fortress-style embassies such as the one in neighboring Jordan. The Damascus embassy is housed in two large, old houses that have been joined and modified, but not the standards that would prevent a successful attack. In fact, the embassy has been attacked several times over the last few years. I was posted to this embassy for over two years - make no mistake about this, when there is an attack or demonstration against the American embassy in Damascus, the Syrian government has either organized or approved it.

Having served at the embassy and living in Damascus, I understand the security issue. There are consequences of not having a diplomatic presence in Syria. It is not so much about the diplomacy, but the ability to have American eyes and ears on the ground in an area of concern. Okay, that might also mean an intelligence capability that is critical to our understanding of the situation. If you look at the areas in which we have had military confrontations, it is in those countries in which we have not had Americans - diplomats and military attaches - there to observe and report.

The situation has gotten so bad the many Arab League members have withdrawn from the mission in Syria, faulting the Asad regime for not halting the attacks on its citizens. Instead, the League has appealed to the United Nations Security Council to intervene. The Secretary General of the Arab League will also ask the UN to support its plan by which Asad steps down and a transition unity government is established. The Syrians, true to form, rejected the Arab League's "meddling in Syrian internal affairs."

What will happen in the United Nations? Is there the possibility of a Libyan-style military intervention in Syria? It's not likely - Russia, a permanent member of the Security Council with veto power, is a staunch supporter and apologist for the Syrians. The United States, also a permanent member, is not anxious to involve itself in yet another military operation in the region, despite its new-found strategy of "leading from behind." Syria is not Libya - it has a much a more capable air defense system and air force, and the population is spread out over much of the country rather than being concentrated in a narrow strip along the Mediterranean coast.

The regional powers, including Turkey, are not likely to intervene. The most likely course of action may be some weak UN resolutions condemning the violence, but meaningful sanctions are highly improbable given Russian support for Damascus. In essence, the Syrian regime will continue to oppress its own population in hopes that they can stop the protests. The government does not show any signs of compromise with the protesters.

I do not assess the Syrians as capable of overthrowing the Asad regime at this time. Perhaps if there are continuing large-scale defections from the Syrian military to the opposition, there may be a chance of a change of government. I don't see that happening anytime soon.

Without assistance from outside Syria, be it from Turkey, the United States, or the European Union, there is little chance that the government will fall.

There is a major concern that argues against any American support for the opposition. The primary Syrian opposition organization is the Syrian National Council, which is little more than a front for the Muslim Brotherhood.

Thus, the quandary for the Obama Administration is - do you help remove the oppressive Ba'th regime of Bashar al-Asad and probably usher in an Islamic fundamentalist government? There is precedent: Libya, and to some extent Egypt.

Civil war in Iraq - not improbable, maybe likely

2012-01-19T20:05:00.000-08:00

Iraqi Shi'a militiamen march on Israeli and American flags

Every day the news from Iraq reflects increasing sectarian violence - it has been virtually the same since the premature, arbitrary and precipitous withdrawal of American troops from the country. My views on that betrayal of trust is well known - see my latest on that outrage: Betrayals - Obama and the withdrawal from Iraq.

It comes as no surprise that in the absence of thousands of American forces in the country, local groups who have been constrained in the past have begun to assert themselves in their quest for power. The Shi'a-dominated groups - this includes the forces loyal to Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, the Iranian-backed party and militia of radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, and other parties wanting a piece of the political pie in Iraq - also are seeking revenge for years of being treated as third-class citizens at the hands of the Sunni-dominated Ba'th regime of Saddam Husayn.

Sunni groups, including al-Qa'idah in Iraq (AQI) who simply waited for the Americans to leave on schedule, have re-asserted themselves in their rejection of the Shi'a-dominated government.

It's a pretty simple analysis - the Shi'a want to marginalize any Sunni influence in the government as that government leans toward Iran; the Sunnis want to regain some of the political power they once enjoyed. The Kurds are probably the only winners in this situation, enjoying the relative safety and security of the Kurdish Autonomous Region in northern Iraq.

The Kurds are concerned, however, that al-Maliki's moves to consolidate his power as soon as American forces left have put the country at risk of a civil war. The Americans were hardly out the door when al-Maliki sought the arrest of Sunni Vice President Tariq Hashimi in what most analysts believe to be are trumped up charges as part of a power play to seize even more control of the government.

As al-Maliki tries to marginalize the Sunni-supported coalition Iraqiya party headed by former prime minister Iyad 'Alawi (himself a Shi'a), pushback from AQI and Sunni political leaders has lead to a spike in violence targeted against Shi'a areas and religious functions. The attacks are reminiscent of the 2006 attacks against Shi'a shrines that led to an outright religious civil war in the country. Iraqiya ministers boycotted the parliament in protest; the Shi'a-dominated body reacted by suspending the boycotting ministers, leading to a greater political crisis. If this tit for tat does not stop, the violence will devolve into a full-blown civil war.

The violence is disheartening to anyone who has served or has family who served in Iraq. It cheapens the sacrifice and commitment of our young men and women - who believe in what they did - to allow the Iraqis to develop a successful post-Saddam Iraq. The new reports are saddening.

Since the withdrawal of American forces - what I describe as Obama's mad dash for the exit - at least 200 people have been killed in the sectarian violence as the Sunni groups attempt to goad the Shi'a into another civil war. The Sunnis have assessed, correctly in my view, that Iraqi forces are unwilling or unable to stop the violence without American troops to back them up.

The image at the beginning of the article is illustrative of how badly two American administrations have handled our involvement in Iraq. The mere fact that Muqtada al-Sadr is still alive is a statement of failure by the Bush Administration - al-Sadr should have been killed in 2003 when we had the opportunity. The fact that the militias are now free to spew their anti-American hatred is an indictment of the Obama Administration and its failure to capitalize on the success of the surge and Anbar Awakening that broke the back of AQI and other Sunni insurgent groups.

Without American troops, it appears that a civil war is not only improbable but likely. Should it happen, there is almost nothing the United States can do about it. Thanks to President Obama's failure to secure an American presence in the country after December 31, 2011, the only way American forces can assist the Iraqi security and military organizations in keeping the peace is via an invitation from the Iraqi government.

Given the fact that the Shi'a-dominated government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki stands to gain from the disorder, there is liitle chance of that invitation happening.

We are now faced with a situation in which a country whose freedom was purchased with the effort and blood of American forces is devolving into civil war, and the Obama Administration has squandered any opportunity to influence events.

The Obama Administration and Iran - an infusion of spine?

2012-01-10T18:07:00.000-08:00

CJCS General Dempsey, President Obama and Secretary of Defense Panetta

Has there been a sudden infusion of spine at the White House? If you believe the words of Dennis Ross, one of President Obama's key advisors on Iran, it has been there all along - I'm not so sure. Ross served on the National Security Council as the Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for the Central Region (Middle East, Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, Pakistan and South Asia).

I first met Ambassador Ross in the early/mid-1990s while I was posted as the Air Attache to the U.S. Embassy in Damascus, Syria. He was a frequent visitor to Damascus as then-Secretary of State Warren Christopher attempted to restart the Syria-Israel track of the Middle East Peace Process. I found him to be extremely knowledgeable on the region, although his bias towards Israel was easily discernible. The Palestinians did not regard him as an honest broker, likely because of this perceived bias.

According to Ambassador Ross, the President has "made it very clear" that he regards a nuclear-armed Iran as so great a threat to international security that "the Iranians should never think that there's a reluctance to use force...." He argues that those who believe the President would rather contain a nuclear-armed Iran than use military force to prevent the Islamic Republic from acquiring nuclear weapon are wrong. The ambassador claims that the Administration considers Iran with nuclear weapons a greater threat than the fallout from American military action against Iran's nuclear facilities.

That is refreshing to hear, but I am not thoroughly convinced that this has been the President's position for any length of time.

It has taken almost three years for anyone in the Administration to actually say that the United States will not permit Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. That's because it has been the policy of the Obama White House to "engage" the Iranians in hopes that rational diplomatic discourse would deter the Iranians from continuing on their program to enrich uranium and develop a nuclear weapon. There is also no doubt that the goal of the Iranian program is the development of a nuclear weapon.

That engagement policy, in conjunction with ineffective economic sanctions, has failed miserably. It had about the same chance of success as the request to return the reconnaissance drone. While the President is of the belief that he was taking the high road and showing strength in trying to reach out to the Iranians, the Iranians, being Middle Easterners, regarded it as a sign of weakness. Combined with his sprint for the exits in Iraq and Afghanistan, the leadership in Tehran viewed his policy as one of capitulation.

It was not until late last year that a senior Administration official - Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta - said the words many of us have been waiting to hear: "The United States does not want Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. That's a red line for us and that's a red line, obviously, for the Israelis. If we have to do it we will deal with it. ... If they proceed and we get intelligence that they are proceeding with developing a nuclear weapon then we will take whatever steps necessary to stop it. There are no options off the table. ... A nuclear weapon in Iran is unacceptable."

The Secretary reiterated his remarks just last week, saying, "They [the Iranians] need to know that if they take that step, they're going to get stopped." The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army General Martin Dempsey followed Panetta's remarks with the acknowledgement that the Pentagon has been planning and positioning assets to be ready to take military action if ordered to do so. This should come as no surprise - this is what military planners do.

Finally, some spine from Obama Administration officials. It seems to be having the desired effect - the Iranians are finally taking notice. They appear to have come to the realization that they are dealing with a superpower.

Combined with real sanctions, those "crippling" sanctions that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has promised since 2009, these statements by senior American officials have Iran concerned. The Administration seems to have found Iran's Achilles heel - sanctions on Iran's central bank. Despite that, after the legislation imposing the sanctions passed overwhelmingly in the U.S. Congress, the President signed it only reluctantly. As Ambassador Ross said, "The latest measures are the first really affecting the core of their [Iran's] revenue, which is their sale of oil." The Administration, with the prodding of the Congress, finally gets it.

Immediately afterwards, an Iranian official threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz. (See my earlier article, Iranian Navy versus the U.S. Fifth Fleet? I can imagine the reaction in Tehran when he said that - "You said what? Do you know what the American fleet will do to us if we try that?"

So what is behind the Administration's newly discovered backbone?

I would like to tell you that it was the realization that what we were doing was not working and it was time to adjust our policy to something that might. I would like to tell you that the new Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, retired Army General David Petraeus, and new Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta were able to convince the President that his policies were not working, and in fact were allowing Iran to proceed almost unhindered down the road to a nuclear weapon.

Unfortunately, I think it has more to do with the upcoming Presidential election than the realization of a failed policy. The President needs something successful and popular to run on. Appearing to be strong on the Iran issue will help, as will the by-product of that stance: perception of the President's support for Israel, whether he really favors that or not.

Whatever the reason, the American Administration is finally enacting the crippling sanctions we have been waiting for, and a senior official - the one who runs the armed forces - has made the declaration that we will not allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon.

Spine - it's about time.

The resurrection of the caliphate?

2012-01-06T12:30:00.000-08:00

Libyan rebel military commander 'Abd al-Hakim Balhaj,
an associate of the late al-Qa'idah leader Usamah bin Ladin

As their forefathers did over 1,300 years ago, the forces of militant Islam have swept across North Africa. Ridding the world of dictators and corrupt regimes is a good thing, but there are always unintended consequences.

In the case of those initial countries who have liberated themselves in what is known in the West as "the Arab spring" - Tunisia, Egypt and Libya - it appears that the replacement governments are going to be Islamic. They are going to be not only Islamic, but likely militant Islamist. Some of the leaders of the emerging governments seek a return to the caliphate of old.

The term caliphate derives from the Arabic khilāfah (خلافة, succession). The caliphate is primarily a Sunni Muslim construct and is the existential difference between the Sunnis and the Shi'a Muslims. The two sects evolved because of their differences over the issue of succession when Muhammad died in 632 – who would follow Muhammad as the leader of the faithful?

Many believed that the successor to Muhammad should be a family member, someone in the bloodline of the prophet. However, Muhammad had no son, so there was no male heir to assume the caliphate. Muhammad did have a daughter, Fatimah, who was married to Muhammad's cousin 'Ali bin Abu Talib. The people who favored the selection of 'Ali as the caliph were called the Shi'at 'Ali, the "partisans of 'Ali," hence the name Shi'a.

The other school of thought, held by many prominent Muslims of the day, was that the caliph should be drawn from one of the senior and learned members of the faith, the ummah or "community." These were the Sunnis, the traditionalists.

The Sunni position prevailed and the first three caliphs (Abu Bakr, 'Umar and 'Uthman) were not of Muhammad's bloodline. Finally, a convergence occurred in 656 when 'Ali (regarded by the Shi'a as the first imam) was named the fourth caliph. 'Ali was soon murdered and his son Hasan became the second Imam.

Real political power at this time rested with the Sunni caliph in Damascus. Hasan abdicated in favor of these 'Umayyad rulers. Following 'Ali, the succession took on the form of dynasties - the Umayyad, followed by the 'Abassid, the Fatimid and finally the Ottomans. The caliphate was abolished with the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1924.

In the aftermath of World War One and the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, the Middle East was carved up by Western powers. Regions in which Arab tribes lived were divided up. Lines were drawn on maps by people that did not live in the area. Countries that never before existed were created - Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan were established.

The Gaza Strip, West Bank and the area that is now Israel were administered by the United Kingdom under a United Nations mandate. In 1947, the United Nations voted to allow the partition of the Palestinian mandate into an Arab and Jewish state - this led to the creation of the State of Israel in 1948.

The creation of Israel was a watershed event in the Middle East. Many Arabs, especially the Palestinians, viewed this an attempt to assuage guilt for the actions of the Nazis, a misplaced attempt to create a homeland for the Jews at the expense of the local Arab population. I will not explore the merits of those beliefs - it is the perceptions that are important since they are the basis for Arab reaction.

Fast forward to the Yom Kippur war of 1973. When it was apparent that Israel was in danger of suffering a defeat at the hands of the Egyptian and Syrian armed forces, the United States military executed Operation Nickel Grass, the airlift/delivery of fighter aircraft, armor, artillery, munitions and other supplies to the the Jewish state. The operation turned the tide and the Israeli army soon moved to within 60 miles of Cairo on the Egyptian front, and to within less that 20 miles (well within artillery range) of Damascus on the Syrian front.

The American resupply of Israel led to a confrontation between the superpowers - the United States and the Soviet Union. Both countries put their armed forces on alert for possible intervention in the Middle East. On October 24, I remember going on alert for immediate deployment to counter Soviet moves in the region - it was the first time in 11 years, the first time since the Cuban missile crisis, that American forces went on worldwide alert.

At 11:41pm, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered all U.S. armed forces to assume DEFCON (Defense Condition) III which meant putting nuclear-armed units on the "highest state of peacetime alert." The next step, DEFCON II would ready the nuclear triad - strategic bombers, and land and submarine-based nuclear missiles - for imminent launch. The Pentagon alerted the 82nd Airborne Division and ordered the movement of aircraft carriers toward the Eastern Mediterranean. It was a scary time - trust me. Things were happening very quickly as young men from the armed forces of two nuclear-armed powers began to square off over events in a far-off corner of the world.

Cooler heads prevailed and both nations stepped back from the brink. Yet another United Nations resolution was adopted and life returned to the new normal. However, the incident indicated that events in the Middle East were not solely under the control of the people that live there, including the Arabs. When the Arabs and Jews/Israelis came to blows, it was the West and East blocs that actually called the shots (no pun intended).

Over the years following the Yom Kippur war, there were other smaller American/Western military interventions in the region, such as the Marine operation at Beirut airport, American deployments in support of Egypt and the Sudan, U.S. operations against Libya, and American support for Iraq against Iran, all in the in the 1980's. However, it was the 1990's that brought about the greatest confrontation between the West and the descendants of the Muslim caliphate.

In August 1990, Iraqi forces invaded the neighboring State of Kuwait, overpowering the capital city in less than five hours. In two days, there were substantial Iraqi forces on the northern border of Saudi Arabia. Any threat to the oilfields of Saudi Arabia were, and are, a red line for the United States. In what was another watershed event for the region and particularly its Muslim residents, the Saudi royal family asked the United States to deploy armed forces to defend the Kingdom from a potential Iraqi invasion. In the end, over half a million American troops deployed to defend Saudi Arabia and eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

It was the deployment of American troops to Saudi Arabia that germinated the seed of hatred among many Islamists. Saudi Arabia is home to the two holiest sites in Islam, the Ka'aba/Grand Mosque in Mecca and the Mosque of the Prophet in Medina. Note that the official title of the Saudi king is actually "Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques." This responsibility forms the social contract between the monarchy and the people of Saudi Arabia.

The introduction of American forces into what many Islamists consider holy ground caused a backlash among several groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood (al-ikhwan al-muslimin), and an organization of Arabs who had fought against the Soviets in Afghanstan, al-Qa'idah, led by a Saudi, Usamah bin Ladin. In 1996, bin Ladin issued a fatwa, an Islamic legal pronouncement, entitled "Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places."

We are all aware of al-Qa'idah's operations between 1996 and 2001. Following the American invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, al-Qa'idah moved its operations to Pakistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Somalia. While their primary tactical goal was to kill Americans, the strategic goal always was the fall of current and corrupt Arab governments and the establishment of an Islamic state, or the forerunner to a caliphate.

In a bizarre and somewhat unexpected coincidence of events, the so-called "Arab Spring" brought new hope to the Islamists. It began in Tunisia and quickly spread to other venues, including Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Syria and Libya. North Africa is well on its way to becoming an Islamist bloc. Elections in Tunisia, Egyptand Morocco saw victories by Islamist parties. The new governments of Tunisia and Egypt will be dominated by these parties. Libya will likely follow after elections in April.

In the Kingdom of Morocco, an Islamic party gained a plurality in the hastily called elections and King Muhammad VI named its leader as prime minister. In Algeria, elections this spring will likely result in increased Islamist participation in the government - the campaigns are already underway. If you are an Islamist, you have to consider things to be looking good for your cause in North Africa.

Looking elsewhere in the region, Islamists are also likely pleased with events in Yemen. President 'Ali 'Abdullah Salih is about to renege on a deal that would grant him immunity in exchange for stepping down and leaving the country. This is a temporary reprieve for Salih; he is on his way out. After he eventually departs, there will be a power vacuum - look for al-Qa'idah in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to consolidate its power and lead the country toward an Islamic state.

In Iraq, the fortunes of al-Qa'idah in Iraq (AQI) appeared to be on the decline until the scheduled - and some would say, premature - withdrawal of American forces from Iraq. No sooner were the Americans gone than a wave of sectarian violence re-ignited. While the Obama Administration bandies about claims of "success" in Iraq, the country is on the verge of another round of Sunni-Shi'a bloodshed.

As many Middle East analysts (including this one) predicted, AQI merely waited out the Americans to stick to an announced withdrawal timetable. This is what happens when you have a President with no military experience who refuses to listen to his military advisors. (See my earlier thoughts on that: Betrayals - Obama and the withdrawal from Iraq.)

In Turkey, the longstanding absolute separation of church and state is coming under attack. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) under Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is an Islamist party and is slowly attempting to replace secular democracy with Islamic law. Note that the terms "Justice and Development" are common to Islamist parties throughout the region.

There is some push back in the region as the Islamists seek to take power. In Syria, the opposition group calling itself the Syrian National Council is dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood. There is fear among some segments of the Syrian population that an Islamic government will seize power if the regime of Bashar al-Asad is overthrown. In an unlikely alliance against an Islamist takeover, the government has garnered support from secular Sunni groups, Christian residents and the Druze of the al-Suwayda' area. However, Islamists can still be hopeful that the government will fall, ushering in their successful takeover in Syria. It could go either way.

Looking to other locations as well, such as Somalia, Sudan, Nigeria and Mali, may give Islamists hope that their star (and crescent) is on the rise. Is there a chance we could see a new caliphate in the Middle East?

Let's hope not.

Iranian Navy versus the U.S. Fifth Fleet?

2011-12-29T16:38:00.000-08:00

Sea lanes in the Strait of Hormuz

Iran has threatened to close the Straits of Hormuz if the West carries out its plans to impose more stringent sanctions on Iran, specifically on its central bank. While the western nations stopped short of the threat of an outright embargo on Iranian oil exports, tough sanctions on the central bank will have almost the same effect. If Iran cannot process payments for its oil, it can't export it.

The Obama Administration has been reluctant to sanction Iran's central bank, sometimes called Bank Markazi (Persian for "central bank"), claiming that it could cause a dramatic increase in the price of oil and disrupt the global economy. Possibly, but it appears that given the response from Tehran, it is the type of sanction that might actually force Iran to comply with international demands to halt its uranium enrichment program. It is widely accepted that the program is nothing more than a precursor to the development of a nuclear weapon, despite Iran's claims that it is merely building a nuclear energy capability.

The previous four United Nations sanctions protocols have not had the desired effect. Iran's immediate reaction and threats to halt the flow of one-sixth of the world's oil (a third of the oil that moves on the water) indicates how effective sanctions on Bank Markazi might be. President Obama has said recently that despite his misgivings, he will sign a sanctions bill.

If the President is serious about preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, this is a good first serious step - and a welcome one. I credit Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta for what appears to be an infusion of spine in dealing with the Iranians.

Panetta's words are pretty clear: "The United States does not want Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. That's a red line for us and that's a red line, obviously, for the Israelis. If we have to do it we will deal with it. ... If they proceed and we get intelligence that they are proceeding with developing a nuclear weapon then we will take whatever steps necessary to stop it. There are no options off the table. ... A nuclear weapon in Iran is unacceptable."

Islamic Republic of Iran Navy ships and mobile missile launcher

Iran also responded with military demonstration in the Persian Gulf in the guise of an exercise named Velayet-90. The exercise, currently underway, is being conducted in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, the bodies of water on either side of the Strait of Hormuz. The timing and venue are not a coincidence. It is meant to send a message to the West that Iran can close the world's major oil choke point if it wishes. Habibollah Sayyari, commander of the Iranian navy (and I use the term loosely), claimed that closing the strait "will be easier than drinking a glass of water."

That's the message Iranian leaders hope to send - that they can close the strait at will. They are saying it, and maybe even a few of them believe it, but there are some serious issues they may want to consider.

Although the sea lanes through the Strait of Hormuz transit the territorial waters of both Iran and Oman, the strait falls under the legal protocol of "transit passage" as codified by the United Nations and is thus open to ships of all nations. Basically, it is an international waterway.

The free flow of oil from the Persian Gulf is a vital U.S. national interest - this is not an area for missteps. It has been our stated policy for decades to guarantee that flow, using military force if necessary. In the past, the United States has gone so far as to re-flag Kuwaiti tankers to allow the U.S. Navy to escort the ships through the Strait during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s.

In response to the latest Iranian threat, a spokesperson for the U.S. Fifth Fleet made this statement: "Anyone who threatens to disrupt freedom of navigation in an international strait is clearly outside the community of nations; any disruption will not be tolerated." That's a polite way of saying to the Iranians, "If the Iranian Navy tries to close the Strait of Hormuz, the United States Navy will reopen it."

The Iranian navy would be no match for the firepower of the U.S. Fifth Fleet. The Fifth Fleet, the maritime component of the U.S. Central Command, commands ships on rotation from the Pacific (Seventh) Fleet or the Atlantic (Second Fleet). The fleet normally consists of a carrier strike group, an expeditionary strike group, and a variety of support assets. That translates to about 20 surface combatants and submarines, with 15,000 personnel (including a U.S. Marine expeditionary unit) and almost 100 combat aircraft. If the Iranians are serious about this, the Navy has another 10 carrier strike groups and 11 expeditionary strike groups from which to draw augmentation.

The Fifth Fleet will not operate alone. Since Iran's threatened action also impacts the Gulf Arab nations, they will likely allow basing of U.S. Air Force combat aircraft at their many excellent air bases. While the participation of our Arab allies is uncertain, they will open their facilities to maintain the flow of oil.

U.S. Navy Carrier Strike Group

Iranian challenges to the U.S. Navy in the Persian Gulf are not new. In 1988, the last year of the eight-year long Iran-Iraq War, there was a series of escalating events between the Iranians and Americans. When the U.S. agreed to escort Kuwaiti tankers in the Gulf, IRGC sailors laid mines in the shipping lanes, one of which damaged a U.S. Navy frigate.

In retaliation, the Navy destroyed an Iranian oil platform used for surveillance of U.S. operations. That caused the Iranian navy to attempt a surface engagement with the U.S. flotilla. In the battle that followed, two Iranian surface combatants and half a dozen speedboats were sunk and many other units and facilities damaged. The action was a stinging defeat for the Iranians.

If the Iranians are serious about provoking an armed confrontation with the United States, they must know what will happen to them. They have had a front row seat for decades of American combat operations in the Gulf, starting with our support of our Arab allies in the 1980s, the defense of Saudi Arabia and liberation of Kuwait in 1990 and 1991 (Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm), the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 (Operation Enduring Freedom), and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Operation Iraqi Freedom).

If there is a confrontation, it will not be a localized maritime confrontation in the Strait of Hormuz. American aircraft and cruise missiles (air, sea and submarine launched) will strike targets all over the country to neutralize the air defense system, establish air dominance over the country, and disrupt the regime's command and control systems. Air and naval assets will begin the elimination of the Iranian navy inventory. The Iranian navy possesses Chinese surface to surface missiles that are both ship and land launched - these are of concern, but in the end, they will be destroyed.

The Defense Intelligence Agency and the Office of Naval Intelligence have been collecting intelligence for three decades to support this exact operation - it is the key concern of the Fifth Fleet. This was always a threat posed by the Islamic Republic. The U.S. Navy has been planning, training and preparing for this for a long time - after all, this is why we have a navy. I am sure the plans are being updated as I write this.

There is a final consideration. If the Iranians mean to do this - and I don't think Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is that insane - they may just precipitate the very action they are trying to avert. Whether they carry out the threat or not will be Khamenei's decision. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad may have some input, but something with ramifications this extensive will be made by the Supreme Leader himself.

Iran's threats to close the Strait of Hormuz are in direct response to the U.S./Western threat of sanctions that will seriously hurt Tehran's nuclear weapons development program. If they are willing to trigger an armed confrontation with the United States, what is to stop the United States from attacking the nuclear facilities as well?

A confrontation between the United States and Iran has been brewing since the Islamic Revolution of 1978-1979. If we are once again going to send young Americans into harm's way, this time in Iran, we should break all of Ahmadinejad's toys.

Betrayals - Obama and the withdrawal from Iraq

2011-12-27T21:49:00.000-08:00

As President Barack Obama promised, all American forces withdrew from Iraq prior to the end of December 2011. That fulfilled the letter of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) negotiated between Baghdad and Washington in 2008. The Iraqi prime minister at the time was Nuri al-Maliki, who remains in that position.

When the deal was struck, then-President George Bush and Prime Minister al-Maliki envisioned that the security situation at the end of 2011 would dictate whether the agreement would be modified to retain a number of American forces in country. Then-Secretary of Defense Bob Gates estimated that "tens of thousands" of troops would likely be necessary to maintain security, even after the end of 2011.

As late as fall of 2011, Iraqi and American leaders were discussing how to keep a small number of American troops in Iraq after the December 31 deadline. Military leaders of both countries realized that although the Iraqi military and security forces have improved markedly since 2008, they were not capable of maintaining adequate security throughout the country. Even Democrat Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta was in favor of a continued troop presence after the end of this year.

It was the political leadership of both countries that failed the Iraqi people. Granted, the issue that precluded the signing of a modification of the SOFA - immunity for American forces in the country - is an important one and a key factor in virtually all of our similar agreements worldwide. Negotiators on both sides were of the opinion that some accommodation could be reached to allow some American troops to remain to lessen the chance of a spike in violence as the bulk of U.S. forces departed Iraq.

In its rush to get out of Iraq regardless of the security realities on the ground, the Obama Administration pulled the plug on the negotiations and played the "deer in the headlights" card - blaming the Iraqis and claiming that it could do nothing to break the impasse. What the Administration did was run for the exit and abandon the Iraqi people to a new round of sectarian violence - exactly what many Middle East specialists, including this one, predicted.

Of course, there were internal Iraqi politics involved. The Sadrists under namesake Muqtada al-Sadr, toeing the Iranian line, refused to accept any American presence. Iranian influence over the future of U.S. troop presence in Iraq? Yes, Iran, the same nation President Obama has decided to deal with through "outreach?" I guess after the success of his outreach policy in dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue - oh, wait, Iran is on the verge of developing a nuclear weapon. It is plain to see how that effort is working.

Betrayal of the American electorate
What the Administration did flies in face of campaign/transition-team promises - it is a betrayal of the trust placed in the President by the American electorate. Here are the words from the Obama-Biden transition team - it makes interesting reading: (my highlights)

The Obama-Biden Plan

Barack Obama and Joe Biden will responsibly end the war in Iraq so that we can renew our military strength, dedicate more resources to the fight against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and invest in our economy at home. The Obama-Biden plan will help us succeed in Iraq by transitioning to Iraqi control of their country.

Judgment You Can Trust

In 2002, Obama had the judgment and courage to speak out against going to war, and to warn of "an occupation of undetermined length, with undetermined costs, and undetermined consequences." He and Joe Biden are fully committed to ending the war in Iraq. *

A Responsible, Phased Withdrawal

Barack Obama and Joe Biden believe we must be as careful getting out of Iraq as we were careless getting in. Immediately upon taking office, Obama will give his Secretary of Defense and military commanders a new mission in Iraq: ending the war. The removal of our troops will be responsible and phased, directed by military commanders on the ground and done in consultation with the Iraqi government. Military experts believe we can safely redeploy combat brigades from Iraq at a pace of 1 to 2 brigades a month -- which would remove all of them in 16 months. That would be the summer of 2010 -- more than 7 years after the war began.

Under the Obama-Biden plan, a residual force will remain in Iraq and in the region to conduct targeted counter-terrorism missions against al Qaeda in Iraq and protect American diplomatic and civilian personnel. They will not build permanent bases in Iraq, but will continue efforts to train and support the Iraqi security forces as long as Iraqi leaders move toward political reconciliation and away from sectarianism.

Encouraging Political Accommodation

Barack Obama and Joe Biden believe that the U.S. must apply pressure on the Iraqi government to work toward real political accommodation. There is no military solution to Iraq’s political differences. Now is the time to press Iraq’s leaders to take responsibility for their future and to invest their oil revenues in their own reconstruction.

Obama and Biden's plan will help create lasting stability in Iraq. A phased withdrawal will encourage Iraqis to take the lead in securing their own country and making political compromises, while the responsible pace of redeployment called for by the Obama-Biden plan offers more than enough time for Iraqi leaders to get their own house in order. As our forces redeploy, Obama and Biden will make sure we engage representatives from all levels of Iraqi society -- in and out of government -- to forge compromises on oil revenue sharing, the equitable provision of services, federalism, the status of disputed territories, new elections, aid to displaced Iraqis, and the reform of Iraqi security forces.

Surging Diplomacy

Barack Obama and Joe Biden will launch an aggressive diplomatic effort to reach a comprehensive compact on the stability of Iraq and the region. This effort will include all of Iraq’s neighbors -- including Iran and Syria, as suggested by the bi-partisan Iraq Study Group Report. This compact will aim to secure Iraq’s borders; keep neighboring countries from meddling inside Iraq; isolate al Qaeda; support reconciliation among Iraq’s sectarian groups; and provide financial support for Iraq’s reconstruction and development.

Preventing Humanitarian Crisis

Barack Obama and Joe Biden believe that America has both a moral obligation and a responsibility for security that demands we confront Iraq’s humanitarian crisis -- more than five million Iraqis are refugees or are displaced inside their own country. Obama and Biden will form an international working group to address this crisis. They will provide at least $2 billion to expand services to Iraqi refugees in neighboring countries, and ensure that Iraqis inside their own country can find sanctuary. Obama and Biden will also work with Iraqi authorities and the international community to hold accountable the perpetrators of potential war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. They will reserve the right to intervene militarily, with our international partners, to suppress potential genocidal violence within Iraq.

The Status-of-Forces Agreement

Obama and Biden believe it is vital that a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) be reached so our troops have the legal protections and immunities they need. Any SOFA should be subject to Congressional review to ensure it has bipartisan support here at home.

* This fails to mention that then-Senator Joe Biden voted for the Iraq War resolution in 2002. He was for it before he was against it, I guess. If we were relying on Biden's votes on Iraq policy, Saddam Husayn would still be in Kuwait.

At the top of the transition team page - Change.gov - there is a quote from then President-Elect Obama, "Today we begin in earnest the work of making sure that the world we leave our children is just a little bit better than the one we inhabit today."

How about the world he has just left for Iraqi children?

Betrayal of America's armed forces
The United States deployed hundreds of thousands of its sons and daughters to remove Saddam Husayn and the Ba'th Party. They did that, quite effectively, in a matter of weeks. Granted, the execution of the war after Coalition Provisional Authority chief Jerry Bremer disbanded the Iraqi armed forces was abysmal and led to a prolonged insurgency that took thousands of lives unnecessarily. However, by 2007 and 2008, the "Anbar Awakening" and the troop surge had tamped the violence down and the country was beginning to function.

Then, two things happened - one was bad, the other was catastrophic. In 2008, the United States and Iraq signed the SOFA agreement that scheduled American troop withdrawals from the cities by June 2009, and from the country at the end of 2011. A key military principle is not telling the enemy your plans and timetable.

When the Obama Administration walked away from talks with the Iraqis, it pounded the final nail in the coffin for Iraqi security. The date certain timetables simply told the still-alive but badly hurt al-Qa'idah in Iraq (AQI) - as well as the Sadrists under Muqtada al-Sadr - to regain relevance in Iraq, simply wait out the Americans. Lull them into a false sense of security, let them leave, then make your move.

Just days after the last American troops left the country, AQI set off a series of bombs, primarily targeting Shi'a facilities. AQI and other Sunni insurgents are putting the Shi'a-dominated Iraqi government of Nuri al-Maliki on notice that they will not accept heavy-handed treatment by the Shi'a majority in the country (60 percent of Iraq is Shi'a). The group referred to itself as the Ministry of War in the Islamic State of Iraq. It hopes to reignite the civil war it started in 2006.

For this, we suffered 4,400 dead and 32,000 wounded? The failure to reach an agreement by which American forces remain to assist Iraqi forces in maintaining security is a disgrace - it betrays the memory of our fallen and wounded. Handing things over to the Iraqis prematurely is reminiscent of the Administration's ludicrous concept of "leading from behind."

Betrayal of the Iraqi people
Not only have we betrayed the memory of our fallen, we have betrayed the trust of the Iraqi people who depended on the presence of American forces to keep a lid on sectarian violence. Iraqis, both Sunnis and Shi'a (not to mention the Kurds) are bewildered that the Americans just packed up and left.

Iraqis tend to be the most xenophobic of the Arabs. Most of the population wanted American troops to leave the country, but realized that those troops were the key to the uneasy stability in the country. They were correct, as we have seen.

American troop presence also kept a rein on the Shi'a government of Nuri al-Maliki. No sooner had the troops departed then al-Maliki began a series of political moves designed to consolidate his power. The Sunni vice president has been accused by the prime minister of operating death squads, al-Maliki has told the Sunnis he will not accept a proposal for a Sunni autonomous regime (although it is allowed under the Iraqi constitution), and threatened Shi'a political rivals with loss of powerful positions.

Who is going to stop him? Maybe we can ask him to cease and desist. That tactic worked well in securing the return of a top secret American drone from Iran - oh, wait, that failed.

Betrayal of the Mujahidin-e Khalq (MEK)
There is one more group being betrayed that we should not overlook. The MEK is a group of Iranians who have been in Iraq for decades. During the Saddam era, they conducted operations at the behest of the Iraqi dictator, mostly against Iranian regime targets. They are believed to have been involved on an attack on American diplomats, for which they were labeled as a terrorist organization by the State Department.

After the fall of Saddam Husayn, they agreed to lay down their arms and remain at Camp Ashraf under U.S. protection. When American troops withdrew from the cities, they abandoned Camp Ashraf to the Iraqis, who immediately attacked the now defenseless group.

Caving to Iranian pressure, the Iraqis told the MEK they must leave Camp Ashraf and Iraq. The U.S. brokered a deal whereby they will move to an abandoned American military base temporarily pending resettlement. However, they cannot come to the United States as long as they remain on the terrorism list.

The group was instrumental in providing critical intelligence on the Iranian nuclear program. For that, they are abandoned and betrayed by the Obama Administration. The President can fix this with the stroke of a pen. I am waiting for him to do the right thing.

Bottom line
The premature withdrawal from Iraq based on political expedience ostensibly fulfills a campaign commitment by the President - ostensibly because the actual promise was to "responsibly end the war in Iraq." What Mr. Obama has done is to make a run for the exit, regardless of the death and chaos we leave behind.

Rhetoric and speeches to the contrary, this will come back to haunt us. Although the President is too young to remember another war, Biden should - can he spell F-A-L-L-O-F-S-A-I-G-O-N?

Unless the President realizes that his actions should go beyond the next election and corrects his Iraq policy, they constitute betrayals on a variety of levels.

Syria on the brink of a civil war

2011-12-24T14:44:00.000-08:00

Syrian television images of a car used in one of two suicide bombings
in Damascus targeting military and civilian intelligence facilities

The headlines are virtually the same every day - more Syrian civilians are killed by the military and security forces loyal to President Bashar al-Asad and more soldiers defect to the opposition. Of course, the regime has recently upped the ante, adding jet fighters and helicopter gunships to the fight. The death toll is over 5,000 civilians, while the regime claims that over 2,000 of its troops and security personnel have been killed as well.

The Syrian government agreed to allow a team of Arab League observers into the country; the advance element arrived in the last few days. The team is headed by a Sudanese general with blood on his hands from the genocide in Darfur, leading to questions of the credibility of the observer mission. The team will theoretically monitor an agreement between Syria and the Arab League by which the Syrian military will withdraw from the cities.

As the observers began to arrive, recent headlines change things even more, and not in a good way. Two suicide bombers detonated car bombs near military and civilian intelligence facilities in the Kafr Susa section of Damascus. The death toll is at least 40 and will likely be higher as cleanup continues. Suicide bombing has not really been a part of the Syrian opposition arsenal. The location of the attacks, in an upscale section of Damascus, brings what amounts to a civil war home to Syria's capital city. Residents who felt insulated from the violence occurring in other cities around Syria are now faced with the possibility of escalating violence in their own backyard.

Of course, the Syrian government has reiterated its dubious claims that the violence and protests are the work of "terrorists backed by foreign powers trying to topple the state." I am not sure which foreign power the Syrians mean, thought when they make these claims it is normally directed against Israel and the United States. When I served as the air attache to the American Embassy in the early/mid-1990s, every Syrian function to which I was invited included a diatribe against Israel and U.S. foreign policy. It got tiresome.

Israelis I have spoken to about this issue are adamant that the violence is not the work of the Israeli intelligence services. Israel, along with many moderate Syrians and the few remaining Christians and Jews in the country, is concerned that the removal of the al-Asad regime will usher in an Islamist government dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood - with good reason. The primary groups attempting to force Bashar al-Asad to step down is the Syrian National Council which is controlled by the Syrian wing of the Muslim Brotherhood. Israel believes that even with al-Asad in power, Syria can be deterred from a confrontation with Israel, despite its alliance with Iran, who conversely cannot be deterred. In any case, Israel can deal with al-Asad; an Islamist state might pose a greater threat.

Perhaps the "foreign powers" the Syrians mean are the Turks. The Syrian National Council is headquartered in Istanbul and supported by the Islamic party that dominates the government of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) has espoused Islamic ideals in Turkey - such as proposing to allow women to wear the hijab (headscarf) in government offices, and curtailing the rights of women in what has been a secular Turkey. It stands to reason that the Erdogan government would support an organization that hopes to convert secular Ba'th Syria to a more Islamic government and society.

The Syrian government's claims notwithstanding, there is no doubt that the country is devolving into civil war. The battle lines are still fluid, but in general you find the moderate Sunnis, many of the Christians, the Druze and the minority 'Alawis supporting the regime of Bashar al-Asad. Make no mistake - most of these constituencies differ politically with the al-Asad regime, but sometimes it is the better to keep the devil you know. The only thing these groups have in common is that the fear that a post al-Asad government will be dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood, threatening the secular society that the Ba'th Party has built over the last almost five decades.

On the other side, the opposition includes many Syrians who want to end the rule of the Ba'th Party and the 'Alawi minority. Unfortunately, they have been subjugated to the Islamic-leaning factions,including the Muslim Brotherhood. The level of violence in the country rivals that of the attack on Hamah in 1982. Although many more people were killed in that massacre, the present confrontation is much more widespread and has the additional element of attracting deserters from the armed forces. This is the closest Syria has been to civil war since its founding.

The world has been vocal in its condemnation of the Syrian regime for its brutal repression of its citizens, while the United Nations has been largely silent. It would appear that the UN is wary of creating the conditions for military intervention as was done in Libya earlier this year.

"We're not the Libyans"

In response to any potential military operations against it, such as a no-fly zone to prevent the continued use of fighter aircraft and attack helicopters against demonstrators, Syria has broadcast a series of military videos on both Syrian and Russian television. Supporters of the regime have posted the videos on the internet, including Facebook and You Tube. The videos are well-made and showcase a wide range of Syrian military hardware in live fire exercises. From my attache days, the level of information released in these videos is astounding to me. The Syrians are extremely sensitive about releasing any information on their military capabilities.

Here are television broadcasts of Syrian combined arms live fire exercises:

Why the sudden release of Syrian military videos? Simple - the Syrians are telling the world that intervention in Libya is one thing; intervention in Syria would be quite another. They have a point - the logistics involved in mounting a no-fly-zone in Syria would be challenging, especially with no more American forces in neighboring Iraq. Using Israeli bases is out of question. Turkey, a NATO ally, would be key to any successful operation, but I don't see that happening at this time. Carrier-based aviation will not be adequate.

Unless there is sufficient international pressure, be it diplomatic, economic or in the last resort, military, it does not appear that Bashar al-Asad is going to relinquish power. He has already demonstrated that he is willing to kill large numbers of his own citizens to maintain his regime.

Change from inside Syria will be difficult, but many Syrians seem willing to take the risk. The country is either in, or soon will be, a civil war. The question we need to be addressing: do we assist the opposition and by doing so possibly helping usher in an Islamic government?

Syrian Air Force video analysis

2011-12-15T21:08:00.000-08:00

A friend sent this to me, knowing that I served as the Air Attache to the U.S. Embassy in Damascus, Syria from late 1992 to early 1995. It is a video posted on You Tube, titled in Arabic, "Asad's Eagles of Syria. The peace of God be upon you, you most honorable people."

When I was the air attache, the Syrians basically ignored me - relations between the United States and Syria were awful, despite the temporary and politically expedient alliance during Desert Storm in 1991. My only official contacts with the Syrian military were the occasional "hail and farewell" dinners at the Officers Club for departing and arriving military attaches, and the graduation ceremonies from the four Syrian military academies - the Naval Academy at Latakia, the Military Academy at Homs, the Women's Military College in Damascus, and the Air Force Academy at Rasin al-'Abud air base about 25 miles from Aleppo.

When I watched the video of a formation Sukhoi-24 (NATO: FENCER) aircraft, I immediately started looking for familiar landmarks. As I watched, I thought the large city resembled what I remembered of Syria's second-largest city, Aleppo, located in northern Syria close to the Turkish border. There was something eerily familiar about the airfield as the formation passed over it, like I had been there before. As it turns out, I actually had been there. When the aircraft kept on flying, I realized it was a fly-by.

So, for those of you who want to play imagery interpreter for a few minutes...

Open Google Earth and the You Tube video - we'll use both.

What we are looking at is a fly-by by three SU-24's at the Syrian Air Force Academy at Rasin al-'Abud air base - the formation flies over the parking apron from west to east.

The video opens with the formation north of Aleppo. At 0:21, the aircraft is north of Aleppo airport, also known as Nayrab air base. You can see the runways under the aircraft in the video, and closer the Shaykh Najar industrial area. I put the formation at about 36 24N 37 17E.

The aircraft then fly due west about 25 miles to Rasin al-'Abud. Pull up the air base on Google Earth at coordinates 36 11 10N 37 34 30E.

On the video at 2:46, there is a Yak-40 (NATO: CODLING) parked on the apron, on Google Earth at 36 11 04.70N 36 34 14.00E. When we attaches were transported to Rasin al-'Abud for academy graduations, it was on a Yak-40, and we parked at that spot. Note the pattern of the apron and trees, and compare it to the Google Earth imagery. You can see the white circle painted on the tarmac on both, at 36 11 05.04N 36 34 19.63E. There is a reviewing stand under the area where the vehicles are parked. It is not easily visible from the air, but having been there twice, I recognize it.

At 2:55, you can see two Quonset hut looking buildings. They are visible on Google Earth at 36 10 44.25N 37 35 41.75E. After that, the jets head east over Dayr al-Hafir and then out over the desert, likely to the south. I assume they were headed home to Tiyas air base (at 34 31 30N 37 37 40E, which gives new meaning to "the middle of nowhere").

As an aside, here is a photo of two MiG-23 (NATO: FLOGGER) fighter aircraft in shelters and one on a hardstand at the east end of the runway at Rasin al-'Abud. (There is a photo icon on the Google Earth imagery.)

I did not know they had fighters at Rasin al-'Abud in addition to the L-39 Albatross and MBB-223 Flamingo trainers. From personal experience, I can tell you that taking these photos, or any photos for that matter, near a Syrian air base is an extremely dangerous activity.

I was surprised that someone has posted this video taken by a Syrian pilot. My experience with the Syrian armed forces is that they are one of the most paranoid and security-conscious militaries in the world. What I would have given for access to this type of information in the early 1990's....

Just when you think the Saudis have learned....

2011-12-14T11:53:00.000-08:00

Beheading in Saudi Arabia

Over the last almost four decades, I have tried to give the Saudis the benefit of the doubt when it comes to their attempts to throw off the bonds of ultra-conservative Islam and embrace some semblance of modernity in what we Middle East specialists like to (somewhat derisively) call "the Magic Kingdom." I have served in Saudi Arabia many times in a variety of positions, including being a liaison officer to the Saudi armed forces and as General Norman Schwarzkopf's Arabic-language interpreter during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Try as I might to see the Saudi positions on some of their ways, they do not make it easy.

Some of the Saudi positions are puzzling - for example, the prohibition on women driving in the kingdom. Saudi Arabia is the only country in the world with this restriction. For a discussion on that, see my article, "Women driving in Saudi Arabia? I give up." (May 2011)

The women's driving issue, however, pales when compared to the recent beheading of individuals - regardless of gender - for sorcery and witchcraft, sometimes even referred to as "black magic." In 2007, an Egyptian pharmacist was beheaded for sorcery, sparking international outrage. In 2010 when a Lebanese television personality was sentenced to be beheaded for the same crime, the Saudi government caved in to world opinion and stayed the execution; the man remains in prison for the "crime." I discussed this in my earlier article - "Saudi Arabia - What century are we in here?" (April 2010)

Evidently, the Saudis have not changed their position on beheading people convicted of sorcery. In September of this year, a Sudanese man was beheaded in the the city of Medina (al-Madinah al-Munawarah) after being convicted of sorcery. As an aside, Amnesty International claims that the number of executions overall had tripled from 27 in 2010 to 79 thus far in 2011.

It continues. Witch hunting has become institutionalized in Saudi Arabia - the country's religious police now have an Anti-Witchcraft Unit and a sorcery hotline. On December 12, a woman named Aminah bint 'Abd al-Halim bin Salim Nasr was beheaded in the al-Jawf region of northern Saudi Arabia after being convicted of sorcery and witchcraft.

Rape, murder, apostasy, armed robbery and drug trafficking are all punishable by death under Saudi Arabia's strict interpretation of Islamic law. Here is an interesting story/interview by Lebanese television on beheadings and Saudi Arabia's most famous executioner.

As I said before - execution by beheading for witchcraft and sorcery? What century is this?

The coming nuclear arms race in the Middle East

2011-12-05T16:41:00.000-08:00

The "proliferation spiral" in the Middle East

Given the abdication of American leadership on the Iranian nuclear program for the last decade - both the Bush and Obama Administrations have failed - it appears that Iran will be successful in acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.

Here are the words of Vice President (then Senator) Joe Biden when he was a Presidential candidate in 2008:

“I stand with the many citizens - from the U.S. and around the world - who are concerned at the prospect of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. Nuclear proliferation is a grave concern to international stability, and in the hands of the sponsors of terrorism is entirely unacceptable.

“Iran with the bomb could spark an arms race in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria joining in. Given the fault lines - between Sunni and Shi'a, Israelis and Palestinians, Persians and Arabs, Turks and Kurds, fundamentalists and moderates - that's the last thing we need. And it's the last thing Israel needs.

"No President should take any option off the table, including force. But we have time: Iran is years away from having a bomb and a missile to deliver it. We need to use the time wisely."

I would posit that "we" - that would be you and Barack Obama in this case - have not used the time wisely. In the more than three years since you made those statements, Iran has moved steadily towards its goal while all "we" have done is make idle threats of "crippling sanctions." Your Secretary of State's blatantly misleading claims about increased Russian and Chinese support notwithstanding, the sanctions "we" have been able to get through the United Nations Security Council have been ineffective in achieving the objectives. Life is tougher now for the average Iranian, sure, but "we" have not measurably slowed the Iranian nuclear program.

One would have to conclude that despite the rhetoric of the American government, the United States has resigned itself to dealing with a nuclear-armed Iran. That will inevitably lead to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Iran should be thanking us.

Israel

Israel may not so easily accept the existence of Iran with a nuclear arsenal. We'll forgo the discussion on Israel's not-so-secret nuclear weapons. It is a fact the Arabs have learned to live with - most have assessed that the probability of a first-use strike by Israel is too low to quantify. The Iranians? Given the urgency with which they are developing nuclear weapons and the missiles with which to deliver them, the mullahs have not made that same calculation.

I cannot fathom what thought processes, if any, are going through the minds of the Iranian leadership as they rush towards a certain confrontation with the rest of the world. I believe they have correctly assessed that despite the "no options off the table" talk from Washington, there will be no American military action by this Administration and that they have a free hand to continue their efforts.

The confrontation over the program, if there is one, will be with Israel. The United States believes it can deter a nuclear-armed Iran if necessary. Iran poses no missile threat - not yet, at least - to the contiguous United States. The missile track from Iran to CONUS is at least 5,000 nautical miles. While the Iranians may think they might prevail in a fight with its Arab neighbors or even on a good day, Israel, even President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad knows that a nuclear attack on the United States would almost certainly result in a "Biblical, Old Testament-level" response.

The difference between the American and Israeli assessments of Iran is based on the probability that deterrence will work. The Israeli intelligence analysts with whom I have discussed this issue believe that Israel can successfully deter any of its Arab neighbors from using any type of weapon of mass destruction against the Jewish state, knowing that Israel possesses what we called in the military, a "strategic capability" - military/diplo-speak for "nuclear weapons."

Whether or not Israel will tolerate Iran's acquisition of a deliverable nuclear weapons capability is still questionable. We know the Israelis have developed and exercised plans to attack Iran's nuclear facilities. At some point they may want to execute one of those options. However, the likelihood of a successful attack on Iran is not great. It is a long way to the targets - virtually all of it in hostile airspace, which precludes many aerial refueling options, thus the aircraft will be operating at the extreme limits of their combat radii and will be carrying more external fuel tanks and less munitions.

It is a difficult military scenario. Will the Israelis try it? That depends on how they assess Iranian intentions once Tehran has nuclear warheads and missiles to carry them. If they believe the Iranians are apt to launch a first strike, the Israelis will attack. They will not wait to absorb the potential destruction of half of Israel's population.

While Israel's reaction is uncertain, the same cannot be said for the other power brokers in the region. If the Iranians acquire nuclear weapons, it will ignite an arms race in the region. At a minimum, Saudi Arabia, Egypt (as it recovers from the revolution) and Turkey will seek their own "strategic capabilities."

Saudi Arabia
The former director of Saudi Arabia's intelligence service stated this week that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, then the Kingdom may be forced to as well. Although Prince Turki al-Faysal couched his remarks by first citing the world's failure to convince Israel to abandon its nuclear weapons, then casually adding "as well as Iran," his meaning was perfectly clear - if Iran develops them, we'll buy our own. Saudi Arabia is currently planning to build 16 nuclear reactors to generate electricity. The weapons program would be an easy add-on, although the Kingdom is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Saudi interest in a nuclear weapons capability is not new. In 1987, the Saudis purchased CSS-2 missiles from China; the missiles are designed to carry a nuclear warhead. Although the Saudis did not acquire that capability, they did express interest in a joint research and development program with Pakistan. If the Saudis decide to move ahead with a nuclear weapons capability, they have the requisite infrastructure already in place.

While I deplore the release of classified documents by the Wikileaks crowd, some of the information is interesting. Here is an excerpt from a February 2010 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh to the Secretary of State. (10RIYADH178, SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY CLINTON'S FEB 15-16 VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA, classified SECRET NOFORN. Read the entire cable here.)

9. (S/NF) COUNTERING IRAN: We expect that Saudi Arabia will continue to develop its ties with China, in part to counterbalance relations with the West. While the King's preference is to cooperate with the U.S., he has concluded that he needs to proceed with his own strategy to counter Iranian influence in the region, which includes rebuilding Riyadh-Cairo-Damascus coordination, supporting Palestinian reconciliation, supporting the Yemeni government, and expanding relations with non-traditional partners such as Russia, China, and India to create diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran that do not directly depend on U.S. help. The King told General Jones that if Iran succeeded in developing nuclear weapons, everyone in the region would do the same, including Saudi Arabia.

10. (S/NF) The King is convinced that current U.S. engagement efforts with Tehran will not succeed; he is likely to feel grimly vindicated in his view by Ahmadinejad's February 11 boast that having successfully enriched uranium to a level of 20 percent, Iran "is now a nuclear nation." The King told General Jones that Iranian internal turmoil presented an opportunity to weaken the regime -- which he encouraged -- but he also urged that this be done covertly and stressed that public statements in support of the reformers were counterproductive. The King assesses that sanctions could help weaken the government, but only if they are strong and sustained. The King will want you to elaborate on the President's statement that the time for sanctions has come. He will also want to hear our plans for bolstering Gulf defenses vis-a-vis Iran. (The King has invited General Petraeus to his desert camp for discussion on this topic on Tuesday.)

Turkey
Turkish leaders, watching what is happening in neighboring Iran, are involved in discussions on whether the country should begin a nuclear weapons program. While the ruling Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, or AKP) has attempted to bridge the gap between Iran and the West, Iran does not seem to be interested in a compromise. A Turkish-brokered deal failed last year.

A nuclear-armed Iran would challenge Turkey for dominance in Central Asia at a time when the nation is seeking to re-assert itself as the leader of all the Turkic peoples. There has been a low-level nuclear program in the country for years, including some cooperation with Pakistan. If Turkey is to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, the AKP will have to give the word and allocate the requisite resources.

Turkey's economy is doing remarkably well compared to the rest of Europe, so investing money in an expensive research and development program will meet resistance. When Iran presents the world with a nuclear weapon, the Turks will overcome that resistance and embark on their own program.

Egypt
Egypt is the leader of the Arab world. If the Iranians successfully acquire a nuclear weapons capability, Egypt will assess that as a direct threat to the Arab World. While Saudi Arabia views Iran as a rival in the Persian Gulf, Egypt views Iran in the larger context of the entire Arab World.

We know, thanks to Wikileaks, the former Mubarak regime's position on a nuclear armed Iran. This is taken from a May 2008 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Cairo (08CAIRO1067, CODEL BAIRD MEETS WITH EGYPTIAN LEADERS ON MARGINS OF WEF, classified CONFIDENTIAL. Read the entire cable here.)

3. (C) Asked about Egypt's reaction if Iran developed nuclear weapons capability, Mubarak said that none will accept a nuclear Iran, "we are all terrified." Mubarak said that when he spoke with former Iranian President Khatami he told him to tell current President Ahmedinejad "not to provoke the Americans" on the nuclear issue so that the U.S. is not forced to strike. Mubarak said that Egypt might be forced to begin its own nuclear weapons program if Iran succeeds in those efforts.

There is a new government in formation in Cairo. What the new government will be, let alone their policy toward Iran and its nuclear weapons program, is undetermined. I suspect even a Muslim Brotherhood-dominated government will want to seek an antidote to the poison of a nuclear-armed Shi'a Islamist power in the Persian Gulf.

Syria
The regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad has its hands full merely maintaining itself in power. Its first serious attempt to acquire nuclear weapons was destroyed by the Israeli Air Force in 2007 when they attacked a North Korean-provided reactor northwest of Day az-Zawr. If the regime survives, they will likely revive their quest for nuclear weapons, but this is not in reaction to the Iranian nuclear program. Iran and Syria are allies; they are signatories of a mutual defense treaty. A Syrian weapon will be in reaction to Israel's nuclear capabilities.

If the Syrian regime survives and decides to pursue a nuclear weapons program, it is a virtual certainty that Israel will attack it.

Bottom line
An Iranian nuclear weapons capability will trigger research and development programs in several countries in the region. Iran cannot be trusted as a steward of these weapons - several Arab states and the Turks do not trust the mullahs in Tehran and will seek the ultimate deterrent, nuclear weapons of their own.

Biden's upcoming visit to Turkey - propping up an Islamist?

2011-12-01T19:40:00.000-08:00

Sultan Ahmet Mosque, Istanbul (photo: Rick Francona)

Vice President Joe Biden is scheduled to visit Turkey and Greece this week, after a short visit to Iraq. While it is normal for senior Administration officials to visit key allies Turkey and Greece - both countries are NATO allies - I am surprised Biden chose to visit Iraq following the Obama Administration's failure to negotiate the continued presence of American troops in the country past December 31, 2011. That's a matter for a different discussion - see my comments on that foreign policy debacle: Iraq - Obama spins another policy failure into a success? I still have hopes that failure can be salvaged.

Anytime Mr. Biden travels, he is apt to make embarrassing statements - we all remember his remarks on China's one-child policy. The vice president will be in Ankara to meet with Turkish officials about the situation in neighboring Syria, as well as Turkey's continuing fight with the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK, a designated terrorist organization). Mr. Biden will then travel to Istanbul to attend a global entrepreneurship summit aimed at increasing U.S. business ties in the Arab and Muslim world.

We have a preview of what the substance of Biden's remarks in Turkey might be. A few days ago, Biden's national security advisor (if we are looking for a way to save money in the federal government, let's eliminate this useless position) Tony Blinken praised the government of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

I will give Mr. Blinken the benefit of the doubt here - he seems like a bright guy, educated at Harvard and Columbia with a lot of Washington staff experience, but apparently little familiarity with things Middle Eastern. His statements echo the Administration's continued support of an Islamic government in what once was a staunchly secular Muslim democracy, the poster child for how Islam and democracy might coexist. I am sure he has a Google alert set up for his name, so I'll help him connect the dots.

We do need to support Turkey's fight against PKK terrorism, after all, Turkey supported American military efforts in Afghanistan by sending non-combat troops. However, the relationship between Ankara and Washington has suffered some serious setbacks over the last decade.

In January 2003, after agreeing to allow the U.S. Army 4th Infantry Division (4ID) to deploy into northern Iraq via Turkish territory, the newly elected Islamist government abruptly changed its mind and refused passage. That forced the United States to re-deploy the entire division from Turkey to Kuwait, delaying the 4ID's entry into the fight until mid-April. The delay not only prevented the United States from opening up a second front that would have caused the Iraqis to split their forces defending Baghdad, it possibly added to the number of American battle casualties.

Turkey also sought to create an Iranian-Turkish-Syrian alliance in 2010 after the Mavi Marmara incident. That was coincident with Turkish efforts to play the mediator role in the dispute between Iran and virtually the rest of the world over its nuclear program. Their efforts, while well-intentioned, slowed down the already glacial progress on the imposition of meaningful sanctions on Iran - which has not yet happened.

As Syria's regime has adopted brutal repressive measured against its own population, Turkey has been in the forefront of sanctions against Damascus and has made repeated calls for Syrian President Bashar al-Asad to step down. The Turks have allowed the major Syrian opposition group, the Muslim Brotherhood-dominated Syrian National Council, to set up its headquarters in Istanbul.

A closer look at Turkey's stance against the Ba'th Party regime in Syria might be instructional for Messrs. Biden and Blinken. First, some history might be in order. Prime Minister Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (Turkish: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, or AKP) was founded in 2001 and elected to power in a landslide in 2002 with over two-thirds of the seats in the Grand National Assembly.

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 al-Qa'idah attacks on the United States, there was an increase in militant Islam throughout the Muslim world. In Turkey, that translated into growth for the nascent Islamist AKP. In the elections in 2007, the AKP increased its share of the popular vote, and again in 2011 the party was able to maintain the majority position in the government.

For the two gentlemen, please take away from this article that the Turkish government is controlled by an Islamist party, and that the Syrian National Council is dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood. Erdogan is supporting his fellow Islamists in Syria, hoping that the next Syrian government is an Islamist one, much like the one he envisions for Turkey. Turkey is also forging ties with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, as well as with Palestinian Hamas*.

Mr. Blinken's own words demonstrate his regional naivete. "We've been urging the Turks in this constitutional reform process to have an inclusive process that strengthens freedoms of expression, religion and other fundamental rights, including the human rights of minorities...." The Turks I talk to believe they already had strong freedoms of these basic human rights until the ascendancy of Erdogan and the AKP. Turkey under Ergodan and the Islamist AKP is not progressing as far as these rights are concerned, it is regressing.

I just returned from a trip to Turkey. Granted, I spoke to mostly secular and Western-leaning members of the population, but there is a growing sense of unease that the AKP is leading Turkey away from the ideals that led to the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923 based on the secular ideals of Kemal Ataturk. Ataturk's party now finds itself in the minority and the opposition.

My Turkish contacts specifically are opposed to the attempts by the AKP to change many of the secular rules in favor of a more fundamentalist adherence of Islam. For example, current Turkish law prohibits women who work for the government from wearing the başörtüsü, the Muslim headscarf, in government facilities. The party attempted to change this law by granting "personal choice" to women employees. The party also sponsored a change to the country's constitution and the law that bans women from wearing headscarves at universities. While these seem innocuous to us, they are real issues in secular Muslim countries that are trying to balance Islam and modernity.

When Vice President Biden or members of his staff praise the Turkish government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, they lend credibility to Erdogan's Islamist agenda. Do we really want to do that?

Pakistan - part of the problem, not the solution

2011-11-29T22:37:00.000-08:00

U.S. Army AH-64 Apache attack helicopter

The recent attack on two Pakistani border posts by NATO (read: American) combat aircraft and the political fallout it has generated highlights the fragile relationship between the United States and Pakistan. This incident comes at a time when the earlier damage to the relationship caused by the American special operations forces raid that killed Usamah bin Ladin was beginning to fade.

As expected, there are conflicting reports about exactly what happened. NATO and Afghan forces claim that artillery was fired at them from the vicinity of the two Pakistani border posts. The Pakistanis, of course, deny this claim. One senior Pakistani officer went so far to make the ludicrous claim that this may have been a deliberate attack on the part of NATO.

I have to assume that there was artillery fire from the Pakistani side of the border. The question is who conducted the fire - was it Pakistani troops or members of the Taliban using Pakistani territory as a safe haven, knowing that NATO and Afghan forces cannot legally follow them or attack them in Pakistan? The Americans responded, as they should have, with overwhelming firepower.

The thought that it may have been Pakistani artillery is not out of the question - the Pakistani army and intelligence services are full of Taliban (and al-Qa'idah) sympathizers. More likely, though, the fire was from Afghan Taliban fighters operating right under the nose of the Pakistani troops who have rarely intervened to prevent the Afghan Taliban from using Pakistani territory. Note that the Pakistanis have taken action against the Pakistani Taliban, but often ignore at best - and support at worst - the Afghan Taliban.

The relationship between the United States and Pakistan can hardly be called an alliance. Much of that is due to the fact that Pakistan is hardly a viable country. It is yet another country cobbled together in the waning days of the British Empire. It has disparate ethnic groups that have not truly reconciled themselves into being a nation. One of these groups is the Pushtuns, the same group that comprises the largest ethnic group across the border - an artificial construct diving the Pushtuns - in Afghanistan.

I have always wondered about Pakistan and other countries in the region whose borders were drawn by failed European colonialists, where the loyalties of many of the tribal and ethnic groups lie. Are the Pushtuns of Pakistan more loyal to the government in Islamabad or to their blood relatives on either side of an imaginary line drawn by a foreign power? Will the Pushtuns of Afghanistan take up arms against the Pushtuns in Pakistan based on orders issued by a multi-ethnic government in Kabul?

The Pakistanis have retaliated for the incident by demanding that the CIA leave a Pakistani air base in Baluchistan from which the controversial - and highly effective - Predator armed unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operation is conducted. I am not sure that will really happen. If you look at the targets killed by the UAVs, the program benefits Pakistan more than the United States. Since the attacks are launched from Pakistani soil against targets also on Pakistani soil, the targets must be approved by the Pakistani intelligence service, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate. Therefore, all of the militants killed by American UAV-launched missiles are actually those that the Pakistanis want dead, almost exclusively Pakistani Taliban members. It is the militants that appear on both the Pakistani and American lists that are targeted. Why would the ISI halt an operation that furthers its interests at almost no cost to them?

The targets who are missing from the UAV program targets are the al-Qa'idah and Afghan Taliban militants that the United States wants dead - but the Pakistanis may not. The ISI is manned by officers who were responsible for the creation of the Taliban and by officers who were at least sympathetic to Usamah bin Ladin. There are some analysts (me included) who believe that the ISI was also protecting bin Ladin, necessitating the unilateral American special operations raid on the bin Ladin compound in Abbottabad, a city full of retired Pakistani military and intelligence officers and home to the country's military academy. Most of the analysts I speak with believe that the Pakistanis are either complicit or incompetent in the bin Ladin case. I am not sure which is more palatable.

Pakistan has tried, with some success, to manipulate the United States because it believes that the Americans need Pakistan to prosecute the war on al-Qa'idah. That may have been the case in 2001, but much less so today. This is where I take exception with the Obama Administration's policy on the war on Afghanistan, as I did with the Bush Administration as well. The war in Afghanistan was launched to attack and destroy al-Qa'idah. That objective, as far as Afghanistan is concerned, was met that same year. The remnants of al-Qa'idah fled to Pakistan, and later Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Somalia. Operations against al-Qa'idah in Pakistan were impossible - after all, the Pakistanis or elements in the Pakistani military and intelligence services were providing support to al-Qa'idah.

For whatever reason, the United States embarked on a nation-building exercise in Afghanistan which of necessity included military operations against the Taliban. Until that time, the Taliban had never been a threat to the United States. At some point, America was engaged in a war against a group that had not threatened the United States in a country that has no national security interest to the United States. The enemy - al-Qa'idah - had mostly fled to Pakistan.

At best, Pakistan made virtually no effort to take on the al-Qa'idah Organization (tanzim al-qa'idah). At worst, the Pakistani military and intelligence establishments either actively or passively supported the terrorist group. The group's leader was found living in a compound virtually in the Pakistani government's backyard almost 10 years later.

Bottom line for me: the United States should no longer be engaged in military operations in Afghanistan. Our mission there should have ended with the removal of the Taliban government and the flight of the al-Qa'idah vermin to Pakistan. Our attention should then have shifted to Pakistan. Our attempts to ally with Pakistan have failed - we are doing their bidding in their war against the Pakistani Taliban while they continue to support the Afghan Taliban and any remaining elements of al-Qa'idah.

The Pakistanis are not part of the solution - they are part of the problem.

Syria - nearing the brink of civil war?

2011-11-27T16:24:00.000-08:00

The situation in Syria continues to deteriorate, almost to the point that many observers are warning that the country is destined for a civil war. The divisions in the country go far beyond the political differences that have existed in Syria since the country was created after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War One. When there are significant defections from the Syrian armed forces and attacks on Syrian military installations, there is the potential for the breakdown of civil authority and the descent into a civil war between two defined groups, or a complete breakdown and the evolution of anarchy. In Syria, I suspect it will be the former.

For those of us who have lived in the country and observed it first hand, it comes as no surprise that the government and various segments of the population are so far apart. When I was assigned to the American Embassy as the air attache, it was evident that there were huge divisions between the rulers and the ruled, the exploiters and the exploited, those on the inside and the rest of the country.

In an academic paradigm, the divisions are moot points. In the reality of the current situation on the streets of Syria's cities, the divisions take on serious meanings. The willingness of an oppressed population to demonstrate against - and confront - a government that shows no remorse in using troops backed by armor and artillery only tells me that the country is indeed headed for a civil war.

One thing is clear to me: President Bashar al-Asad will not step down. No combination of western, United Nations or the imminent Arab League sanctions will convince him that a voluntary abdication is a viable course of action. If Bashar is to be removed from power, it will be after much more bloodshed and civil strife in the country. Should Bashar al-Asad be removed, it will also be the death knell for the position of his corrupt 'Alawi clans.

More important than the removal of the 'Alawi clans from power, the downfall of Bashar al-Asad will also spell the end of secular socialist Ba'th Party. The Ba'th Party has been in power for over four decades, and while almost universally regarded as nothing more than "'Alawi, Inc." or "The al-Asad Corporation," it does maintain a stance against rising Islamic fundamentalism in the country. That one fact is key to the support the al-Asad regime enjoys among a significant portion of the Sunni and Christian Arab members of the population. Many Syrians fear that the demise of the al-Asad family and the Ba'th Party will lead to an Islamic fundamentalist government in Syria. These Syrians prefer "the devil you know" to the specter of an Islamic republic.

Thus far, nothing has altered the behavior of the al-Asad regime. Sanctions imposed by the United States and European nations have had little effect. That is not surprising since Syria has been somewhat of a pariah nation for decades. The threat of Arab League sanctions carries a bit more weight, but in the end, Syria is no stranger to being estranged from its Arab brethren. In one of the longest and bloodiest wars in modern history, the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988, Syria alone among the Arab countries sided with Persian Iran against Arab Iraq.

While virtually all Arab states were materially, financially or morally supporting Iraq, Syria provided access to its airbases for Iranian aircraft conducting attacks against targets in Iraq. Given the fact that Syria's major trading partners are countries in the European Union and its major export to those countries is oil, I doubt the threat of sanctions from the Arab League will have any real impact on the al-Asad regime. Yes, it acts concerned about the opinions of the Arab League, but in the end will stand alone against its Arab brethren. It really has no choice.

It may be the refusal of the al-Asad regime to deal with the international community that eventually leads to its demise. Every week there are reports of new defections from the Syrian armed forces to the Free Syrian Army (logo left*), the major in-country opposition group. These former Syrian military personnel have the weapons and training to create real problems for the regime.

During the initial period of the uprising, the majority of the demonstrators were civilians across the country - there was no coherent, organized opposition. Now we have the Free Syrian Army appealing to soldiers to defect to the opposition, with some effect. Outside the country, the Syrian National Council (SNC) is the leading opposition group. According to most analysts of things Syrian - including me - the SNC is basically the Muslim Brotherhood.

Yes, that is the same al-ikhwan al-muslimin that has gained the upper hand in Tunisia and Egypt, will likely be the key power broker in Libya, and is on the rise in Morocco and Algeria. North Africa is becoming a victory story for the Brotherhood, which comes as no surprise - many of the Islamists captured or killed fighting for al-Qa'idah throughout the Middle East and South Asia are from the area stretching from Morocco to Egypt.

Note also that the SNC is based in Turkey. The current Turkish government is headed by an Islamist prime minister (Recep Tayyip Erdoğan) and cabinet, much to the chagrin of the generally secular Turks. The Turkish government has been the primary supporter of the SNC. Since the SNC is dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood, this alliance should come as no surprise, but I get the impression that not many people are connecting those dots.

Will the Turks assist the Free Syrian Army and/or the Syrian National Council with money and equipment (diplo-speak for weapons)? If the situation gets worse, I think they will. The Turks are already providing a moral and political support. However, if they move to the next level, they need to be prepared for the Syrians to renew their material and safe haven support to the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). In the past, when the Turks reduced the flow of the Euphrates River to the legal minimum, that action shut down many of the electrical generating turbines at the Tabaqah dam. The Syrians would then allow the PKK to launch cross border raids into southern Turkey.

The rise of the Free Syrian Army increases the probability of a civil war. The defectors from the Syrian army not only have access to weapons, they have inside knowledge of the regime's armed forces. That inside knowledge contributed to the group's successful ambush of a group of Syrian air force pilots on the the Homs-Palmyra road last week. The group claims that they killed eight "elite" pilots from the airbase at Tiyas; I assume they were assigned to the 819th squadron that flies the Su-24 (NATO: FENCER) fighter bomber. There is nothing else at Tiyas that could be construed as elite.

Given the refusal of the al-Asad regime to act like part of the international community of nations, and the ride of opposition groups both inside and outside the country, it appears that a civil war is almost becoming inevitable. The upside is the removal of the al-Asad regime and the Ba'th Party. The downside is the bloodshed and probable rise of the Muslim Brotherhood.

It's a tough call - which is better? A secular Syria allied with Iran under the Ba'th Party and President Bashar al-Asad, or Syria dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood? I guess it depends on who you ask.

___________
* In the image of the Free Syrian Army and in the image at the top of this article, the flag (on which the logo is based) is not the current Syrian flag, although it does comprise the common Arab (and Muslim) colors of red, white, black and green. The flag dates back to 1932 and is unofficially called the "flag of independence" because it was the flag in use when Syria achieved independence from the French Mandate on April 17, 1946. It was used until 1958, making it the longest used flag in Syrian history. It is considered a symbol of protest against the Ba'th Party and the al-Asad regime.

The IAEA's useless condemnation of Iran

2011-11-18T13:52:00.001-08:00

The Economist magazine cover from May 4, 2006 seems to have been right on the money. Given the world reaction to the recent report by the United Nations' nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), that Iran was in fact embarking on the development of nuclear warheads for its ballistic missiles, it would appear that Iran's nuclear ambitions are indeed unstoppable.

That possibility was highlighted at the Thursday (November 17) IAEA meeting in Vienna. The world's representatives to the agency met to determine the next moves following the release of the report on the Iranian program. Predictably, the agency was unable to come up with anything more meaningful than what the media has described as "sharp criticism" of Iran and drafting of a resolution.

The draft resolution contains words that will no doubt set back Iran's efforts (for those who do not know me, I am being sarcastic), expressing "deep and increasing concern about the unresolved issues" and "urges Iran to agree to new negotiations without preconditions." There is no mention of sanctions or penalties - a concession to Russia and China - and defers any further discussions on the program until March 2012. Meaningless.

Call me skeptical, but I don't see this resolution having any adverse impact whatsoever on Iran's nuclear program. In fact, the opposite is likely true. The Iranians have just been given a free pass for at least the next four months. In those four months, Iranian engineers and physicists will continue to enrich uranium far above levels required for the generation of nuclear energy, continue to research and develop ballistic missile warhead technology and continue to laugh at the impotence of the West.

Of course, that means laughing at the impotence of the Obama Administration whose "engagement" policy towards Iran has allowed Iran's program to continue virtually unabated for years. An Administration spokesman tried to spin this failure by saying, "We are confident that there’s going to be a strong message coming out of the board of governors, and a unified message." I am not convinced that a "strong and unified message" will have any effect on Iran other than affirming their perception - a correct perception in my opinion - that they have again gained time while again outmaneuvering the West.

Another Western spokesman, obviously using the Obama Administration's talking points, hailed the IAEA "strong and unified message" as "setting the stage for a possible showdown in the spring if IAEA investigators find that Iran is continuing to violate its nuclear treaty obligations." Is he serious? Does anyone with a modicum of thought processes believe that Iran is not going to continue its nuclear weapons development program in contravention of its treaty obligations?

Meanwhile, the Israelis continue to wrestle with the possibility - some would say probability - of the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran. I have been to Israel several times in the last few years. On a trip in 2006 in the aftermath of the war with Hizballah ostensibly to talk about that operation, in almost every instance my talks with Israeli political, military and intelligence officials focused on the "existential threat" posed by Tehran's quest for nuclear weapons.

Another trip in 2009 to ostensibly review the military operations in the Gaza Strip in late 2008 and early 2009 also focused on Iran's nuclear program. Israel was understandably disappointed with the results of Thursday's meeting which gives Iran a free hand to continue its weapons program with no consequences until the spring.

Since the Israelis have not been shy in sharing their analysis that while they can deter any or all of the Arab countries from launching an attack on the Jewish state but that the Islamic Republic of Iran cannot be deterred, the possibility of an Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facilities increases in direct proportion to the Western world's refusal to address the issue.

The IAEA's decision to "sharply criticize" Iran and impose no penalties led U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta to caution Israel against taking military action against Iran, urging more time for diplomacy at this point. The interesting point of this advise to the Israelis is his use of "at this point." Are we to believe that if the Obama Administration continues to fail to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon then Israel will get a green light to do what no one else seems willing to do?

I had great hopes when the United Nations named Yukiya Amano as the new Director General of the IAEA, replacing Egyptian Muhammad al-Barada'i. I was encouraged when the IAEA released its report that Iran was - surprise, surprise - developing a nuclear warhead for its ballistic missiles.

I am now disappointed that nothing new appears to be on the horizon. Iran is developing nuclear weapons - we all know it, but no one is willing to do anything about it. There is no sense of urgency - it will be March before we as an international body hear of this again. The IAEA's condemnation, its "sharp criticism," is meaningless.

Russia Today - Crosstalk: "Getting Syrious"

2011-11-16T11:54:00.001-08:00

I appeared as part of a panel discussion on November 15's edition of Crosstalk on the Russia Today television channel. Watch it on YouTube!

Iran - IAEA report forces candidates' hands

2011-11-14T09:18:00.001-08:00

Now that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has released its long-awaited report on the Iranian nuclear program, there is an official document - other than Israeli and American intelligence assessments - that Iran is in fact developing a nuclear weapon. More alarmingly, according to the report, the Iranians are close to having the ability to field a nuclear weapon much sooner than thought. In contrast to the now widely discounted U.S. National Intelligence Estimate of 2007, the IAEA reports that the Iranians have been working on a nuclear weapons capability continuously since at least 2003.

This should come as no surprise to anyone, except maybe the few holdouts at State Department that cannot fathom that the Iranians are actually determined to build a nuclear weapon. Why is that? It's hard to quantify, but in my dealings with foreign service officers, and in a few instances, intelligence analysts in the department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, there was a tendency to always give the Iranians the benefit of the doubt.

I attribute this to the fact that many of the officers had served in Iran prior to the fall of the Shah in 1979, and virtually all of them regarded their postings in Iran as a positive experience. Those good feelings about pre-revolutionary Iran have often clouded their judgments and assessments when it comes to the current Islamic Republic of Iran.

Hopefully the publication of a report that even the most dovish members of the Obama Administration will find hard to dispute - most of them are big supporters of the United Nations - we can get past the previous argument over whether or not the objective of the Iranian nuclear program was the development of nuclear weapons. It is. The Iranian regime's ludicrous claims that the purpose of the program is the development of an electrical generation capability has been refuted, not that many serious analysts ever bought such drivel.

Now that it would appear that everyone is now on the same page, we need to deal with it. Well, the current administration and any potential Republican nominee that will challenge Barack Obama for the Presidency in 2012 will have to deal with it. Unfortunately, I suspect that there will be stark contrasts between the incumbent president and the Republican challenger.

Let's take a quick look at President Obama and his plans to prevent the Islamic Republic from acquiring a nuclear weapon. In 2008, Presidential candidate Obama stated, "It is unacceptable for Iran to possess a nuclear weapon, it would be a game changer." He further said that diplomacy and sanctions were preferable to military action, as if we needed reminding of that. Of course, this is the same Barack Obama, then a Senator, that complained that earlier sanctions on Iraq were ineffective. Candidate Obama also said, “It’s sufficient to say I would not take military action off the table and that I will never hesitate to use our military force in order to protect the homeland and the United States’ interests.”

However, since Obama has been President, he has walked that back. One of Obama's chief supporters, Harvard University law professor and former Special Advisor for the United States Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Elizabeth Warren hailed the President’s “nuanced response” with “no chest-thumping...that could backfire.”

It appears that we have gone from "unacceptable" to "nuanced response." The President just last week cited the United Nations sanctions protocol as having had an "enormous bite." That claim flies in the face of the reports that Iran is within a year of developing a nuclear weapon.

The President also claimed that Russian and Chinese leaders are united with him to ensure Iran does not develop the weapons capability. Again, that claim flies in the face of reality - both the Russians and Chinese have been very vocal in their objections to any increased sanctions on Iran. In fact, both countries are suppliers of technology and weapons to the Islamic Republic.

Unfortunately, the Iranians have assessed that there is almost no possibility that President Obama would consider the military option and thus have no intention of halting or slowing their weapons development program. They also have assessed that their close relationships with China and Russia will impede the imposition of any increased sanctions in the United Nations.

On the Republican challengers, there is not unanimity of opinion of how to handle the Iranian nuclear weapons issue. For example, Ron Paul believes that the best course of action is to "offer friendship." I won't touch that one.

Most of the Republicans are more in line with former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney. His words: "If we re-elect Barack Obama, Iran will have a nuclear weapon...if you elect me as the next president, they will not have a nuclear weapon."

Neither President Obama nor virtually any of the Republican candidates want the Iranians to acquire a nuclear weapons capability - that is not the point. The point is how that position is portrayed to the Iranians. A "nuanced response" with "no chest-thumping" probably isn't going to have much effect in Tehran. One need only look at how effective the Administration's engagement policy has worked for the past 35 months.

What we need is both of the final candidates for President - the incumbent Barack Obama on the Democratic side and whoever emerges as the Republican challenger to unequivocally state, "We will not permit the Islamic Republic of Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon." Too nuanced?

Iran, the IAEA and Israel - convergence coming?

2011-11-05T23:18:00.000-07:00

There is a convergence of events looming in the Middle East over the next few weeks, events which could have a profound impact on the area for years to come. These events are the upcoming International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report on Iran's nuclear weapons program, the Iranian reaction to that report, the Israeli reaction to that report, and to a lesser extent the Obama Administration reaction to that report.

According to numerous sources who claim to have seen parts of the report, the IAEA is planning to "reveal" that Iran has been working clandestinely to develop a nuclear weapons capability, citing evidence that Iran has made models of a nuclear warhead. This comes to no surprise to anyone who has been following the progress of the Iranian "peaceful nuclear energy" program for the past decade or more.

The question on the minds of most Middle East analysts is, "What took so long?" The easy answers are that there was not concrete evidence, or that former IAEA chief Muhammad al-Barada'i did not want to find that Iran had an illicit weapons program. There is probably some truth to both, but given the size of Iran's program and its unwillingness to live up to agreements it had made was enough for me. The program is much too small to develop a nuclear power generation capability, but just the right size for nuclear weapons production.

IAEA documents reportedly show that Iran is working on a nuclear warhead that can be mounted on a ballistic missile. This makes sense - Iran has a large arsenal of ballistic missiles complemented by an aggressive missile development program which draws heavily on technology imported from North Korea. It is important to note that Islamic Republic is the only country to develop a 2,000-km (1,100 nautical miles or 1,250 statute miles) missile without first having a nuclear weapons capability. Absent a nuclear warhead, Iran's medium-range missiles remain militarily ineffective, although capable of creating terror and confusion.

The United States, United Kingdom and France are urging the IAEA to report all of its information, while Russia and China are calling for the report to be postponed or totally discarded. That comes as no surprise. There has always been this split between the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. It remains to be seen if the two apologists for Iran - sorry, that should read: It remains to be seen if Iran's technology and weapons suppliers will attempt to veto the report. The intransigence of these two major business partners of Iran is the reason that there is no crippling sanctions protocol in place against the Islamic Republic.

Anyone who believes that the Iranian nuclear research and development program is not aimed at the acquisition of a nuclear weapon is either in a state of denial or has misread the Iranian regime. Those in a state of denial - and that includes part of the U.S. intelligence community - would rather not address the uncomfortable truth that a nuclear-armed Iran is not the same as other nuclear states, be it Pakistan, India or Israel. These other states, for the most part, have rational governmental structures in place to oversee their nuclear arsenals.

I am not certain you can say the same for the theocracy in Iran. While most states have acquired nuclear weapons for deterrence, no one is certain that is the rationale for the Iranians. They may or may not have the intention of actually using a nuclear weapon, but are we willing to live with that uncertainty? I guess the real question is are the Israelis, who have much more at risk, willing to live with that uncertainty?

As you would expect, the Iranians claim the IAEA report is a fabrication resulting from pressure on the agency from the United States and its allies. While there might be some truth in that, it does not change the facts that point toward a clandestine weapons program. If the report clearly accuses Iran of having a nuclear weapons program, it should pave the way for real sanctions on the country. The Iranian president recently conceded that the sanctions protocols in place are having some effect, but for anything short of a military strike to end the Iranian program, much more stringent sanctions will be required, or as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton once promised, "crippling" sanctions. We are not there by a long shot.

As long as there is the potential for Iran to develop a nuclear arms capability, Israel will remain the most concerned nation. I have spent quite a bit of time in Israel talking to a variety of Israelis, both government (military and intelligence) and civilians. They believe, and are not bashful to explain it, that a nuclear-armed Iran will constitute an "existential threat" to the Jewish state. They claim that three nuclear warheads could virtually annihilate the heart of Israel and kill a good portion of the world's Jews in one strike. There may not be enough of the country left to retaliate.

Israeli intelligence officials have told me that they assess that Israel has enough military power to deter any of its neighbors from attacking. They do not believe that Iran, on the other hand, despite Israel's "strategic capabilities" - that's diplo-intel-speak for nuclear weapons - Iran will not deterred. Many of them believe that if Iran develops nuclear weapons, there is a strong possibility that they will use them.

The Israelis are concerned that although most countries view Iran's quest for nuclear weapons as a world problem, many nations are hoping for an Israeli solution. Here again, an "Israeli solution" is diplo-intel-speak for an Israeli military strike, be it from the air, sea or a combination of both. While the United States and European countries declare that a nuclear-armed Iran is "unacceptable," Israel is the country that will bear the brunt of any misjudgment on the part of the mullahs in Tehran.

Is an Israeli military option on the table? Certainly, but this week's revelations that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is lobbying the Knesset for support for a military strike on Iran's nuclear facilities has a strange feel to it. If the Israelis are talking about it, they probably aren't going to do it anytime soon. It's when they are not talking about it that we might expect them to act. Does Israel have the capability to attack the Iranian facilities? It is hard to say. On paper, yes, but there are so many things that would have to come off perfectly; there is almost no room for error.

A look at the map will tell you that Israeli aircraft will be in hostile airspace almost the entire way to and from the targets. I, and others, have written about how the Israelis might do this. Who knows, the Saudis - who have no wish to see arch-rival Iran with a nuclear weapon - might just green light Israeli aircraft through their airspace. Remember the well-known Middle East adage, "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." Even Israeli President Shimon Peres, not a hawk by any stretch of the imagination, declared, "What needs to be done must be done and there is a long list of options." For a man like Peres to utter those words is chilling to me.

On the American side, President Barack Obama says Iran’s nuclear program "continues to pose a threat...." Do you think? He further threatened that Iran would suffer the "toughest possible" sanctions. That's the same rhetoric we have heard for years. One of Obama's national security advisors (where do they find these people?) added that the United States is focused on is a diplomatic strategy which ... "increases the pressure on the Iranians, through financial pressure, through economic sanctions, through diplomatic isolation."

I would be crass and ask, "Great, so how is that working so far?" I think we all know the answer to that. The next few weeks may prove critical to the future of the Middle East, and whether we like it or not, our national interests are at stake. If the IAEA rises to the task and unambiguously states that Iran is developing nuclear weapons, we need to be ready to take effective actions to preclude that from happening. More "engagement" may not be the right answer...."

حبر على ورق - Syria's agreement with the Arab League

2011-11-03T16:46:00.000-07:00

Syrian tank in Homs

حبر على ورق (hibr 'ala waraq) is a common Arabic phrase that translates literally to "ink on paper." It is normally used to refer to and demean a worthless piece of paper, much like the agreement signed just two days ago (November 2) between the Syrian government of Bashar al-Asad and the Arab League. The agreement did not last two days - on November 3, Syrian army tanks and armored personnel carriers opened fire on protesters in the city of Homs, killing at least 20 people.

According to the the agreement, the Syrian government was to withdraw troops from urban areas, halt armed operations against civilian populations, release political prisoners, and start "dialogue" with opposition groups within two weeks. It also required the government to allow journalists, human rights groups and Arab League representatives into the country. There has been no international press coverage of the protests in Syria - or the government reaction - since they began earlier this year.

I would not put too much stock in the fact that the Syrian government, or regime, if you prefer, under the leadership (or dictatorship) of President Bashar al-Asad reached an agreement with the Arab League. In my opinion, having lived in Syria for several years and following events in the country for decades, Bashar al-Asad has no intention of adhering to any agreement that he makes. If the Syrian government agrees to anything, it is only to buy time to continue repression of any perceived threat to the continuation of the Ba'th Party regime that has ruled the country since 1963. Any agreement signed by Bashar al-Asad will be merely hibr 'ala waraq.

The protesters have laid down some markers of their own - the most important, of course, being the demand that the president step down. They have made clear that not only do the want Bashar out, they also want the end of the Ba'th Party. One need only look at the flags in the anti-regime demonstrations.

For comparison purposes, look at the current flag of Syria, first adopted when Syria and Egypt merged to create the United Arab Republic in 1958. It was used until the union was dissolved in 1961, and re-introduced by the Ba'th Party in 1980.

Pro-regime demonstrators with current Syrian flag

Below is the flag carried by many of the protesters. Note that the colors are the same, but used in different places. Red, white, black and green are common Arab and Muslim colors.

Syrian protesters with pre-union flag

This flag dates back to 1932 and is unofficially called the "flag of independence" because it was the flag in use when Syria achieved independence from the French Mandate on April 17, 1946. It was used until 1958, making it the longest used flag in Syrian history.

The protesters are not fooled by Bashar's alleged acceptance of agreements. It will be interesting to see what happens on Friday, the Muslim holy day.

Upgraded weapons in the Gaza Strip

2011-11-02T13:03:00.000-07:00

The Palestinian group Islamic Jihad (actually, the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine) recently released a video of a multiple rocket launcher mounted on the back of a small pickup truck. The clip showed five rockets being fired from the launcher - if true, that would be the first instance of this type of launcher being used to fire rockets from the Gaza Strip into Israel. The group claims that the weapon system was brought to Gaza from Libya. The Egyptians have stopped the smuggling of some weapons from Libya destined for the Gaza Strip, but it appears that some weapons have made it through. If the Palestinians were able to move rocket launchers of this size, they may also have smuggled shoulder-launched air defense missiles - the Libyans had thousands of them and they are now unaccounted for.

The rocket launcher seen in the video fires the Grad 122mm rocket, a 1950's vintage weapon with a range of 25 miles. They have been in the Gaza Strip since least 2008 - HAMAS has fired them at Israeli cities, but previously using a makeshift ground launcher. What we see now is a ten-tube launcher which I assume to be one rack of the four that normally comprise the standard Russian-designed (but produced in many countries) 40-tube BM-21 launcher.

On October 29, Islamic Jihad fired eight of these rockets towards Ashdod, Gan Yavne, and near Beersheva. One Israeli was killed in the attacks, and significant property damage was inflicted in Ashdod. Press reports carry claims of responsibility from both Islamic Jihad and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade (the military arm of Fatah); the video carries the logo of Islamic Jihad.

The attacks on Saturday have prompted the Israelis to order all schools within 25 miles of Gaza to close pending cessation of this round of violence. Israeli schools have been dealing with Palestinian rockets attacks since the Israelis withdrew from Gaza in 2005. The city of Sderot, just a few kilometers from the Gaza Strip, has been hit almost daily since then. To cope with the attacks, the city has constructed shelters over some school buildings and and installed steel awnings over others, as seen in these photographs (I took these in Sderot in 2009).

The Israeli air force has conducted air raids in retaliation for the recent rocket attacks, killing several Islamic Jihad fighters and at least one member of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. If the rocket attacks continue and HAMAS cannot rein in Islamic Jihad and the al-Aqsa Martyr's Brigade, there is a chance that the recently-brokered deal in which Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit was released from five years of captivity in exchange for over 1000 Palestinian prisoners, will fall through. To date, less than half of the prisoners have been released.

At some point, Israel may renege on that lop-sided deal. Who would blame them?

The "Biden-ization" of Iraq?

2011-10-28T16:15:00.000-07:00

صلاح الدين

Vice President Joe Biden just might have been ahead of his time. In 2006, then-Senator Biden was the ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. While in that position, he proposed that Iraq be divided into three separate regions along ethnic and religious lines. Specifically, he called for Kurdish, Shi'a and Sunni areas with a central government in Baghdad.

The Iraqi constitution allows for the formation of autonomous regions - the Kurds have already taken advantage of this and created the Kurdistan Region comprising the three governorates of Dahuk, Irbil and Sulaymaniyah. Of course, the Iraqi Kurds often refer to the area as South Kurdistan. I was recently in Turkey, and one of the questions I heard more than once from the Turks (they are aware of my history with the Kurds in northern Iraq) was, "If the Kurdistan Region is South Kurdistan, then where exactly is North Kurdistan?"

In a surprising development this week, the provincial council of the governorate of Salah al-Din voted to form an autonomous region as well. The majority of the population of Salah al-Din - just over 900,000 people - is Sunni Arab, but there are also Kurds and Shi'a Arabs living in the governorate as well.

Interestingly, the Sunnis were originally against the provision in the constitution allowing for autonomous regions. They were concerned that the Kurds would form an autonomous region in the oil-rich north (as they did) and the Shi'a would do the same in the oil-rich south. Thus far, the Shi'a have not made any moves to form such a region, but they really don't need to - they easily dominate the government based on their numbers. The Sunnis feared that the Kurds and Shi'a would have sole access to the country's primary resource - oil - and freeze them out of the wealth.

What is driving the Sunnis in Salah al-Din to form an autonomous region?

The most recent aggravation between the Sunnis - most of whom live in the areas of central Iraq to the north, east and west of Baghdad - and the Shi'a dominated government is a massive arrest campaign targeting members of the outlawed Ba'th Party, the party of former dictator Saddam Husayn. The Salah al-Din governorate includes the city and environs of Tikrit, the area that was home to Saddam Husayn. The Sunnis believe that autonomous region status will shield them from the Iraqi security services.

In addition to the security crackdown in the governorate, the Sunnis believe that the central government in Baghdad is not allocating national resources fairly to the Sunni areas. They complain that the only city in Salah al-Din that is treated fairly is Sammara' because that city is the home of the shrines of the tenth and eleventh imams of the Shi'a sect. It was this shrine that was bombed by the late al-Qa'idah in Iraq (AQI) leader Abu Musa'ib al-Zarqawi, an event that triggered a civil war between the Sunnis and Shi'a. That bloody conflict lasted until the 'Anbar Awakening in which the local Sunni tribes turned on the mostly foreign fighters of AQI.

If the leaders of Salah al-Din think that forming an autonomous region is going to stymie the Iraqi security services from hunting down remnants of the Ba'th Party and Saddam loyalists, they are mistaken. The Shi'a suffered terribly under Saddam and the Ba'th and will not be deterred from hunting down anyone still wanting to be a Ba'thi.

Will Iraq go the way of the Biden plan? I doubt it. The Kurds have been autonomous for decades and have proven to be such a problem for central governments in Baghdad that it works better to allow them to be autonomous as long as they do not abuse it - as they have tried on more than one occasion. The Shi'a will probably not try to unite the southern provinces into a "Shi'a-stan" since their political alliance with the Kurds gives them the dominant political role in the country as well as key positions in the ministries and government organizations.

On the other hand, I am surprised that the Sunnis have not attempted to unite the Sunni heartland, but it probably would do no good even if they did. That said, who knows - maybe Biden will be right. The only - and major - difference is that the Iraqis will do this themselves rather than have the Americans do it for them.

The Shalit release deal - setting up the next seizure

2011-10-25T13:17:00.000-07:00

Gilad Shalit / גלעד שליט

After more than five years as a prisoner of HAMAS, Israeli soldier Gild Shalit has been exchanged for over 1,000 HAMAS militants. I am all for pressuring HAMAS to release the young Israeli, or possibly an exchange of reasonable proportions, but 1,000 Palestinian prisoners, many serving life sentences and most with Israeli blood on their hands, for one Israeli captive?

It sets a very bad precedent - the reunion of Gilad Shalit and his family feels good, makes a great media story, and certainly will be used to Benyamin "Bibi" Netanyahu's political advantage, but this will come back to haunt the Israelis. How long will it be before HAMAS, Islamic Jihad or some other Palestinian faction attempts to capture another Israeli soldier and force the Israelis to release more of the remaining 4,300 Palestinians incarcerated in Israeli prisons? How long will it be before the released Palestinian prisoners themselves are again plotting violence against Israel? I would venture to say that HAMAS's recruiting efforts have been made much easier by this besting of Israel in the diplomatic arena.

Who are the real winners of this political move? Certainly HAMAS, whose flagging stature and slide into irrelevance has been reversed. The perception that the radical Islamist group has been able to humble the "invincible" Israelis into making such an uneven trade for a young corporal (although he was promoted numerous times in captivity) has revitalized HAMAS arguably into the primary political power in the Palestinian territories. If an election was held today, not only would they sweep the Gaza Strip as they in the elections of 2006, they would almost certainly win in the relatively more moderate West Bank as well.

I understand the emotional bond between the Israeli population and their troops. Israel is a small country with large enemies, forcing virtually all of its Jewish citizens (Arab citizens are exempted) to serve a period of active military duty and remain in the reserves for decades. Military service in Israel is one of the common experiences with which all Israelis identify. Over the 64 years of Israel's existence, almost every family has suffered losses in the various wars and conflicts. With a small population and large military establishment, every soldier is regarded as part of the family. It is not surprising that the Israeli government negotiated with HAMAS for Shalit's release, but what is astounding is the number of prisoners with Israeli blood on their hands the government agreed to release.

I am not in the camp of some of fellow Middle East analysts who believe that this deal might presage improved relations between Israel and the Palestinians, believing that if the two sides could compromise on this issue, perhaps there are other things that could be negotiated. First of all, releasing 1,027 Palestinians, including not just a few murderers, in exchange for one Israeli soldier is not a compromise, it is a capitulation. The Palestinians know, or at least believe, that they now have the upper hand in dealing with the Israelis - all they need are more hostages, be they soldiers (the best capital) or even settlers in the West Bank.

Why would HAMAS - and they are now the key player on the Palestinian side - agree to any deals with the Israelis. All this exchange has done has vindicated the HAMAS hard-line position. Why change a winning strategy? If I was an Israeli soldier anywhere near the border with Gaza or the West Bank, I'd be watching my back. If I was a settler on the West Bank, I'd be careful what Palestinians I allow close to my village. HAMAS will try this again.

Death of Saudi Crown Prince highlights succession issue

2011-10-24T19:27:00.000-07:00

Sultan bin 'Abd al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud * / سلطان بن عبدالعزيز آل سعود‎

His Royal Highness Crown Prince Sultan bin 'Abd al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud died Saturday at the age of 80 while in New York City for medical treatment. The prince had been in ill-health for a number of years and was suspected of suffering from Alzheimer's disease.

The crown prince was well-known to many Americans (including me) from his service as the Minister of Defense and Aviation during Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm in 1990 and 1991. The prince was a gentleman, a friend of the United States and a pleasure to work with - he would have made a fine king, and I mourn his passing. Of note, he was also the father of Prince (Lieutenant General) Khalid bin Sultan bin 'Abd al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud, commander of Saudi and Arab forces during the war (who was not always a pleasure to work with).

King 'Abdullah, the crown prince's older brother, was at the airport in Riyadh to receive the body. The king, now 87, was seen in a wheelchair and a surgical mask, underscoring the health issues that plague the surviving sons of the founder of the kingdom, King 'Abd al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud.

When the kingdom was founded in 1932, King 'Abd al-'Aziz established the succession to be from his sons, from brother to brother, not from father to son. Normally the oldest surviving son was the first choice, but not always. When kings have died, the surviving sons of King 'Abd al-'Aziz have gathered and selected the new king by consensus.

This system has been in place since the death of King 'Abd al-'Aziz in 1953. With 37 sons, there did not seem to be any urgency to provide for further succession. However, the youngest of the founder's sons (Muqran bin 'Abd al-'Aziz) is now 66 years old. At some point, the family will need to come to terms with selecting a monarch from the next generation - that may cause divisions in the family. There are already rivalries among the various groups based on their different mothers. Given the close relationship between the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, it is in America's national interest that there continue to be smooth transitions of power in Riyadh.

To address this issue, in 2006 King 'Abdullah created the Allegiance Council, comprised of 35 princes charged with determining, in consultation with the king, who will become the new crown prince. It is widely rumored that Nayif bin 'Abd al-'Aziz, who has been the extremely powerful Minister of the Interior since 1975, will be the next crown prince. Nayif is also one of the powerful "Sudayri Seven," a set of full brothers who include the former King Fahd and the late crown prince.

Nayif is 78, so still may be able to serve for years as king following the death of his older brother 'Abdullah. Assume that he becomes king in 2013 and serves for 10 years. That means that Muqran, the youngest of the first generation would be 78 at that time, and could possibly serve for ten years or so. Then the real issue surfaces. Who in the second generation becomes the king?

As long as the United States imports most of its oil ( a situation that unfortunately I do not see changing anytime soon), it is essential that there be a friendly monarch on the throne in Riyadh. That means smooth successions from the brothers and later to the next generation.

______________
* Please note the difference in the transliterations of the Arabic al- and Al. In the name 'Abd al-'Aziz, al- is the Arabic definite article "the." The word Al in Al Sa'ud, Al is the word for "house of" or "family."

Iraq - Obama spins another policy failure into a success?

2011-10-21T16:03:00.000-07:00

(Note: This should be read in conjunction with my July 30 article - click here or on image to open in new tab).

October 21 - President Barack Obama announced today that after speaking with Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki that the United States and Iraq were in "full agreement" on the complete withdrawal of American troops from Iraq by the end of the year. I am surprised that the announcement was not accompanied by a warning to DC area residents to remain in their homes or be swept up by the vortex caused by the incredible spinning coming from the White House.

Today's claim goes beyond the normal spinning we have come to expect from this Administration. Today's spin was replete with references to the deaths of al-Qa'idah leader 'Usamah bin Ladin and Libyan dictator Mu'amar al-Qadhafi and the continued - and ill-advised - scheduled draw down of American troops in Afghanistan. We should expect that, after all, the death of bin Ladin and al-Qadhafi are successes, albeit a bit more nuanced than the President would have you believe (see my earlier article, Mu'amar al-Qadhafi dead in Libya - what took so long?). However, to spin this obvious foreign policy failure into a success is a stretch for even this White House - the claim that Iraq and the United States are now in "full agreement" is disingenuous and misleading. That's a polite way to say that it's a lie.

The President continued, "The last American soldier (sic) will cross the border out of Iraq with their heads held high, proud of their success and knowing that the American people stand united in our support for our troops." On this, he is correct - the American troops (I am including the marines, airmen and sailors in addition to that soldier he mentions) should hold their heads high. They did their part, they were successful. However, this Administration has not been. The "full agreement" the President cites is actually an admission of failure.

Over the past six months, the Administration has been in almost crisis mode trying to secure an agreement whereby some American troops could remain in Iraq past the December 31, 2011 deadline established in the Status of Forces Agreement of 2008. This Administration has had almost three years to make an arrangement with the Iraqis - as provided for in the SOFA. Now we have today's admission that the effort has failed. American commanders wanted to keep between 15,000 and 25,000 troops in Iraq as trainers of the not-ready-for-prime-time Iraqi forces and as a contingency force. This failure will put at risk many of the gains achieved by almost nine years of the expenditure of American blood and treasure.

Given Iran's constant meddling in Iraqi politics and its lethal operations against American troops in both Iraq and Afghanistan, combined with the fact this region is critical to American national interests, it is important that we have a presence in the region. Thanks to this failure, there will be almost no American troops on the ground in the Middle East. That may come back to haunt us the next time a crisis - and there will be one - erupts in the region.

Mr. Obama, you may think that this ends our involvement in Iraq and frees you up to focus on your domestic agenda - national security has never been your strong suit - but I venture to say we will be dealing with the fallout from this failure for years to come.

You have committed one of the worst sins of a President - you have broken faith with the troops.

Mu'amar al-Qadhafi dead in Libya - what took so long?

2011-10-20T09:19:00.000-07:00

Screen capture from the Al-Jazeera web site announcing
the killing of al-Qadhafi and the end of his regime

October 20, 2011 - According to Libyan officials former "Brother Leader" Mu'amar al-Qadhafi has been killed and photos of his bloody corpse broadcast on various news media around the world. This, of course, is welcome news. Not only does it end a 42-year reign of terror in Libya, it presents an opportunity for the Libyan people to at long last determine their own future.

This culminates a revolution that began on February 15 of this year - eight months of fierce fighting between al-Qadhafi loyalists hoping to hold onto power and a variety of armed groups seeking the end of the regime that has been in power since September of 1969. These rebel groups have been supported by NATO air power since March 19. The five-week delay by NATO, which includes the United States, to take action almost doomed the rebellion from the start and cost many more Libyan lives than was necessary.

Later today, no doubt President Obama will make another speech in which he will claim victory and vindication for his policy on Libya, specifically his ludicrous "leading from behind" military strategy. The delays in taking actions in February and the limited American involvement, leaving the bulk of the air operation to our NATO allies, prolonged what should have been a very short, weeks-long engagement rather than an eight-month bloodbath that has not only killed thousands of Libyans but decimated the infrastructure of the country.

We should be happy that the regime of Mu'amar al-Qadhafi is gone, and we should salute our forces and those of our NATO allies who played a critical role in that process. We should also, however, demand an analysis of how many lives could have been saved had we exercised better political leadership and employed much more capable American air power with more appropriate weapons systems for this type of fighting. This particular episode of timid operations execution turned out well albeit delayed; next time we may not be so fortunate.

This entire affair should have been over in weeks with much less loss of life. Remember that when Caesar comes forth for his accolades.

Proposed U.S. arms sale to Bahrain - the wrong weapons

2011-10-19T15:32:00.000-07:00

The State Department announced that it will take into consideration an upcoming report on how Bahrain handled recent protests in the Gulf kingdom before approving the proposed sale of $53 million of American-made weapons. The State Department announcement is in response to Democratic senators who voiced concern that United States was in effect arming a nation who may have abused its citizens' human rights. They cite the Egyptian example that we might be perceived as arming a repressive government, a perception that in the future might harm our relations with the Bahraini people.

I have problems with the arms sale package, but not because of the concern over the ruling family in the Kingdom of Bahrain. My issue is with the makeup of the arms package itself - we're selling them the wrong weapons for their needs. I understand that a $53 million sale would be nice for contractors AM General and Raytheon, but isn't someone advising the Bahrainis on what they need?

Let's take a look at the relationship between the United States and Bahrain. Bahrain has been a staunch ally of the United States for years, in fact, the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet is headquartered in the island kingdom. The Bahraini royal family, the Al Khalifah, is Sunni in a 70 percent Shi'a country. Because of the Shi'a's natural affinity for the Iranians, Iran has been a constant thorn in the side of the Al Khalifah. The United States supports Bahrain's efforts to minimize Iranian influence on the island. Despite that, the Iranians have fomented unrest in the Shi'a community. The Iranians have gone so far as to claim that Bahrain is actually part of Iran.

Given the fact that the kingdom is ruled by a Sunni minority, it is doubtful that in a future change of government the Shi'a majority will ever gravitate towards the United States, so I think we should not consider how our support of the al Khalifah is viewed by the Shi'a. When push comes to shove, they will align with their Shi'a allies in Tehran.

The proposed $53 million arms package consists of 44 up-armored Humvees, 48 TOW anti-tank missile launchers, almost 300 TOW missiles (in various configurations), and associated night sighting devices.

Approval of the sale requires the Defense Security Cooperation Agency to certify that it will contribute to the foreign policy and national security of the United States, specifically in this case, "by helping to improve the security of a major non-NATO ally that has been, and continues to be, an important force for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East. The proposed sale will improve Bahrain’s capability to meet current and future armored threats. Bahrain will use the enhanced capability as a deterrent to regional threats and to strengthen its homeland defense."

This is where I have a problem. Armored Humvees and TOW missiles constitute an anti-armor capability, defending against tanks and armored personnel carriers. From the certification: "The proposed sale will improve Bahrain’s capability to meet current and future armored threats." Hey, DOD, just where is that armored threat?

Bahrain is an island in the Persian Gulf. It's nearest neighbors are Saudi Arabia, less than 20 miles to the west, and Qatar, a little over 20 miles to the east. Bahrain is connected to Saudi Arabia by a causeway. Iran, which might pose the greatest threat to the kingdom, is over 100 miles away across the Persian Gulf.

I am having trouble picturing an armored vehicle threat to Bahrain. Perhaps the Saudis - a close ally of Bahrain, by the way - might run an armored column down the causeway? First, they would not do that. Bahrain has fairly liberal rules when it comes to Islam - Manama has bars and nightclubs. The causeway is usually packed on Wednesday (last day of the Saudi workweek) afternoons with Saudis heading for what passes for "sin city" in the region.

Which brings me to the next point. In the far-fetch likelihood of an attempted incursion via the causeway, it could easily be stopped with air power. It is hard to imagine any real land threat to Bahrain. Is someone postulating that the Iranians would attempt an amphibious assault across the Persian Gulf? Here again, the answer is air and sea power.

As with many of these small Gulf nations, Bahrain's best "bang for the buck" (excuse the obvious pun) lies in acquiring a capable air force and navy. A potent air force and navy can blunt almost any threat to Bahrain, or at least buy enough time for more capable allied forces such as the United States and Saudi Arabia to enter the fray.

Humvees and TOW missiles? I would ask if anyone at the Pentagon has actually thought this through, but the answer is obvious in their certification: "The proposed sale will improve Bahrain’s capability to meet current and future armored threats."

In case I am being too subtle, that's a no.

The MV Mavi Marmara in the Golden Horn

2011-10-17T16:21:00.000-07:00

I was in Istanbul, Turkey earlier this month and happened on the MV Mavi Marmara at a dock in the Golden Horn (my pictures).

The ship was docked at an out-of-the way location not far from some Turkish government facilities. The current status of the vessel is unclear.

To me, the Mavi Marmara is a bit of recent Middle East history.

The Mavi Marmara, which translates from the Turkish as Blue Marmara (Sea) was built in Turkey in 1994. It was operated as a passenger ferry in the Istanbul area until 2010, when it was purchased for $800,000 by IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation, an Islamic Turkish charity organization active in more than 100 countries. IHH is derived from the first three words of its full name in Turkish: İnsan Hak ve Hürriyetleri ve İnsani Yardım Vakfı, or The Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief.

IHH purchased the vessel specifically to lead an international effort to challenge the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip. Since no shipowners would allow their vessels to take part in such a dangerous operation, IHH purchased a vessel using public donations. This is interesting - the IHH has special consultative status with the United Nations, but the United Nations has upheld the legality of the Israeli naval blockade of Gaza.

If IHH was looking for a confrontation, unfortunately, the Israelis obliged them. In May 2010, the Mavi Marmara participated in a convoy of ships manned by activists from 37 different countries. After the activists refused Israeli Navy demands that they divert to the Israeli port of Ashdod or be boarded, the Israelis began forcibly boarding the Mavi Marmara early in the morning of May 31.

In the violent clash that followed, nine activists on the vessel were killed and several dozen others injured. There are mixed reports as to whether or not the ship was carrying humanitarian aid.

The Mavi Marmara was released in July 2010; after being towed to a Turkish port and repaired, it returned to Istanbul in December.

According to what information I can find, including several Turkish sources, the vessel is still registered in the Comoros Islands. That may be, but the Turkish flag has been reapplied to the side of the ship, and the vessel was flying the Turkish flag from the stern when I saw it in the Golden Horn. During the confrontation with the Israelis in 2010, the ship did not have the Turkish flag painted on the side, although there were huge Turkish cloth flags adorning the vessel. It also flew the Cormoros flag on the stern.

Most of the Turks I spoke with about this incident believe that the IHH activists were looking for a fight. They aslo expressed surprise that the Israelis took the bait and, in their view, overreacted. I tend to agree with that assessment, but then, it's always easy to second guess these things after the fact.

The Qods Force plot to kill the Saudi Ambassador - Amateur Hour?

2011-10-15T13:13:00.000-07:00

Saudi Ambassador 'Adil al-Jubayr

There has been a lot of "analysis" of the plot by the Iranian Qods Force to assassinate 'Adil bin Ahmad al-Jubayr, the Saudi Ambassador to the United States. It has been called amateurish, an act of war or a rogue operation. The Iranians claim that the entire story is simply a fabrication of the Obama Administration.

Given the transfer of $100,000 from the Iranians to someone they believed was part of Mexican drug cartel and the confession of the one person now in custody, I am dismissing the Iranian regime's claims that the plot was made up by the Obama Administration. Granted, Attorniey General Eric Holder could use a distraction from his abysmal performance in a host of national security matters, but this is not it.

One only needs to look at Holder's attempts to try senior al-Qa'idah operatives in a New York City federal courthouse rather than military tribunals in Guantanamo, or his decisions to treat "underwear bomber" Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab as a criminal rather than as the illegal combatant he is. As the facts of the botched Fast and Furious operation expose Holder's ineptitude and deceit, he could use a successful case - like breaking up a plot to assassinate the ambassador of one of America's closest allies.

Let's address the so-called amateurish nature of the operation. Having run somewhat similar operations in the past (although I never tried to have anyone assassinated), I can identify with the Iranians involved in the case - the three Qods Force case officers, Gholam Shukuri, Qasem Soleimani and Hamed Abdollahi. Like me, these case officers are trained to spot, assess and recruit assets to conduct whatever operation they are tasked with, be it intelligence collection or a covert action.

We should not underestimate the Iranians - the Qods Force is the elite operations element of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). These Iranian case officers probably received similar training as we American case officers - after all, much of the intelligence training in Iran prior to 1979 was modeled after ours. As I read the case, there are, however, some glaring tradecraft errors that I will not specifically discuss. The fact that there are errors is good for us.

In the intelligence world, you sometimes have to recruit assets that are not always the most skilled or the most reliable people - you take what you can get. If you can find someone willing to betray their country or conduct dangerous operations, sometime you have to overlook character flaws. When the Iranians spotted Manssor Arbabsiar, they saw a man who could be manipulated and who needed money. For the Iranians, Arbabsiar was a "throwaway," someone who was useful for an operation, but of no consequence if discovered. Arbabsiar's ability to be manipulated was confirmed when the FBI was able to convince him to make recorded, and incriminating, phone calls to Shakuri in Iran.

I am surprised at the apparent urgency on the part of the Iranians to kill Ambassador al-Jubayr, but not with the selection of the target. Al-Jubayr has been a strong proponent of the close relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia, and a vociferous critic of the increasing Iranian power in the Gulf region. According to a leaked 2008 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh, Ambassador al-Jubayr, who is close to Saudi King 'Abdullah, reiterated the Saudi monarch's frequent exhortations to the United States to attack Iran over Tehran's nuclear program, quoted the King as saying, "cut off the head of the snake."

The Saudis and Iranians have been rivals for influence in the Gulf - they both control major portions of the Gulf coast - Saudi Arabia on the west and Iran on the east. The rivalry is not only based on geography, but religion and ethnicity. The Saudis are Arabs and predominantly Sunni Muslims, while the Iranians are mostly Persians and overwhelmingly Shi'a Muslims.

One of the key issues between the two countries is Iran's quest for a nuclear weapons capability. The Saudi believe, rightly in my opinion, that Tehran's acquisition of nuclear weapons will ignite an arms race in the region, virtually forcing states like Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey to acquire a similar capability. It will be a huge expense none of them needs or wants.

That said, why kill the Saudi ambassador to the United States on American soil? That is truly a provocative act. Certainly the Iranians would have been on the short list of suspects had the operation been conducted. And why now? When contacted by Arbabsiar, Colonel Shukuri indicated that he wanted the operation to be done as soon as possible. What was driving the timing of the operation? Is there another operation that is tied to this one? If I were investigating this case, I'd surely be asking those questions.

According to the State Department, representatives of the United States and Iran sat down to discuss this issue. Why are we meeting with the Iranians over this, or anything for that matter? Is this more of the misguided Obama Administration outreach to the Iranians? How many times do we have to be outmaneuvered before we give up trying to negotiate with these people and start acting in our own interests?

The Iranians, specifically the IRGC Qods Force, has American blood on its hands in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Now we discover that they have just planned an operation to kill the ambassador of one of our closest allies in our own capital city, an operation in which dozens of Americans would also have been killed. This plot would have to have been approved at the highest levels, and when you are talking about the IRGC and especially the Qods Force, they answer directly to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ali Khamenei. The transfer of $100,000 certainly was approved above Colonel Shakuri's level.

This operation has unmasked the Iranian regime for what it is. I hope the Obama Administration finally wakes up and recognizes that these are not people we can negotiate with, be it about this issue, support to the Taliban in Afghanistan and Shi'a militias in Iraq, or their nuclear weapons programs.

If the United States continues to display what is perceived as weakness in our position towards Iran, we can expect more of these types of operations targeting our interests. Why not? There never seem to be consequences for the Iranians.

Syria - the chances for change

2011-08-31T15:22:00.000-07:00

Syrian Army Vehicle 907735

After the fall of the Mu'amar al-Qadhafi regime in Libya, much of the world's attention has turned to the ongoing crisis in Syria. The situation in Syria is not quite the same as in Libya - in Syria there is no coherent and organized opposition that has the wherewithal to overthrow the regime of President Bashar al-Asad.

There is, however, a history of resistance in Syria going back to the founding of the county - Syria was created in the aftermath of World War One and the defeat of the Ottoman Empire that had ruled the area for centuries. Based on the secret Sykes-Picot agreement between Britain and France, the French assumed control of the area that is now the countries of Lebanon and Syria. Despite the efforts of Prince Faysal, close ally of Colonel T.E. Lawrence (more commonly known as Lawrence of Arabia), to gain acceptance of and support for an independent kingdom in the former Ottoman lands, the British departed Syria in favor of the French. Faysal had led the Arab Revolt which made major contributions to the British in their defeat of the Ottoman Turks.

The French were given a formal mandate by the League of Nations in 1920. Faysal declared an independent Arab kingdom at the same time and refused to acknowledge the French Mandate. The Christians in what is now Lebanon rejected Faysal's announcement and declared an independent Lebanon. In response to Faysal's actions, the French began to move troops from Beirut towards Damascus. Faysal left the country and moved to Baghdad where the British enthroned him as the monarch of the newly created Kingdom of Iraq.

A weak Syrian army engaged the French as they approached Damascus. The French easily defeated the Syrians at Maysalun, a pass about 10 miles west of the city. The Battle of Maysalun was only the beginning of a series of uprisings against the French. It took the French three years to impose full control over the country.

In 1925, the Druze in southern Syria rebelled against the French occupation. The rebellion spread throughout the country. The French managed to maintain some semblance of control until 1936 when the two sides signed an agreement creating a Syrian republic. French forces remained until 1946.

There were coups against Syrian governments in 1949, 1951, 1954, 1961 and 1963. The 1963 coup brought the current ruling party, the Ba'th Party, to power. In 1970, Hafiz al-Asad, father of the current president, lead a "Corrective Movement" that continued Ba'th Party rule but under his control. His son Bashar assumed power on his father's death in 2000 after the Syrian parliament changed the constitution to allow the 33-year old to become president - the Syrian constitution previously required the president to be at least 40 years of age. The revolt in 1925 and the subsequent coups were organized and mostly led by military officers. Today's demonstrations are not led by military officers and are not centrally organized.

There have been challenges by Islamic groups against the government, beginning in 1979 and culminating in the 1982 uprising in Hamah. Hamah is now the venue of some of the most violent repression of the current protests. When the Muslim Brotherhood stood up against the Ba'ath Party in February 1982, then-President Hafiz al-Asad dispatched his brother General Rifa't al-Asad and his feared Defense Companies to quell the city. He did just that.

In what has become known in the region as "the Hamah rules," the Syrian soldiers issued an ultimatum for the Brotherhood to surrender. When the Islamists refused to comply, the soldiers laid waste to the city, killing as many as 25,000 citizens, and incurring 1000 dead among the troops. It was one of the most brutal repressions by a country of its own citizens in modern Arab history.

Although the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood has survived, it has not been a threat to the government. When I was assigned to the American Embassy in Damascus, I would occasionally hear gunfire in the city. Several times, I approached the area of the shooting and in most cases the story was the same. Members of the Brotherhood had been discovered and had barricaded themselves in a building. Police and security officers explained to me that the Islamists never give up, so usually the authorities burned the structure with the members inside.

Since the advent of the rule of the Asads - Hafiz the father and Bashar the son - their internal security agencies, and there are many of them, have thoroughly neutralized any credible, organized opposition to the regime. Given the regime's total lack of hesitation to use military force against its own citizens and its past history in places such as Hamah in 1982, I must admit that I am surprised that the Syrian people have been willing to participate in these demonstrations and protests.

I fear that no matter how large the demonstrations become, it will fail in front of Syrian guns. Change in Syria, like Iraq and Libya before it, will require some external force. In Iraq, it was the American-led invasion of 2003. In Libya, it was NATO air support to a fairly organized opposition movement in a much more homogeneous society.

What form will potential external support take? An invasion is not going to happen. President Barack Obama has taken military action off the table. How about a NATO air campaign to protect Syrian citizens as was done in Libya? If Obama is serious that there will be no American military action, it cannot happen. NATO's weaknesses were laid bare in the Libya operation. Perhaps Turkey, a member of NATO, will allow use of its air bases, but unless there is U.S. military involvement, it will fail.

Again, I favor the removal of the al-Asad/Ba'th regime in Syria. I am just not sure it can happen without some outside help...and I don' see it coming anytime soon.

The chances for change in Syria? Slim.

Libya: Finally, but what now?

2011-08-24T10:09:00.000-07:00

Given the recent fall of the Bab al-'Aziziyah compound, the Tripoli stronghold of Libyan leader Mu'amar al-Qadhafi, it is apparent that the regime has collapsed. Of course, much of the credit goes to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, more commonly known as NATO, and its principal power, the United States.

My friend and colleague retired Army Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Peters, whose opinion I respect, gives President Barack Obama a B+. Karl Rove, who I do not know but whose opinion I also respect, gives the President a B-. I must respectfully disagree with both. I think I have more experience dealing with Qadhafi's Libya then either Ralph or Karl (and certainly more than this President) - I give Mr. Obama a D at best.

Why the low grade?

Simple - this operation took six months. Most of the blame for that rests with the President and NATO. This should have been over in three weeks. Instead of six months of continuous bloodshed, there could have been a short, albeit bloody, conflict which in the long run would have resulted in less casualties on both sides.

I have a close friend and mentor - a retired and highly-decorated Air Force colonel who is a true hero in his own right - who will accuse me of "Obama bashing." I guess that is true. Had the President exercised the leadership inherent in the office of President of the United States - often referred to by the Administration as "leader of the free world" - less people would have died in the fighting in the North African nation. I guess my question is, "Do you favor actions that result in less deaths or not?"

I really abhor the President's self-described theory of "leading from behind." Never in over three decades of military service and as a military operations analyst have I ever heard of such an oxymoronic concept. There is a reason for that: it does not exist. You cannot lead from behind. The basic leadership tenet of second lieutenants in all American (and other) services has always been "Follow me," as opposed to "Go ahead, I'm in charge back here...."

Here's how this should have played out. The United States should have continued to lead the operation, not ceding control to France and the United Kingdom. This operation should have happened whether or not the United Nations authorized the action. We should not be hampered in doing what is right by the collective reasoning of a group that does not share our values or interests.

American aircraft led the initial strikes, as they should have. However, after initial successful sorties, the President - for whatever reason - decided to take a back seat to NATO and only play a supporting role. That sounds great, but in reality, the only forces in NATO capable of sustained military operations are those of the United States. Although the Obama Administration would have you believe otherwise, NATO could not have executed this campaign without American support. Put more bluntly, besides American command and control, reconnaissance, refueling, intelligence, surveillance, precision guided munitions, airlift, etc., NATO did a great job. Those of us who have had the misfortune to work with NATO during our military careers refer to the organization as "Not After Two O'clock."

After the initial strikes, we should have introduced the weapons systems that could have changed the course of the battle. The U.S. Air Force has developed at great cost the AC-130 Spectre gunship and the A-10 Thunderbolt II (although most of us call it "the Warthog") to deal with these types of targets. Application of these devastating weapons platforms would have essentially shredded the Libyan army in short order and brought the situation to a quicker close. Shorter battle, less casualties (on both sides).

But no, we had to pull the much more capable American weapons platforms out in favor of the more politically correct but far less capable NATO systems. Dedicated aircrews to be sure, but not equal to state-of-the-art American aircraft flown by combat-experienced pilots.

Bottom line: it took longer. "Leading from behind" always will.

The paradox: the Arab (and at time Muslim) nations of the Middle East and North Africa view this as an American intervention no matter what spin the Obama Administration puts on it. That was a good thing. For the first time in decades, we had popular regional support for our policy, yet we chose to squander that away by invoking NATO cover. Incredulous. The Arabs and Muslims know that although this operation had a NATO fig leaf, it was due to American military power that it succeeded. This was a highly popular operation - in this instance, we should have taken the credit.

So here we are. The Qadhafi regime will fall, if it has not already. Now what? As I watched the coverage of the fighting on the various networks, it was clear that many of the fighters are not just Muslims, but Islamic. Does that mean that we can expect an Islamist group to emerge as the power broker in Libya? I don't know, but I did hear many religious chants as the Qadhafi regime fell.

Will the Muslim Brotherhood make a play for the new Libya? Have the younger Libyans adopted Western technology and social mores, or will they revert to tribal control?

I fear that the Libyan rebel leaders are adept enough at international politics to convince our current gullible American diplomats (led by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton) that they are on the path to a Jeffersonian democracy. Given my experience in the region, I have to say that I doubt it.

I hope that Qadhafi is found soon and brought to justice. Unfortunately, he may be able to escape Tripoli and start an insurgency. It may take some time before he is tracked down and pulled out of a hole like Saddam Husayn in Iraq in 2003.

In any case, there will be a new government in Libya. That's a good thing. We don't seem to have much influence because we were "leading from behind." That's a bad thing.

"Who is the Deadliest Warrior?" Aftermath

2011-08-23T10:01:00.000-07:00

The Aftermath show - I get a lot more airtime here:

http://www.spike.com/full-episodes/yuwwv3/deadliest-warrior-aftermath-saddam-hussein-vs-pol-pot-season-33-ep-305a

"Who is the Deadliest Warrior" Episode

2011-08-21T10:57:00.000-07:00

The "Who is the Deadliest Warrior?" episode in which I appear is now available on the Spike TV website at:
http://www.spike.com/full-episodes/4o4950/deadliest-warrior-saddam-hussein-vs-pol-pot-season-3-ep-305

Rick Francona on Spike TV's "Who is the Deadliest Warrior?"

2011-08-13T20:25:00.000-07:00

Rick Francona appears as a subject matter expert about Saddam Husayn, the Iraqi Republican Guard Forces Command and the Iraqi military in next week's episode of Spike TV's "Who is the Deadliest Warrior?" The episode airs on wednesday, August 17 at 10pm (but check local listings). He also translates for a former Iraqi general....

The show pits Saddam Husayn and his Republican Guard against Cambodian psychopathic ruler Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge guerrilla fighters.

Watch the first 15 minutes of the show here:
http://www.spike.com/video-clips/f7xmzg/deadliest-warrior-sneak-peek-saddam-hussein-vs-pol-pot.

Taliban Tactics and American Ambiguity

2011-08-12T08:35:00.000-07:00

Last weekend's crash of a U.S. Army CH-47 Chinook helicopter as the result of Taliban RPG hit in which 30 American troops were killed was a tactical victory for the Taliban. The television news bulletin with the headline "30 US Troops Die in Afghan Chopper Crash" is the goal of these operations. The Taliban know they are not going to defeat the American-led coalition on the battlefield. They are not seeking a military victory, they simply want the foreign forces to leave, giving them a political victory. The question is how to get them to leave?

Any student of history would draw the conclusions that Americans can be swayed by what political-military scholars call a "significant emotional event." These events do not have to be military or political losses, they may even be victories, but they must galvanize American public opinion against the current course of action. The headline in the photo just might be another significant emotional event.

Some examples of significant emotional events and the fallout:

- 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam. On January 31, 1968, the Vietnamese New Year (in Vietnamese, Tết Nguyên Đán, hence the name Tet), the Viet Cong launched coordinated strikes on military bases and command centers throughout South Vietnam, hoping to spark an uprising that would topple the American-backed government and force the American troops to leave.

The military campaign was a disaster for the Viet Cong. After achieving initial surprise, American forces counterattacked and in essence destroyed the Viet Cong as a fighting force. After Tet, the only effective military force opposing the Americans were the regulars of the North Vietnamese army.

Despite the offensive being a loss for the Viet Cong and a military victory for the United States, the perception in the United States was that the war was not winnable nor worth the expenditure of blood and treasure. Although American involvement (including mine) continued until 1973, the Tet offensive changed American public opinion toward the war. While American troops won the battles in Vietnam, the American public lost the war at home.

- 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut. On 23, 1983 during the civil war in Lebanon, a truck bomb struck a building at Beirut International Airport used to house U.S. Marines. The Marines were in Lebanon as part of a UN-mandated force positioned there in the aftermath of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon aimed at the destruction of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The attack left 241 American troops dead; 58 French paratroopers were killed in a near-simultaneous separate attack. The attack was the event that led to the eventual withdrawal of American (and French) forces from Lebanon.

- 1993 "Blackhawk Down" in Mogadishu. On October 3 and 4, 1993, Task Force Ranger, consisting of diverse elements of the U.S. Special Operations community, conducted a raid into Mogadishu to arrest known collaborators of warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid. During the operation, two U.S. Army UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters were shot down by RPGs, stranding a group of survivors in the city overnight. In the overnight fighting, 19 American troops were killed and 73 wounded.

Although the task force in the end achieved its objectives in capturing the targets, the political fallout and objections to the mishandling of the military situation by President Clinton caused the eventual U.S. withdrawal from Somalia.

The effect of the downed Chinook in Afghanistan

The loss of 30 American troops, the largest single daily loss in the almost 10-year old Afghan war, may constitute a significant emotional event. The crash comes at a critical time for U.S. policy in Afghanistan. The Obama Administration, for whatever misguided reason, is wedded to a specific timeline for withdrawal of American troops from the country. This follows a surge of forces to take on the Taliban in their traditional strongholds.

It is a mixed message. The United States, because it is trying to do more with less troops, will necessarily have to change its counterinsurgency strategy to one of counterterrorism. That will likely mean more of the type of raids that led to these high casualties. This coincides with more and more American's becoming weary of a war that seems to have no defined mission.

Why are we fighting the Taliban? Why are we supporting the Karzai government? Wasn't the reason for the invasion in 2001 to remove and defeat al-Qa'idah? Aren't they gone? Why aren't we hunting and killing al-Qa'idah where they are instead of nation building in Afghanistan?

Good questions all. I am still waiting for the answers. Somehow I doubt they will be forthcoming from the President focused on his re-election campaign in Iowa or on vacation in Martha's Vineyard. Perhaps the loss of these fine Americans will be the significant emotional event that causes the American people to demand those answers.

Syria: The invasion of Hamah

2011-08-06T14:14:00.000-07:00

Syrian T-55 tanks in downtown Hamah

It is a scene reminiscent of television footage of Iraqi tanks rolling into Kuwait City in August 1990. Unfortunately, the scenes captured in this amateur video broadcast on the Sham (Damascus) News Network are of Syrian tanks assaulting the Syrian city of Hamah.

Hamah is being invaded. It is being invaded by the Syrian army. As his father did to Hamah in 1982 in which over 25,000 residents were slaughtered, President Bashar al-Asad has unleashed the full range of military weaponry on the city's mostly unarmed citizens. This is not a police or internal security operation, this is a full-fledged military assault, complete with artillery, armor, helicopter gunships and mechanized infantry, and in some case, air strikes.

I am surprised that this is taking place in Hamah. The 1982 destruction of the city resulted in the phenomenon known throughout the region as the "Hamah Rules," the knowledge that the Syrian Ba'thist regime will use overwhelming military force against its own citizens to maintain itself in power. The people of Hamah knew full well the likely response from the regime if they dared to rise up again. Still, they chose to do just that.

I have been to Hamah numerous times - it was (and hopefully still is) a beautiful city. Its 17 huge water wheels (nawriyah - see above photo) on the 'Asi (Orontes) River that runs through the city produce a unique sound that defines Hamah. Ironically, the name of the river means "rebel" in Arabic. It was a pleasant place to stop when traveling from Damascus to northern Syria - much nicer than the industrial complex of Homs, another city that has suffered at the hands of the Asad regime.

I am also surprised at the conduct of the Syrian army. It is a conscript army, made of of ordinary Syrians. Although the senior ranks of the officer corps are dominated by members of the Asad's 'Alawi minority, the junior officers and enlisted are primarily Sunni Arabs.

The fact that the troops show no remorse in putting down the protests in Hamah leads me to believe that the units participating in the operation are drawn from the Republican Guard or other regime protection units, specifically the 4th Armored Division based near the palace in Damascus. These units are made up of vetted, loyal Ba'thists, officered by true believers, have the best equipment, and have everything to lose if the regime is overthrown.

I contrast what is happening in Syria and the muted world reaction to it with the reaction almost six months ago when a similar situation erupted in Libya. The world not only condemned the threats made by Libyan leader Mu'amar al-Qadhafi but convinced NATO (initially led by the United States) to intervene militarily. I submit we have much greater national interests at stake in Syria, yet there is nothing but rhetoric emanating from Washington and European capitals.

Meanwhile, the people of Hamah are on their own.

Al-Hariri indictments - Lebanon to arrest Hizbllah members???

2011-08-01T13:00:00.000-07:00

The United Nations Special Tribunal for Lebanon has officially released the names of four Lebanese men indicted in the 2005 murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri. Although their names have been leaked in the past, the official release of the names starts a clock requiring the Lebanese government to take the four into custody.

Don't hold your breath for a "perp walk" in at the Ministry of Justice in downtown Beirut. Leaders of the Lebanese government as well as Hizballah - to which the four belong - have stated that they will not be arrested. Hizballah leader Sayid Hasan Nasrallah boasted that Lebanese authorities would not dare arrest any members of his group.

Nasrallah simply said that the four accused will not be able to be located. He's right, of course. When the most powerful political party and strongest militia in the country want to protect four of its thugs and henchmen, the ineffective Lebanese police, internal security and military will never take them into custody.

Hizballah's adversarial stance has caused numerous crises for the weak Lebanese government. Now that Hizballah holds 16 of 30 cabinets positions, Nasrallah's words probably ring true. He claims that the accusations were engineered in the West to bring down the Hizballah-dominated government.

One of the four men is fairly well-known in terrorist circles. Mustafa Amin Badr al-Din (rendered by the UN as Mustafa Amine Badreddine) is the brother-in-law of the legendary late Hizballah military commander 'Imad Mughniyah, one of the world's most notorious mass murderers. Mughniyah was killed by a car bomb in Damascus, Syria in 2008. Although there has been no official acknowledgement, it was almost certainly the work of the Israeli Mossad.

The tribunal also named Salim Jamil 'Ayash (Salim Jamil Ayyash), Husayn Hasan 'Unaysi (Hussein Hassan Oneissi) and Asad Hasan Sabra (Assad Hassan Sabra). International arrest warrants were issued for the suspects on July 8. In theory, according to international law, the Lebanese government is responsible for arresting the indictees; Beirut has until August 11 to respond. Given the fractious nature of the Lebanese government and the strength of Hizballah, it is almost certain not to happen.

This is reminiscent of the war crimes indictments levied after the war in the former Yugoslavia. It took foreign forces, nominally NATO, but mostly American, to finally make arrests in those cases. If there are to be arrests in this case, they certainly will not be made by the current Lebanese government.

It will be years, if ever, before any of the four indicted persons see a courtroom.

American troops to remain in Iraq? Hopefully...

2011-07-30T09:55:00.000-07:00

The author with Jalal Talabani in northern Iraq – 1996

Reality sets in

Iraqi President Jalal Talabani has called a series of meetings to discuss the possibility of continued American troop presence in Iraq after the December 31, 2011 deadline for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the country. The key players at the meeting will be Talabani, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and Foreign Minister Hoshyar al-Zebari.

There will be other political leaders in attendance at the meeting - a decision is needed fairly quickly if any American forces are to remain. The meeting is in probable response to calls by U.S. Vice President Joe Biden asking if a request for a continued troop presence was forthcoming. This is an interesting reversal from an Administration that could not remove American forces fast enough.

It appears that some of the senior Iraqi and American political leadership recognize that Iraqi military and security forces are not capable of maintaining order in the country. The Iraqi leadership does not want the situation in the country to deteriorate into a new round of sectarian violence, and the Obama Administration does not want to be blamed for squandering the gains made by American forces after the troop surge of 2007-2008. Both Iraqi and American officials concede that the situation in Iraq has worsened over the past year - about the same time when all U.S. combat forces were withdrawn from the country.

If there is a request for some American troops to remain, it will likely be framed as a request for “training and assistance” rather than a security presence. That is merely semantics, a fig leaf - the current American forces in the country involved in training and assistance operations are combat capable. Prime Minister Al-Maliki will want a parliamentary decision – that allows him political cover with his Iranian sponsors who want all American forces out of the entire Gulf region, not just Iraq. Al-Maliki is in a delicate position. While his Iranian sponsors are providing weapons and training to sectarian forces responsible for recent American casualties, he will likely have to adopt a position that counters Tehran's wishes.

The Kurdish dimension

There is another dynamic in play here. Both President Talabani and Foreign Minister Zebari are Kurds; Talabani was the Secretary General of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Zebari was a senior official of the rival Kurdish Democratic Party. The Kurds, who have established the Kurdish Autonomous Region (KAR) in northern Iraq – the most stable and prosperous section of the country – view the Americans as the ultimate guarantor of their continued security and prosperity and want a continued American presence in the country. The Kurds’ continued security concern is not sectarian violence, but ethnic violence from the Arab majority of Iraq.

The Kurds have been at loggerheads with central government in Baghdad since they established the KAR in 2005 in accordance with the new Iraqi constitution. The Kurds have tried to negotiate oil contracts with foreign oil companies to exploit oil fields in the northern part of Iraq, including oil fields near the contested city of Kirkuk that technically are not within the current KAR boundaries. The Kurds are adopting a hard line on the future status of the city. They insist it is part – some call it the capital - of the Kurdish area, while the Iraqi government is concerned about the Arab and Turkoman minorities who also reside in the oil-rich city.

The American perspective

Despite the Obama Administration’s political agenda to remove American troops as soon as possible, it appears that some of Obama's advisors at the Pentagon and State Department realize that a continued American presence is desirable on several levels. First, to simply leave an unstable situation - it is unstable and getting worse - is not in the interests of either the United States or Iraq. It might play well for the Iranians, something this Administration has overlooked in the past.

Second, as long as the United States has interests in the Persian Gulf region, meaning as long as we are dependent on foreign oil, it will be necessary to have a viable American military presence in the region. Although the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet is headquartered in Bahrain, political unrest there may cause that venue to be untenable in the future.

There is no country in the Middle East more suitable than Iraq for an American military presence. The country has adequate infrastructure and is centrally located. It allows the United States to almost surround with allies two countries led by regimes of concern: Iran and Syria. Having American troops and combat aircraft in Iraq would provide a credible deterrent to these countries. Of course, that assumes this Administration is willing to review - and reverse - its failed "engagement" policies with Tehran and Damascus.

American troops in Iraq after the end of the year? It's a good idea.

Analysis of the Syrian Train Sabotage Attack

2011-07-25T16:27:00.000-07:00

On July 24, unknown persons caused the derailment of a passenger train outside the restless city of Homs, about 100 miles north of Damascus. The city has been the venue for weeks of anti-government demonstrations and ruthless regime repression of those demonstrations. Sixteen passengers were injured in the incident; the train's engineer was killed. Unusually, the Syrian government did not try to portray this as an accident, going out of its way to show reporters bullet holes in the engineer's cabin.

Additional video (narration in Arabic)

The exact location of the derailing is 34º 45' 39"N 36º 38' 02"E, just outside the Ring Road around Homs. A search of satellite imagery and available news footage enabled me to find the location. It is close to the village of Quzhal, quite a distance from the reported location of al-Sawda. This is not surprising - the Syrians are notorious for not providing accurate locational data.

The spot selected for the train derailment smacks of amateur actors. A few rail sections appear to have been removed on the south side of a bridge over a small river. In the absence of using explosives to destroy the bridge, the perpetrators should have removed track sections on the bridge itself or on the north side of the bridge to cause damage to the bridge, possibly rendering it unsafe for future traffic. Tracks are easy to replace; bridges are not.

That said, the choice of a passenger train carrying almost 500 people is hardly a viable target for a groups of anti-government protesters - but who else would have done it? It would be impossible to know if the passengers on the train were regime supporters; more likely, many were not happy with the Ba'th regime of President Bashar al-Asad. Had this been a military train, that might be an acceptable target.

Given the timing of the derailing, this appears to have been Train 230, the night train from Aleppo to Damascus, hardly a train that would be used for military movements. According to the governor of Homs governorate, Ghasan 'Abd al-'Al, the train derailed between 1:00am and 3:00am. This coincides with the schedule below, showing Train 230 departing Aleppo shortly after midnight and scheduled to stop in Homs at 3:30am.

The governor's remarks are confusing, though. He said (translated), "The saboteurs learned the schedule of the train which passed Aleppo at 1:00 a.m. They dismantled the rails during the two hours before the train was due to arrive at Damascus at 3:00 am." This may be an error in translation; I have not been able to get the audio of the remarks in Arabic to allow me to determine exactly what he said.

First, "learning" the train schedule is not rocket science. Even in tightly-controlled Syria, the government has to tell people when the trains operate. Second, the train was scheduled to depart its origin in Aleppo earlier than the 1:00am time cited by 'Abd al-'Al, and the train was not due to reach Damascus until well after 6:00am.

The bottom line

This attack was exactly the wrong thing to do. An unprovoked attack on a passenger train that has nothing to do with the Ba'th regime other than the fact that it is part of a state-owned enterprise, is just wrong. it undermines the legitimacy and credibility of the anti-government demonstrators who up until this point have been nonviolent. The violence has been perpetrated by regime forces seeking to repress the demonstrations.

This violent attack plays right in to the hands of the regime. It now has a violent act that can be cited to justify further repression of the demonstrations. If there was a chapter on how not to protest successfully in a dictatorship, this would be among the major topics.

The leaders of the demonstrators need to denounce this senseless act.

Obama and the Middle East - Worse than Bush?

2011-07-24T11:25:00.000-07:00

To say that the Middle East policies of the Obama Administration are different than that of the previous administration is an understatement. As we used to say in the Air Force, it's "180 out" from one to the other. I say the "policies of the Obama Administration" rather than attributing the policies to the President himself because I assume he is following the guidance of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and his other political advisors. If so, he may want to rethink his choices of Cabinet members and advisors should he be re-elected - this current group is not doing so well.

One need only look at public opinion polls being conducted where it counts - in the Middle East. Polls conducted here are meaningless to the people who live in the region and are directly affected by the Obama Administration's policies. One such poll was conducted by the firm of IBOPE Zogby International. The primary pollster for this firm is John Zogby, a Lebanese-American with a keen understanding of Middle East events, and a member of the Democratic Party.

The bottom line - the United States is less popular now in most Arab countries than during the Bush Administration. This must come as a blow to the Obama Administration, who touted its new "engagement" policies as the way to restore American influence and standing in the region in the aftermath of the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.

With the exception of favorable views in Saudi Arabia and Lebanon of Obama's decision to support the imposition of a no-fly zone over Libya earlier this year, public opinion in Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates cites no improvement in U.S. relations in the Arab World since Obama took office in 2009. One alarming statistic is that except in Saudi Arabia, the Islamic Republic of Iran under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has higher positive ratings than does the United States under President Barack Obama.

President Obama’s attempts to engage Iran and Syria have not resulted in improved relations or improved perceptions of America. In fact, the opposite is true. President Obama is perceived as a weak leader, unwilling to confront the regimes in Tehran and Damascus, and incapable of resolving any regional issues, including the Palestinian issue, an issue on which the President has expended large amounts of real and political capital. This must be frustrating for the residents of the Middle East who hoped the election of President Obama would usher in a new era of American leadership in the region.

What we find in the region now are American withdrawals from yet undecided conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, an unwillingness by the Administration to put pressure on Syria for its brutal repression of its own people, no plan from Washington for progress on the Palestinian-Israeli issue, and a seeming lack of urgency is addressing the Iranian quest for nuclear weapons. There also seems to be confusion on how to deal with the popular uprisings - the so-called "Arab Spring" - in the region.

Please do not hold up Libya as the shining example of successful policy. The United States waited until it was almost too late, led some effective operations, but then abdicated its leadership role and assumed this puzzling "lead from behind" strategy. In my almost three decades of military service, I never was exposed to this "lead from behind" concept. That's because it is ridiculous.

Libya should have been over in three weeks. By prolonging the conflict through lack of American leadership, more Libyans have died than were necessary, and the situation is still not resolved. Imposing the no-fly zone was the right thing to do. How this Administration did it was not.

All of this is not lost on the Arab world. The perception that the United States is being led by a weak, indecisive President makes the area more dangerous, not less. Mr. President, please listen to the career Middle East specialists at State and Defense, not the political appointees who are harming American interests in the region. They are not serving you well.

Iran and al-Qa'idah - strange bedfellows

2011-07-09T15:36:00.000-07:00

Sayf al-'Adil / سيف العدل‎

In the aftermath of the successful May 2011 U.S. special operations forces raid into Pakistan that resulted in the killing of al-Qa'idah leader Usamah bin Ladin, there has been a subtle shift in the traditionally uneasy relationship between the government of Iran and the al-Qa'idah terrorist organization. One of the key leaders of the terror organization is Sayf al-'Adil*, currently under supposed house arrest near Tehran.

Al-'Adil, like other senior al-Qa'idah leaders and bin Ladin family members, fled to Iran in the face of the American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. According to the Iranians, they were placed under so-called "house arrest" in a residential facility near Tehran. Despite the restrictions placed on these leaders, al-'Adil has been known to travel to Pakistan and probably Afghanistan.

Iran is using al-Qa'idah as a tool in its own fight with the United States and the West. There is no common ideology between the Iranian Islamic Revolution (enqelab-e islami) and the al-Qa'idah Organization (tanzim al-qa'idah) other than the fact that they are both Muslim and favor the imposition of their own interpretation of Shari'ah law. The Iranians follow the doctrine of the Shi'a sect of Islam, while al-Qa'idah is a Sunni fundamentalist group. This relationship is also complicated by the fact that al-Qa'idah is an Arab organization, while the Iranians are predominantly Persians - the animosity between the two runs long and deep.

So here we have two diametrically opposed, ethnically-different Islamic fundamentalist groups supposedly cooperating with each other. The differences go further than just ideology or belief system - it involves much bloodshed on both sides and includes attacks on sites holy to the other side. For example, in Iraq in 2006, the group known as "al-Qa'idah in the land of the two rivers" (more commonly called al-Qa'idah in Iraq, or AQI) under the leadership of the late Abu Musa'ib al-Zarqawi masterminded the beginning of a civil war in Iraq, a civil war between Sunni Arabs and Shi'a Arabs.

The event that triggered the internecine fighting was an attack on the al-'Askari Shrine in al-Samarra' that destroyed the golden dome of the mosque. An AQI attack the next year destroyed the two 100-feet tall minarets at the shrine. The shrine is the burial place of the 10th and 11th Shi'a imams and considered one of the holiest sites in Shi'a Islam. (It has since been restored.)

The attack was the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back. Despite exhortations from Tehran and Iraqi Shi'a religious leaders, the Shi'a rose up and responded with violence - just as al-Zarqawi planned it. Al-Zarqawi's stated goal, although not supported by Usamah bin Ladin and al-Qa'idah number two Ayman al-Zawahiri, was to kill all of the Shi'a, whom he viewed as apostates to Islam.

The irony - Iran is now cooperating with a group that attempted to kill as many of its fellow Shi'a as it could. Why? The answer is simple. There is one common conviction shared by both al-Qa'idah and the Iranians - hatred of the United States. That hatred of the United States transcends their hatred of each other. It is strong enough to make the two enemies work with each other.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta's recent remarks that intelligence gathered from the Abbottabad compound of Usamah bin Ladin has identified 10 to 20 al-Qa'idah leaders whose deaths or capture would "strategically defeat" the organization, may play right into Iran's hand. Iran has pretty much out-maneuvered the Obama Administration in virtually all aspects of the Iranian issue, be it the nuclear program, Iraq or Afghanistan. (See my earlier pieces on Iran going back several years, including during the Bush Administration.)

Since the Secretary has laid down the gauntlet and told these top leaders that if possible, their fate will be the same as that of Usamah bin Ladin, they may be looking for a safer place to hide than Pakistan. Pakistan's probably-complicit Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate has proven not as efficient as might have been thought prior to the May raid. The chances of the Obama Administration launching a similar raid into Iran is virtually non-existent, given its flawed and failed "engagement" policy toward the Islamic Republic.

Iran, for its part, gets to exert greater influence over the al-Qa'idah organization, fitting in with its goal to be the key power broker in the region as the United States all but capitulates its leadership position with the politically-motivated - and premature - withdrawal of its military forces from Iraq and Afghanistan.

Note to political science majors and junkies - what the Iranians are doing is classic. They have turned a potential enemy into an ally in the fight against a common, larger threat - the United States.

The Iranians live by the Middle East adage, "The enemy of my enemy is my friend.

_________________
* Sayf al-'Adil is a nom de guerre. It is Arabic for "Sword of Justice."

Iran ups the ante in Iraq and Afghanistan

2011-07-07T07:47:00.000-07:00

The Iranians are moving to replace the United States as the key power broker in both Iraq and Afghanistan as the Obama Administration withdraws American forces from those two countries. (See my earlier piece, Iran picks up the pieces - again.

That is to be expected, especially since the Obama Administration has in essence handed the area to the Iranians. The Iranians have assessed - correctly in my opinion - that the current Administration must please its voting base and withdraw its forces whether or not it makes sense militarily. It is difficult to blame the Iranians, after all, they are acting in their own national interest.

However, the Iranians have taken this effort to another level, one for which we can blame them. Not content to wait out the American troop withdrawal and simply ingratiate themselves with the corrupt governments of Nuri al-Maliki in Baghdad and Hamid Karzai in Kabul, the Iranians have upped the ante by providing additional and more effective weapons to the Taliban in Afghanistan and three Shi'a militias in Iraq. These weapons have been tied directly to recent deaths of American troops both countries.

In somewhat refreshing declarations, American military leaders in Baghdad and Washington, as well as American ambassador to Iraq James Jeffrey, have unambiguously identified the weaponry as originating in Iran, provided by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and tied directly to American casualties. This is a welcome change - in the past two years, no official would acknowledge what we all knew to be true, that Iranian weapons were killing American forces. To admit that would be to cast doubt on the wisdom of the Obama Administration's policy of engagement with Iran.

This policy has failed. In fact, it has gone beyond failure and led to a series of Iranian policy successes. One only need look at the status of the Iranian nuclear weapons issue to realize this. If you are still under the impression that Iran is developing a nuclear electrical energy generation capability, you may not care to read further. Iran is developing nuclear weapons - it already has the missiles to deliver them. If they did not have the missiles, the United States would not be seeking an anti-missile capability that specifically addresses Iran's capabilities.

Why has the Iranian leadership decided to provide weapons to the Taliban and Iraqi Shi'a militias, weapons they know will be used against American troops? Why not wait for the American troops to just leave?

In the case of Iraq, that withdrawal will be later this year, unless the Iraqis ask for the continued presence of American troops. The Iranians are astute followers of American domestic politics. They know that if they use their surrogates to cause increased American casualties, it will not matter if the Iraqi government asks for troops to remain because American public opinion will not support it. I view an Iraqi request for a continued American troop presence as unlikely as long as al-Maliki is in the pockets of the Iranians.

In the case of Afghanistan, the Iranians know that the war is becoming unpopular in the United States. They assess - again correctly in my opinion - that President Obama is making decisions based on politics and not the military situation. As the United States enters the 2012 Presidential election cycle, Obama will be even more prone to view Afghanistan through the political optic versus the military situation.

Now we have the failure of the "engagement" policy converging with the fact that President Obama wants to be re-elected. Given the abysmal state of the so-called economic "recovery," the last thing the President needs is continued involvement in two increasingly unpopular wars in which American casualties as perceived as rising. The Iranians are trying to create the impression in Afghanistan and Iraq that they are forcing the Americans out. They may be successful on both counts.

Mr. Obama, I am puzzled. One of two conditions exist in your Administration. Either you don't have anyone that knows much about the Middle East, or you are not listening to them. I have to believe it is the latter since I have worked with some of the Middle East specialists at the Pentagon, CIA and State - many are excellent analysts with years of experience.

Since you seem to have chosen to ignore their counsel, let me offer you some free advice. First, your engagement policy was misguided - you allowed the Iranians to take the lead on virtually every occasion. While in your mind this makes the United States the stronger, the more respected, the party willing to go the extra mile. That may be, but in the minds of the Iranians and Arabs that comprise the majority of the people in the Middle East, it makes the United States look weak, like we are caving in to their demands. They know you are not going to use military force, so any threat - and that includes your "nothing is off the table" rhetoric - you might make is meaningless. Perception is reality, and you are perceived as weak.

Mr. Obama, if you disagree with my analysis, please feel free to point out the diplomatic successes your "engagement" has brought us.

Iran picks up the pieces - again

2011-06-29T08:08:00.000-07:00

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad hosted a meeting with the presidents of Afghanistan and Pakistan in Tehran recently. The focus of the meeting was the future of the region after the upcoming withdrawal of American and NATO forces from Afghanistan, Iran's neighbor to the east. Iran's concerns and plans coincide with its focus on the future of Iraq, its neighbor to the west, after the withdrawal of American forces from that country later this year.

Interestingly, all three nations represented are Islamic republics. The official titles of the three are: Islamic Republic of Iran, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Despite the fact that Pakistan and Afghanistan are predominantly Sunni Muslim and Iran is over 90 percent Twelver Shi'a Islam, the leaders in Tehran believe that Islamic governments in all three countries can be a unifying factor. That includes unity against the West.

The truth is that both Iranian Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution (rahbare mo'azzame enghelab, literally "Leader of the Revolution") Ali Khamenei and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are positioning themselves to become the key power brokers in Afghanistan, much as they have done to the west in Iraq. Following the American invasion of Iraq and removal of the Saddam Husayn regime, the Iranians immediately began a campaign to solidify relations with the Shi'a majority in Iraq. As that Shi'a majority gained the prominent position in Iraqi politics by virtue of its sheer numbers, the Iranians were quick to offer all types of support.

The Iranians succeeded beyond their wildest expectations in Iraq. With the election of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, the Iranians got a virtual puppet in charge in Baghdad - al-Maliki is derisively known as al-irani, the Iranian. After his first term, he was able to retain the prime minister position despite not winning the most number of seats - it was Iranian influence that led to the formation of a new government with al-Maliki still in charge.

Although it was American military power that removed a ruthless dictator in Iraq - at great cost in terms of blood and treasure - it was ultimately the Iranians who benefited the most from that action. The brutality of the Saddam Husayn regime has been replaced by a new government allied with an equally brutal regime in Tehran.

With Iraq firmly in their sphere of influence, the Iranians are now turning their attention to the east. The Iranians have attempted to influence events in the Herat area of western Afghanistan for years, including dispatching elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to provide the same things the IRGC has done elsewhere in the region to destabilize situations - money, weapons and training to subversive elements.

Just as they have supported insurgencies and uprisings in Lebanon, Kurdish Iraq during the Saddam years, Croatia, Chechnya, Gaza and post-Saddam Iraq, the IRGC's al-Qods (Jerusalem) Force has provided material support to the Taliban. It is important to note that in the mid-1990's, the Taliban (Sunni Islamist) and the Iranians (Shi'a Islamist) were enemies. Mutual hatred of the United States transcends the differences between the two Islamist groups.

In Pakistan, relations between the United States and Islamabad are strained, especially in the wake of a U.S. special operations raid into Pakistan in which American troops killed al-Qa'idah leader Usamah bin Ladin under the noses of an either complicit or incompetent Pakistani intelligence service (I'm betting on complicit). Iran is attempting to exploit this ebb in the Pakistani-American relationship, with some success.

In the two years since Barack Obama took office and instituted his policy to engage the Iranians, Iranian influence in Iraq, the Persian Gulf and now South Asia has increased markedly. The Iranians are also pursuing the development of a nuclear weapon almost unchecked, yet there appears to be no change of strategy in Washington.

Mr. President, is that what you had in mind when you took office? Perhaps it's time to reassess this "engagement" policy - it's clearly not working.

Taliban Intelligence Report on Obama's Speech

2011-06-23T09:55:00.000-07:00

President Obama announced his plans to begin the withdrawal of 10,000 American troops from Afghanistan by the end of this year, and as many as 33,000 by the end of next year.

This is how the Taliban's intelligence officers might assess Obama's remarks.
----------------------------------

DATE: 22 Rajab 1432 / 25 June 2011
FROM: Taliban Intelligence/Qandahar Sector
TO: Excellency Mullah Omar (Allah protect him)
SUBJ: President Obama's Plans to Withdraw Crusader Forces from Afghanistan

C O N F I D E N T I A L - INTEL/URGENT - BY COURIER

1. SUMMARY: On 19 Rajab 1432, Infidel crusader President Barack Obama announced his plans to reduce the number of occupiers by 10,000 by the end of this year. We expect to see one brigade (approximately 5,000 troops) beginning to retreat in Sha'ban, followed by another brigade nolater than at the time of the pilgrimage this winter. An additional 23,000 troops will be withdrawn by the end of next summer.

In essence, Excellency, the infidel crusaders have given up. Our strategy to counter the so-called American "surge" has been proven effective. Victory is within sight. Allahu akbar.

2. OUR ANALYSIS:

a. This report should be read in conjunction with our earlier report, "President Obama Provides Outline for Taliban Victory in Afghanistan" of Thu al-Hijjah 13, 1430 (December 1, 2009). That report detailed Obama's announcement of the so-called surge, but included a date certain for the beginning of the withdrawal of those troops. Thanks be to Allah that Obama has no military experience or training, and apparently no understanding of military strategy. He predicted his own defeat, and now that glorious day has come. As our friends and supporters in the hopefully temporary Kingdom of Saudi Arabia say, Obama has been hobbled by his own 'iqal.

b. Since Obama has no valid military reason to withdraw his troops, we assess that the announcement of the removal of 33,000 troops over the next year is a political decision based on American public opinion. Polls in the United States indicate that most Americans want the 10-year war to be over, and that the continued presence of American forces does nothing to further American strategic interests.

Just as our Vietnamese brothers did four decades ago, we have won the battle not on the battlefield, but via American public opinion. Although we cannot militarily defeat the cowardly Americans with their aircraft, drones and artillery, we have bested them in their own media. As Ho Chi Minh warned the Americans years ago, "We kill one of you, you kill ten of us. But soon you will tire of it and go home. We will still be here." The Americans are going home; we will still be here.

c. The infidel Secretary of State, the uncovered woman Hillary Clinton, claimed in a Congressional hearing that American and NATO forces have broken the momentum of our faithful mujahdin. Her fictional claims cause our beards to shake with laughter. Nothing could be further from the truth. We have allowed the crusaders to advance where we cannot stop them, and resist where we can. Yet, no areas that they have "secured" remain under their control without the continuous presence of their troops. The population is with us.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. As in our earlier report, Excellency, we encourage the mujahidin to continue to conduct low-level operations against the infidels using the calendar as our battlefield companion. We should continue to wait out the Americans and their NATO subjects as they begin their retreat from our mountains. At that time we will rebuild the Islamic state we all crave. Now that we have a timetable when the crusaders will leave, we can plan accordingly.

b. We further suggest that our mujahidin continue to infiltrate the ranks of the so-called Afghan National Army. When the Americans determine that this force is capable of maintaining "security" (as they define it) in the country, more of the foreign occupation troops will depart. When enough of them are gone and the so-called army is deployed, we will order our embedded mujahidin to rise up and seize control. The Americans, weary of the war, will not return. Witness again their actions in Vietnam as their allies were crushed. So it will be in the land of the Pashtun.

c. The apostate Obama has spoken many times about American cooperation with Pakistan, yet there seems to be little willingness on the part of the regime in Islamabad to work with the crusaders. We should continue to exploit the rift between the two countries in the wake of the dastardly murder of our Arab al-Qa'idah brother Shaykh Usamah bin Ladin (peace be upon him). Our contacts within the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate assure us that any further cooperation with the Americans - including allowing unpiloted aircraft attacks - is from the Punjabis and Sindhs - the Pushtuns remain in our camp.

d. We are aware that elements of our organization are "negotiating" with the occupation authorities. We assess this is bearing fruit, especially in light of Obama's virtual capitulation to American public opinion and the extreme left wing of his party. This tactic has been useful as it encourages the United States to continue to spend money in what they refer to as "nation building." Look for Obama to continue to appease his party as he grovels for re-election next year.

The more the occupiers build for us, the less reconstruction we will have to do when they leave - it will all fall under our control as we re-assert our authority over areas as soon as the crusaders depart. We especially appreciate their building of girls' schools. Since we have no need for education of women, these buildings will make excellent offices for our renewed administration of the country.

e. Excellency, we respectfully advise that as long as the crusaders are continuing to retreat and continue removing their forces, you do not invite our al-Qa'idah brethren to re-establish their presence in our country. A renewed al-Qa'idah presence will give the infidel Obama an excuse to stop the retreat and increase military operations against us. Further, we believe that the reintroduction of al-Qa'idah even after all infidel forces have departed will cause renewed American air operations over Afghanistan. Although we are capable of defending ourselves, the crusaders do have the ability to cause great damage to our forces, installations and infrastructure from the air.

f. Sadly, we have distressing news on the hell-hole known as Guantanamo. Although the apostate Obama promised to move our brothers to civilian courts in the United States, the American Congress has prevented that from happening. Unfortunately, it now appears that our heroic fighters will be tried by military courts. We can only assume that courts comprised of military officers who have been involved in the persecution of our people will be disposed to further illegal detention and possibly execution.

The jihad continues.

4. CONCLUSION: The American president, the apostate Barack Obama, continues swinging at a goat carcass much larger than his club can handle. The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan - the truly Islamic state - will resurrect, thanks be to Allah. Then we will rid ourselves of the traitor Hamid Karzai and his ilk, and reform the status of women in accordance with the laws revealed to Muhammad (peace be upon him) and bring our society back into compliance with shari'a law.

Another invader will leave and we will progress on the path of jihad.

In the service of Allah,
Mullah Istikhbar

The nexus of Syria's protests and Hizballah's future

2011-06-22T10:22:00.000-07:00

The recent protests in Syria pose a real threat to the regime of President Bashar al-Asad, and by extension, to the very existence of the Iranian-supported Shi'a militant organization Hizballah in neighboring Lebanon. Hizballah was started by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in 1982, and continues to exist and flourish because of direct Syrian support and Damascus's acquiescence in allowing Iran to provide substantial amounts of money, weapons and training via Syrian airspace and highways.

The future of Bashar al-Asad and his Ba'th Party is unknown. Many analysts believe that he will be able to weather the current storm and successfully - and brutally - suppress the protests and demonstrations against his continued rule. According to human rights groups, over 1,400 civilians have been killed and 10,000 others taken into custody by the dreaded Syrian security services since the protests began in mid-March.

Common sense analysis would normally lead you to the conclusion that at some point, the Syrian military, intelligence and security services will refuse to continue the brutal oppression of their own people. It was similar refusals on the part of the Egyptian, Tunisian and to some extent Yemeni forces that led to the fall of the presidents of those countries.

However, what is happening in Syria is not your normal situation. If Israeli intelligence is to be believed - and they have excellent sources in Syria - it is not just Syrian forces involved in the suppression of the demonstrations. The Israelis claim that Iran and Hizballah have dispatched armed units to assist the Syrians. The reports of non-Arabic speaking officials is consistent with the presence of Iranian units; Iranians speak Farsi (Persian), not Arabic.

Reports that Hizballah may have deployed some of its members to assist Syrian units is credible, for several reasons. Being Lebanese, Hizballah has no real allegiance to the Syrian people. In fact, the converse is true - Hizballah does have an allegiance to the Syrian government, based on a longstanding relationship in which the Syrian government provides weapons and training to the group, and the group functions as a surrogate armed force in Lebanon targeted against Israel.

In the past, when tensions between Syria and Israel increased, Syria would often direct Hizballah to create a disturbance on Israel's northern border. This gave Damascus the option of confronting the Jewish state without using an overt Syrian hand.

In the event that the Syrian government falls, the new Syrian government, be it secular or dominated by the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood, will likely not be favorable to continue the close relationship with Hizballah. That would be the best case. In the worst case for the Shi'a organization, Hizballah may well find itself confronted with a government hostile to its very existence. Further, if the new Syrian government distances itself from its primary sponsor - Iran - Hizballah's support might wither substantially. The organization will find it difficult or impossible to survive without Syrian and Iranian support.

There are rumors rampant in Lebanon that Hizballah is making preparations for a possible war with Israel to divert world attention from the situation in Syria. I have problems with this on several levels. Rumors are the favorite pastime of the Lebanese. If Hizballah wanted to start a war with Israel, and I doubt that after the damage Israel did to southern Lebanon and the Hizballah-controlled areas of Beirut in 2006, they cannot challenge superior Israeli firepower. While the results of that war were inconclusive and Hizballah has been fully rearmed by Damascus and Tehran, the organization was sharply criticized for exposing the infrastructure of the entire country of Lebanon to extensive damage at the hands of the Israeli air force.

Despite the fact that Lebanon now has a Hizballah-dominated cabinet, I doubt if the majority of Lebanese would support Hizballah starting a war with Israel in support of Syria. Starting such a war may spell the end of the organization's role as the key political power in the country.

Hizballah faces a difficult calculus. It needs to do all it can to ensure that the Bashar al-Asad regime in Syria survives, but is reluctant to risk its current political situation in Lebanon in a war with Israel. If it does nothing, however, it risks its very existence.

Pakistan - our "ally"

2011-06-16T06:23:00.000-07:00

Usamah Bin Ladin compound - Abbottabad, Pakistan

In the aftermath of the successful U.S. special operations assault on the Usamah bin Ladin compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, there has been a chilling of relations between the intelligence services of the two countries. This is understandable since the United States and Pakistan are supposed to be allies, yet a team of U.S. Navy SEALs launched a covert raid from Afghanistan into Pakistan, conducted an attack on a residential compound and killed al-Qa'idah leader Usamah bin Ladin (among others) and removed his body from the country. How would we react to such a raid on American soil?

That said, it is important to consider the nature of the alliance between the United States and Pakistan as well as the intelligence cooperation aspect of that alliance. The American military and intelligence establishments have had a longstanding relationship with the Pakistani intelligence service, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, more commonly known as the ISI. That relationship was very close in the 1980s during the American effort in support of the Afghan mujahidin fighting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

Virtually all American support to the mujahidin, be it money, weapons or training, was funneled through the ISI. That was not without its controversies. Chief among these was the lack of strict accountability of the FIM-92 Stinger man-portable, shoulder-fired air defense missile system, regarded by many even today as the most effective system of its type in the world. Its use was one of the key factors that led to the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan.

The U.S. Defense Department was concerned that a lack of strict control of the Stingers might lead to them falling into the hands of potential adversaries, and that the missiles might in the future be used against American pilots. This is exactly what happened. At least one Stinger captured later from the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was traced to a shipment sent to the the ISI for provision to the mujahidin.

Since the Stinger-IRGC issue, there has been a well-deserved skepticism of the trustworthiness of the ISI. That has been compounded by the ISI's role in the creation of the Taliban and that group's subsequent seizure of power in Afghanistan.

Following the Afghanistan-based al-Qa'idah attacks on the United States in September 2011 and then-Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's decision to support American military operations against the Taliban and al-Qa'idah in neighboring Afghanistan, there has been suspicion of the ISI's true loyalties and allegiance. This suspicion on the part of the U.S. military and intelligence service extended to elements of the Pakistani military as well. Given the lack of alternative allies, working with the Pakistanis was the only, albeit unpalatable, option.

The recent successful hunting down and killing of Usamah bin Ladin has again called into question the loyalties and allegiance of our Pakistani "allies." The world's most wanted man was living in a city that is home to many retired military and intelligence officials, and home to Pakistan's military academy. Bin Ladin had been living there for as long as seven years. The thought that no one in the Pakistani military or intelligence services were not aware of his presence, or that he was not being assisted by some members of these organizations stretches the bounds of credibility.

We are left with one of two conclusions - either the Pakistani military and intelligence services are complicit, or they are incompetent. Neither conclusion is comforting.

I am voting for complicity. Governments, or more properly, regimes in this part of the world survive through the creation of excellent internal security services. To think that the Pakistani intelligence and security agencies were not aware of the presence of Usamah bin Ladin in their country is hard to believe. The recent arrests of those who supported the American operation against bin Ladin seem to bear out my theory.

How better to silence any witnesses that might be knowledgeable of Pakistani complicity than to place them under arrest? From reading reports of Pakistani treatment of suspects, being under arrest in Pakistan at the hands of the dreaded ISI is potentially life threatening. This is exacerbated by Pakistan's foot dragging on issuing visas for the American investigators with whom the Pakistanis have agreed to cooperate.

Al-Qa'idah's General Command (al-qiyadat al-'amah lil-jama'at al-qa'idah al-jihad)* issued a statement that Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri has been named as the new new leader of the organization, succeeding Usamah bin Ladin.

One has to ask the question - where is al-Zawahiri? Most analysts believe he is in Pakistan, just as was bin Ladin. Can we expect cooperation from our "allies" the Pakistanis in hunting down and killing Ayman al-Zawahiri? Probably as much as we got in the hunt for Usamah bin Ladin.

Call me cynical....

_____________
* The Arabic used in the al-Qa'idah statement is interesting. Normally they refer to themselves as tanzim al-qa'idah, or "the al-Qa'idah organization." This statement used the words jama'at qa'idah al-jihad, which translates to "the al-qa'idah jihad group." Does this indicate the organization describing itself as a parent group of subordinate terrorist entities?

"Covert" drone attacks in Yemen?

2011-06-14T08:27:00.000-07:00

Recent press reports claim that the United States is about to begin a "covert" Central Intelligence Agency operation in Yemen. Much like a similar "covert" operation in Pakistan, the CIA will use armed Predator drones to launch missile attacks on al-Qa'idah militants in the country.

I have placed the word covert in quotes to indicate the irony that once the existence of an operation is made public, it can no longer be considered covert. In the cases of drone attacks in Pakistan and Yemen, it is probably a moot point. While covert operations are operations that are readily apparent - like a missile strike - the persons, agency and/or country conducting the operations usually remain unknown.

When Predator drones are used in countries without a U.S. military presence, it is likely, but not certain, that the operation is an American operation conducted by the CIA. (The Royal Air Force and the Italian Air Force also operate armed drones). The covert nature of the operation is likely compromised after the first attack evolution.

Expanding the CIA drone attack operation beyond Pakistan makes sense, and the Obama Administration should be applauded for doing so. No doubt there will be a great hue and cry from various civil liberties groups that we are not affording due process to the targets of these missile attacks. I believe that we are in a war, but let them show their ignorance and disdain for effective counterterrorist measures.

Al-Qa'idah moved its operations from Afghanistan to Pakistan after being decimated by the American invasion in 2001. After the "Anbar Awakening" and American troop surge in 2007, the organization moved most of its surviving fighters from Iraq to Saudi Arabia, where the Saudi security forces killed many of them and forced the remainder to relocate to Yemen.

Since al-Qa'idah is no longer in strength in either Iraq or Afghanistan, but is in Pakistan and Yemen, these are suitable venues for American attacks. Rather than fighting the Taliban and engaging in nation building in Afghanistan, we should be killing the real enemy wherever that enemy is located. That currently is Pakistan and Yemen.

Yemen is in a state of turmoil. President 'Ali 'Abdullah Salih and his regime are the targets of a popular uprising demanding that he step down. The President was wounded in an attack on the presidential compound and is currently in Saudi Arabia ostensibly for medical treatment. Whether or not he will return is unknown at this time.

The regional al-Qa'idah-affiliated group, al-Qaidah in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), is exploiting this power vacuum and is attempting to turn the country into a new Afghanistan, a venue for training operatives and planning attacks on the West, especially the United States. See my earlier piece, Yemen - fertile ground for al-Qa'idah.

Of major interest to the U.S. government is the presence of an effective al-Qa'idah leader, American-born Anwar al-'Awlaqi. Again, given al-'Awlaqi's status as a native-born American citizen, there will be protests that any orders to kill him violates U.S. law. it would appear that the Obama Administration, to its credit, has determined that al-'Awlaqi is a valid terrorist target and should be hunted down and killed by whatever means, be it a missile strike or a visit from SEAL Team Six.

In this case, the Administration is continuing to operate under the finding issued by President George Bush which directed the CIA to kill or capture al-Qa'idah militants. The American people have spent a lot of money developing the unique low-risk, high-impact capability of the armed unmanned aircraft. I applaud the President's decision to use it.

Lebanon "falls" to Hizballah

2011-06-13T09:45:00.000-07:00

This is the logical conclusion of a piece I did earlier this year: Lebanon - failure of American leadership in which I blame President Obama's misguided Middle East outreach policy for the loss of Lebanon as a U.S. ally. The rise of Hizballah is the direct fallout of the utter failure of that policy.

After months of back and forth between the disparate ethnic groups, confessional factions and political parties that define the Lebanese body politic, Hizballah-backed Prime Minister Najib Miqati announced a new cabinet that gives the Iranian-created and Syrian-backed "Party of God" 16 of the 30 seats. That gives a party labeled as a terrorist organization by the U.S. government unprecedented power in the one-time American ally. In real terms, however, this cabinet lineup gives unprecedented influence to the regimes in Damascus and Tehran.

Giving credit where credit is due, Hizballah has done through political intimidation and maneuvering what it could not do by force of arms, although they possess the most potent armed force in the country, easily outclassing the Lebanese Army. With Hizballah now in charge, the Lebanese Army will become another tool of the Islamist organization. Despite almost $750 million of American aid money since 2006 to support the Lebanese Army, it will no longer be a moderating force in the country. Hizballah has now emerged as Lebanon's major power broker.

According to the Lebanese constitution, the proposed cabinet slate must be presented to the majlis al-nuwab (Chamber of Deputies, the legislature). This is a sham exercise. I want to interject a small point of humor here. For those of you who do not speak Arabic, sham is the Arabic word for the Damascus area. To say submitting the names to the Lebanese parliament is a "sham" exercise, I mean that it is merely being submitted for Syrian approval. Of course, the chamber is going to rubber stamp it - it has already been approved in the Syrian (and Iranian) capital.

The Hizballah-dominated Lebanese government has not consulted with Washington - why should it? The current administration has made itself irrelevant by its weak and aimless outreach policy. Prime Minister Miqati is not trying to adhere to American wishes, mainly because he does not know what they are. There has been an absence of American leadership in the region, which has in turn led to American failure in the region.

Looking at what has been labeled the "Arab Spring," where is the United States? There was no policy leadership in Tunisia, none in Egypt - a key American ally, and none in Yemen. Given the half-hearted attempt at shying away from initial leadership and now merely participating in Libya until shamed into it by France and the United Kingdom, it is no wonder many of our Arab allies are losing faith in the United States to address relevant foreign policy issues.

Unfortunately, what is happening in Lebanon is symptomatic of our policies in the region. No one takes us seriously. As I asked in my original article: "So, Mr. Obama, how is that outreach policy working out for you? More importantly, how is it working our for our allies in Lebanon?"

P.S. Mr President, it's a rhetorical question - I know the answer.

Can Syria's Bashar al-Asad survive "the Arab Spring?"

2011-06-12T13:45:00.000-07:00

In what seems like a continuous refrain, Syrian President Bashar al-Asad has sent thousands of troops backed by armor, artillery and helicopter gunships to attack his own people, this time in a city in northwest Syria. The move caused as many as 10,000 residents of the area of Jisr al-Shughur to seek refuge in neighboring Turkey, about 12 miles away.

The violence in this part of the country follows demonstrations and armed confrontations in Dara', located in the far south of Syria on the border with Jordan, in the industrial city of Homs in central Syria, in Hamah, the city virtually destroyed in 1982 by Bashar's father Hafiz, in suburbs of the capital city of Damascus, in the coastal city of Latakia (near the Asad family home of al-Qurdahah), and now in the Turkish border area. Jisr al-Shughur was the venue of a 1980 uprising against then-President Hafiz al-Asad; it was brutally crushed by the Syrian army.

Bashar learned well from his father. In March 1980, Bashar was almost 15 years old, certainly old enough to observe how his father handled threats to his iron-fist rule of the country and absolute control of the socialist Ba'th Party. The elder Asad sent Syrian assault helicopters carrying maghawir (commandos) into the city to conduct a ruthless operation in which hundreds of residents were killed.

Bashar was almost seventeen in February 1982 when his father dispatched Bashar's uncle Rif'at to Hamah to quell an uprising against the government orchestrated by the Muslim Brotherhood. Estimates of the dead resulting from the carnage range from 20,000 to 40,000. The numbers are hard to determine because Rifa't flattened the center of the city with heavy artillery, followed by tank assaults and house-to-house searches by the dreaded mukhabarat (intelligence service). A thousand Syrian troops died in the fighting, but in the end the city was subdues in what is described as one of the most brutal attacks by an Arab leader on his own population. The Syrian operation is referred to now as the "Hamah Rules." Of course, Hamah was before Mu'amar al-Qadhafi began to attack his own citizens earlier this year.

Like his father, Bashar believes that he has no choice but to put down any challenge to his regime with brute force. If the Syrian demonstrators are successful, which is far from decided, there will be no future role for Bashar, his family, his ethnic 'Alawi sect, nor the Ba'th Party. In essence, these groups will lose everything. Most of the senior military leadership falls into one of those constituencies, so they have everything to lose as well. It is in their interest that Bashar remain in power. That is why there have been only a few defections among the military leadership.

For the most part, Syrian troops have followed the orders of Bashar's younger brother Mahir, who Bashar has put in charge of quelling the current uprising. Like his uncle Rif'at before him, Mahir has not been at all reticent to use the full range of weaponry available to the Syrian armed forces. This includes the use of the very effective and deadly Mi-25 (NATO: HIND) gunships. When I was the air attache at the U.S. Embassy in Damascus, I would watch Syrian HINDs conducting maneuvers. It is a frightening aircraft.

Asad's handling of the over four months of demonstrations across Syria differs from those in Tunisia and Egypt, where the army refused to fire on their fellow citizens. What we see in Syria is somewhat reminiscent, albeit to varying degrees, of the reactions of King Hamad in Bahrain, President 'Ali 'Abdullah Salih in Yemen and Mu'amar al-Qadhafi in Libya. The brutal action of the Syrian regime is closest to that of the Qadhafi government in Libya. The difference between what is happening in Libya and what is happening in Syria is the reaction of the West.

France, the United Kingdom and the United States (although reluctantly) declared that what Qadhafi threatened to do to his own people was unacceptable. Based on a United Nations Security Council Resolution, a coalition of forces led initially by the United States, enforced a no-fly zone over the country. NATO has taken charge of the operation and is currently attempting to force Qadahfi to relinquish power.

There is no similar action against Syria, even though the situation is equally dire. Syria plays a more important role in American foreign policy issues - the Middle East peace process, support to terrorist groups including Hizballah in Lebanon, alliance with Iran, etc. Yet, there has been nothing but rhetoric aimed at Bashar al-Asad, while Libyan forces are being attacked daily by NATO airpower. Given the treatment of the two situations, I think it is safe to say that Mu'amar al-Qadhafi will not survive the so-called "Arab Spring."

What about Bashar al-Asad? Will he and his regime survive the Arab Spring?

Tough call. I lived in Syria and watched how the Ba'th Party and the Asad family ran the place. I was there when Hafiz's eldest son and hand-picked successor Basil was killed in a senseless automobile accident. While I thought that Basil had been prepared well by his father to take over the leadership at some point, Bashar was more of a question. When his brother was killed, he was furthering his education in ophthalmology in London and was more interested in his British girlfriend than in being president of Syria. Of course, that all changed in an instant and the grooming process began anew.

In 2000, he became President on the death of his father. I was surprised at how his father had prepared the way by constructing a series of alliances in the power centers of the country. It took the Syrian majlis al-sha'ab (parliament) less than 90 minutes to amend the constitution to allow the under-40 Bashar to assume the presidency.

I must admit now that Bashar learned well from his father. Although he came into office with talk of reforming the country, opening up the economy more to market forces, lessening the restrictions on external communications, it soon became apparent that his primary function - as with most absolute dictatorships - was to maintain the regime.

The key to regime survival, as with most regimes in the Arab world, is the military. In Egypt, the decision of the military to not support Husni Mubarak led to his ouster, just as it did earlier in Tunisia when the army refused to support Zayn al-'Abidayn bin 'Ali. In Yemen, the jury is still out on Salih's fate. In Bahrain, the military supported the government, and with intervention by troops from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, King Hamad remains in power.

As for Bashar al-Asad, watch the senior Syrian military leadership. Bashar, and his father Hafiz before him, placed family and political allies in all the key positions, as well as in those of the pervasive intelligence service and the Ba'th Party. If there is a wave of defections in the military, intelligence apparatus and the party, Bashar's days are numbered.

I haven't seen any indication yet that causes me to be hopeful that he will not survive. My assessment is that the rest of the world will not rush to intervene in Syria as they did in Libya. Without outside intervention and the support of the army, Bashar's chances of survival remain good.

Yemen - fertile gound for al-Qa'idah

2011-06-03T15:17:00.000-07:00

The rapidly deteriorating situation in Yemen is creating fertile ground for al-Qa'idah's local affiliate to create a new Afghanistan. This "new Afghanistan," however, will sit on the border of America's key Arab ally in the region, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. On June 3, there was an attack on the Yemeni presidential palace compound Sana'. President 'Ali 'Abdullah Salih was slightly injured, and was able to make an audio announcement later in the day.

Salih's cat-and-mouse game over how and when he will relinquish power only serves to exacerbate the violence in the country. More than 350 people have been killed since the uprising started in January. At some point, he will have to step down as president. There is a Gulf Co-operation Council deal on the table that would allow Salih to relinquish power with a guarantee of immunity from prosecution. He would be wise to take it.

That begs the question: what happens after he departs?

Unless there is an orderly transition of authority, there will be a huge power vacuum in the country. Given the fractious tribal society that is Yemen, it is highly unlikely there will be an orderly transition. The absence of central authority in Sana' will create an opportunity too hard to resist for al-Qa'idah in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and its charismatic American-born leader, Anwar al-'Awlaqi. Unfortunately, AQAP may be in the best position to seize a leadership role in the country.

If AQAP emerges as the key power broker in the country, Yemen may become what Afghanistan was prior to the American invasion in 2001. The mountainous country could be the new home base of al-Qa'idah and an expanded venue for its training camps. Most of the recent attacks on the United States have had origins in Yemen.

The emergence of Yemen as an al-Qa'idah stronghold does not come as a surprise to most Middle East observers. Yemen's commitment to its supposed alliance with the United States and to the global war on terror is sketchy at best. The United States Central Command (CENTCOM), the organization responsible for military operations in the region, has tried to establish a close relationship and partnership with the Yemeni military for the last 30 years. It has not always been successful or even useful.

In the late 1980's, CENTCOM floated the idea of establishing its headquarters, or at least a forward headquarters, in Yemen. Thankfully, saner heads at the Department of Defense prevailed and the idea was shelved. Yemen does not have the security, infrastructure or geopolitical location to serve as the focal point for American military operations in the region.

A short survey of our history with Yemen might be helpful.

- October 2000: The USS Cole was attacked while on a port visit to Aden, killing 17 American sailors.

- February 2006: Twenty three al-Qa'idah prisoners escaped from a Yemeni maximum security prison. Included in the 23 escapees were Jamal al-Badawi, the mastermind of the attack on the USS Cole, and Jabr al-Banah, an American citizen wanted in New York state for terrorist activities - he is one of the so-called "Lackawanna Six."

- July 2006: A Yemeni court has acquitted 19 suspected al-Qa'idah members, some of whom had confessed to fighting American troops in Iraq. According to the judge, killing Americans in Iraq is not a violation of Yemeni law.

- February 2008: Jabr al-Banah (see February 2006 entry) waltzed into a courtroom in Sana', Yemen, made a brief appearance and departed.

- May 2008: Usamah Bin Ladin ordered his followers in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to leave and head for Yemen. Bin Ladin assessed - correctly, in my opinion - that the climate in Yemen is much more conducive venue to base his terrorist operatives and their operations.

- November 5, 2009: U.S. Army psychiatrist Major Nidal Hasan killed 13 and wounded 30 others in an attack at Fort Hood, Texas, inspired by Anwar al-'Awlaqi.

- December 25, 2009: Nigerian 'Umar Faruq 'Abd al-Mutallab, trained by AQAP and inspired by al-'Awlaqi, attempted to detonate explosives hidden in his underwear while on board a Detroit-bound airliner.

- May 1, 2010: Faysal Shahzad, a Pakistani American inspired by al-'Awlaqi, attempted to detonate a car laden with explosives in New York City's Times Square.

- October 2010: Two air cargo packages were intercepted overseas, reportedly based on information provided by the Saudi intelligence service. The two packages contained explosive devices hidden in printer cartridges and were bound for Jewish facilities in the Chicago area. The packages were discovered on aircraft in the United Kingdom and Dubai (United Arab Emirates); both originated in Yemen.

It seems to me that bin Ladin was correct. After he ordered his followers to relocate to Yemen following defeats in Afghanistan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, al-Qa'idah has been able to mount operations against the United States, albeit with mixed results.

I believe it is a combination of the skills of Anwar al-'Awlaqi and the weak government of 'Ali 'Abdullah Salih that has allowed Yemen to devolve into a terrorist haven. When Salih departs, I fear that al-Qa'idah will be able to be even more effective, unless a strong central government emerges. I am not optimistic.

Women driving in Saudi Arabia? I give up.

2011-05-29T04:49:00.000-07:00

A Saudi woman was recently arrested for driving without a license. Actually, no Saudi woman has a driver's license since it illegal for women to drive in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The woman, 32-year-old Manal al-Sharif, posted a video (above) on YouTube and Facebook of herself driving a car in the city of al-Khubar (Khobar) in the Eastern Province of the kingdom.

In the video, Manal carries on an animated conversation with a female passenger who is obviously operating the camera. The conversation mainly revolves around how the driving restrictions affect the lives of women and their families. It is in pretty fast and idiomatic Saudi Arabic - it gives me the impression that the woman making the video is not a close friend and possibly a journalist.

Saudi Arabia is the only country in the world that does not allow women to drive. The stated reasons range from the religious to the ridiculous. Over the years, I have spent a lot of time in "the magic kingdom," as we Middle East specialists call Saudi Arabia. I have yet to get an acceptable, sensical answer from a Saudi. When an actual law was passed in 1990 to codify the ban, the reason given by the Ministry of the Interior was "Islamic tradition." The statement read, "Women's driving of cars contradicts the sound Islamic attitude of the Saudi citizen, who is jealous about his sacred ideals."

What does that mean? I have asked several Saudis to explain it to me. One of the more popular explanations is that allowing women to drive would allow them to succumb to their natural base instincts and carnal desires. A vehicle would allow them to engage in illicit sexual activity.

I challenged that assumption on several levels. First, Saudi men seem to have a low opinion of the moral character of not only Saudi women but women in general. Second, I told them that I knew for a fact that prohibiting women from driving does not stop them from having affairs.

When I was assigned to the U.S. Central Command in Riyadh during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Saudi (and Kuwaiti) women made it clear that the driving ban was not going to get in their way. For example, I noted that even in the intense heat, many Saudis would drive in the city with their front passenger windows open. When I asked a more enlightened Saudi about this practice, he explained that the window was open for women to toss calling cards into the vehicle. The recipient, if interested, would call the number on the card and the woman would have her driver pick up the man and drive him to a rendezvous location. At times, I also saw Saudi women drop calling cards as they walked by young men - same idea. The Kuwaiti women in Saudi Arabia were less subtle - they would just hand you the card.

Because I could speak Arabic, I had the unenviable task of being a liaison between the American military and the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation. One of the first issues that came up was American military women and driving. Initially, the Saudis said that the women servicemembers would not be permitted to drive in the kingdom. I explained that many U.S. Army transportation battalions had women drivers and that without the women it would be impossible to move the massive amounts of men and materiel that were being brought into the country to defend against a possible Iraqi invasion.

As I pointed out other examples of how women are totally integrated into the U.S. armed forces, the Saudis came up with uniquely Saudi solution. The Minister of Defense and Aviation issued a decree that American females when in U.S. military uniform were not women. I decided not to translate that literally, softening it to a statement that American military women could drive military vehicles while in uniform. It remained an irritant since they could not drive during those rare times of being off duty.

While working some long shifts with my Saudi counterparts, I often talked to a major who had graduated from Oregon State University. I once asked him if his wife drove a car while they lived in Corvallis. He replied that she did. I asked if she missed having that ability to drive now that they were back in Riyadh. He immediately replied that she did not. I countered by asking if he had actually asked her about it, or did he merely assume that she did not miss driving. He replied that he had not asked her. His exact words, "Why would I ask her a question when I already know the answer?" I gave up.

I gave up then and I give up now. The Saudi reaction to Manal's driving offense? The members of the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, the mutawa'in (volunteers), have organized a campaign encouraging Saudi men to remove their 'iqal (the black rope-like cord that secures the male headdress) and use them to beat any woman who dares to drive.

What century are we in?

Obama's puzzling military strategy in Libya

2011-05-28T11:59:00.000-07:00

During his recent European trip, U.S. President Barack Obama revealed some puzzling aspects of his military strategy in Libya. After meetings with the leaders of key allies France and the United Kingdom, the President stated that there will be "no let up" in the military operations supposedly focused on forcing Libyan dictator Mu'amar al-Qadhafi to step down.

President Obama's words:
"...Qadhafi and his regime need to understand that there will not be a let-up in the pressure that we are applying. I believe that we have built enough momentum that, as long as we sustain the course we are on, he will step down. Ultimately this is going to be a slow, steady process in which we are able to wear down the regime forces."

Interesting. When the President agreed with France and the United Kingdom and ordered American forces to participate in operations against Libya and to take the lead initially, he stated unequivocally that the purpose of the operation was to protect innocent civilians from Libya's armed forces, and not to remove Qadhafi from power. At that time, he appeared to directly contradict his Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton. The Secretary had stated that it was U.S. policy that Qadhafi should be removed.

Now we are told that NATO and allied forces will continue to attack Libyan military forces and government installations until Qadhafi steps down. So it seems that Mrs. Clinton was right - we are using military force to remove Qadhafi from power.

Mr. Obama's employment of American military power is confusing. I understand that the President has no military experience and probably feels uncomfortable in the military environment. That said, he does have generals who know how to conduct effective air operations. I would venture to say that he is disregarding their advice. No rational U.S. Air Force officer would recommend the kind of operation that the President is pursuing. I also believe that the Europeans are going along with the President because they do not have the military capabilities to do this on their own.

This entire Libyan intervention should have been completed in weeks. Qadhafi should have been gone, either dead, in prison or in exile weeks ago. The bloodshed on both sides should have been stopped. By adopting his strategy of a "slow, steady process...to wear down the regime," the President has certainly prolonged the fighting and likely increased the number of deaths.

Had I been advising the President, I would have recommended a fast, massive air campaign to quickly eliminate Libyan air defenses, then introduce significant numbers of AC-130 gunships, A-10 attack aircraft and possible AH-64 attack helicopters to destroy the Libyan army. If the goal of the operation was to remove Qadhafi, concentrated attacks on his centers of gravity should have been considered.

By not using overwhelming force, we have put American, NATO and allied forces at greater risk by prolonging the period of the operation. This "slow, steady process" is exactly what led us to a commitment of over a decade in Southeast Asia.

Get in, use massive firepower to achieve the objective, then get out.

Interview on theDove TV/Radio

2011-05-25T09:00:00.000-07:00

This video clip is from an interview I did with theDove TV/Radio. It was done via Skype, so it is not full-up video, and yes, I know I am a retired Lt Col....

Memorial Day 2011

2011-05-23T20:57:00.000-07:00

I wrote this in 2007 while still a military analyst at NBC News. I think it still holds true today.

This article appeared on MSNBC.com

'On behalf of a grateful nation'
Let us make sure that we do not forget our fallen men and women
COMMENTARY
By Lt. Col. Rick Francona
Military analyst - MSNBC

Lt. Gen. Ed Soriano, left, presents Jessica Hebert, sister of Spc. Justin Hebert who was killed in Kirkuk, Iraq, with an American flag during his military funeral (AP Photo/The Herald, Meggan Booker). Comment - Ed Soriano and I served together in Desert Storm - this must be his hardest duty.

Memorial Day weekend – most people associate that with the start of the “summer driving season.” The constant news coverage of record high gasoline prices tends to overshadow the real meaning of the holiday. It’s not about driving or shopping – it’s about remembering the men and women who died while in military service. It is important that we not forget the reason for this holiday – we are at war and lose some our finest young men and women every day.

Yes, we are at war. No one knows this more than the families of those who have fallen on battlefields far from home with names most of us cannot pronounce. Unlike most of the wars America has fought in the past, we are fighting with an all volunteer force – there has been no draft since 1973. Less than one-half of one percent of our people will serve in uniform (in World War II, it was over 12 percent) at any one time.

In the draft era, a much higher percent of the population entered the service, creating a large pool of veterans. Veterans understand the unique demands of military service, the separation from loved ones, the dangers of combat. With far fewer veterans or a veteran in the family, community and government, it is easy to lose sight of the demands military service requires of our men and women in uniform – all volunteers – and to forget too quickly those who have made the ultimate sacrifice.

Sometimes one could get the feeling that foreign countries – especially those that have been liberated by American forces – pay more tribute to our fallen troops than we do. I will never forget standing in a church in rural France – not a fancy cathedral, not a tourist spot, nothing architecturally significant, just a village church. I would not have paid much attention until I spotted a well-maintained corner with a small American flag and a plaque.

I walked over and read the simple but powerful words in French and English, “In gratitude to the United States of America and in remembrance of her 56,681 sons that now and forever sleep in French soil.” A elderly parishioner sitting in a pew nearby saw me reading the inscription and asked if I was an American. I said that I was – she slowly rose, nodded at the memorial and said, “You are welcome in France.”

Over the years, over a million Americans have died in military service. Each fallen warrior is afforded a military funeral. Military funerals symbolize respect for the fallen and their families. Anyone who has attended a military funeral will never forget it – the flag on the coffin, the honor guard in full dress uniform, the crack of the rifles firing three volleys as Taps is played on the bugle, the snap of the flag as it is folded into the familiar triangle of blue, the reverence of fellow warriors.

Before his final salute, the officer in charge presents that folded flag to, in most cases, a young widow. He makes that presentation “on behalf of a grateful nation.”

At some point on this day, let us make sure that we do not forget our fallen men and women, and that we are in fact a grateful nation.

© 2007 MSNBC Interactive

On enhanced interrogation of al-Qa'idah detainees

2011-05-09T18:52:00.000-07:00

There is renewed debate about the efficacy of what the intelligence community has labeled "enhanced interrogation techniques." Some critics call these techniques torture, while others believe that even though they contravene the tactics sanctioned by the interrogator's handbook, U.S. Army Field Manual 2-22.3 - Human Intelligence Collector Operations, they do not constitute torture.

Personally, I am in the latter camp. I have been waterboarded while in training to be on a U.S. Air Force intelligence collection aircrew. It was not a pleasant experience; it was instructive, but I do not think it rises to the level of torture. The Air Force is not in the habit of subjecting its personnel to torture.

Following the successful Navy SEAL elimination of al-Qa'idah chief Shaykh Usamah bin Ladin, proponents of harsh interrogations claimed, with some validity as far as I can tell, that waterboarding of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad and Abu Faraj al-Libi extracted the information that identified the courier that eventually led us to the location of Usamah bin Ladin.

As can be expected, the opponents of enhanced interrogations claim the opposite. They also add the conjecture that the information could have been obtained through normal interrogation techniques. That claim is impossible to prove, and in my opinion ludicrous.

Having done some of this for a living, I have concluded that when committed, hard-core subjects know you cannot stress them, they are almost impossible to break. I will not go into how we got around the restrictions, but suffice it to say a loaded pistol between the eyes is a powerful motivator. In theory, they know you cannot hurt them, but once you have them convinced that you are the one amirki (American) that did not get the memo, a false sense of reality sets in.

In March 2008, I was asked to debate the use of harsh interrogation techniques in New York for an organization called Intelligence Squared. Here is my initial argument at that forum. I still stand by my words.

If "enhanced interrogation techniques," or torture to some, don't work, they would not have been practiced for thousands of years.

You decide.

Will death stop terror? No, says one expert

2011-05-08T17:27:00.000-07:00

Medford, Oregon - May 8, 2011

Will death stop terror? No, says one expert

By Paul Fattig
Mail Tribune
May 08, 2011 2:00 AM

Like the overwhelming majority of Americans, Rick Francona was mighty glad to see the last of Osama bin Laden.

But the Port Orford resident, while understanding the desire of many to express jubilation over the demise of the 9/11 mastermind responsible for the deaths of nearly 3,000 in that attack alone, found the high-fiving demonstrations in poor taste.

"Some of it looked like a European soccer victory celebration," he observes. "People need to remember this was a very dangerous military operation in which we had up to 40 young American lives at risk.

"This is not a circus — this is deadly serious business," he adds.

What's more, he takes exception to the Monday-morning quarterbacking following Sunday night's (our time) raid by Navy SEALS on bin Laden's walled compound in Pakistan.

"I am a little disturbed that some are now second-guessing these Navy SEALS," he says. "You want an overwhelming force because that leads to fewer casualties on both sides when you seize the objective. There are so many unanswered questions going into a dangerous mission like this."

By now you rightfully suspect that Francona knows a bit more about the subject than your average resident along Oregon's picturesque coast.

Or anywhere across the nation, for that matter.

Francona, 59, is a nationally known Middle East expert. He is a retired U.S. Air Force intelligence officer whose focus was the Middle East. The former lieutenant colonel is fluent in Arabic and was Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf's personal interpreter during the Gulf War.

He is the author of Ally to Adversary: An Eyewitness Account of Iraq's Fall From Grace, a book praised by critics at The London Times and the Washington Post. He also is an expert resource called by national TV news shows in the years following 9/11 to get his perspective on the evolving situation.

A Vietnam War veteran, he has worked with the shadow agencies — the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. During one of his missions with the CIA, he slipped covertly into northern Iraq to help groups that opposed Saddam Hussein.

But his intelligence experience wasn't restricted to the Middle East: He worked closely with SEALs in Bosnia when they were deployed to arrest five war criminals.

His wife, Emily, also is a former intelligence officer in the Air Force, having retired as a lieutenant colonel.

Although you won't see Francona much on national programs now that the wars have become old news, he still is called upon for public speaking engagements and writes a blog — rickfrancona.com — about the Middle East.

The death of bin Laden doesn't mean the end of terrorism as we know it, he concludes. In fact, al-Qaida on Friday acknowledged bin Laden's death and has vowed revenge.

"No, I don't think his death will change much the threat from al-Qaida," he says. "It has metastasized into various areas in the Middle East."

And the hottest spot now appears to be Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula, where American-born cleric Anwar al-Awlaki is leading al-Qaida's faction in that country, he says.

"That seems to be the new power base for al-Qaida, especially with the weak government in Yemen," he says. "Yemen could be the new Afghanistan.

"Once the president of Yemen steps down, and we know it is going to happen, we don't know who will replace him," he adds. "We don't know if the replacement will be friendly to the U.S."

What experts do know is that the killing of bin Laden was a necessary step in the fight against terrorism, he says.

"It was a good step which had to be done, but I don't think it will lessen the terrorist threat," he reiterates. "His death has a greater impact on our capabilities, giving our military and intelligence people a shot in the arm."

Meanwhile, what many are calling the Arab Spring uprisings, as people throughout the Middle East revolt against dictatorships, merits close watching, he stresses, noting the political upheavals could provide openings for terrorist groups.

"There are some real opportunities there for chaos and mayhem," he says. "I think we are on the verge of some dangerous times."

Reach reporter Paul Fattig at 541-776-4496 or email him at pfattig@mailtribune.com.

Usamah Bin Ladin (1957 – 2011)

2011-05-01T21:50:00.000-07:00

In 2001, President George W. Bush said, "No matter how long it takes, whether we bring you to justice, or we bring justice to you, justice will be done."

After almost ten years, American forces brought justice to Usamah bin Ladin, leader of the terrorist group tanzim al-qa'idah (the base organization). Media reports are claiming that U.S. Navy SEALs operating half way around the world in the dark of night have finally avenged the murder of 3,000 of their countrymen on September 11, 2001. Personally, I hope the last image that connected in the synapses of bin Ladin's brain was the weapon of a young American serviceman about to deliver American justice. I hope he could read the "US NAVY" on the uniform. I worked with the SEALs in Bosnia; they were the muscle of our operations to arrest five war criminals. They are impressive young men.

Kudos to the Obama Administration for making the decision to mount such an operation. The was not without risk. Pakistan is a theoretical ally of the United States in the war on terrorism, but there are elements inside the Pakistani military and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate who are not. Virtually anything that is told to the Pakistanis finds it way to if not al-Qa'idah and the Taliban at least to their sympathizers. Maintaining operational security in this environment is challenging to say the least. I suspect the Pakistanis were kept in the dark until the last possible moment. Had we told them the operational details, there is almost no doubt that someone in the Pakistani service would have tipped Bin Ladin.

As more information about the operation comes to light, it raises many questions. Probably the most important is how does someone of the profile of Usmah bin Ladin live in a guarded, secured and protected compound just 60 miles from the capital of Islamabad? From media reports, which may or may not be accurate, the compound stood out in the neighborhood with its seven-feet high walls and concertina wire barriers. Any intelligence or security service worth its name would have investigated such an anomalous residence. The thought that no one in the Pakistani military or ISI did not know bin Ladin was there is ludicrous.

The drivel spouted by President Obama about the Pakistanis is just that - drivel. Of course, he had to say it to give the Pakistanis plausible cover that they are not the two-faced slime most of us believe them to be, but that is a two-edged sword. The tenor of the Pakistani media reporting on the event is accusatory against the government for helping the Americans kill a fellow Muslim, someone revered among many in Pakistan. Helping the United States is not a popular thing. There is a lot of resentment among the population against the government in Islamabad for allowing the CIA to conduct drone-launched missile strikes in the country. The Pakistani government may have to deal with popular discontent for allowing this operation.

That said, this operation is exactly the way to deal with these people - no lengthy, expensive trials in federal court that would turn into a platform for terrorist rantings; no long prison sentences to either Guantanamo or another detention facility at great expense affording these vermin treatment not given to our troops; or no sham rehabilitation programs in Saudi Arabia or Yemen that see at least 25 percent return to the fight. You cannot reason with these people, for they are the true believers. It goes against our sense of justice, but the only way to deal with these people is to hunt them down and kill them.

Thankfully, they killed bin Ladin. Bin Ladin as a prisoner would be a nightmare; Attorney General Eric Holder would want to try him in federal court. Given Holder's track record with terrorist suspects, a conviction would not be a sure thing.

A chapter in the war against al-Qa'idah is over, but the war will go on. Hopefully this operation will send the message that America's memory is long and its reach unlimited. I want every al-Qa'idah commander tonight to be sleepless with the fear that some young American special forces operator is coming for him.

Syria - more violence at the hands of "the reformer"

2011-04-25T21:35:00.000-07:00

Hundreds of Syrian demonstrators have been killed by Syrian security and military forces on the orders of President Bashar al-Asad. This is in sharp contrast to the actions of the Tunisian, Egyptian and Yemeni armies which refused to fire on their own people. Syria is different, it always has been. It is ruled by a dictator with no concern for anything other than the perpetuation of his own regime, a man willing to use overwhelming violence to achieve that aim.

Regardless of how Secretary of State Hillary Clinton characterized al-Asad as a "reformer," he's nothing of the kind. Oh, please spare me the drivel that she was only quoting visiting American legislators, that "many of the members of Congress of both parties who have gone to Syria in recent months have said they believe he’s a reformer.” If Mrs. Clinton cited the words, she believed them and owns them.

The "reformer" image was something that Bashar cultivated as a promise to the people of Syria when he assumed power upon his father's death in 2000. It was not an easy feat, but his father had paved the way well. When the father dies, Bashar was not yet of age, but it only took the Syrian majlis al-sha'ab (legislature) about 90 minutes to change the constitution to allow him to serve. He came into power on a wave of hope that this young doctor, a technocrat, would move Syria into the modern world and be less restrictive than his father.

The hopes were short-lived. The younger Asad proved himself to be capable of all the negative attributes of his father. It was not long before he revamped the pervasive and overlapping Syrian internal security services and intelligence organizations into a newer, more modern regime-protection system. He replaced all of his father's cronies with his own - younger, better educated and more capable. Yet, for whatever reason, he was able to maintain a facade of hope and change (pun intended). He married a cosmopolitan Syrian woman who had grown up, been educated and had worked in England. They became Syria's "royal couple."

The Asads fit in well with that segment of Syrian society that has profited from the reign of the Ba'th Party. This group includes a mixture of the 'Alawite, Christian and Druze minorities and those Sunni Muslims who have allied themselves with the regime. On the other side is the specter of Islamic fundamentalism. It is the fear of turning into an Islamic republic like Iran that allies many groups with the Ba'th Party. That is ironic (or Iran-ic) since the Islamic Republic Iran is Syria's closest ally.

It is these groups that keep Bashar al-Asad in power. I lived in Damascus for several years and made friends with Syrians across the socioeconomic spectrum. Some of them fall into the category of supporting the regime. I recently asked one of them about the situation. I describe him as one who has "drunk the Kool-Aid," but you decide. Here are his comments (my translation):

"It is fine in Damascus, but there is some trouble in Homs, Latakia and Baniyas. Most of the people do not want problems in the country - what you see on television is much more exaggerated than the reality. It is hard for someone not here to understand what is really going on - no one is looking for trouble, perhaps maybe only 10 percent are causing the problems.

"I do not deny that we need to have some changes, but certainly it is not worth bloodshed and killing. We all know that our president is working towards that change - we love him and his wife.

"I cannot imagine the ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood) in my country. We used to live in peace and that is all we want."

He then referred me to several Facebook pages and websites. I checked them out. They are nothing more than outright pro-regime propaganda.

-- https://www.facebook.com/pages/International-Latakia-News-Network-iLNN/212828238732239 (English)
-- https://www.facebook.com/pages/HNN-Homs-News-Network/195132347192669?sk=wall (mixed English and Arabic)
-- http://www.dearsyria.com/ (Arabic)
-- https://www.facebook.com/pages/DearSyria/163079277084127 (Arabic)

There are other sources of information, mostly being smuggled out of the country at great risk. If you have the stomach for it, here is what is really happening in Syria's cities.

WARNING - This is grisly, graphic material.

Is this the action of a "reformer?"

Confusing signs from DC - support for the Libyan opposition

2011-04-20T14:33:00.000-07:00

In yet more confusing pronouncements from Washington, the Obama Administration notified Congress that it would begin providing $25 million in "non-lethal" aid to Libyan opposition forces. According to a U.S. State Department memorandum reported in the press, that aid will come in the form of "vehicles, fuel trucks, fuel bladders, ambulances, medical equipment, protective vests, binoculars, and non-secure radios.”

Confusion point number one
In the context of providing assistance to an armed opposition, there is really no such thing as "non-lethal" aid. Money is a fungible commodity, impossible to trace. If you provide money to a group with restrictions on how it can be spent, they will simply use your money for the purpose you have specified. They will then divert their own funds for weapons or things you have proscribed. If you provide them actual materiel, such as the Administration proposes, they will not have to procure those items with their own resources, freeing those funds to be used for weapons.

This is "diplo-speak." The Administration can claim it has not given weapons to the Libyan opposition. That said, all of the items will obviously support military operations. Does it then matter?

Confusion point number two
The Administration's memorandum justifies the aid as part of "efforts to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas under threat of attack in Libya.” Portraying the proposed assistance package as humanitarian aid is disingenuous. Let's be up front and state that we are supporting the opposition. The materiel we are providing will be used by the opposition forces in combat against the pro-government forces. In essence, we're providing everything but the weapons.

Again, "diplo-speak." Efforts to protect citizens is merely a euphemism for providing support to opposition fighters.

Our allies are a bit more open, refreshingly so. The United Kingdom has announced that it will send military officers to train and advise opposition forces, including coordinating NATO air strikes. The European Union agreed to deploy an armed force to protect deliveries of humanitarian aid.

I fully support these efforts, but we must be aware of the "slippery slope" we have seen in other areas - Somalia comes to mind.

Confusion point number three
President Obama has repeatedly said that it is U.S. foreign policy that Libyan leader Mu'amar al-Qadhafi must step down. Recently, he has made the seemingly contradictory statement that the United States does not support regime change in Libya.

Which is it, Mr. President? Make no mistake about it. The only way Qadhafi will step down is via regime change, and it appears that violent removal is the only viable option.

How about some clarity?
One of President Obama's favorite and often used phrases is, "Let me be clear." Okay, here's an opportunity to be clear, a chance to clear up the confusion caused by hiding behind words and trite phrases.

How about this:

It is U.S. policy that Mu'amar al-Qadhafi must be removed from power, by force if necessary
The United States will provide weapons and training to the Libyan opposition
American intelligence and special operations forces will assist on the ground towards these objectives

There. Clear, concise and reflects the actual situation. Most Americans will support these efforts when you are honest about what we are trying to accomplish. Using "diplo-speak" and "politi-babble" only makes you look unwilling to stand up for the effort to which you have committed our resources. People read $25 million - they want to know what it is for.

You have the chance to look like a real leader here. Go for it.

Guest Comment - Dr. Jacob Keryakes

2011-04-20T09:47:00.000-07:00

The Islamic Role in the Middle East Uprisings

I think the Muslim brotherhood is playing it smart this time. They did that in Egypt. They claimed they would not participate in the January 25 "revolution," and preferred to remain invisible until the 28th when they saw signs of success. Only then did they say they were "participating."

It was their militia that fought back in Tahrir square in what is now known as the "Camel battle" when pro-government elements clashed with anti-government demonstrators. After Mubarak's fall, Essam El Arian of the Muslim Brotherhood said in a TV interview, "The revolution is a byproduct of the Brotherhood."

We have to take this claim seriously, especially given what is happening on the ground in Egypt now. Egypt is turning into a more extreme right wing Islamic society. Mubarak was able to keep the ikhwan in check with a small window of operation. He also used the Salafis to his favor. Both groups are now on the loose. They feel like they have the law in their hands and can apply whatever backward thinking rules they want.

Egypt is going downhill. I'm afraid it's too late to stop the Brotherhood from taking over. I think the United States should think carefully before arming any rebels, lest these same weapons be used against the U.S. and its interests in the region in the future.

Islamic elements are playing a major role in all these uprisings - in Yemen, Libya, Jordan, Syria as well as Egypt. They played it smart in Egypt by hiding behind some "secular" figures at the beginning. Where are these figures now? Completely gone, and we are left to deal with the forces of darkness.

Rick - Excellent analysis of the situation in Libya, however, I think deploying ground forces will end the game in favor of Islamists.

Dr. Jacob Keryakes is an Egyptian Coptic Chrisitian who provides his language and analytical skills to the NBC family of networks. He is also a personal friend.

Reality strikes - Libya rebels plead for foreign forces

2011-04-19T22:23:00.000-07:00

When the Libyan rebellion started last month, there was a sense of bravado among the opposition fighters, almost a sense of invincibility as one city after another fell to them. Starting in Benghazi and Tobruq, moving west to Ajdabiya, Brega (al-Burayqah) and Ra's al-Lanuf, then on towards Sirte. There were signs and placards calling for a no-fly zone, huge signs picked up by the media. I remember the words written in Arabic asking for a no-fly zone, for help, but no troops on the ground.

Then the Libyan military got its act together and started using air power in conjunction with its armor and artillery. The opposition quickly learned the value of superior firepower and a modicum of military training. The Libyan military is not renowned as a potent fighting force - they would not last but a few weeks against any armed forces with any real training and modern equipment. Against a rag-tag band of rebels with no armor or artillery, and air power or ability to defend airspace over its positions, the Libyan armed forces are actually quite effective.

The Libyan air force was effectively neutralized with the declaration of a no-fly zone. While it might be effective against a domestic rebellion, it's ability to confront the air forces of the United States, the United Kingdom and France is non-existent. They were wise to stand down.

That said, watching the media coverage of Libyan army operations against opposition forces tells the story, and today's request by the opposition for foreign forces on the ground is the result. The Libyan army may be a Third-World military force, its equipment may be old and its personnel not the most disciplined in the region, but against an untrained, ill-equipped rebel force, it can bring devastating firepower to bear. It was obvious that someone in the Libyan army had attended military training courses. The massed artillery fires and deployment of forces indicated a basic understanding of military tactics.

The rebel demand that there be no foreign ground forces was short-sighted to say the least. Of course, they were indirectly applauded for that decision by the ill-advised statements by U.S. President Barack Obama that no American ground forces would be deployed. This is just another example of a naive, inexperienced commander in chief telling adversaries what tactics will and will not be used. All the President's statements did was embolden the Libyans to use what effective forces they have - armor an artillery.

Although the opposition learned one lesson of air power, they did not take the graduate-level course. The no-fly zone was able to blunt some of Mu'amar al-Qadhafi's military operations. However, once the fighting came to the cities, there was no way to decisively stop the government forces from effective operations without trained air combat controllers on the ground. It was obvious to anyone with military training that without a coordinated air-ground operation, it would only be a matter of time before the better trained and equipped Libyan military would overcome the rebels.

It appears that as the fighting intensified, it became obvious to the opposition forces that although they had courage and the righteous fervor on their side, it was no match for the superior firepower of the trained Libyan army. As more Libyans with military experience joined the opposition, they may have been able to temper some of the earlier bravado with the realization that they need help. Without some military support on the ground, their cause is lost.

Now we have Nuri 'Abdullah 'Abdullati, a member of Misratah's governing council, requesting foreign troops, saying , "we did not accept any foreign soldiers in our country, but now, as we face these crimes of Qadhafi, we are asking on the basis of humanitarian and Islamic principles for someone to come and stop the killing. Before we were asking for no foreign interference, but that was before Qadhafi used Grad rockets and planes. Now it's a life or death situation."

Asking for assistance is a good first step; it provides legitimacy for troops to assist in coordinating the air attacks to bring precision air power to bear. It is akin to the Arab League calling for a no-fly zone. If I were the Libyan opposition, I would downplay the "Islamic principles" argument - it does not play well in the West, especially the United Kingdom and France.

The British have stepped up to the plate; the French have not. This is a bit surprising since France was the first Western power to commit forces to the Libyan effort. The French claim that military action will not bring down Qadhafi. There are the usual academic think tanks echoing that same line.

On the contrary, force is exactly what will bring down Qadhafi, perhaps the only thing that will remove the dictator. The only words that will resolve this crisis are Qadhafi saying "I quit." I do not envision him saying that unless his forces are defeated and he has no other way out. You cannot reason with Mu'amar al-Qadhafi; he must be driven from power by force. The rebels know that - it is why they are asking for military support, not diplomatic efforts.

Again we are at a decision point. Either we support the opposition with some ground forces or we allow the current stalemate to continue. If we allow the stalemate to continue, eventually Qadhafi's forces will prevail.

The British will send military officers to Libya. One hopes they are combat controllers who can coordinate NATO air strikes and break the stalemate. One also hopes that President Obama has come to his senses and ordered covert U.S. special operations support as well.

If not, call me - I'd be proud to help.

Bashar al-Asad warns the Syrian people

2011-04-17T12:24:00.000-07:00

Syrian President Bashar al-Asad said Saturday (April 16) that he expects the government to lift the state of emergency that has been in effect for nearly 50 years. This is but one of the demands of demonstrators emboldened by successful regime changes in Tunisia and Egypt, continuing demonstrations in Bahrain, Yemen and Jordan, not to mention a civil war in Libya.

I have to laugh at his choice of words about "expecting the government to...." In Syria, Bashar al-Asad IS the government. He alone can and will make the decision whether or not the state of emergency is ended. Of course, there will be show debates and a vote in the People's Council (the Syrian legislature), but in the end, it is Asad who decides what happens.

What is more important and of concern, however, is the remainder of President Asad's statement. He continued that after the lifting of the emergency laws and the implementation of some reforms, there would no longer be any reason or excuse for demonstrations. The Syrian leadership and media are careful to use the Arabic word for demonstrations rather than the word for protests. He stated, "After that we will not tolerate any attempt at sabotage."

These are pretty clear words - this is a blatant threat. Threats from the Syrian government are not to be taken lightly. By now, the world is aware of the 1982 destruction of the city of Hamah when the Muslim Brotherhood defied the government; as many as 25,000 Syrians were killed in the artillery barrages that destroyed the center of the once-beautiful city. In the last month, over 200 people have been killed by Syrian security and military forces.

In his remarks, Asad reiterated the claim that the demonstrations have been orchestrated by unidentified foreign conspirators who have incited armed gangs to attack security forces and Syrian civilians. In Asad's mythical version of events, Syrian security and military forces are merely acting to protect the population. I don't think the world is buying it.

It will be interesting to watch. I lived in Damascus in the early to mid-1990's. The Syrian intelligence and internal security forces were and remain pervasive and heavy-handed. Their primary, possibly only, mission is to preserve the regime. Bashar al-Asad will do whatever it takes to remain in power. He may go through the motions of lifting the state of emergency and implement some reforms on paper, but nothing will really change.

This is not Tunisia, this is not Egypt. When and if there is a serious threat to Asad's hold on power, he will use armed force to brutally put down the demonstrations. Although there were a lot of people willing to march in Tunis and Cairo, Damascus is different. The government has so thoroughly ferreted out any opposition groups that I doubt there are enough Syrians willing to risk their lives taking to the streets that will pose a real threat to the government.

That said, I have been surprised at the number of Syrians willing to demonstrate. They are all aware of what we call "The Hamah Rules." I do not think Asad is going to put up with much more. His words were chilling, "We will not tolerate...." He means it.

The key to success in Libya - fire NATO

2011-04-12T10:37:00.000-07:00

The hand-lettered sign reading "Where Are You NATO - Free Us From Qaddafi" in this New York Times photo by Bryan Denton underscores part of the problem in what has become a stalemate in Libya. The opposition fighters are relying on NATO air power to help them remove entrenched leader Mu'amar al-Qadhafi from power.

It doesn't work that way. Using NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to enforce a no-fly zone over Libya and protect civilians from attacks by government forces as provided for in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 sounds like a good idea, but in reality may not be.

There are two major problems here. First, the UN resolution does not specifically call for the removal of Qadhafi. President Barack Obama also clarified that the removal of Qadhafi is not an objective of American military forces supporting the operation, despite it being a stated U.S. foreign policy objective that Qadhafi must step down.

Without the removal of Qadhafi as an objective of the operation, NATO will be hard-pressed to support the rebels effectively. Technically, NATO pilots are only there to prevent the killing of civilians, not to provide close air support to the opposition. The second problem is that the United States has foregone its traditional leadership role in NATO military operations over and near Libya. (See my earlier piece, Libya and the abdication of leadership.) Without the United States in the lead role, NATO will be hard-pressed to carry out its mission.

Already we are seeing the current situation in Libya described as a stalemate. NATO forces as currently constituted might, and that is not certain, be able to stop Libyan government forces from completely crushing the rebels. Libya may not have effective armed forces, but with their superior firepower and military organization. they are capable of inflicting heavy casualties on the lightly-armed and inexperienced opposition fighters.

Complicating the situation is the demand by the opposition that no foreign forces have "boots on the ground" in Libya. This is short-sighted to say the least. NATO pilots in high-performance aircraft moving at high speeds and maneuvering to avoid any remaining air defenses* often have a hard time distinguishing pro-Qadhafi troops from opposition forces, especially at night when they use night-vision devices. There have been at least two incidents of friendly fire when NATO aircraft have mistakenly attacked opposition forces and killed 12 of their fighters.

The opposition continues to appeal to NATO to increase its air operations against pro-Qadhafi forces, almost to the point of complaining that NATO is not pursuing the operation as aggressively as the initial coalition prior to NATO taking over command and control eight days ago.

That observation is likely true. To expect NATO, basically "war by committee" to act as aggressively as military forces from the United States, United Kingdom and France is unrealistic. Anyone monitoring Malta's air traffic control system that manages the airspace through which most NATO aircraft must transit to and from their operations, would have noticed a significant lessening of military air traffic since NATO assumed command of the operation.

The rebels seem to have found allies for their demands in the governments of the UK and France. Both nations have called on NATO to intensify air strikes against Libyan government forces. NATO responded to the thinly-veiled criticism with an official statement: "NATO is conducting its military operations in Libya with vigor within the current mandate. The pace of the operations is determined by the need to protect the population."

While President Obama may not feel that NATO's operations are insufficient, his allies in London and Paris do. There is a solution if the seemingly timid Obama Administration can be brought on board. Fire NATO.

That's right - fire NATO. Go back to the initial coalition under American command and control. Then contact the opposition leaders and explain how modern air power works. While it can be somewhat effective without eyes on the ground, it is devastating when combined with trained U.S. Air Force combat controllers.

I know, the President has already said that there will not be American boots on the ground. Secretary of Defense Bob Gates has said that there will be no American boots on the ground in Libya as long as he is in office.

The President has a choice to make here. The situation in Libya does not have to be a stalemate. He can continue to cede leadership to NATO, he can cede leadership to his British and French allies, or he can reverse course and take charge. If he cedes leadership to NATO, as he currently has, it is almost certain that there will be a long stalemate. If he cedes leadership to the UK and France, the situation could go either way.

Mr. President, to guarantee that Qadhafi does not kill more of his own people, and to achieve a stated American foreign policy objective of Qadhafi's removal, get back in the fight. Tell Gates to get on board or go back to Texas A&M. Tell the opposition leaders that if they want to end this, cooperate and get some U.S. special operations teams in there to bring serious air power to bear. Deploy more AC-130 gunships and A-10 tank killers; these close air support platforms can shred the Libyan army. It can be over in weeks.

Mr. President, you committed the country to this mission. Now, follow through and get it done. Otherwise, Qadhafi stays in power, and in his eyes and in the eyes of rest of the world, he wins. If he wins, you lose.

______________

* While coalition and NATO aircraft have effectively destroyed Libya's centralized integrated air defense system, there are many surface-to-air missiles and artillery systems organic to Libyan army units in the field still in service.

Iraq bows to Iranian pressure to expel MEK

2011-04-12T08:46:00.000-07:00

In yet another indication of Iran's significant and growing influence over events in Iraq, the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki ordered that the Iranian mujahidin-e khalq (MEK, also known as the People's Mujahidin of Iran, PMOI) opposition group resident at a former military facility, Camp Ashraf, leave the country. At least al-Maliki did not give in to demands from Tehran to repatriate group's members to Iran where most of them would likely face the death penalty.

Since the U.S. invasion, which I supported, and the U.S. government's abysmal conduct, which I criticized, of the aftermath of the removal of Saddam Husayn, Iran has emerged as the primary power broker in the country.

Iran's position as power broker was underscored by the recent formation of an Iraqi coalition government of the Shi'a and the Kurds. These two groups were able to thwart the will of the Iraqi electorate who cast more ballots for secular candidate and former prime minister Iyad 'Alawi, but 'Alawi was never able to form a government thanks to the maneuverings of Nuri al-Maliki, of course backed by Iran.

Nuri al-Maliki is widely regarded as an Iranian stooge; I am in that camp. Many Iraqis refer to him as nuri al-irani, "Nuri the Iranian," and to his office as qali irani, "the Persian rug." To many of us, it appears that he receives his marching orders from Tehran. The decision to expel the MEK from Iraq certainly originated there, and I am willing to bet that the recent deadly attack on Camp Ashraf was not solely al-Maliki's idea. According to the MEK, 34 of its members were killed and over 200 wounded. Then the Iraqis delayed the entrance of American military medical teams to assist the wounded.

You might be tempted to ask, "Just who is in charge?" Unfortunately, the Obama Administration apparently ceded that role to the Iranians. That is what happens when you pursue a policy of established withdrawal dates and a rush to the exit regardless of the situation on the ground. Pull out your troops without an accurate assessment of the security situation and say good bye to influence over events in one of the most important countries in the region. The best the Administration could do is to "urge Iraqi officials at the highest levels to avoid violence and show restraint."

Not surprisingly, the Iranian regime of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad praised the Iraqi raid on the MEK camp. The Iranians have jailed or executed many members of the group in the past, and will not hesitate to do so in the future. The question is where will the group, mostly ethnic Persians, go?

The group has been useful to the United States in the past, and could be again. The MEK/PMOI were key to uncovering Iran's nuclear program; much of the initial intelligence was gathered by MEK sources inside Iran. They have access that can be of use to the United States should the Obama Administration push for regime change in Iran. The MEK has an established, and apparently effective intelligence network inside Iran, and have shown the willingness to conduct lethal operations against regime targets.

Iran has an abysmal record on human rights, has American blood on its hands in Iraq and Afghanistan, and is developing a nuclear weapons capability. Perhaps we should be utilizing the MEK to effect some - as Obama said during the campaign - "change we can believe in."

Libya and the abdication of leadership

2011-04-05T15:59:00.000-07:00

It has been two and a half weeks since the United States and a coalition began military operations in Libya to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973. That resolution authorized all measures to enforce a no-fly zone over the country and protect civilians from the violence in the country. The impetus for that action was the imminent defeat of opposition forces in Benghazi.

First, a comment on the timing of the military action. It was a last minute rescue of the opposition. Had coalition aircraft and missiles not been committed to the battle on March 19, Mu'amar al-Qadhafi's tanks and infantry, supported by artillery and helicopter gunships, would have entered Benghazi and wreaked havoc on the surviving opposition fighters. Additionally, there may have been thousands of casualties among civilians either caught in the crossfire, or deliberately slaughtered by Qadhafi's forces to send a message to those who would oppose his regime.

If America and its allies had not acted on that Saturday, Benghazi could have become Libya's Hamah, and the "Hamah Rules" could have been rewritten as the "Benghazi Rules." I refer to the incident in Syria in 1982 when a group of Islamic fundamentalists attempted to defy the authoritarian government of then-President Hafiz al-Asad (father of the current president). Asad deployed elements of the Syrian army under the command of his ruthless brother Rifa't. Syrian artillery flattened the center of the city and killed upwards of 25,000 people. The Syrian response has become notorious around the world as the Hamah Rules.

Fortunately, the coalition responded on March 19 - and unfortunately the coalition responded on March 19. If there had been decisive American leadership when the rebels were on the move towards Tripoli and a no-fly zone imposed then, I might not be writing this article about the abdication of American leadership. Instead, we might be discussing the possibilities of a post-Qadhafi Libya.

President Obama is to be commended for committing American military forces to the enforcement of the no-fly zone and protection of Libyan civilians. He is not to be commended for taking so long to make the decision. Hundreds, possibly thousands of Libyans died in the interim.

It goes beyond that, however. It appears the President waited for the United Nations resolution and the agreement of European and at least two Arab allies. That in itself is not a bad thing, but it also appeared to be a further abdication of American leadership. Whether the President likes it or not, the United States is a superpower, a superpower with global interests and global commitments. Whether we like it or not, the world looks to us for leadership in times of crises.

I understand the President's reticence to order American forces to attack an Arab or Muslim countries, given our past record in Iraq and Afghanistan, and earlier operations in other places in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Again, in and of itself not a bad thing. Reticence before placing young American men and women in harm's way is a good thing, however, timidity in the face of adversity is not.

This was one case, maybe the only one we'll see for years to come, in which there was Arab sanction for military action. It was the Arab League that called for the imposition of a no-fly zone over a fellow Arab country, an unprecedented action, knowing full well that the enforcement of a no-fly zone would begin with lethal attacks on the Libyan air defense system.

It was almost what some would call a cry for American leadership. Here was the opportunity to protect Libyan civilians, and hopefully achieve another American policy goal, the removal of Mu'amar al-Qadhafi from power, all with Arab League support. Yet the President chose to deliberately downplay the contribution of American armed forces, couching it in terms of "unique capabilities" and support.

The reality of the initial coalition, and the reality of NATO* that is now in charge of the operation, is that without the United States military, it does not function. Without the American contribution, there would have been only an ineffectual operation. In addition to massive firepower delivered by American aircraft and missiles, the percentage of aerial refueling, airborne command and control, reconnaissance, intelligence and surveillance was overwhelmingly American.

If the intent of downplaying the American role was to convince the Arab nations that this was not another case of the United States trying to interfere in the Middle East, it failed. The Arabs know who is shouldering the load. In this case, we should be claiming that role. It also appeared that the President could not wait to turn command and control of the operation over to NATO, although much of the effort and almost all of the support would still be done by American forces.

Some gratuitous advice:

- Mr. Obama, as you often remind us, you are the President of the United States of America. You are the Commander in Chief of the most powerful military force on the planet. The American people have spent trillions of dollars and invested their most valuable resource, their sons and daughters, to provide you that capability.

- To many people, as President, you are the leader of the free world. They look to you for leadership in these types of crisis. It may not be what you had in mind when you decided to run for the office, but we all play the cards we are dealt. You should not abdicate your leadership role. The rest of the world, and in this case, the Arab world, is counting on you.

- Get back in the fight. NATO cannot do this with the United States sitting in the sidelines "in case they are needed." They are needed. One only need look at the setbacks handed to the Libyan opposition since you decided to sit it out. Only the American armed forces have the specialized and advanced weapons systems to get this done.

- You are the President, you are the Commander in Chief. Act like it.

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* NATO is the acronym for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, not as those of us unfortunate as having had to deal with them referred to them - Not After Two O'clock.

Bashar al-Asad's attempts to placate the Syrians

2011-03-29T11:09:00.000-07:00

Syria's President Bashar al-Asad has been in power for over ten years. He has survived numerous political crises, but nothing compared to what appears to be the beginnings of a popular uprising no doubt fueled by revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, and a host of uprisings across the Arab world. Demonstrations in Yemen, Jordan and Saudi Arabia were met with promises of reform and increased government salaries, an attempt to placate the population and maintain the leaders' grips on power.

Syria has a different tactic - the use of heavily armed police, internal security and military units to break up peaceful demonstrations. It was only a day after the initial protests broke out in the southern Syrian city of Dara' that special regime security troops were helicoptered to the city where they brutally stopped the protests with lethal force. Although it is difficult to obtain reliable information on just how many protesters were killed, the numbers may be in the hundreds.

Having seen what happened in other Arab countries over the past months, al-Asad thought he might try the carrot approach after using the stick. His spokesperson, the polished Dr. Butaynah Sha'ban* claimed that the Syrian president had ordered that a committee be established to talk to "our brothers in Dara'" and bring to justice those officials responsible for killing protesters. She continued that the al-Asad government would raise wages, reform the health care system, open election to more political parties, fight corruption and relax tight restrictions on the media.

The claim that action would be taken against those responsible for killing protesters is disingenuous. They were no doubt acting on orders coming directly from the Presidential office. The troops who were dispatched by helicopter were what we at the embassy called "regime protection units."

There are two separate units charged with regime protection, both based in Damascus, but completely separate organizations to make sure the other is not a threat to the regime it is charged to protect. These units do not normally deploy outside Damascus since that is the seat of government and the likely venue for a coup attempt. When they deployed to Dara', they did so with Presidential authority and direction.

The Syrians have a history with handling demonstrators - that history is not lost on the population. In one defining event, the Syrians learned what their government will tolerate and what it will not. It was in 1982 in the northern city of Hamah, the fourth largest city in the country. The Muslim Brotherhood had decided to defy the Syrian government. President Hafiz al-Asad deployed elements of the Syrian army under the command of his ruthless brother Rifa't. Syrian artillery flattened the center of the city and killed upwards of 25,000 people. The Syrian response has become notorious around the world as "The Hamah Rules.

The Syrians learned the rules. Up until now, they really haven't broken the rules. Occasionally, though, in the early and mid-1990's we would hear gunshots in Damascus. Being the inquisitive military attache that I was, I would try to find the source of the gunfire. More often than not, it was a group of Muslim Brotherhood fighters holed up in a house. After a few cursory shots of return fire, the Syrian internal security forces would set the house on fire. I asked one of the officers why they resorted to such drastic action so quickly. He explained that the ikhwan ("brothers") will not surrender, they had to be killed.

It is that history that causes many Middle East observers to be surprised at the tenacity and courage of the protesters. it should have come as no surprise that at the first hint of an uprising, the al-Asad regime put soldiers from its protection units on the streets of Dara' with obvious orders to use whatever force was necessary to put an end to the demonstrations.

It did not. Within days, there were more protests in Dara', but also in the northern coastal city of Latakia, close to the al-Asad family home city of al-Qardahah. Troops were dispatched to both cities and demonstrators were killed.

Al-Asad knew he had to do something to halt the momentum of the protesters. He did two things - he fired his cabinet and orchestrated massive pro-government demonstrations in Damascus.

The Syrian government is good at putting on massive demonstrations comprising hundreds of thousands of people in the street. I was in Damascus when Bashar's late older brother and then-heir apparent was killed in an automobile accident. The Syrians organized huge demonstrations by mobilizing unions and trade organizations - you can do that in a socialist country. A doctor friend was told at work that he was to be present for the doctors' union "spontaneous outpouring of grief" at at specific time and place. What you are seeing on Syrian television is just more of the same organized propaganda.

Firing the cabinet is just another meaningless machination. None of the ministers have any actual power - they do what Bashar al-Asad tells them to do. He will merely replace this batch of yes-men (and women) with a new batch. Nothing will change.

For the Syrian government to react the way it has indicates to me that al-Asad is concerned that at some point his forces, be they police, internal security or military, might well follow the lead of Egyptian military and refuse to act against the civilian population. Or he might fear that the civilian population will continue to rise up as the Libyans have. In any case, he's probably not sleeping well.

______________________

* I say "the polished Dr. Butaynah Sha'ban" for a reason. She holds a minister-level position as the Political and Media Advisor for the Office of the Presidency. She has a Ph.D in English literature and is attractive and charming. She is perfect for the job. I know her from the time when I was the Air Attache at the U.S. Embassy in Damascus and she was the presidential interpreter; I worked with her on several occasions.

Amateur Hour at the White House - Take 2

2011-03-24T19:51:00.001-07:00

CAVEAT: If you think the President is handling the Libya crisis well, you may find these comments offensive yet enlightening.

I have tried to understand why President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton seem to ignore every principle of foreign policy taught at leading international relations schools and military institutions, not just in this country but around the world. I might give Mrs. Clinton a pass since she may be in the position of having to represent an ill-conceived position as she works for the President. Then again, if she does not agree with the Obama policy, she can resign - it merely takes a phone call and she doesn't need the money.

Where do I start? I was astounded by the earlier bifurcation of the President's policy and his military strategy. As I said in a previous article, any graduate of our professional military education institutions understands that military power and its application is but one component, one tool of foreign policy, just as is diplomacy. Both are used to advance foreign policy objectives. Stated another way, diplomacy and military power are both used to achieve foreign policy goals.

Applying that theory to reality, President Obama has stated that U.S. policy is the removal of Mu'amar al-Qadhafi from power. The President has made that clear (he is big on clarity) on more than one occasion. If that is the goal, then American diplomacy should be geared toward that. If diplomacy fails, the President also has the military option to achieve that aim.

Inexplicably, that did not happen. The President, for reasons that most of us cannot understand, has separated foreign policy goals from its components. When he articulated the reasons the United States supported the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, the President stated that although it was U.S. policy to support the removal of Qadhafi from power, the use of force under the resolution was not to achieve that goal. If you are not using military force to achieve a stated policy objective, why are you placing young American men and women in harm's way? That is inexcusable.

That said, perhaps the most egregious failure to grasp the realities of what is happening in Libya is the bifurcation of the military operation. Since the beginning of the military campaign on March 19, Obama has tried to downplay the leading role of the U.S. armed forces and was looking for a way to pass off leadership to another entity, in this case NATO.

That's okay in and of itself, but it was the convoluted agreement reached by the leaders of the NATO nations that is dangerous and confusing. NATO works on a consensus basis - all 28 nations must agree. In its haste to transfer leadership, the Obama Administration violated one of the key precepts of military operations - unity of command. What Obama and Clinton agreed to comes as a shock to any professional military officer.

Under what I will call the "Obama Abdication," the President agreed to cede command and control of the no-fly zone enforcement portion of UNSCR 1973 to NATO, but retains (via the U.S. Africa Command) responsibility for the portion of the resolution that applies to the protection of Libyan citizens from the brutality of the Qadhafi regime.

This is a formula for disaster. NATO forces operating under one chain of command will enforce the no-fly zone, while at the same time in the same air space American forces, possibly with other allies, in a separate chain of command will enforce the protection of civilians portion of the resolution.

Two command structures in the same space at the same time? This is dangerous work under ideal circumstances. There will be young men and women operating high-performance lethal weapons systems in close proximity against one enemy who has, through no machinations of its own, retained a key tenet of military operations - unity of command. There needs to be one commander focused on one set of military goals. Today's agreement does not do that.

It is obvious that the two-tier agreement took some arm twisting, otherwise Mrs. Clinton would have been on time for her announcement, rather than spending time on the phone begging and cajoling her counterparts at the last minute. This is probably the best she could do in an attempt to execute the wishes of the President to abdicate leadership of the operation.

The fact that the President of the United States and the Secretary of State agreed to ignore a basic military concept underscores their lack of understanding of the military option. Neither one of them have the background or experience to be making these decisions. What they did today is dangerous for our troops and our country.

Mr. Obama, the next time the phone rings at 3:00am, please don't answer it. The caller will understand - you can explain that you were appearing with Ted Mack on Amateur Hour.

Mr. Obama - please define our mission in Libya

2011-03-21T17:25:00.000-07:00

We are not yet three days into Operation Odyssey Dawn, the United Nations mandated enforcement of a no-fly zone over Libya to prevent the forces of Mu'amar al-Qadhafi from killing Libyan civilians. Already there are issues with a clear definition of our mission. What exactly are we, the United States, hoping to accomplish?

First, to borrow a phrase from the President, let me be clear. I support the imposition of a no-fly zone over Libya. I called for it weeks ago. I am also on record stating that in the absence of a no-fly zone, the Libyan rebellion would have failed and Qadhafi would remain in power. I defended Director of National Intelligence Jim Clapper when he made that same assessment in a Congressional hearing.

My reasons for supporting a no-fly zone were also clear: to give the rebellion a chance to succeed. Three weeks ago, the imposition of a no-fly zone may have led to the overthrow of the Qadhafi regime. Military units and government officials were defecting on a daily basis. As President Obama "dithered" and equivocated on why not to push for action, the momentum of the rebellion stalled and Qadhafi regrouped. By the time the United Nations, moving glacially as usual, got its act together, the no-fly zone was necessary to prevent wholesale slaughter in the remaining rebel stronghold of Benghazi.

Since the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1973, there seems to be confusion in the Obama administration about what we are trying to accomplish. Most of us Middle East specialists took the President and Secretary of State Clinton at their word: Qadhafi must go. They both said it; I assume they meant it. When the President and Secretary rallied the Europeans and the United Nations to unite against what was happening in Libya, I thought they were being true to their word. When the President of the United States and his chief foreign policy architect advocate regime change, it stands to reason that subsequent diplomatic and military action is in support of that policy.

Yet today in Chile, the President sought to bifurcate the ongoing military operation from American policy. According to his remarks, American policy was that Qadhafi no longer had legitimacy and needed to go, but that the objective of Operation Odyssey Dawn was to protect Libyan civilians from Qadhafi's forces.

What we have here, as my wife describes it, is "it's 'Amateur Hour' at the White House." Policy and actions should not be separate issues. Policy drives the actions and operations. Committing American military power to an operation that is not in line with stated policy is ludicrous. We have sent hundreds of young American airmen, sailors and Marines into harm's way, so why are they not operating toward the achievement of our stated policy goals?

Do I not recall Mrs. Clinton telling us she was "ready on day one" to lead the country? Here we are over two years into this administration and they still don't get it. When you order American armed forces into action, you need to delineate the mission. As graduates of any of our command and staff or war colleges know, military force is an element of foreign policy, just as diplomacy is. The standard phrase in the military about the application of military power is "when diplomacy fails."

Here is the dilemma. We have now engineered a United Nations resolution authorizing "all available means" to prevent Qadhafi's forces from killing civilians. Nowhere in that resolution is authorization for the removal of the Qadhafi regime from power. So, Mr. President, just what would you have General Carter Ham, commander of the U.S. Africa Command, do? Shall he merely prevent loss of civilian life, or shall he maneuver forces for the removal of the regime?

If this was an American foreign policy issue, the answer is obvious. Apply the military force in a manner that destroys the centers of gravity of the regime while ensuring that pro-Qadhafi forces cannot attack rebel forces or civilian populations. Oh yeah, you might want to make sure Qadhafi does not try to torch the oil fields like Saddam Husayn did in 1991.

You see where this is going. There is no clear mandate from the President. The American military will do whatever you order them to do. Trust me, the armed forces are capable of that, but you have to articulate what you want them to do. Thus far, it's too ambiguous.

The bifurcation of policy and mandate is a recipe for disaster. When the civilian population and the rebels are safe from the Qadhafi regime but the regime is still firmly in power, there will be a stalemate. What then?

Be the commander in chief - issue the orders that execute American policy as you have defined it. You cannot have it both ways.

Welcome to the real world.